

Rational Theology
in Interfaith
Communication
*Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī's
Muʿtazilī Theology
among the Karaites
in the Fāṭimid Age*

By Wilferd Madelung and
Sabine Schmidtke

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PREFACE

Rational speculative theology (*kalām*) in early Islam was represented most distinctly by the theological school of the Muʿtazila. Founded in Basra in the early 8th century, the school soon became predominant in theological scholarship and discourse and remained so, in spite of the rise of rival, less rationalist schools, until the early 11th century. The Muʿtazila held that the basic truths of theology, such as the existence of God and the nature of His attributes and justice, are entirely subject to rational proof without the benefit of scriptural revelation. Only after these basic truths have been established can the veracity of scripture be proved by reason, and the primacy of reason must also be maintained in the interpretation of scripture.

Muʿtazilī theology naturally appealed to rationally inclined theologians of other scriptural religions and provided a suitable basis for inter-faith communication in the Islamic world. In Judaism Muʿtazilī thought was adopted to varying degrees from the 9th century on. In the 10th century the Basran school of the Muʿtazila gained ascendancy over the school of Baghdad and elaborated novel systematic thought based on the teaching first of Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī (d. 916) and then of his son Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī (d. 933), who often deviated to some extent from the views of his father. The center of the school now moved to the ʿAbbāsid capital Baghdad where Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Baṣrī (d. 980) attracted a large following. Muʿtazilī scholarship was favoured by the Būyid authorities ruling in Iraq and western Persia. The Būyid vizier al-Šāhib b. ʿAbbād in particular in his religious policy promoted Muʿtazilī and Shīʿī doctrine. When he appointed ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Asadābādī, the most gifted of Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Baṣrī's pupils, chief judge (*qāḍī l-quḍāt*) in Rayy in 977, that city in western Persia became the flourishing center of Muʿtazilī scholarship.

Muʿtazilī influence on Jewish theologians also reached a peak during this century. Among the Rabbanite Jewish mainstream several heads of the ancient Academies (Yeshivot) in Iraq adopted Muʿtazilī thought. One of them, Samuel ben Hofni Gaon (d. 1013) had direct contacts with Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Baṣrī in Baghdad. Even more evident was the impact of Muʿtazilī theological and legal thought among the Karaites, a sect that had arisen in the 8th century in Persia and was first marked

by strong ascetic tendencies, but now particularly inclined to rationalist religious thought. The Karaite Yūsuf al-Baṣīr (d. ca. 1040) brought the theological teaching of Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār from Iraq to Jerusalem in Fatimid territory and adopted and defended it in his own writings, including his comprehensive summaries of theology *Kitāb al-Tamyīz* and *Kitāb al-Muḥtawī*.

The Mu‘tazilī world view and rational theology was at this time facing increasing competition and criticism from philosophy of Greek origin, which claimed to provide the only scientific world view based on cogent logical demonstration independent of religious beliefs. Study of the philosophical sciences was mostly shunned in religious scholarship, but was an integral part of the education of the medical profession. Among Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s disciples in Rayy was for some time a young physician trained in the philosophical sciences, Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 1044), who challenged some of his teaching in his lectures and went on to compose a massive critical review of the arguments and proofs used in *kalām*. Most of ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s students were scandalized by this criticism of their teacher and accused Abu l-Ḥusayn of seeking to undermine essential school doctrine and concealing heretical philosophical views. His theological works were generally ignored among the Mu‘tazila and handed down among students of medicine. Only a century later his teaching was revived and espoused by the Mu‘tazilī scholar Maḥmūd b. al-Malāḥimī in Khorezm in Central Asia and gained recognition as a school of Mu‘tazilī theology.

The present study presents evidence that Abu l-Ḥusayn’s theology was immediately registered and controversially debated in the Karaite community under the Fatimid caliphate. Yūsuf al-Baṣīr explicitly defended the views of Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār and vigorously attacked Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī in a treatise, arguing that his views destroyed the rational proof for the existence of God. Abu l-Ḥusayn’s teaching was upheld and advocated from the middle of the 11th century, a half century before Ibn al-Malāḥimī, by the Karaite Sahl b. al-Faḍl (Yashar ben Hesed) al-Tustarī in Egypt. Sahl al-Tustarī not only criticized the conceptual principles of the school of ‘Abd al-Jabbār which had been upheld by Yūsuf al-Baṣīr, but also refuted philosophical doctrine on existence, as entailed by Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, on the basis of Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s teaching.

The study is based on source material preserved in Genizahs and now dispersed in libraries around the world. Our thanks are due first to David Sklare of the Ben Tzvi Institute and the Institute of Microfilmed

Hebrew Manuscripts at the Jewish National and University Library in Jerusalem for having drawn our attention to the extant fragment of Yūsuf al-Baṣīr's refutation of Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. We also wish to express our thanks to the authorities of the Russian National Library, St. Petersburg, for granting us liberal access to the manuscripts of the Firkovitch Collection for research and permitting the publication of facsimile editions of manuscript material, and to the British Library, London, for permitting the use of ms. Or 2572 and publication of facsimiles of parts of it here. We also thank the Fritz Thyssen Foundation for financially supporting this publication, as well as the Institute for Advanced Studies at the Hebrew University Jerusalem where part of the research was carried out. Finally we would like to thank Guy Stroumsa and David Shulman for accepting the publication of this study in the series Jerusalem Studies in Religion and Culture.

INTRODUCTION

Mu'tazilī *kalām* theology flourished under the Shī'ī reign of the Būyids in Iraq and western Persia during the 4th/10th and early 5th/11th centuries. The Būyid vizier al-Šāhib b. 'Abbād in particular favoured and promoted Mu'tazilī and Shī'ī teaching in his religious policy. In 367/977 he appointed the Shāfi'ī Ash'arī convert to the Mu'tazila 'Abd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad al-Asadābādī chief judge (*qāḍī l-quḍāt*) in Rayy where the latter taught until his death in 415/1024-25. Representing the Baṣran school of the Mu'tazila, also known as the Bahshamiyya, Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār was commonly recognized as the foremost *kalām* theologian of his time, attracting numerous gifted and devoted disciples. He and his pupils composed the authoritative works of the later Mu'tazila.

Among 'Abd al-Jabbār's students in Rayy was a physician originally from Baṣra, Abu l-Ḥusayn Muḥammad b. 'Alī b. al-Ṭayyib al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1045). Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī belonged to the Ḥanafī legal school and was probably brought up on a Mu'tazilī creed. He then went to Baghdad to prepare for a medical career which involved him with the study of the philosophical sciences. When he attached himself as a student of *kalām* to Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār, he questioned and criticized some of the views of his teacher in his lectures. While 'Abd al-Jabbār seems to have received his critical comments with equanimity, most of his other pupils were scandalized by Abu l-Ḥusayn's temerity and suspected his motives in criticizing their revered master. Writing two generations after Abu l-Ḥusayn, al-Ḥākim al-Jushamī (d. 494/1101), the continuator of Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār's *Ṭabaqāt al-Mu'tazila*, reports that Abu l-Ḥusayn was ostracized by his Mu'tazilī colleagues for having soiled himself by his involvement with philosophy and for employing improper arguments.¹ He evidently soon returned to Baghdad where he set forth his opinions on theology and legal methodology in writing and teaching besides practicing medicine. While his views were generally ignored in the later Bahshamiyya school, he eventually came to be recognized as the founder of the last school of Mu'tazilī thought.

¹ Ibn al-Murtaḍā, *Ṭabaqāt al-Mu'tazila*, ed. S. Diwald-Wilzer, Wiesbaden 1961, p. 119.

The later Mu'tazilī sources provide little information about the specific points of Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī's criticism of traditional Bahshamī doctrine that aroused such sharp reaction in the school. Some light is thrown on the early controversy, however, in a polemical refutation of Abu l-Ḥusayn's proof for the existence of God by the contemporary Jewish Karaite theologian Abū Ya'qūb Yūsuf al-Baṣrī (d. ca. 431/1040).² Jewish theological and legal thought had long been open to influences of Mu'tazilī *kalām*. With the rise of the Bahshamiyya school to public prominence in Baghdad in the 4th/10th century, some Jewish scholars in Iraq closely associated with its teaching. Among the Rabbanites, Samuel b. Ḥofnī Gaon (d. 404/1013), head of the Yeshivah of Sura in Baghdad was perhaps the first to openly adopt Bahshamī *kalām* in his writings.³ The Karaite Yūsuf al-Baṣrī, a younger contemporary of Samuel b. Ḥofnī, probably also acquired his knowledge of Mu'tazilī *kalām* in Iraq and brought it with him to Jerusalem,⁴ where he became the leading Karaite theologian and authoritative writer in the early decades of the 5th/11th century. In any case, al-Baṣrī is well known as a vigorous supporter of the theological teaching of Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār. It is from the Bahshamī perspective of the disciples of 'Abd al-Jabbār that he defends the traditional Mu'tazilī proof for the existence of God against the arguments of Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, highlighting the absurd consequences that, he asserts, follow from them.

Yūsuf al-Baṣrī's refutation is partly preserved in the Geniza fragment of a manuscript in the Abraham Firkovitch collection in St. Petersburg (Russian National Library) edited and translated here.⁵ The manuscript

² See Z. Ankori, "Ibn al-Hīt and the Chronology of Joseph al-Baṣrī," in *Journal of Jewish Studies*, VIII (1957), pp. 71–81.

³ See the study by David Sklare, *Samel Ben Hofni and his Cultural World: Texts and Studies*, Leiden 1996.

⁴ See David Sklare, "Yūsuf al-Baṣrī: Theological Aspects of his Halakhic Works", in D. Frank (ed.), *The Jews of Medieval Islam: Community, Society, and Identity*, Leiden 1995, p. 252, n. 12.

⁵ II Firk. Yevr.-Arab. I 3118. A microfilm copy of the manuscript is available at the Institute of Microfilmed Hebrew Manuscripts at the Jewish National and University Library in Jerusalem. The manuscript of the fragment, written in Hebrew characters and transcribed here in Arabic letters, is generally clearly written and, as far as the text is preserved, well legible. There is evidence that the text was copied from an Arabic original. The faulty reading of *ḥakāhā* for *khatta'ahā* (fol. 6a) thus is easily explained by the graphics of an Arabic original. The text as transcribed from the microfilm copy in Jerusalem has been found reliable on collation with the fragment preserved in St. Petersburg.

consists of 16 folios of a treatise whose title is unknown. It probably comprised ten chapters (*faṣl*) of which the first four are lost except for a few words ending the fourth chapter. Chapter ten is incomplete at the end, and at least one folio is missing in chapter eight. The author of the treatise is not named in the extant text, but can be safely identified, especially by his reference to his own *Kiṭāb al-Tamyīz*.⁶

The key issue in the dispute is set forth at the beginning of chapter five which is entitled “Concerning the impossibility of knowing the temporality of the body and of proving the existence of the Creator while upholding the negation of accidents, even though it has been reported of some upholders of that view that they maintain the eternity of the body.” In the first four chapters, al-Baṣīr apparently had presented four indications (*dalāla*) for the reality of accidents (*aʿrād*) as conceived by the *kalām* theologians.⁷ Al-Baṣīr goes on to summarize the traditional Muʿtazilī proof for the existence of God. He explains that the purpose in establishing the reality of accidents is to prove the temporality of the body, since bodies cannot exist without accidents, and the mind judges that whatever cannot exist without the presence of something temporal must equally be temporal. The next step is to demonstrate that those accidents that are produced by us human beings are in need of us for their origination (*hudūth*). Similarly the body (which we are unable to produce) must be in need of an agent for its origination. Al-Baṣīr insists that whoever deviates from this proof is unable to demonstrate the unicity and justice of God. Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, however, doubted these facts and composed a book entitled *Taṣaffuḥ al-adilla*, the *Scrutiny of the Proofs*,⁸ for which the *kalām* theologians charged him with unbelief. He now claimed that even though the traditional proofs used by the

⁶ Fol. 4b.

⁷ In the tenth chapter (fol. 16b) the author refers to the fourth indication mentioned in the book, which asserted the impossibility of distinguishing between light and heavy bodies without acknowledging the reality of accidents. In what remains of the end of the fourth chapter there is word of “the states of heavy bodies.” The fourth indication thus was probably discussed in that chapter, while the other three indications may have been treated in the previous chapters.

⁸ Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s *K. Taṣaffuḥ al-adilla* is extensively quoted by Ibn al-Malāḥimī in his *K. al-Muʿtamad fī uṣūl al-dīn* (ed. M. McDermott and W. Madelung, London 1991). Ibn al-Malāḥimī states (p. 492) that Abu l-Ḥusayn left it unfinished at his death. From al-Baṣīr’s account it is evident that some version of parts of it was published early in Abu l-Ḥusayn’s career. It is possible that later in his life he revised it and was hoping to complete it.

theologians were false, there were others of which they were unaware, and he composed a work (*taṣnīf*) about his principles. This book is not named by al-Baṣīr, but is most likely to be identified as his *K. Ghurar al-adilla*, the *Best of Proofs*. Al-Baṣīr notes that he had refuted it and refers the reader repeatedly to this earlier *Refutation (Naqd)*.⁹ He asserts that Abu l-Ḥusayn's new book was not based on his real principles. Rather, Abu l-Ḥusayn in his expressions feigned agreement with the theologians and concealed his true views. Al-Baṣīr promises to uncover these facts and to prove that Abu l-Ḥusayn in reality obstructed the path to knowledge of the existence of the Creator.

Abu l-Ḥusayn's proof for the existence of the Creator is mentioned only summarily by al-Baṣīr. Abu l-Ḥusayn, he states, built his proof on the contingency (*jawāz*) of the body which occurs despite the possibility that it not occur. Its occurrence thus required an agent (*fā'il*).¹⁰ Al-Baṣīr objects with the question as to why the body should not occur by necessity (rather than the free choice of the Creator), since Abu l-Ḥusayn explained God's power to act by His special essence (*dhāt makhṣūsa*). He ignores Abu l-Ḥusayn's lengthy argument that the producer of the body must indeed be a freely choosing agent rather than a necessitating cause.¹¹ Al-Baṣīr here evidently seeks to associate Abu l-Ḥusayn with the Muslim philosophers, who also argued on the basis of contingency for the existence of a Necessary Being, but viewed this Necessary Being as a necessitating cause, not a freely choosing Creator. For them the material world, though not the individual bodies, was inevitably coeternal with God. Al-Baṣīr presumably had them in mind when he noted in the title of the fifth chapter that some deniers of accidents upheld the eternity of the body. He does not mention the contemporary

⁹ A fragment of al-Baṣīr's *Refutation* has recently been found and identified by Gregor Schwarb in RNL Firk. Yevr.-Arab. I 3100 (10 folios).

¹⁰ Fol. 3. Abu l-Ḥusayn's proof is more fully described by Ibn al-Malāḥimī in his *K. al-Mu'tamad* (esp. pp. 167-72). The significant contribution made by Abu l-Ḥusayn to the development of the proof of the existence of God in *kalām* theology has not yet been appreciated in modern scholarship. In his book on the *Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy*, H. Davidson does not mention him at all. He describes the Ash'arī theologian al-Juwaynī as the major reviser of the traditional *kalām* proof. Al-Juwaynī's proof, however, can be seen to depend directly on that of Abu l-Ḥusayn. See W. Madelung, "Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣīr's proof of the existence of God." In: *Arabic Theology, Arabic Philosophy, from the Many to the One. Essays in Celebration of Richard M. Frank*. Ed. James Montgomery. Leuven (forthcoming).

¹¹ See Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *al-Mu'tamad*, pp. 167-9.

Avicenna, but must certainly have been aware of his teaching. Abu l-Ḥusayn was thoroughly familiar with contemporary philosophy and adopted philosophical concepts, such as contingency versus necessity, in his criticism of the prevalent Baṣran Muʿtazilī thought. He backed, however, the fundamentals of Muʿtazilī theology and theodicy, including recognition of both man and God as freely choosing agents. There is no reason to doubt his sincerity in upholding the Muʿtazilī position here against that of the Neoplatonizing Muslim philosophers. His aim in criticising Muʿtazilī concepts and argumentation was not to discredit the Muʿtazila, but to make their fundamental creed more defensible on rational grounds.

Accidents as conceived by the Muʿtazilī theologians were certain categories of immaterial beings, such as colours, sounds, pains and spatial states (*akwān*), which normally could exist only inhering in a material substrate, a body. Although dependent in existence on the body, they possessed a separate reality, independent of it. Yūsuf al-Baṣīr insists that they, like bodies, are *dhawāt*, individual essences or entities. As such they were, according to Muʿtazilī doctrine, stable (*thābit*) and unchangeable in their state of non-existence and could be known before their existence. For their origination or occurrence (*ḥudūth*), the attribute of existence (*ṣifat al-wujūd*) had to be added to their stable essence. Some accidents, especially the *akwān*,¹² i.e. motion and rest, composition and separation, can be given existence by human beings with their limited capacity (*qudra*). By analogy we can infer that all other accidents and bodies must be produced by a Creator with unlimited power. The basis for this analogy is, as al-Baṣīr explains, our recognition that accidents and bodies all are different essences (*dhawāt mukhtalifa*).

For Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣīr, on the other hand, these accidents were merely attributes (*ṣifāt*) and changeable characteristics (*aḥkām*) of bodies, not independent essences. Existence was inseparable from essence, no attribute that could be added to a previously stable essence. Creation thus meant producing essences themselves. Humans were able to affect existing bodies, but not to produce them. There was thus little basis for an analogy between man's freely choosing activity and God's creation of the world. Abu l-Ḥusayn's proof of the existence of the Creator dispensed with the traditional analogy between the witnessed

¹² About the Bahshamī concept of *akwān* see R.M. Frank, *Beings and Their Attributes*, Albany 1978, pp. 95–104.

world and the unseen (*al-shāhid wa l-ghā'ib*). He deduced it directly from the contingency of the world, i.e., the body's inherent possibility to exist or not to exist which required an external agent to bring it into existence.

Al-Baṣīr contends that this argument is not valid on Abu l-Ḥusayn's principles. As he had already explained in his earlier *Refutation (naqd)* of Abu l-Ḥusayn's views, the occurrence of a thing when it is possible for it not to occur requires the affirmation of an external specifier (*mukhaṣṣiṣ*) only if the circumstances are equal (*wa l-hāl wāḥida*). Thus when a body moves while it possible for it not to move, there must inevitably be a specifier, who was identified by the opponent as an agent. By equality of circumstances in this case was meant the body's occupation of space (*taḥayyuz*) and all other attributes. If the circumstances were unequal, however, why should the thing not occur by a cause (*'illa*) rather than an agent?

Al-Baṣīr acknowledges that he himself had employed the same argument as Abu l-Ḥusayn in his *Kitāb al-Tamyīz* to demonstrate that the body is in need of an agent for its occurrence while it is possible for it not to occur, and the Qāḍī al-Labbād, a prominent disciple of 'Abd al-Jabbār, had also used this method. The argument from contingency was evidently still unfamiliar in *kalām* theology for al-Baṣīr and al-Labbād first to use it. Al-Baṣīr explains that its legitimate use here depended on affirmation of different essences such as sounds, pains, *akwān* and composition of which we know that we are able to produce them. The stability of the essence in its state of non-existence (*kawn al-dhāt ma'dūmatan*) makes its occurrence possible while it was also possible for it to remain unchanged in that state. In its need for a specifier, it thus parallels the occupation of space by a substance (*jawhar*) which makes motion and rest possible. Abu l-Ḥusayn, however, asserts that essences are innovated (*tajaddud*) at the time of their coming into existence. Their circumstances are thus unequal before and after origination, and the need for an agent cannot legitimately be claimed by him.

Al-Baṣīr's argumentation is tenuous here. The occupation of space by the body is obviously a precondition for its movement, but without it a cause could not move it any more than a freely choosing agent. It could plausibly be argued that knowledge of a thing is necessary before its production by an agent. The Mu'tazila responded to this necessity with their thesis that essences are stable in their state of non-existence, a doctrine often denounced by their opponents as entailing the eternity of the world. Yet by his assertion that essences themselves are "innovated"

at the time of their coming into existence, Abu l-Ḥusayn surely did not deny the possibility of foreknowledge of them. His claim that creation of the temporal world required an agent thus was as legitimate as that put forward now by al-Baṣīr and the Qāḍī al-Labbād.

The remaining chapters elaborate on the unacceptable consequences of Abu l-Ḥusayn's denial of the reality of accidents and his assertion that essences are produced by the Creator. Al-Baṣīr's arguments here reflect the method of *ilzām* as commonly employed in *kalām* debate, the deduction of unintended and absurd conclusions from the principles of the opponent. In chapter six he argues that an analogy between the human agent and the divine Creator is impossible for Abu l-Ḥusayn since the human agent according to him is capable only of producing attributes in existing essences, but not essences. There is thus no basis for comparing their acts. Moreover, any proof of causation (*ta'tīl*) requires recognition of essences which are the cause of attributes in other essences. Since Abu l-Ḥusayn does not acknowledge such essences, he is unable to prove the need of the body for a producer (*muḥdith*) on the basis of causality.

In chapter seven al-Baṣīr argues that Abu l-Ḥusayn is unable to prove that only God can be the Creator of bodies since he does not acknowledge any attribute of power and the distinction between the essential attribute of power in God and the accidental, limited power in man. For Abu l-Ḥusayn God's ability to act is entailed by His special essence and man's by his physical structure (*bīnya*). Why should it not be possible for humans to have a structure enabling them to produce bodies including their own children? Why should snakes and lions not be produced by the devil and the world by an angel?

In chapter eight al-Baṣīr seeks to demonstrate that the upholders of Abu l-Ḥusayn's views are compelled to admit the possibility that God turn Himself into a sound, colour, taste or body, as the Nuṣayrīs claim, or that He may unite with a human body, as the Christians believe. When they witness someone performing miraculous acts, however harmful these may be, they cannot be sure that the person is not God who has transformed Himself into this human shape. They are thus just like the Sufis and must accept that person's claim of deserving worship. All this follows from their view that essences can be produced by an agent. God thus must be able to change His own essence as He sees fit.

The ninth chapter asserts the inability of the followers of Abu l-Ḥusayn to negate evil on the part of God. Proof that God does not

do any evil, al-Baṣīr explains, depends on deduction of a cause and extending (*tard*) it to similar cases. In accordance with Muʿtazilī doctrine, he argues that among humans the reason for not committing evil is their knowledge of the evil and self-sufficiency (*ghinā*), i.e. lack of need to derive benefit from it. This cause can by analogy be extended to the unseen. Abu l-Ḥusayn's principles, however, do not allow the deduction of causes and their extension by analogy. His followers thus must admit that there is nothing to prevent God from doing evil.

In chapter ten al-Baṣīr argues that Abu l-Ḥusayn is unable to prove the singleness of God and must admit that He may have partners capable of doing the same acts as He. The proof for the singleness of God, he affirms, must be based on His being powerful and willing (*murīd*), all other proofs are futile. Since Abu l-Ḥusayn does not uphold God's being willing, he is unable to argue that a single object of capability cannot be shared by two powerful beings. The common proof of the singleness of God by the mutual prevention (*tamānuʿ*) of two almighty beings is thus closed to him. He must even admit the possibility of two eternal agents, one being light and the other darkness, as the dualists believe. A second proof, by the impossibility of distinguishing between two eternal beings with the same attributes, is equally unavailable to him because of his denial of accidents. From all this, al-Baṣīr concludes, it is evident that the followers of Abu l-Ḥusayn are unable to prove any point of the sciences of Unicity and Justice, the Muʿtazilī creed.

II

In the present treatise, Yūsuf al-Baṣīr appears seriously concerned about the threat posed by Abu l-Ḥusayn's criticism to the principles of his Bahshamī theological thought. This concern evidently was not only momentary. Already earlier he had, as he mentions, written a *Refutation* (*Naqd*) of the new doctrine put forward by the critic. He further refers to his *Responsa* to questions he had received from Tinnīs in Egypt in which he dealt with a point raised by the controversy around the new school of thought.¹³ In his *Kitāb al-Muḥtawī*, a late sum of his theology, he mentions the titles of three treatises which also seem to be related

¹³ Fol. 11b with n 22 (translation).

to the controversy: *Aḥwāl al-fā'il*, the *Conditions of the Agent*; *Aḥkām al-mu'aththirāt*, the *Characteristics of Effectors*; and *Kitāb al-Istidlāl bi l-shāhid 'alā l-ghā'ib*, *On the Deduction of Proofs [by Analogy] from the Witnessed World to the Unseen*.¹⁴ These treatises are not mentioned in the present work and presumably were composed later.

Al-Baṣīr's continuous concern with the controversy suggests that the impact of Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣīr's critical revision of Bahshamī theological doctrine must have been considerable in the contemporary Karaite community. His *Responsa* to questions from Tinnīs indicate that there was an early interest in Abu l-Ḥusayn's teaching among the Karaites in Egypt. Such an interest can hardly have been aroused by the local Muslim scholarly environment there. Mu'tazilī *kalām* was not taught under the Fāṭimid reign. Abu l-Ḥusayn's theology presumably was brought to the Karaites in Egypt by Jews from Iraq, just as Bahshamī teaching was brought to Fāṭimid Jerusalem by Yūsuf al-Baṣīr from there. In his *Ghurur al-adilla*, Abu l-Ḥusayn mentions that he had contacts with Jews who informed him about questions relating to the Bible,¹⁵ and there must have been Jews who were interested in his teaching. Ibn al-Malāḥimī quotes from the responsa of Abu l-Ḥusayn to an otherwise unknown Dāwūd b. Sulaymān (also b. Abī Sahl) al-Miṣrī *Jawābāt masā'il Dāwūd al-Miṣrī*.¹⁶ The name may indicate that the questioner was a Jew or, more likely, a Jewish convert to Islam. Coming from Egypt, he probably became a disciple of Abu l-Ḥusayn, posing questions to him, and perhaps returned to Egypt with the works of his teacher.

Whatever the role of Dāwūd b. Sulaymān, it seems likely that the prominent Karaite Tustarī family of eastern origin, who rose to social and political leadership in Fāṭimid Egypt while maintaining close contacts in Baghdad, favoured Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣīr's theological thought from an early date. A scholarly member of this family belonging to the third generation after their migration to Fuṣṭāṭ in Egypt became an active supporter of his *kalām* teaching. Three large fragments from

¹⁴ See Sklare, "Yūsuf al-Baṣīr," p. 256. The fact that al-Baṣīr mentions his *K. al-Tamyīz*, but not its expanded version *K. al-Muḥtawī*, makes it likely that it is a relatively early work. The *K. al-Muḥtawī* is known to have been composed before 412/1021.

¹⁵ See Sadīd al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-Ḥimmaṣī al-Rāzī, *al-Munqidh min al-taqlīd*, Qum 1412/[1991], vol. 1, pp. 505–6.

¹⁶ The quotations are contained in an unpublished section of Ibn al-Malāḥimī's *K. al-Mu'tamad*.

different copies of Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī's *Kitāb Taṣaffiḥ al-adilla* have been preserved in the Firkovitch collection.¹⁷ One of them in Arabic script, containing the third part of the work, bears a note in Hebrew that it is constituted as a pious endowment to Yashar (Sahl), son of the "minister" Ḥesed (al-Faḍl) al-Tustarī, and to his descendants.¹⁸ A second one in Arabic script appears to be in the handwriting of Abu l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Sulaymān al-Muqaddasī,¹⁹ a Karaite theologian originally from Jerusalem who became closely associated with Sahl b. al-Faḍl whom he adopted as his teacher. A third fragment, in Hebrew characters, cannot be dated, but may have been written about the same time.²⁰ Sahl b. al-Faḍl al-Tustarī, the leading Karaite theologian in Egypt in the second half of the 11th century, evidently was interested in promoting the study of Abu l-Ḥusayn's thought in the Karaite community.

Sahl al-Tustarī's theology has not yet been studied in detail, and none of his works has been published. Here brief excerpts from three of his partly extant works reflecting his endorsement of Abu l-Ḥusayn's theological views against the teaching of the school of Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār are edited and translated.²¹

1. The first section of Part Two of al-Tustarī's *Maqdisiyyāt* (or *Muqaddasiyyāt*)

The *Maqdisiyyāt* evidently were responsa to theological questions posed by 'Alī b. Sulaymān al-Muqaddasī. Two incomplete manuscripts containing Part Two of the text, one of them written by 'Alī b. Sulaymān, have

¹⁷ RNL II Firk. Evr. Arab. I 4814 in Hebrew characters, II Firk. Arab. 655 and II Firk. Arab. 103. See Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, *Taṣaffiḥ al-adilla*. The extant parts introduced and edited by Wilferd Madelung and Sabine Schmidtke, Wiesbaden 2006.

¹⁸ RNL II Firk. Arab. 655, f. 1a: קדש על ישר בן השר חסד אלתסתרי ועל דורות: בניו אחריו לא ימכר ולא יגאל ארור המחליף. On the Karaite Tustarī family in Egypt see especially M. Gil, *The Tustarīs, Family and Sect*, [in Hebrew] Tel-Aviv 1981. Abū Naṣr al-Faḍl b. Sahl al-Tustarī was not actually minister (*waṣīr*), but as a favourite of the mother of the caliph al-Mustaṣfir and treasurer of the caliph became a powerful rival of the vizier Abu l-Barakāt al-Jarjārā'ī who brought about his fall from favour. He was tortured to death in 440/1048–9.

¹⁹ RNL II Firk. Arab. 103.

²⁰ RNL II Firk. Evr. Arab. I 4814. The manuscript was copied from an Arabic original of a slightly different recension than II Firk. 103. On 'Alī b. Sulaymān see A. Ya. Borisov, "The time and place of the life of the Karaite author 'Alī b. Sulaymān," [in Russian], *Palestinskiy Sbornik* 9 (1962), pp. 109–14.

²¹ It may be noted that in his *K. al-Imā'*, an edition of which is in preparation by Gregor Schwarb, al-Tustarī upholds the existence of a human soul independent of the body against the Mu'tazilī position of Abu l-Ḥusayn denying such a soul.

come to light in the Firkovitch collection in St Petersburg.²² The first question in it deals with the claim of unnamed opponents that whoever deviates from their method of establishing proofs and drawing analogies (*ṭarīq al-taʿlīl wa l-muqāyasa*) is unable to prove the existence of the Originator of the world. Al-Tustarī responds that his proof of the temporality of the world and the existence of the Originator, perhaps set forth in the first part of the *Maqdisiyyāt*, had already demonstrated the falseness of their claim. He goes on to criticize the concepts and method of argumentation of the opponents at length, suggesting in the end that their doctrine in reality entailed the eternity of the world and their inability to prove the existence of the Originator. From his elaborations it is evident that the opponents are those who uphold the principles of the school of Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār. His arguments directly contradict those put forward by Yūsuf al-Baṣīr in his refutation of Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī.

2. Excerpt from al-Tustarī's *Kitāb al-Talwīḥ ilā l-tawḥīd wa l-ʿadl*, a summary of his theology in accordance with the basic Muʿtazilī theses of God's Unicity and Justice

The excerpt is taken from a Karaite manuscript of the British Library²³ containing several excerpts from the *Kitāb al-Talwīḥ*. It deals with the question of whether God effects existence (*wujūd*) or essence and whether existence is additional (*zāʿid*) to the reality of things. Al-Tustarī adopts the position of Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, without naming him, that existence is nothing additional to the reality of things that could be provided to stable (*thābit*) essences as the Bahshamī Muʿtazila held. Existence is not a uniform matter, and God produces all temporal things themselves.

²² RNL II Firk. Arab. 119 was copied, according to a note on fol. 1a, by ʿAlī b. Shlūmū (ʿAlī b. Sulaymān) in Dhu l-Ḥijja 448 (Febr.-March 1057) in Tinnīs. This copy is denoted as *alif* in the text. The second manuscript, denoted as *bāʿ*, is II Firk. Arab. 100. A fragment originally part of the latter manuscript is contained in II Firk. Arab. 158.

²³ Or 2572, described in G. Margoliouth, *Catalogue of the Hebrew and Samaritan manuscripts in the British Museum*, London 1899–1935, vol. 3, pp. 200–1, no. 996. The excerpt is on fol. 38a–41b.

3. Excerpt from the *Kitāb al-Tahrīr li-kitāb Aristū fīmā ba'd al-ṭabī'a*, a critical commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*

The excerpt is taken from the same Karaite manuscript of the British Library as the previous text.²⁴ It also refutes the view that existence is uniform in all existent things and that it is additional to essence defined as a stable reality. Here the thrust of al-Tustarī's criticism is against the philosophical doctrine of Aristotle, whom he briefly associated in the *Talwīḥ* text with the (Bahshamī) *kalām* theologians, and he quotes directly from the first four sections of Book *Gamma* of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* in order to refute his statements. He concludes with an affirmation of the Mu'tazilī thesis that the Maker of the temporal world must be a single and eternal freely choosing Agent (*fā'il wāḥid azalī mukhtār*) rather than a necessitating cause of an eternal world.

²⁴ Or 2572, fol. 47b–52b.

YŪSUF AL-BAŞĪR'S REFUTATION OF ABU L-HUSAYN
AL-BAŞRĪ'S PROOF FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

TRANSLATION

The fifth chapter concerning the impossibility of knowing the temporality of the body and proving the existence of the Creator while upholding the negation of accidents,¹ even though it has been reported of some upholders of this view that they maintain the eternity of the body

Know that the purpose in proving the existence of accidents is to establish the temporality of the body, since it is impossible for it to be separated from them and since they are temporal. For it is firmly established in the mind that whatever cannot be devoid of something originated must itself be originated. Subsequently we explain that the ground why accidents produced by us need us is their temporality. If the body shares their origination it necessarily shares their need for a producer. Whoever deviates from that is unable to accomplish anything in regard to the doctrine of Unicity and Justice.

Know that Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, when he doubted these matters and composed a book which he entitled *Scrutiny of the Proofs* (*Taṣaffuḥ al-adilla*), and then the *kalām* theologians² accused him of unbelief, responded according to what has reached me: Even though the well-known proofs are false, there are (other) proofs of which you are not aware. He was then told: If there were something you believe to be sound, you would present it and support it. Thus he needed to compose [a book on his] proximate principles, which I have refuted. Yet they were not founded on his basic system but are set forth in expressions as if he agreed with the theologians, so that the disagreement is hidden. In my view he is like someone who disguises himself in that compilation. I shall explain, God willing, the soundness of what I have mentioned

¹ By accidents (*a'rād*) the Bahshamiyya and al-Baṣrī meant determinants (*ma'ānī*), i.e. entitative beings or essences (*dhawāt*) that normally inhere in bodies and are the cause of attributes (*ṣifāt*) and characteristics (*aḥkām*) in them. The deniers of accidents viewed these attributes and characteristics as nothing independent or additional to the body.

² By *mutakallimūn* al-Baṣrī means specifically the Mu'tazilī theologians, those who hold the Mu'tazilī doctrine of *al-tawḥīd wa-l-'adl*. Ash'arī and other determinist theologians are called by him *mujbira*.

that he obstructs the path to knowledge of the proof of the existence of the Creator.

The clarification of this is that when he negates accidents and is unable to affirm, on account of their negation, what is specific to a substance because of its essence—rather it seems from his position and the position of his like that he holds that if the temporality of the body or the innovation (*tajaddud*) of its being an essence³ is affirmed, this is due to an agent,—then it can be said to him: Why should it be innovated so that you can refer its being an essence as it is witnessed back to him? And why do you deny its being like this from eternity? If he then says: If this were the case, its transfer from the place in which it was from eternity would be impossible, he will be asked to verify his claim. There is no way for him to that, for our assertion that the attribute which is not innovated is necessary by [the body] itself and that it cannot depart from it results from our knowledge of the proof of existence of various essences that are distinguished from each other by an essential attribute. If this is not viable according to his basic system, then what prevents the substance from occupying space eternally for no reason, being specified by place also for no reason, and from departing from being in the place equally for no reason? Rather, it might depart from being an essence for no reason and might even depart from occupying space while its essence remained stable if it had an attribute by its occupation of space. However, it is evident from his position that since it is an essence because of an agent, its being an essence is not distinct from its occupying space. This [distinction] is possible according to our position only insofar as it is an essence from eternity distinct from blackness, and then its occupation of space which is conditional on its existence becomes innovated.⁴

³ For the Bahshamiyya and al-Baṣīr essences are timelessly stable and thus cannot be innovated as essences, but are provided with existence in time by the agent originating them. While human agents can existentiate some categories of accidents, God can existentiate bodies and all categories of accidents. For Abu l-Ḥusayn God is the sole Agent producing all things or essences themselves in time. Human agents can merely effect attributes and characteristics in existent bodies.

⁴ In Bahshamī doctrine, occupation of space (*tahayyuz*) is an essential attribute of the body, but it is conditional on the body's existence. In its state of non-existence, the essence of the body is stable (*thābit*) but does not occupy space. Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣīr does not distinguish between essence and existence. In his view the essence has no stability before its innovation (*tajaddud*).

However, asserting the innovation of the substance that transfers into places is of no avail to him; rather, he is obliged to doubt the rest of the earth as long as he does not know its transfer to be possible. So what assures him against that it has eternally been resting? This [consequence] does not apply to us, for bodies [in our view] are all of one kind; what is possible for some of them is necessarily possible for the rest of them, and discussion about necessity is like the discussion about possibility because they are alike by themselves. Thus it is necessary that the earth is resting because of a rest produced in time, and it is necessary that the characteristic [of the earth] be identical with the characteristic [of other bodies] with regard to temporality. Therefore we say to him: If bodies are moving, resting, joining and separating according to our motives,⁵ then whatever we do not know at all that it is moving according to the motives of an agent, such as the movements of the spheres, the waves of the seas and the rest of the earth, how do you deny that it is not due to an agent? Thus the rest of the earth and the rotation of the sphere may belong to what is necessary. Even the assertion of a fifth nature is not impossible then as has been related of some people. As long as he does not affirm different causes whose effects differ according to their difference, it is not possible to extend any cause consistently; rather, it is impossible to prove whatever is not known compulsorily.

It is for this reason that he founded his case in the *Book of Scrutiny* on raising doubts. This is the method of those who assert the equivalence of proofs. Yet how do they know their equivalence, on the basis of a proof or by necessity? Eventually, [knowledge] by necessity inevitably comes to naught, while it is impossible to establish a proof. Rather, we have already explained that attributes cannot serve as a proof for the innovation of the body if we suppose that the body cannot be separated from them; for they cannot be non-existent then while the body is known to be qualified by them. Reason guarantees that whatever cannot be devoid of something originated is itself originated; but it does not conclude that the body is necessarily temporal when it cannot be devoid of being either joined or separate. Do you not see that with regard to the temporality of that we have recourse to the necessity of Zayd being temporal if it cannot be separated from the temporality of

⁵ The fact that bodies may move or rest according to our motives (*dawāʿi*) proves that we are the agents of their motion and rest.

‘Umar? His transfer of that to the attribute corresponds to someone affirming it [the attribute] to be an essence.⁶ In that case he would only deviate nominally. Because of that you will find his speech confused; sometimes he affirms accidents, sometimes he negates them. Know also that even if we accepted the soundness of his argumentation for the innovation of bodies, the proof of an agent would inevitably still be impossible for him. That is so because he does not affirm grounds for judgements, nor does he even affirm any effector but the agent.⁷ That here is an affirmation of what he negates in meaning. We will explain the indication of this and speak about it, although we already clarified that in the *Refutation (al-Naqd)* of him, except that here we shall mention an objection and shall reply to it, so that the opponent will cease to persist with it.

Thus we say, first, that he based his argument for the proof of the existence of God on saying: the temporality of the body belongs to what is contingent, for it occurred while it was possible for it not to occur; thus there must be an agent. Then it is to be said to him: Could it not occur while it was necessary for it to occur, for you also say that the act can occur from the Almighty for no intelligible reason but because He is a special essence? This shows that he sets forth grounds for it while denying them in meaning, because the act is possible. If that happened without any ground, since he already denied the attribute of being powerful and does not assert any attribute for Him at all,⁸ if he then were to assert that the act issued from Him for no reason and

⁶ The argument here rests on whether attributes are caused by accidents with a separate identity or essence independent of the body as the Bahshamiyya held, or are merely changeable characteristics of it as Abu l-Ḥusayn maintained. If attributes are merely characteristics of the body without separate identity, they cannot be used to prove the temporality of the body. The temporality of Zayd can be demonstrated only if it depends on the temporality of ‘Umar whose identity is separate from Zayd’s. If Abu l-Ḥusayn attempts to prove it from the temporality of an attribute, he can do so only if he recognizes it as being an essence (*dhāt*) with a separate identity.

⁷ According to Bahshamī doctrine upheld by al-Baṣīr, the effector (*mu’aththir*) of everything that occurs must be either a cause (*‘illa*) or an agent (*fā’il*). See also below fol. 14. Al-Baṣīr consistently claims that Abu l-Ḥusayn does not recognize causes and admits only the agent as an effector.

⁸ Al-Baṣīr’s contention that Abu l-Ḥusayn denied God’s attribute of being powerful and all His other attributes is polemically derived from Abu l-Ḥusayn’s explanation of God’s power to act by His special essence rather than by a state of being powerful as stipulated by the Bahshamiyya. Abu l-Ḥusayn did not in fact deny God’s attribute of being all-powerful.

that there is no ground for it, as we say about blackness in its specificity to its substrate, it would not make a difference. Similarly he says: The occurrence of the act is necessary at this specific moment for no reason and that this belongs to the category of what does not require provision of a ground. If he then said: This applies to you even more, for you affirm that for some judgments grounds can be provided but not for others, so why should the act not be possible from Him for no intelligible reason; rather, why should the body not occur without an agent? Whatever you may answer, the same is my reply; he is then to be told: As for us, we take recourse to a basic principle, namely, that for whatever a ground can be provided and this provision of a ground does not lead to falsity, must be explained by the ground. By contrast, anything whose provision with a ground would lead to falsity ought not be explained by a ground. The affirmation of these two divisions is inevitable, for their denial in every respect would invalidate deduction and it would be impossible to gain knowledge of anything by it. The assertion of grounds in all instances would lead to an infinite regress of grounds and grounds of grounds. Moreover, it would be impossible to know that there are some judgments for which provision of any ground is false. Thus he should be told: Is not the judgment of the occurrence of the body together with the specific moment in which it occurred like the judgment of the act together with the Almighty, so that it occurred because of the moment being special, as you say that concerning His act?

What we have already explained in the *Refutation* is that the occurrence of the thing while it was possible for it not to occur, necessarily requires the affirmation of a specifier only when the circumstances are identical. As we said that when the body moves while it was possible for it not to move with the circumstances being identical, there must inevitably be a specifier. Thus we affirm movement in this manner, and the opponent affirms its being thus because of an agent. By the circumstances being identical we meant its occupation of space and its other attributes, because it has no attribute but that it is inevitably sound for it to occur while [the body] moves and equally while it does not move. Thus there must inevitably be something external requiring that [motion or rest]. Therefore it is not sound to attribute its being moved to its occupation of space and to assert its being caused by it. How can it then be claimed that when the body occurs while it was possible for it not to occur the circumstances were identical, so that a specifier would be required who is the agent because of the falsity of its occurring on account of a cause?

The absurdity of his argumentation has thus become clear to you in regard to both aspects, namely whether he accepts the contingency of origination or he denies that.

Know further that we can prove the origination [of the body] to be contingent in a way that he is unable to follow. For we say: If its origination were of the category of what is necessary, its existence necessarily would not be more likely in some moments than in others. That implies the necessity of its eternity. This is based on what we have said that if its existence were necessary it would be so only because of what it is by its essence whose characteristics are the same at all times. Thus it is impossible for that to be innovated except on a condition, as we have said with regard to the occupation of space that, since it is founded in the essence, it is not specified by any moment rather than another, but by a condition, namely existence. However, anyone who negates accidents does not recognize a characteristic that is founded in the essence, and does not affirm anything on that basis. That is known with regard to the position of that man, as he denies states with regard to the Eternal One and as he affirms the substance to be [substance] by an agent. Thus he does not attribute anything to what distinguishes one essence from another.

Know also that in the *Book of Distinction* (*Kitāb al-Tamyīz*)⁹ we have argued that the body in its temporality needs an agent for its occurrence with the possibility that it does not occur, and that even the Qāḍī al-Labbād¹⁰ argued by this method. The soundness of that is founded on the affirmation of different essences such as sounds, pains, forms of spatial presence (*akwān*), and composition that we know prior to their existence, and whose origination on our part we know to be possible. Thus the essence's being non-existent¹¹ requires the feasibility of its origination together with the possibility for it not to occur by its remaining non-existent as it was. Its being an essence, insofar as it

⁹ Al-Baṣīr's *Kitāb al-Tamyīz* is extant in manuscript. A partial critical edition of the work has been prepared by Wolfgang von Abel (Yūsuf al-Baṣīr, *Das Buch der Unterscheidung*. Arabisch—Deutsch, Freiburg 2005).

¹⁰ Abū Muḥammad 'Abd Allāh b. Sa'īd al-Labbād is described as the successor (*khalīfā*) of Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār in teaching and as having survived him. Ibn al-Murtaḍā, *Ṭabaqāt*, p. 116. In his *Kitāb al-Muḥtawī* al-Baṣīr refers to a commentary he wrote on al-Labbād's *Kitāb al-uṣūl*, probably a theological work, titled *Sharḥ uṣūl al-Labbād*. See Sklare, „Yūsuf al-Baṣīr," p. 256.

¹¹ The stability of the essence in the state of non-existence is meant.

renders possible its occurrence and that it does not occur, is like the occupation of space which renders possible the motion of the substance as well as the absence of motion in its requirement of a specifier. If he maintains, however, that the essence being an essence is innovated after it had not been so, how can it be asserted that the innovation of its being an essence inevitably requires an agent when it was equally possible for it to occur or not to occur, yet the circumstances were not the same? Is it not the case that if we knew the possibility for a body to move even though it did not move, while the circumstances were not identical insofar as that would not require the occupation of space that renders the alternatives feasible, there would be no reason for affirming a specifier and it would be impossible to affirm anything requiring the motion? Your situation with regard to the innovation of the essence being an essence then is the same as this case with regard to [its] not requiring a specifier. You cannot escape doubt on account of our objection to your argumentation, according to your own method in the *Scrutiny*.

Know further that one of the supporters of his doctrine has argued against this coercive argument by saying, according to what has reached me: We may know Zayd's act and its need for him without our knowing the being of the act [while it is] non-existent. An answer to this was: We have not said with regard to the act which occurs in accordance with the intention of Zayd that it is impossible for us to know its need for him, nor have we said that the knowledge of this is founded upon knowledge that the essence [while] non-existent is knowable. Rather we have said: The act for which no agent is known by witnessing or the like of it and it is impossible to know of him except through the possibility of the occurrence and the non-occurrence of the act that leads to knowledge of him even if no intention of his is known—how can we possibly know that the act requires an agent while we know neither that its occurrence and its non-occurrence are equally possible nor that the circumstances are identical? Rather, we are entitled to reprehend him who argues for this despite the impossibility for us to show that the circumstances are identical whether it occurs or does not, while his essence is not known. Thus we say to him: What indication is there in the possibility of its [the body's] occurrence and its non-occurrence for the affirmation of a specifier, when by necessity we summarily know that Zayd's act is in need of him and [when we know this] in detail by deduction on the basis of its occurrence in accordance with his intention? Surely, the situation of the body differs from that, since

it is not summarily known by necessity that [its occurrence] requires an agent, nor is its occurrence in accordance with his intention known by necessity, so that we could on that basis deduce its need [for an agent] and would gain knowledge in detail. The absurdity of his argumentation is thus evident to you.

The sixth chapter concerning the impossibility of proving the existence of an agent making bodies by relating them to the attributes that are innovated by us for bodies

Know that we compare the body to what occurs on our part in the proof of the existence of an agent by extending the cause of the need [for an agent], namely the origination, according to what has been explained repeatedly. This man, however, does not argue on the basis of this indication, for its principles are impossible according to his doctrine, and he declared them to be erroneous. Know further that this indication is not sound according to his basic system on account of two aspects; therefore he left it for what we have previously shown to be false according to his basic system. One of the two aspects is that it is possible for us to innovate some attributes of bodies, but it is not possible for us to make an essence to be an essence; yet the body has become an essence according to his doctrine after it had not been an essence. The most that can thus be said in this regard is that the innovated attribute, not the essence after its becoming an essence, can be compared to the attributes. [Comparing the essence] is impossible, because it does not share any matter that could be a ground [for comparison], for we know by necessity in a summary manner that there is a difference between the innovation of an essence being an essence and the innovation of an attribute for a stable essence. For what relation is there between the two, given this obvious difference? If he said: This is like someone who objects to your proof by saying: The body is different from accidents, and this makes it impossible to compare the body to them; he would be told: The difference between what we say in reply to this objection and what you might perhaps reply to it is clear. For accidents are differing essences that share one attribute, namely the existence that he denies. When that is innovated in them like the innovation of the existence of the body, and we know that it is sound to explain the need by the innovation of existence which the various accidents have in common and which the body shares with them, then we say: The difference between body and accidents does not

exceed the difference among accidents while their partnership in the cause [of need] is present. However, attributes cannot be described as differing in reality.¹² Thus when you assert attributes to be different in reality, you make them essences in meaning. The body cannot be said to be resembling attributes, nor to be different from them. Rather, we have already explained that the innovation of an essence becoming an essence is different from the innovation of an attribute. Thus the path of analogy [between the two] is not sound.

The second aspect is that the principle of asserting a cause requires the affirmation of essences that entail attributes for others. Whoever denies causes cannot possibly assert anything by way of asserting a cause. That is elucidated by the fact that when we explain the need of writing for a writer by its occurrence, this can be understood only by likening it with the knowledge that necessitates for the knower to become knowing and analogous causes. However, when it is not possible to prove the existence of an effector by way of necessitation, it is impossible that the occurrence is necessitating [the need]. And if it is said: It admits the need, [the answer is that] it is not necessary that what admits is inseparable from the admitted. What could then prevent the occurrence from being present and admitting the need but not necessitating it? This implies that the occurrence may be separated from the need for a producer. Why should the body occur then only by a producer? Yet the agent, in [the case] we have explained makes possible the innovated attributes of bodies only, to the exclusion of that. Affirmation of something rendering possible apart from [the agent] thus depends on a proof. Yet [according to his doctrine] there is no proof that the admission of occurrence renders possible the need, and to dismiss that the [mere] admission and doubt are sufficient. Because of this we have said that the holder of this doctrine is unable to assert the evilness of a lie from which a benefit is drawn since his explanation of the evilness of a lie without benefit is not by a ground that can be extended specifically, while it is certain that benefit is an aspect of goodness of the act in some respects.¹³ In that [doctrine is

¹² That attributes, unlike accidents, are merely descriptive and cannot be further described is part of their common definition in *kalām*. If Abu l-Ḥusayn describes them as differing in reality, he turns them into accidents.

¹³ The relevant Bahshamī doctrine is analysed by G.F. Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism: The Ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbār*, Oxford 1971, pp. 90–97.

also implied] the impossibility of extending the judgement of anything from the visible world to the unseen.

The seventh chapter about that the holder of this doctrine is forced to allow the possibility that the lion and snakes are made by Satan and that the world is made by an angel and what is connected with this

Know that we have already shown that the holder of this doctrine is unable to prove the existence of an agent in the unseen world. That makes it impossible to distinguish His action from the act of others because that is like a branch [of the previously mentioned impossibility]. We will argue about this by supposition in the manner in which the *kalām* theologians have said to the determinists: Your doctrine makes it impossible to prove our being capable in addition to the capability, which is a basic principle in the discussion by its making feasible or necessitating [the act]. Then they explained the absurdity of the first thesis and proceeded to demonstrate the absurdity entailed by the doctrine that capability is necessitating.¹⁴ Know also that the way to our knowledge that the capable from among us is not able to produce bodies is founded on the affirmation of an attribute for the capable among us and of a capability which necessitates that and which with regard to the Almighty is necessary because of His self.¹⁵ Yet this speaker has already denied the [capability] with regard to us and with regard to Him, be He praised. He said: The act is feasible from Him because He is a special essence, and it is feasible from us because of a physical structure.¹⁶ He is forced then to allow that the Eternal one create us in a physical structure such that we would be capable to make bodies, for he keeps repeating that the capability is different while its

¹⁴ By determinists (*mujbira*) the Ash'arīs are primarily meant. Because of their doctrine that God wills and creates the acts of men, they are unable to define capability as implying a choice in the agent, whether he be man or God. Power and capability in their view necessitates the act rather than making it possible.

¹⁵ By attribute here is meant an accident additional to the essence. God's power for the Mu'tazila is grounded in His essence and does not require an additional attribute as demanded by Ash'arī theology.

¹⁶ About Abu l-Ḥusayn's doctrine concerning the attribute of *qudra*, see Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *al-Mu'tamad*, pp. 184–9. By Abu l-Ḥusayn's "denial of the attribute of *qudra*" in God and man, al-Baṣīr presumably means the denial of the special state (*ḥāla*) by which Bahshamī doctrine explained the attribute.

characteristics are identical. Thus why should it not be possible to assert a capability through which the body can be made and whose difference to this [our] capability is no greater than the difference among [our present capabilities]? And so on to the rest of what we mention that he cannot reasonably maintain what indeed he has already denied. On that basis we have said: Why does he not allow that God grant some bodies a structure by which it is possible to make the body an essence? Rather, it would not be impossible that the creation of the child in the intestines is an act of ours because of the male organ having a special physical structure inside it and the vulva having a special attribute and a special structure, and that if anyone does not produce offspring, it is because the site is not built in the special manner, in accordance with the doctrine of the philosophers. Some shaykh among our companions who is skilled in Hebrew indeed used to declare God to be far above creating a child born out of adultery, above discourse about worms growing out of filth, above creating vermin of the earth, the rat from dirt and chickens from dung. This paves the way for the doctrine that acts occur by nature which does not think, and the like of this suffices [to dismiss] the speaker.

The eighth chapter concerning the possibility of corporealization and union for the Almighty and other falsehood which this thesis leads to according to their doctrine

Know that if substance became an essence by an agent, it would be possible that He made it a sound, and that even we made it a sound despite the impossibility of our making it an essence. The holder of this doctrine thus cannot be sure that the Almighty will not turn Himself into a sound, a colour, a taste or a body, which is the doctrine specifically of the Nuṣayrīs about the corporealization of the *Ma'nā*.¹⁷ He is also forced to admit the doctrine of union, for if it were not possible for Him to turn His essence into a body, it would still be possible for Him to mix with bodies, like the doctrine of the Christians and their likes who maintain incarnation, for this is reasonable and can be believed,

¹⁷ *Ma'nā* (the Essence) in Nuṣayrī belief is the highest aspect of the divine trinity which has variously manifested itself in history in biblical figures from Abel to St. Peter and in 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib and the Imams descended from him. See. H. Halm in *EI*² s.v. „Nuṣayriyya“.

and some people even believe it. We shall explain the absurdity to which the pursuit of this leads after we explain that this necessarily applies to them but not to us. That is done by someone telling them: You have asserted that God Almighty is existent and you have asserted that each one of us is produced. Why do you deny that He may have been occupying space from eternity just as He existed from eternity, while one of you comes to occupy space after he has not, just as he becomes existent after he was not? We thus force upon you what you forced upon us according to your basic system, while you try to force upon us what you are forcing upon us on the basis of creating some doubt without noting what we have noted in forcing you. The answer is that the escape [from any argument] must be based on the principles of the holder of the doctrine. We then, if ...¹⁸

...of the object of perception and the like rendering possible perception and His being perceiving because it goes back to His being alive which is necessary on account of His attribute of essence, it is inadmissible that He be not alive and it is impossible for Him not to be perceiving in the presence of the object of perception. It is equally impossible then that He be not knowing, for His being knowing is based on His attribute of essence. Therefore it is necessary that He is knowing of all objects of knowledge and thus ignorance is impossible [for Him].¹⁹ What can necessitate then His being specified by a place, so that it is impossible for Him to be elsewhere, when He is qualified by the characteristic of a substance that requires its occupying space and when moreover its occupation of space renders possible its being specified by alternate places without distinction? If it is impossible, however, to point to a reason for which He would be specified by one place rather than another, the comparison and similitude which you presented in your question becomes void. If he were to say: I escape from what you force upon me on my basic system. This is so because the agent must have an effect on others, but not on himself; therefore it is not possible for Him to make His essence occupy space; it would then be said to him: Escape on the basis of systematic doctrine without a proof for its soundness is inadmissible, especially as you base your case on doubts and

¹⁸ A folio or some folios of the manuscript are missing here.

¹⁹ See Frank, *Beings and their Attributes*, pp. 67–8.

no proof for that has been heard from you, for you deny the effectors which we affirm. Rather, you [only] affirm the agent to be an effector. It is impossible then for you to know that the agent cannot exert an effect upon himself in the first place, as there is no proof preventing that. Rather, when you assert an attribute for the knower among us, it must occur by an agent, so that I make myself knowing and even believing, willing and guessing. However, in the discourse of the man there have been indications that he denies the attribute of knowing and instead asserts a connection between [the knower] and the object of his knowledge.²⁰ We have already refuted this in the *Refutation*. When it is impossible to repudiate our being believing and perceiving, then whatever occurs of that according to our motives must be produced by ourselves, either [such] that we originate the belief that necessitates this, or [such] that we make ourselves believing as God makes us knowing, without producing a determinant,²¹ but [immediately] by the agent. This consideration invalidates your argument rejecting what we have forced upon you.

If he were to say: The agent can make the essence acquire an attribute only when the essence becomes an essence through him, and if it is not possible for him to make his own essence an essence, he cannot make it a sound, a colour, or a body; it would be said to him: This invalidates your claim that we make bodies sounds and messages etc., as you were compelled to claim on account of your negation of accidents. If it is possible then that we make the enduring acquire an attribute despite the impossibility that we make it an essence, what could prevent Him from making His essence acquire [the attribute of] occupying space so that He becomes a body united with something else? At least he must admit doubt in this matter. If he then said: Surely, even though we make the essence acquire an attribute in the state of its endurance, the soundness of this is conditional on the innovation of its being an essence by some agent, and if the essence

²⁰ On Abu l-Ḥusayn's doctrine about the divine attribute of knowledge, see Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *al-Mu'tamad*, pp. 194–206. By Abu l-Ḥusayn's denial of the attribute of knowing, al-Baṣīr evidently means the denial of a state (*ḥāla*) which the Bahshamiyya affirmed in the knower as the basis for the attribute of knowledge. The Bahshamiyya considered the connection (*ta'alluq*) between the knower and the known as additional to this state. Abu l-Ḥusayn viewed the connection itself as knowledge, but did not object to the connection being called a state (*al-Mu'tamad*, pp. 200–1).

²¹ Determinant (*ma'nā*) is used here by al-Baṣīr as an equivalent to accident, i.e. as a real being that produces an attribute.

of the Almighty is not innovated, it is not possible for Him to make it acquire an attribute; it would then be said to him: What is your proof for what you have claimed? Does not a claim's lack of proof entail the evilness of asserting it? If he said: [I say it] because allowing this leads to the absurdity that you claim you will prove later on; it would then be said to him: Surely, you have maintained a position that paved the way against you for this compulsory argument which leads to the absurdity we shall mention afterwards. Thus you ought to abandon the first [claim] and uphold what we uphold, so that nothing will cling to you that leads to the absurdity. For we have explained that there are innovated attributes which you claim are due to an agent and which must go back to the agent when determinants (*ma'ānī*) are negated, so that we make ourselves believing. Therefore you are obliged to allow that the Almighty may turn Himself into a body and you may be questioned whether allowing this leads to absurdity. Thus he ought to deny that an essence becomes an essence through an agent, and similar [claims]. If he said: For an essence to become a sound it must occupy space, and I am not obliged to accept that the Almighty could turn His essence into a sound. For as it is impossible for a message to become a message without its becoming speech, so is it impossible [for Him] to become a sound without occupying space; it will then be said to him: We have already demonstrated that you are obliged to allow His making Himself occupy space, and this implies the possibility of His making Himself a speech or a pain. Moreover, it is only possible for attributes to require each other as a consequence of essences requiring one another, but when there are no essences, no requirement is possible. An illustration of this is that as capability requires life, it is necessary that what follows necessarily from it, namely that the capable is capable, requires him to be living as a consequence. If this were not known with regard to the visible world, it could not be known with regard to the unseen world; rather, to believe and imagine this would necessarily be impossible. As for the requirement of the message to consist of sounds in order to be a message, this is so because it occurs with a specific aspect, such as precise execution or ugliness and the like that follow the occurrence.

In regard to discussion of the absurdity to which this thesis leads, it is that allowing that He make Himself a body requires allowing that He make Himself a human being, and even a body capable of harming us in doing that in view of its goodness and its wisdom. We would then have no way to prevent Him from doing the like of this, since He is a worshipped Lord and God who made Himself a body

according to what He considered to be right. Or He could unite with a human being, as the Christians claim that the divine nature united with the human nature or that He inhered in it. If He then said: I am entitled to being worshipped, we would have to admit that He may be truthful. Perhaps we would even presume this, seeing Him qualified with characteristics of virtue such as knowledge, courage, generosity and nobility. If miracles were found in His abode and in His house, He would be judged noble and great in our souls, as is the teaching of the Sufis, and we would be obliged to endure patiently the harm inflicted by Him. All this is brought on by the claim that the essence is an essence because of an agent. He [Abu l-Ḥusayn] cannot even have any assurance against His ceasing to be an essence, since he does not know that there is an essence whose characteristic goes back to its being like that, so that it cannot depart from what it deserves because of that, as the holder of this doctrine does not have a proof concerning the like of it. I have already explained in [*the Responsa to*] *the Questions from Tinnīs* that the state of essences, despite their variation, is uniform in regard to the impossibility of their ceasing to be an essence, the impossibility of their being innovated as an essence and the absurdity of their being [essences] because of an agent as you find there, God willing.²²

The ninth chapter concerning that these people are unable to deny evil on the part of the Almighty

Know that our proof for this is not valid according to their basic system, insofar as it relies on deducing a cause and extending it consistently. We have already explained that their negation of real necessitating causes requires the negation of hypothetical ones, in accordance with our explanation in the proof of the existence of the Originator, that

²² The text of *al-Masā'il al-Tinnīsiyya* does not seem to be extant, and the title is not mentioned elsewhere among the works of al-Baṣīr. Tinnīs in the eastern Nile delta was the home of a small Jewish colony. There must have been Karaites among them who put questions to al-Baṣīr as the leading theologian of their community. The subject discussed thus may reflect the early impact of Abu l-Ḥusayn's teaching among the Karaite community which al-Baṣīr sought to counter.—'Alī b. Sulaymān al-Muqaddasī, presumably the scribe of one of the fragments of Abu l-Ḥusayn's *Taṣaffiḥ al-adilla*, is known to have been active in Tinnīs in the years between 436/1045 and 466/1073. See Borisov, "The time and place of the life of the Karaite author 'Alī b. Sulaymān," pp. 111ff.

we liken the dependence of the need for an originator on origination to the dependence of the attribute of being knowing on knowledge, for the endurance of an act negates its need for the agent, and the same applies to it when it is non-existent. The continuation of the state of linkage of the need to origination thus corresponds to the continuation of the state of linkage of someone's being knowing to the existence of knowledge, and just as it must be his knowledge, the same is true in similar cases. However, if there is no knowledge that could be the cause, nor anything else, what would necessitate origination to be a cause for the need? And what is there in the linkage of one of them to the other continuously that necessitates its comparison except what its need that is linked to its origination for the [originator] teaches us of the necessity to apply that in other cases than knowledge? As for us, analogy is permissible to us only because we know that if the knowledge that exists in my heart necessitates my being knowing, it does so by its essence. Whatever is similar then to it insofar as its essence is like its essence must necessitate what it necessitates. And whatever corresponds to it with regard to the dependence of the need on origination must be judged by its judgment.

Perhaps they will say: Even if knowledge is not established, we can suppose its stability and its being necessitating, and the rule of the need together with origination corresponds to it. The reply to this is: Likening a thing to another and comparing them is sound when it is established and known. When it is merely hypothetical, the comparison is likewise so. However, as the basis is impossible, it is inevitable that what is compared to it and likened with it is also impossible. And what is like this, how can it be adduced as evidence? We only use hypothesis in what is a premise to the proof in order to show that the confirmation of that would lead to absurdity and what we have supposed must be rejected because it leads to absurdity. The clarification of this is that we say: If He were a body, His composition would indicate the temporality of the Almighty, and the absurdity of this is an indication that He is not a body. Thus the premises of proofs must be hypothetical, particularly when the intention in that is negation. In a similar way we negate a second god to the Almighty.

Let us return to our subject. We say: The knowing and self-sufficient in the visible world does not choose evil.²³ The indication for this is

²³ The explanation of the Bahshamiyya as to why it is inconceivable that God does any evil is analysed by Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism*, pp. 97–102.

that someone who is given the choice between [telling] a truth and a lie whereby his benefit from each would be equal turns to the good. The reason for that is his knowledge of the evilness and the lack of need (*ghinā*). Then we extend this reason to the unseen world, likening it to necessitating causes such as capability and knowledge. However, if there are no causes upon investigation, it is impossible to liken and to compare. One might say to the holder of this doctrine: Why do you deny that the state of the Eternal is different than the state of the temporal, since the latter's acts follow his motives such as gaining benefit or averting harm, and if he does not benefit from the like of such an act he does not do it, while we do not know anything about the state of the unseen world? Asserting a ground is not sound, for the effector can only be the agent or a cause. [According to his doctrine], however, [the cause] is not in reality such that it would be possible to liken it to something else, nor is what we are dealing with the effect of an agent. So what would prevent Him from being a doer of evil? [According to his doctrine], moreover, the Eternal is not qualified by a state, rather he asserts Him to be connected to objects of knowledge and of capability, even though the object of capability is not a non-existent thing as we say. Rather, action is feasible for Him because of His being a special essence. Likewise He is connected to the object of His knowledge despite his [Abu l-Ḥusayn's] negation of all states which we assert for the Almighty. Thus he has asserted Him to be a mere essence in a manner that when the essence does not know²⁴ by a detailed knowledge that distinguishes objects of knowledge, the knowledge remains summary. The Eternal thus cannot know in detail. So how [can he assert] that He is connected to all objects of knowledge?

He cannot turn this [argument] back on us, because we assert His being alive that makes possible His knowing all objects of knowledge by recourse to His attribute of essence that makes possible His being knowing through His being living and that necessitates His being knowing without intermediary. Thus the attribute of His self validates

²⁴ The manuscript here reads *na'lam* for *ta'lam*. This reading would imply an unreasonable argument on the part of al-Baṣīr that since we do not have detailed knowledge of God's essence, God also could not have detailed knowledge of all objects of knowledge. Al-Baṣīr's argument is evidently rather that if God were a bare essence without a state (*hāla*) of knowledge stipulated by Bahshamī doctrine, He could not have detailed knowledge of all things.

His being knowing and necessitates it in the mentioned manner. Therefore He necessarily knows all objects of knowledge, since the rule of His self is the same with regard to everything, so that He is not more likely to know some things rather than others as the scholars of the doctrine of Unicity have explained. According to his doctrine, however, He has neither an attribute nor a state that is founded in the essence, or in a determinant or an agent. He thus affirms Him in a manner that if he negated Him, it would not make any difference. According to what we said, it is necessary to assert Him as being one and specified by an attribute that no one shares with Him and by further attributes which no one else shares with Him in the manner of deserving them. The knowledge of that is based on the assertion of His attributes in a specific manner which the opponent cannot adopt. Thus how can he say: His knowledge of the evilness of evil and of His self-sufficiency prevents Him from that, either by way of analogy or by an initial proof? If he said: [I prove it] by way of analogy based on a known ground, then our demonstration of the impossibility of asserting a cause on the basis of his doctrine prevents that. If he said: [This is] by an initial proof, then that is inevitably lacking, for we cannot imagine it and it does not occur to our mind. Rather, we can only judge about the Almighty by the rule about one who is given the choice between telling a truth or a lie whose benefit from either is equal, and explain the impossibility of His doing [evil] by the reason mentioned, extending it to the unseen world. Whoever claims for that a proof apart from analogy and extending the ground consistently is like one who asserts a proof for the number of stars in the sky, the measure of the grains of sand and the water of the sea.

The adherents of this new doctrine sometimes pretend, where they are unable to proclaim disagreement, that there are proofs for that which the scholars of the doctrine of Unicity were unable to grasp. The holder of the doctrine, however, ought to claim here a miraculous theory if he grasped a matter they had not yet grasped. It was said to him, according to what has reached me: If you had a proof you would have followed up with it when you declared absurd the proofs of the scholars. This inevitably indicates that he does not have a proof except either [accepting] the accidents we mention and what is founded upon them, or the attributes you mention by approximation. These contain the possibility of disagreement that is more serious than the disagreement regarding the proof of existence of accidents, for falsehood cannot reach the level of truth.

The tenth chapter concerning his inability to prove that God is [a single] one. He rather invalidated this in his book insofar as the basis of the argumentation for His being one depends on His being powerful and willing. In the *Book on Prevention and Mutual Prevention* (*Kūtāb al-Man‘ wa-l-tamānu*)²⁵ ten proofs for this have been mentioned, and we have added to them.

Know that if he does not assert God Almighty to be either powerful or willing,²⁶ all other arguments become null and void, and he is forced to allow that there may be other essences besides Him which are stable from eternity just like His stability, even if he would not assert Him to be existent,²⁷ yet action were feasible from Him. What can be said that he could argue is what we say that a single object of capability cannot be an object of capability for two powerful agents.²⁸ If there were, however, a second with Him, their object of capability would be a single one. While he does not assert a powerful agent nor an object of capability, he still asserts an act and an agent, so that he might say: The assertion of a second with the Almighty would lead to the assertion of a single act produced by two agents, and that is impossible. This is

²⁵ A *Kūtāb al-Man‘ wa-l-tamānu* is mentioned among the works of Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār. See Ibn al-Murtaḍā, *Ṭabaqāt al-Mu‘tazila*, p. 113. This book is presumably meant by al-Baṣīr. A fragment of this work has recently been found and identified by Bruno Chiesa (RNL Firk. Yevr.-Arab. I 1033). A further fragment of the same manuscript is extant in RNL Firk. Arab. 330. – The proof for the singleness of God by potential mutual prevention (*tamānu*) between two almighty beings was widely employed in early *kalām* theology by the Mu‘tazila and the Ash‘arīs alike (see D. Gimaret, *La doctrine d’al-Ash‘arī*, Paris 1990, pp. 252–54) and was upheld by Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār. Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣīr and his school rejected it as invalid. See Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *al-Mu‘tamad*, pp. 506–38.

²⁶ The proof of mutual prevention was commonly based on acceptance that God was both all-powerful and endowed with a will. If there were a second god like Him, their conflicting wills would lead to mutual prevention, which meant a negation of their being all-powerful. Abu l-Ḥusayn did not in fact deny God’s being willing, but held His will to be identical with the motive (*dā‘ī*) of His act and argued that the motive of two omniscient and wise beings must inevitably be identical so that no conflict could arise. See Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *al-Mu‘tamad*, pp. 420, 509–15.

²⁷ Concerning Abu l-Ḥusayn’s doctrine on existence see Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *al-Mu‘tamad*, pp. 254–60. His thesis that essence (*dhāt*) and existence are identical had been upheld among the Mu‘tazila before him by Abū Ishāq al-Naṣībī. Al-Baṣīr’s suggestion that he would not assert God to be existent is polemical distortion. See *al-Mu‘tamad*, p. 261.

²⁸ That a single object of capability (*maqḍūr*) cannot be shared by two powerful agents (*qādirayn*) was upheld by many *kalām* theologians including ‘Abd al-Jabbār. It was denied by Abu l-Ḥusayn. Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *al-Mu‘tamad*, pp. 506, 524–25.

among the strongest arguments he could argue with, and it is false.²⁹ Thus [it is] also if he argued for the impossibility of their differing from each other and of distinguishing one of them from the other, stating in the first proof that the assertion of the impossibility of an act produced by two agents is founded on the impossibility of an object of capability being the object of two powerful [agents]. That is because it would be necessary, if one of the two intended that it occur, while the other did not want it, that it not occur. If then a single object of capability for two powerful beings is impossible, the occurrence of an act from two agents is impossible too. Yet, if there is no object of capability given, what would prevent the possibility of the occurrence of an act from two agents? Rather, we do find something carried by two carriers and something moved by two movers, so how can he claim the impossibility of an act produced by two agents? Moreover, what prevents the possibility that one of them does something other than the other does, so that this does not lead to the affirmation of an act from two agents? According to our doctrine, the object of capability of one of the two must also be the object of capability of the other only because their being powerful is founded in the self, and that is alike because of their sharing in the eternity that is founded in the essence. Thus there is no specificity of one of them for a particular object of capability for which the other would not have any specificity. However, when the agent's being an agent is not founded in the essence, such that the two agents would [necessarily] share in [the act], but rather it is based on choice and motive, what would then prevent one of the two from acting while the other is not acting at the same time? He is even forced to allow that one of them is light and the other darkness and that they mingle according to the doctrine of the Dualists, either by their corporealizing or by their being like that from eternity. Indeed, there is nothing to prevent mixture and union on the basis of his doctrine, as has been explained before. Because of the possibility of confusion entering into the like of this, the scholars of the thesis of Unicity have exerted themselves to prove the existence of essences

²⁹ Al-Baṣīr's argument here is polemical speculation. Abu l-Ḥusayn did not seek to assert that a single act cannot be shared by two agents. That a single *maqḍūr* may be shared but not a single act (*fi'l*) was the doctrine of al-Ash'arī. See Gimaret, *La doctrine*, p. 388.

that are distinguished by themselves, and that mixture does not change the characteristic of the essence, just as the joining of accidents in a substrate does not change what they are by themselves. Thus light can neither effect nor act either alone or when mixed with anything else, and the same applies to darkness. They explained the impossibility of the occurrence of an act except from a living powerful being by the characteristic of his being powerful that action is feasible for him. Thus if light were able to act, this would imply the feasibility to produce evil and good equally, and the same applies to darkness. They invalidated the doctrine [of the dualists] that [light and darkness] are endowed with a nature, such that light produces good by its nature, while darkness produces evil by its nature. Rather, they asserted the Eternal to have the power of doing evil as [He has] the power to do good, and that His abstention from that is for the reason mentioned in the preceding chapter. Whoever disregards what we have mentioned has no way to establish the thesis of Unicity [of God], and since it is impossible for him to know that, knowledge of the thesis of Justice which is based on it is impossible, too. Thus it is imperative to establish the principles correctly, so that the branches will be founded on them.

As for the second proof, namely the impossibility of a distinction of one of the eternal from the other, even though that is a clear proof, the negator of accidents is unable to argue God's being one by that.³⁰ That is because he asserts the existence of attributes with a kind of mutual similarity for a single object in a way that it is impossible to distinguish the little from the much, as we have mentioned in the fourth indication in this book for the affirmation of accidents. We said: The doctrine of the negation of determinants leads to the impossibility of mutual prevention and to the invalidation of the distinction between the light and the heavy. So he said: I assert for the heavy numerous attributes which prevent transport of the heavy. Then we said: Multiplicity of attributes is not reasonable but through multiplicity of determinants, for attributes do not increase in reality except in consequence of an increase of the necessitating cause. Thus their modification is not reasonable when there is no changeable necessitating cause either in reality or hypothetically. How then could the distinction come about?

³⁰ The second proof for the singleness of God, that two eternal essences with identical attributes cannot be distinguished, was sustained by Abu l-Ḥusayn and his school. See Maḥmūd al-Ḥimmaṣī, *al-Munqidh*, vol. 1, pp. 132–35.

If the attributes, when their state is what we have mentioned, were a single attribute, it would not make any difference. If that is his doctrine about the attributes of the two eternal which mutually prevent each other and about the transport of the heavy, then what prevents the assertion of essences which are impossible to distinguish, so that their fewness cannot be distinguished from their numerousness? Rather, the permissibility is given and that is what was sought. Thus it has become clear to you that they are unable to prove anything in the sciences of the doctrine of Unicity as well as the doctrine of Justice, because knowledge about Justice follows the knowledge that it is impossible for Him to do evil...

ARABIC TEXT

[1^أ]

أحوال الأجسام الثقيلة وهذا بين بحمد الله.
الفصل الخامس في استحالة العلم بحدوث¹
الجسم وإثبات الصانع مع القول بنفي
الأعراض وإن كان قد حكي عن بعض القائلين
بذلك القول بقدّم الجسم
اعلم أن الغرض بإثبات الأعراض أن يحكم للجسم
بالحدوث لاستحالة انفكاكه منها مع حدوثها
لما استقر في العقل أن ما لم يخلُ من المحدث
وجب أن يكون محدثاً. ثم نبين أن الأعراض المحدثة
من قبلنا علّة حاجتها إلينا حدوثها، فالجسم إذا
شاركها في الحدوث فواجب أن يشاركها في الحاجة²
إلى محدث. فمن عدل عن ذلك لم يتم له شيء من قول
بالتوحيد والعدل. واعلم أن أبا الحسين البصري،
لما شكّ في هذه الأمور [و] صنّف كتاباً لقبه
بتصفّح الأدلة فكفّر المتكلمون، قال على ما
بلغني: إن الأدلة المعروفة وإن فسدت، فهناك أدلة
ما وقفتم عليها. فقليل له: لو كان هناك ما
تعتقد صحته لأوردته ونصرته، فاحتاج إلى
تصنيف أصول قريبة نقضتها عليه، وهي غير مستندة

[1^ب]

على أصله، بل يأتي بعبارات كأنه موافق للمتكلمين،
فالباطن الخلاف، وهو عندي في حكم المستتر بتصنيف ذلك.
وأنا أبين إن شاء الله³ صحة ما ذكرته من سده طريق معرفة

¹ بحدوث: إضافة في الهامش.

² الحاجة: אלה אגה.

³ إن شاء الله: אה.

إثبات الصانع. فبيان ذلك أنه إذا نفى الأعراض ولم يصح مع نفيها أن يثبت للجوهر ما يختص به لذاته، بل الظاهر من حاله وحال من يجري مجراه أن يقول: إذا ثبت حدوث الجسم أو تجدد كونه ذاتاً أنه كذلك بالفاعل، فيقال له: ومن أين أنه متجدد حتى ترد كونه ذاتاً على ما يشاهد عليه إليه؟ وما أنكرت من كونه كذلك فيما لم يزل؟ فإذا قال: إنه لو كان كذلك لم يصح انتقاله من الجهة التي كان فيها لم يزل، طولب بتصحيح دعواه، ولا سبيل له إلى ذلك إذ قولنا في الصفة الغير متجددة أنها واجبة للنفس، وأنه يستحيل خروجه [منها] يترتب على معرفتنا إثبات ذوات مختلفة يتميز بعضها من بعض بصفة ذاتية. وإذا كان ذلك غير سائق على أصله، فما المانع من كون الجوهر متحيزاً⁴ فيما لم يزل لا لوجه، مختصاً بالجهة لا لوجه أيضاً، ويخرج من كونه في الجهة لا لوجه أيضاً، بل يخرج من كونه ذاتاً لا لوجه، بل يخرج من كونه [12]

متحيزاً مع ثبوت ذاته إن كان له بكونه متحيزاً صفة، بل الظاهر من قوله أنه إذا كان ذاتاً بالفاعل لا يتميز كونه ذاتاً من كونه متحيزاً، وإنما صح ذلك عندنا لما كان ذاتاً فيما لم يزل متميزاً⁵ من السواد، ثم تجدد تحيزه المشروط بوجوده. على أن قوله بتجدد الجوهر المنتقل في الجهات لا ينفعه، بل يجب أن يشك في سكون الأرض لما لم يعلم صحة تنقلها، فما يؤمنه من أن تكون ساكنة لم تنزل؟ وليس يلزمنا نحن ذلك لأن الأجسام كلها جنس واحد، ما صح على بعضها يجب أن يصح على سائرهما، والكلام في الوجوب كالكلام في الصحة لأنها بأنفسها متاثلة، فيجب أن يكون

⁴ متحيزاً: מתחيز.

⁵ متميزاً: מתחيزא.

الأرض ساكنة بسكون محدث، وينبغي أن يكون حكمها
حكمه في الحدوث، ولذلك قلنا له: إذا كانت
الأجسام متحركة⁶ بحسب دواعينا وساكنة
ومجتمعمة ومفترقة، فما لا نعلم أنه متحرك
بحسب دواعي فاعل البتة كحركات الأفلاك
وأما موج البحار وسكون الأرض ما أنكرت أنه
لا بفاعل؟ فيكون سكون الأرض ودور الفلك من باب
[2ب]

الواجب، بل لا يمتنع من إثباته طبيعة خامسة
على ما قد حكي عن بعضهم، فحتى لا⁷ يثبت عللاً
مختلفة تختلف معلولاتها باختلافها لم
يصح طرد علة، بل لا يصح إثبات ما ليس بمعلوم
باضطرار. ولهذا بنى⁸ أمره على التشكيك في
كتاب التصفح، وهو مذهب القائلين بتكافي الأدلة.
وكيف علموا تكافئها، أبديليل أم ضرورة؟ ولا
محالة من⁹ ارتفاع الضرورة، والاستدلال غير ممكن،
بل قد بينا أن الصفات لا يمكن أن تكون دلالة
على تجدد الجسم لو قدرنا أن الجسم لم ينفك منها
لأنها إذا¹⁰ لم تكن معدومة¹¹، وإنما الجسم يعلم
عليها، والعقل تضمن أن ما لم يخل من المحدث يجب
أن يكون محدثاً، ولم يكمل بأن الجسم إذا لم يخل
من كونه مجتمعاً أو مفترقاً فيجب أن يكون محدثاً.
ألا ترى أنا نفزع في حدوث ذلك إلى وجوب كون زيد
محدثاً إذا لم ينفك من حدوث عمر؟ فنقله
ذلك إلى الصفة في حكم من أثبتها ذاتاً، فحينئذ

⁶ متحركة: אלמותחרכה.

⁷ لا: إضافة في الهامش.

⁸ بنى: בנה.

⁹ من: פי.

¹⁰ لأنه إذا: بين الكلمتين علامة لا تقرأ.

¹¹ معدومة: מעלומה.

يكون مخالفاً في التسمية، ولهذا تجد كلامه مضطرباً
مرةً يثبت الأعراض ومرةً ينفيها. واعلم أنا
[3]

لو سلمنا له صحة استدلاله على تجدد¹² الأجسام
لكان لا محالة لا يصح له إثبات فاعل، وذلك أنه لا يثبت
للأحكام عللاً، بل لا يثبت مؤثراً إلا الفاعل.
وذلك إثبات ما ينفيه في المعنى على ما سنبين دلالتة
وتكلم عليها، وإن كما قد أوضحنا ذلك في النقض
عليه، غير أنا نذكر هاهنا اعتراضاً ونجيب عنه
ليزول تشبّث المخالف به. فنقول أولاً: إنه بنى
استدلاله على إثبات الصانع بأن قال: إن
حدوث الجسم من باب الجائز لأنه قد حدث مع جواز
أن لا يحدث، فلا بدّ من فاعل. فيقال له: ألا حدث
مع وجوب أن يحدث إذ من قولك: إن الفعل صح منه تعالى
لا لوجه معقول بل لكونه ذاتاً مخصوصةً؟ وذلك
إظهار منه للتعليل¹³ مع نفيه في المعنى لأن الفعل
قد صح، فلو كان ذلك غير معلل وقد نفى صفة قادر
ولم يثبت له صفة البتة، فلو قال إن الفعل صدر
منه لا لوجه وإن ذلك غير معلل، كقولنا نحن في
اختصاص السواد بمحله، ما زادت الحال.
وكذلك يقول: إن الفعل يجب حدوثه في هذا الوقت
لا لوجه وأن يكون من باب ما لا يعلل. فإن قال:

[3ب]

إن ذلك لكم ألزم لأنكم قد أثبتم بعض الأحكام
معللاً وبعضها غير معلل، فألا صح الفعل منه لا
لأمر معقول، بل ألا حدث الجسم لا عن فاعل؟
وأي شيء أجبت به هو جوابي، قيل له: إنا نحن
نرجع إلى أصل وهو أن ما صح تعليله ولم يؤدّ

¹² تجدد: אלתגדד، ثم شطبت אל.

¹³ للتعليل: אלתעליל.

تعليله إلى فساد فواجب تعليله، وما أدّى¹⁴
إلى ذلك يجب أن لا يعلل، ولم يكن بدّ من إثبات
هذين القسمين من حيث أن نفيهما على كل وجه يطل
الاستدلال، ويستحيل أن يعلم به شيء، وإثبات
التعليل في كل المواضع يؤدي إلى إثبات ما لا
نحاية له من العلل وعلل العلل، ولأنه كان
يستحيل أن يعلم أن في الأحكام ما تعليله
فساد. فيقال له: وألا كان حكم حدوث الجسم مع
الوقت الذي حدث فيه كحكم الفعل معه تعالى، فلكون
الوقت مخصوصاً حدث، كما قلت ذلك في فعله؟
والذي بيناه في النقض أنه إنما يجب أن يكون
حدوث الشيء مع جواز أن لا يحدث يقتضي
إثبات مخصّص متى كانت الحال واحدة، كما
قلنا: إن الجسم إذا تحرك مع جواز أن لا
[14]

يتحرك والحال واحدة فلا بدّ من مخصّص، فأثبتنا
الحركة بهذه الطريقة، وأثبت المخالف كونه كذلك
بالفاعل. وعيننا بكون الحال واحدة تحيزه وسائر
صفاته لأنه لا صفة له إلا ولا بدّ من صحة
حصولها مع تحركه وألا يتحرك على سواء، فلم يكن
بدّ من أمر من خارج يقتضي ذلك. ولهذا لم يصح رد
تحريكه إلى تحيزه وتعليله به، فمن أين أن الجسم
وإن حدث مع جواز أن لا يحدث أن الحال واحدة
حتى يحتاج إلى إثبات مخصّص هو الفاعل بفساد
أن يكون حادثاً لعله؟ فقد بان لك فساد استدلاله
على الوجهين وهما تسليم جواز الحدوث والمنع من ذلك.
واعلم أنا قد ندل على كون الحدوث جائزاً
بما لا يتم له. وهو أن نقول: إنه لو كان حدوثه
من باب الواجب لوجب أن لا يكون وجوده في بعض

¹⁴ أدّى: ٨٦١.

الأوقات أولى من بعض، وفي ذلك وجوب قَدَمه، وذلك
 ينبني على ما قلناه من أن وجوده لو وجب لما وجب
 إلا لما هو عليه في ذاته، وحكمها مع الأوقات
 كلها على سواء. فمحال أن يتجدد ذلك إلا بشرط
 كما قلناه في أن التحيز لما رجع إلى الذات لم
 [4ب]

يتخصص بوقت دون وقت إلا بشرط هو الوجود. فمن نفى
 الأعراض لم يعرف حكماً يرجع إلى الذات، ولا أثبت
 ما هذا سبيله، حسب المعلوم من حال هذا الرجل
 [من] نفيه الأحوال عن القديم وحسب إثباته كون الجوهر
 بالفاعل، فلم يردّ أمراً من الأمور إلى ما تتميز
 به ذات من ذات. واعلم أنا قد استدللنا
 في كتاب التمييز على كون الجسم محتاجاً في حدوثه
 إلى فاعل بحدوثه مع جواز أن لا يحدث، بل قد
 استدل القاضي اللباد بهذه الطريقة. وصحة
 ذلك يترتب على إثبات ذوات مختلفة من نحو
 الأصوات والآلام والأكوان والتأليف نعلمها¹⁵ قبل
 وجودها¹⁶ ونعلم صحة حدوثها من قبلنا، فكون
 الذات معدومة¹⁷ يقتضي أن حدوثها جائز مع جواز
 أن لا تحدث بأن تبقى على ما كانت عليه معدومة،
 وكونها ذاتاً لما صحّ حدوثها وأن لا تحدث
 جرى مجرى تصحيح التحيز تحرك الجوهر وأن لا يتحرك
 في الافتقار إلى مخصص، وإذا كان من قوله أن
 الذات يتجدد كونها ذاتاً¹⁸ بعد ما لم تكن كذلك
 فمن أين أن تجدد كونها ذاتاً إذا جاز أن يحصل

¹⁵ نعلمها: **נעלמהמא**، مع علامة حذف.

¹⁶ وجودها: **וגודהמא**، مع علامة حذف.

¹⁷ معدومة: **אלמעדומה**، مع علامة حذف.

¹⁸ ذاتاً: **דאָת**.

[١٥]

وأن لا يحصل والحال ليست واحدة أنه لا بد من إثبات فاعل؟ أو ليس لو علمنا جواز تحرك الجسم وإن لم يتحرك مع أن الحال ليست واحدة بأن لا يفتقر ذلك إلى التحيز المصحح للأمرين لم يكن¹⁹ لإثبات مخصص وجه ولا استحالة إثبات ما يقتضي التحرك؟ فخالك في تجدد كون الذات ذاتاً يجري هذا المجرى في الغنى عن مخصص، ولا أقل من أن تشك فيما اعترضنا به دلالتك حسب طريقتك في التصفح. واعلم أن بعض المنتصرين لمقالته اعترض هذا الإلزام بأن قال على ما بلغني: إنا قد نعلم فعل زيد وحاجته إليه من غير أن نعلم كون الفعل معدوماً. وكان من الجواب: إنا لم نقل إن الفعل الواقع بحسب قصد زيد محال أن نعلم حاجته إليه، ولا قلنا إن العلم بذلك يترتب على العلم بكون الذات معدومة معلومة، بل إنما قلنا إن الفعل الذي لا يُعلم²⁰ له فاعل بالمشاهدة وما يجري مجراها، وقد استحال العلم به إلا بجواز حدوث الفعل وأن لا يحدث [٥ب]

المفضي إلى معرفته ولم يُعلم²¹ له قصد، كيف يصح أن نعلم حاجته إلى فاعل وما علمنا جواز حدوثه وألا يحدث على سواء والحال واحدة؟ بل لنا أن نستنكر من استدلال على ذلك مع تعذر أن نبين أن الحال واحدة مع الحدوث ورفعها، وذاته غير معلومة. فنقول له: وما في جواز حدوثه وألا يحدث من الدلالة على إثبات مخصص مع علمنا

¹⁹ لم يكن: إضافة في الهامش.

²⁰ يُعلم: نعلم.

²¹ يُعلم: نعلم.

بحاجة فعل زيد إليه على سبيل الجملة باضطرار،
وتفصيلاً استدلالاً بوقوعه بحسب قصده؟ فحال
الجسم مفارقة لذلك لما لم يعلم حاجته إلى
الفاعل على سبيل الجملة باضطرار، ولا علم²²
وقوعه بحسب قصده اضطراراً، فنستدل بذلك
على حاجته فنعلم تفصيلاً. فقد بان لك استحالة
استدلاله.

الفصل السادس في استحالة إثبات
فاعل الأجسام بحملها على الصفات
المتجددة من قبلنا للأجسام
اعلم أنا نحمل الجسم على ما يحدث من قبلنا
في إثبات الفاعل بطرد علة الحاجة، وهو الحدوث،
[16]

حسب ما قد بُين في غير موضع. وهذا الرجل لم
يستدل بمنه الدلالة لاستحالة أصولها على
مذهبه، بل خطأها²³. واعلم أن هذه الدلالة
لا تصح على أصله على وجهين، فعدل عنها إلى
ما قدمنا إفساده على أصله. وأحد
الوجهين هو أن الذي يصح تجديده منا صفات للأجسام،
ولم يصح منا جعل ذات ذاتاً، والجسم فقد
صار ذاتاً على قوله بعد أن كان غير ذات،
فأكثر ما في الباب أن تكون الصفة المتجددة
لا الذات بعد كونها ذاتاً تُحمل على
الصفات، فمحال لما لم يشترك في أمر من الأمور
يصح أن يكون علة لعلنا ضرورة على سبيل
الجملة بالفرق بين تجدد كون الذات ذاتاً وبين
تجدد الصفة على الذات الثابتة، فأى نسبة
بينهما مع هذا الفرق الواضح؟ فإن قال:
فهذا يجري مجرى من اعترضكم على دليلكم فقال:

²² علم: ע"י.

²³ خطأها: חכאָהא.

إن الجسم مخالف للأعراض، وذلك يمنع من صحة حمل الجسم عليها، قيل له: إن الفرق بين ما قلناه في جواب هذا الاعتراض وبين ما عساك [6ب]

أن تُجيب به فرق واضح، وذلك أن الأعراض ذوات مختلفة اشتركت في صفة واحدة وهي الوجود الذي ينفيه، فلما تجدد ذلك فيها كتجدد وجود الجسم، وعلمنا أن الحاجة يصح تعليلها بتجدد الوجود الذي اشتركت فيه الأعراض المختلفة وشاركها الجسم في ذلك، فقلنا: ليس مخالفة الجسم للأعراض بأكثر من مخالفة بعضها لبعض مع أن الاشتراك في العلة حاصل. والصفات محال أن توصف بالاختلاف حقيقة، فمتى أثبتت الصفات مختلفة في التحقيق جعلتها ذوات في المعنى، فالجسم لا يقال فيه أنه مماثل للصفات ولا مخالف، بل قد يبتأ أن تجدد كون الذات ذاتاً مفارقاً لتجدد الصفة، فطريق المقايسة لا تصح. والوجه الثاني أن أصل التعليل يقتضي إثبات ذوات موجبة لغيرها صفات، فمن نفى العلل محال أن يثبت أمراً بطريقة التعليل، يبين ذلك أنا لما²⁴ عللنا حاجة الكتابة إلى كاتب بالحدوث لم يصح أن يعقل إلا بتشبيه ذلك [17]

بالعلم الموجب كون العالم عالماً وما جرى مجراه من العلل. فإذا لم يصح إثبات مؤثر على سبيل الإيجاب استحال أن يكون الحدوث موجباً. ومتى قيل: صحح الحاجة، لم يجب أن لا ينفك المصحح من المصحح، فما المانع من أن يكون الحدوث حاصلًا ويصحح الحاجة ولا

²⁴ لما: إضافة في الهامش.

يوجبها؟ وفي ذلك حصول الحدوث منفكاً من الحاجة إلى محدث، فمن أين أن الجسم لم يحدث إلا عن محدث؟ على أن الفاعل في ما بيننا المصحح لما يتجدد من صفات الأجسام دون ذلك فقط، فإثبات مصحح سواه يقف على الدليل، ولا دليل على أن الحدوث يصحح الحاجة، ويكفي في إسقاط ذلك التجويز والشك. ولهذا قلنا: إن صاحب هذه المقالة لا يمكنه إثبات قبح الكذب المنتفع به لما لم يكن تعليله²⁵ قبح الكذب الذي لا نفع فيه بعلة يمكن طردها خاصة، وقد ثبت أن النفع وجه في حسن الفعل على بعض الوجوه. وفي ذلك استحالة أن يحكم للغائب بحكم الشاهد في شيء من الأشياء. [7ب]

الفصل السابع في أن القائل بمحذه المقالة يلزمه تجويز كون الأسد والحيات من فعل إبليس وكون العالم من فعل ملائكة وما يتصل بذلك
اعلم أنا قد بينا أن صاحب هذه المقالة لا يمكنه إثبات فاعل في الغائب، وذلك يحيل تمييز ما يفعله من فعل غيره لما كان ذلك كالفرع، ونحن نتكلم على ذلك مقدراً حسب قول المتكلمين للمجبرة: إن مذهبكم يحيل [إثبات] كوننا قادرين فضلاً عن القدرة التي هي أصل للكلام في كونها مصححة أو موجبة، فبينوا فساد القول الأول وثبوت بيان ما يقتضيه القول بأن القدرة موجبة من الفساد. واعلم أن طريق معرفتنا بأن القادر منا لا يصح أن يفعل الأجسام يترتب على إثبات صفة للقادر منا وقدرة توجب ذلك وتجب²⁶ له تعالى لنفسه. وهذا

²⁵ تعليله: תעלילו.

²⁶ وتجب: ויגב.

القاتل قد نفاها عنا وعنه سبحانه، وقال: إن الفعل يصح منه لكونه ذاتاً²⁷ مخصوصة والفعل يصح منا للبنية، فلزمه أن يجوز أن يجعلنا القديم على بنية يصح منا لأجلها فعل الأجسام إذ ما [8]

يكرر²⁸ هو أن القدرة مختلفة مع أن أحكامها متفقة فلم [لا] يجوز إثبات قدرة يفعل بها الجسم ليس مخالفتها لهذه²⁹ القدرة أكثر من مخالفة بعضها لبعض؟ إلى سائر ما نذكره مما لا يمكنه القول به بل قد نفاه، فلذلك قلنا: لم لا يجوز أن يبني الله بعض الأجسام بنية يصح لأجلها جعل الجسم ذاتاً؟ بل لا يمتنع أن يكون خلق الولد في الأحشاء من فعلنا لبنية الذكر بنية مخصوصة في داخله والفرج على صفة مخصوصة وبنية مخصوصة وأن يكون من لم ينسل لكون الموضع مبنياً لا على الوجه المخصوص حسب قول الفلاسفة. وقد كان بعض شيوخ أصحابنا ممن له يد في العبراني ينزه الله تعالى عن خلق ولد³⁰ الزنا والكلام في دود القدر وخلق حشرات الأرض والفأر من التراب والفراريح من الزبل، وهذا يطرق القول بأن الأفعال واقعة بالطبع الذي لا يعقل، وكفى بالقاتل ما هذا سبيله.

الفصل الثامن في صحة التجسد عليه
تعالى والاتحاد إلى سائر ما يؤدي إليه
هذا القول من الفساد على مذهبهم

²⁷ ذاتاً: ذات.

²⁸ يكرر: نكرر.

²⁹ لهذه: إضافة في الهامش.

³⁰ ولد: مولود.

[8ب]

اعلم أن الجوهر إذا كان ذاتاً³¹ بالفاعل فيجوز أن يجعله صوتاً، بل نجعله نحن³² صوتاً مع تعذر جعلنا إياه ذاتاً، فيجب أن لا يأمن رب هذه المقالة من أن يجعل نفسه تعالى صوتاً ولوناً وطعماً وجسداً، وهو قول النصيرية خاصة في تجسد المعنى³³، ويلزمه القول بالاتحاد لأنه لولا صح أن يجعل ذاته جسداً صح امتزاجه بالأجسام، كقول النصارى ومن جرى مجراهم من القول بالحلول، لأنه معقول يصح أن يعتقد، بل قد اعتقده قوم. ونحن نبين ما يؤدي إليه ارتكاب ذلك من الفساد من بعد أن نبين أن ذلك يلزمهم ولا يلزمنا، وذلك بأن يقول القائل: إنكم أثبتتم الله تعالى موجوداً وأثبتتم أحداً مجعولاً، فما أنكرتم أن يكون متحيزاً فيما لم يزل كما كان هو³⁴ موجوداً لم يزل ويصير أحدكم متحيزاً بعد ما لم يكن ككونه موجوداً بعد أن لم يكن؟ فنحن نلزمكم ما ألزمتونا على أصل لكم وأنتم ألزمتونا ما ألزمتونا على نصيب من التشكيك من غير إشارة إلى ما أشرنا إليه في إلزامكم، والجواب أن الانفصال ينبنى على أصول رب المقالة، فنحن إذا...³⁵

[٩]

المدرک وما جرى مجراه من تصحيح الإدراك وكونه مدرکاً لما يرجع إلى كونه حياً الواجب عن صفة ذاته لم يجوز أن لا يكون حياً واستحال أن لا يكون مدرکاً مع وجود المدرک، فلم يجوز أيضاً أن لا يكون

³¹ ذاتاً: דאָת.

³² نحن: إضافة في الهامش.

³³ المعنى: بياض في الأصل.

³⁴ هو: إضافة في الهامش.

³⁵ سقطت ورقة أو أكثر من الأصل بين ورقة 8 وورقة 9.

عالمًا لما كان كونه عالمًا مستنداً إلى صفة ذاته، ولذلك وجب أن يكون عالمًا بكل المعلومات واستحال لذلك الجهل، فما الموجب لاختصاصه بجهة حتى يستحيل عليه سواها مع كونه بصفة الجوهر المقتضية لتحيزه، بل مع كونه متحيزاً المصحح لاختصاصه بالجهات على سبيل البدل من غير مزية؟ وإذا لم يمكن الإشارة إلى وجه يحصل لأجله اختصاصه³⁶ بجهة دون جهة بطل التشبيه والتمثيل الذي أوردته في سؤالك. فإن قال: إني أفصل مما ألزمتومني على أصلي، وهو أن الفاعل يجب أن يؤثر في غيره لا في نفسه، فلذلك لم يصح أن يجعل ذاته متحيزة، قيل له: إن الانفصال بالمذهب من غير دليل على صحته لا يجوز، سيما أن بناء أمرك على الشكوك ولم يسمع منك دليل على ذلك لأنك نفيت المؤثرات التي تثبتها، بل أثبتت [9ب]

الفاعل مؤثراً، فمحال أن تعلم استحالة كون الفاعل مؤثراً في نفسه ابتداء، ولا دليل يمنع من ذلك، بل متى أثبت للعالم منا صفة لم يكن بد من أن تكون حاصلة بالفاعل، فأجعل نفسي عالمًا بل معتقداً ومريداً وظاناً، وقد مضى في كلام الرجل ما دل على نفي صفة العالم، بل أثبت التعلق بينه وبين معلومه، وقد أبطلناه بالنقض. وإذا لم يمكن دفع كوننا معتقدين ومدركين فما وقع من ذلك بحسب دواعينا ينبغي أن يكون من قبلنا إما بحيث نوجد الاعتقاد الموجب لذلك وإما بأن نجعل أنفسنا معتقدة كجعله تعالى إيانا عالمين من غير إيجاد معنى بل بالفاعل، وفي ذلك إبطال ما دفعت به ما ألزمتك. فإن قال: إنما يصح من الفاعل أن يكسب الذات صفة متى كانت الذات ذاتاً

³⁶ اختصاصه: إضافة في الهامش.

به، وإذا لم يصح أن يجعل ذاته ذاتاً لم يصح أن يجعلها صوتاً ولا لوناً ولا جسداً، قيل له: إن ذلك يُبطل قولك: إنا نجعل الأجسام أصواتاً وأخباراً، إلى سائر ما أُخَوِّجُك إليه [10أ]

نفيك الأعراض. فإذا صح أن نكسب الباقي صفة مع استحالة جعلنا إياه ذاتاً، فما المانع من أن يُكسب ذاته التحيز فيصير جسداً متّحداً بغيره؟ ولا أقلّ من الشك في ذلك. فإن قال: إنا وإن أكسبنا الذات صفة في حال بقائها، فإن صحة ذلك مشروطة بتجدّد كونها ذاتاً بفاعل ما، وإذا لم تكن ذاته تعالى متجددة لم يصح أن يكسبها صفة، قيل له: وما دليلك على ما ادّعيته؟ أوليس تعري الدعوى من حجة يقتضي قبح القول بها؟ فإن قال: لأن تجويز ذلك يؤدّي إلى الفساد الذي زعمت أنك تثبته من بعد، قيل له: إنك قلت بقول طرّق عليك هذا الإلزام المؤدّي إلى الفساد الذي نذكره من بعد، فينبغي أن تترك الأول وتقول بما نقول به حتى لا يلزمك ما يؤدّي إلى الفساد. وذاك أنا بينا أن هاهنا صفات متجددة زعمت أنها بالفاعل وأنها متى انتفت المعاني وجب أن ترجع إلى الفاعل، فنجعل أنفسنا معتقدة، [10ب]

فوجب أن تجوّز جعل نفسه تعالى جسداً، [و]تُستتظر هل تجويز ذلك يؤدّي إلى فساد؟ فينبغي أن يمنع من كون الذات ذاتاً بالفاعل، إلى سائر ما يجري هذا المجرى. فإن قال: إن كون الذات صوتاً يفتقر إلى تحيزها³⁷ وما يلزمه جعل ذاته تعالى صوتاً، فكما يستحيل

³⁷ تحيزها: אלתחيزהא.

أن يكون الخبر خبراً من دون كونه كلاماً، كذلك
يستحيل كونه صوتاً من دون التحيز، قيل له: قد
بيّنّا أنه يلزمك أن تحيز جعل نفسه متحيزة،
وفي ذلك جواز جعلها كلاماً وألماً، وإنما يصح
أن تقتصر الصفات بعضها إلى بعض تبعاً
لافتقار الذوات بعضها إلى بعض، ومتى لم
يكن هاهنا ذوات لم يصح الافتقار. يبين ذلك
أن القدرة لما افتقرت إلى الحياة يجب
افتقار ما يجب عنها من كون القادر قادراً
إلى كونه حياً على سبيل التبع، ولو لم يعلم ذلك
في الشاهد لم يصح أن يعلم في الغائب، بل يجب
أن يستحيل اعتقاده وتصوّره. فأما
افتقار كون الخبر خبراً إلى كونه أصواتاً
فمن حيث أن ذلك حدوث على وجه كالأحكام والقبح
[111]

التابع للحدوث إلى ما شاكلهما. فأما
الكلام فيما يؤدّي هذا القول إليه من الفساد فهو أن
تجويز جعله جسداً يقتضي تجويز جعله نفسه
إنساناً، بل جسداً قادراً على الإضرار بنا
في فعل ذلك لحسنه وحكمته، فلا يكون لنا
منعه مما هذا سبيله لكونه رباً إلهياً
معبوداً جعل نفسه جسداً لما رآه من
الصواب، أو اتّحد بالإنسان كما قال النصارى
أن اللاهوت اتّحد بالناسوت أو حلّ فيه.
فإذا قال: إني أستحق العبادّة، يجب أن
نحوّز صدقه، بل قد نطن ذلك إذا رأيناه
على خصال الفضل من علم وشجاعة وجود وكرم،
بل إذا وجدت المعجزات في داره وبيته يشرف
ويعظم في أنفسنا حسب قول الصوفية ويجب أن
نصبر على ضرره، وكل ذلك يجعله القول بأن
الذات ذات بالفاعل، بل يجب أن لا يؤمن خروجه
من كونه ذاتاً لما لم يعلم أن هاهنا ذاتاً

يجب أن يرجع حكمها إلى كونها كذلك فلا تخرج
عن ما تستحقه لذلك، لما لم يكن لصاحب هذه
[11ب]

المقالة دليل على ما هذا سبيله. وقد بينتُ
في المسائل التنيسية أن الذوات مع اختلافها
حالتها على سواء في استحالة خروجها من أن تكون
ذاتاً واستحالة تجددتها ذاتاً وإبطال
كونها بالفاعل حسب ما تجده هناك إن شاء
الله.

الفصل التاسع في أن القوم
لا يمكنهم نفي القبيح عنه تعالى
اعلم أن دليلنا على ذلك لا يصح على
أصلهم من حيث أنه راجع إلى استخراج
علة وطردها، وقد بينّا أن نفيهم العلة
الحقيقية الموجبة يقتضي نفي ما يقدر
تقديرها حسب ما بينّا في إثبات
المحدث أنا نمثل وقوف الحاجة إلى محدث
على³⁸ الحدوث بوقوف صفة العالم على العلم،
إذ بقاء الفعل يحيل حاجته إلى الفاعل،
فكذلك الكلام فيه إذا كان معدوماً،
فاستمرار الحال في مقارنة الحاجة إلى
الحدوث يجري مجرى استمرار الحال في مقارنة
[11أ]

كون الواحد عالماً لوجود العلم، فكما يجب أن
يكون علمه كذلك ما يجري مجراه. فإذا لم
يكن هناك علم يكون علة ولا غيره فما الذي
يوجب كون الحدوث علة في الحاجة؟ وما في مقارنة
أحدهما للآخر على سبيل الاستمرار
مما يوجب حملة³⁹ سوى ما علمنا حاجته

³⁸ على: אל.ל.

³⁹ حملة: חמל.

المقتزنة بحدوثه إليه من وجوب إجراء ذلك في غير
المعلوم؟ ونحن إنما يسعنا⁴⁰ القياس لما
علمنا أن العلم الموجود في قلبي إذا أوجب
كوني عالماً فلذاته يوجب، فما مثله مما
ذاته كذاته يجب أن يوجب مثل ما أوجبه.
فما جرى مجراه من وقوف الحاجة على الحدوث
يجب أن يحكم له بحكمه. وربما قالوا: إن
العلم، وإن لم يكن ثابتاً، فلنا أن تقدر
ثبوته وإيجابه ويمجري حكم الحاجة مع
الحدوث مجرى ذلك. والجواب: إن تشبيه الشيء
بالشيء وحمله عليه يصح إذا كان ثابتاً
معلوماً. فأما إذا كان مقدراً كان
الحمل مثله أيضاً، فكما أن الأصل محال فينبغي
[12ب]

أن يكون ما حمل عليه ومثل به محالاً أيضاً،
وما هذا سبيله كيف يصح الاستشهاد به؟
وإنما تقدر ما هو مقدمة في الدلالة
تقديراً⁴¹ لنبين أن ثبوت ذلك يؤدي إلى الفساد
فيمنع ما قدرناه لما أدى إليه من
الفساد. بيان ذلك أن نقول: لو كان جسماً لوجب
أن يدل تأليفه على حدوثه تعالى، وفي فساد
ذلك دلالة على أنه ليس بجسم، فمقدمات
الأدلة لا بد من أن تكون مقدر، وخاصة
إذا كان الغرض بذلك النفي، وبمثل ذلك ننفي
الثاني له تعالى. نعود إلى ما نحن بسبيله
فنقول: إن العالم الغني في الشاهد لا يختار
القيح بدلالة أن المخير بين صدق وكذب
نفعه فيهما على سواء يعدل إلى الحسن، والعلة
في ذلك⁴² العلم بالقبح والغنى، فنطرد هذه

⁴⁰ يسعنا: תסלנא.

⁴¹ الدلالة تقديراً: بين الكلمتين علامة لا تقرأ.

⁴² ذلك: תלך.

العلة إلى الغائب تشبيهاً بالعلل الموجبة
من نحو القُدْر والعلوم، فإذا لم يكن هناك علل
في التحقيق لم يصح التشبيه والتمثيل.
ولقائل أن يقول لصاحب المقالة: ما أنكرت
[13أ]

أن حال القديم مفارقة لحال المحدث لما
كانت أفعاله تابعة لدواعيه من نحو اجتلاب
النفع ودفع الضرر، فإذا لم يكن ينتفع بما
هذا سبيله لم يفعله، ولا نعلم كيف حال الغائب،
والتعليل غير صحيح لأن المؤثر ليس إلا الفاعل
وعلة، فليست⁴³ في الحقيقة فكان يمكن أن يشبه بها
غيرها، وما نحن بسبيله ليس من تأثير الفاعل،
فما المانع من كونه فاعلاً للقيح؟ علي
أن القديم لا حال له، بل أثبتته متعلقاً
بمعلوم ومقدور، وإن لم يكن المقدور معدوماً
على ما نقول، بل الفعل يصح منه لكونه ذاتاً
مخصوصة، وكذلك يتعلق بمعلومه مع نفي
سائر الأحوال التي تثبت لها تعالى، فأثبتته
مجرد ذات على الوجه الذي إذا لم تعلم⁴⁴
الذات بالعلم المفصل المميز للمعلوم كان
العلم مجملاً، فالقديم إذاً لا يصح أن يعلم
مفصلاً، فمن أين أنه متعلق بسائر المعلومات؟
وليس له أن يرد ذلك علينا لأننا تثبت [كونه]⁴⁵
حياً المصحح لكونه عالماً بكل المعلومات
[13ب]

راجعاً إلى صفة ذاته المصححة لكونه عالماً
بواسطة كونه حياً والموجبة⁴⁶ لكونه عالماً لا

⁴³ فليست: فليس.

⁴⁴ تعلم: نعلم.

⁴⁵ تثبت [كونه]: נתבחה.

⁴⁶ والموجبة: ומוגבה.

بواسطة، فصارت صفة نفسه مصححة لكونه
 عالماً وموجبة على الوجه المذكور، فيجب أن يكون
 عالماً بسائر المعلومات إذ حكم نفسه مع
 الكل على سواء، فليس بأن يعلم البعض أولى من
 سواه على ما قد بين علماء التوحيد. وعلى
 قوله لا صفة له ولا حال يرجع إلى الذات ولا
 إلى معنى ولا بالفاعل، فهو إذا مثبتته على
 حد لو نفاه ما زادت الحال. ولما قلناه وجب
 إثباته واحداً مختصاً بصفة يستحيل
 أن يشاركه فيها مشارك وبصفات يستحيل
 أن يشاركه في وجه استحقاقها غيره، والعلم
 بذلك يبنني على إثبات صفاته على وجه
 مخصوص لا يمكن الخصم القول بذلك، فكيف
 يمكنه أن يقول: إن علمه بقبح القبيح وبغناؤه⁴⁷ يصرفه
 عن ذلك، على طريق المقايسة أم بدليل
 مبتدأ؟ فإن قال: بل على طريق المقايسة
 على علة معلومة، فما يبيّنه من استحالة
 [14]

التعليل على مذهبه يمنع من ذلك. فإن قال:
 بل بدليل مبتدأ، فذلك مفقود لا محالة
 لأننا لا نتصوره ولا يخطر ببالنا، بل إنما
 نحكم له تعالى بحكم⁴⁸ من يجيّر بين صدق وكذب نفعه
 فيهما على سواء ونعلل استحالة فعله
 بالعلة المذكورة ونطردها في الغائب. ومن ادّعى
 على ذلك دليلاً سوى المقايسة وطرد العلة
 كمدعي إثبات دلالة على عدد نجوم السماء
 وكيل الرمل وماء البحر. وأهل هذه المقالة
 الجديدة ربّما وهموا فيما لا⁴⁹ يمكنهم إظهار

⁴⁷ وبغناؤه: إضافة في الهامش.

⁴⁸ بحكم: إضافة في الهامش.

⁴⁹ لا: إضافة في الهامش.

الخلاف فيه أن هناك على ذلك أدلة لم يظفر بها علماء التوحيد، وينبغي أن يدعي بها صاحب المقال مقالة الإعجاز إن كان قد ظفر بأمر لم يظفروا به. وقيل له على ما بلغني: إنه لو كان لك دليل لعقبت به لما أفسدت أدلة العلماء، وذلك لا محالة يدل على أنه لا دليل له إلا: إمّا الأعراس التي نذكرها وما ينبني عليها، وإمّا الصفات التي تذكر تقريباً، وفيها من إمكان الخلاف [14ب]

ما هو أشد من الخلاف في إثبات الأعراس لأن الباطل محال أن يبلغ مبلغ الحقيقة. الفصل العاشر في أنه لا يمكنه إثبات الله تعالى واحداً، بل قد ألغى ذلك في كتابه، من حيث أن بناء الاستدلال على كونه واحداً يرجع إلى كونه⁵⁰ قادراً ومريداً، وقد ذكر في كتاب المنع والتمنع على ذلك عشرة أدلة وزدنا عليها

اعلم أنه إذا لم يثبت الله تعالى قادراً ولا مريداً فسائر الأدلة تبطل، وعليه أن يجوز أن يكون معه ذوات لم تنزل ثابتة على حد ثبوته، وإن لم يثبتته موجوداً، بل يصح الفعل منه. والذي يمكن أن يقال أنه يمكن أن يستدل به هو ما نقوله من أن المقدور الواحد لا يصح أن يكون مقدوراً لقادريْن، ولو كان معه ثان لوجب أن يكون مقدورهما واحداً، وهو وإن لم يثبت قادراً ولا مقدوراً فقد أثبت فعلاً وفاعلاً، فيمكن أن يقول: إن

⁵⁰ واحداً يرجع إلى كونه: إضافة في الهامش.

[15]

إثبات ثاني⁵¹ معه تعالى يؤدّي إلى إثبات
 فعل من فاعلين وذلك يستحيل، فهذا من أقوى
 ما يصح أن يستدل به، وذلك فاسد.
 وكذلك إذا استدل باستحالة تغيّرهما
 وتمييز أحدهما من الآخر في قول في الدليل
 الأول أن إثبات استحالة فعل من فاعلين
 ينبني على استحالة كون المقدور الواحد
 مقدوراً لقادرين، وهو أنه كان يجب إذا
 قصده أحدهما أن يقع وإذا كرهه
 الآخر يجب أن لا يقع، فإذا استحال مقدور
 لقادرين استحال فعل من فاعلين. فإذا
 لم يكن هناك مقدور فما المانع من صحة [فعل]
 من فاعلين؟ بل نحن نجد محمولاً من حاملين
 ومحرّكاً لمحرّكين، وكيف يدعى استحالة
 الفعل من فاعلين، بل ما المانع من صحة أن
 يفعل أحدهما غير ما يفعله الآخر، فلا
 يؤدّي إلى إثبات فعل من فاعلين؟ وإنما وجب
 علي قولنا كون مقدور أحدهما مقدوراً
 للآخر من حيث أن كونهما قادرين يرجع

[15ب]

إلى النفس وذلك متماثل للاشتراك في
 القَدَمَ الراجع إلى الذات، فلا اختصاص
 لأحدهما بالمقدور المعين ما ليس للآخر
 به من الاختصاص، وكون الفاعل فاعلاً إذا
 لم يرجع إلى الذات فيجب اشتراك الفاعلين
 فيه، بل ذلك يرجع إلى الاختيار والداعي، فما
 المانع من كون أحدهما فاعلاً والآخر غير
 فاعل والوقت واحد؟ بل عليه أن يجوز كون أحدهما

⁵¹ ثاني: ثانوي.

نوراً والآخر ظلمةً وأن يمتزجا على ما
 ذهب إلىه الثنوية، إمّا بأن يتجسدا
 وإمّا⁵² أن يكونا لم يزل كذلك، بل الامتزاج
 والاتحاد لا مانع منه على قوله على ما
 مضى شرح ذلك، ولصحة دخول الاشتباه
 فيما هذا سبيله اجتهد علماء التوحيد
 في إثبات الذوات متميزة بأنفسها
 وأن الامتزاج لا يغير حكم الذات، كما
 أن اجتماع الأعراض في المحل لا يغير
 ما هي عليه في أنفسها، فالنور محال أن يكون
 مؤثراً وفاعلاً لا بمفرده ولا إذا
 [16]

امتزج مع سواه، وكذلك الكلام في الظلمة،
 وبينوا استحالة وقوع الفعل إلا من حي قادر
 من حكم كونه قادراً صحة الفعل منه، حتى لو
 كان النور مما يصح أن يفعل لوجب صحة أن يفعل
 الشر والخير على سواء، وكذلك الكلام في الظلمة،
 وأبطلوا قولهم إجماعاً مطبوعاً فالنور يفعل
 الخير بطبعه والظلمة تفعل الشر بطبعها،
 بل أثبتوا القديم قادراً على الشر كقدرته
 على الخير، وأن امتناعه من ذلك للوجه المقدم
 ذكره في الفصل المتقدم. فمن أخل بما
 ذكرناه لم يكن له سبيل إلى إثبات التوحيد،
 وإذا استحال معرفته ذلك استحال ما
 يترتب عليه من علم العدل، فينبغي أن تحكم
 الأصول لتكون الفروع مبنية عليها.
 فأما الدليل الثاني، وهو استحالة تميز
 أحد القديمين من الآخر، فذلك وإن كان دليلاً
 واضحاً فإن نافي الأعراض لا يصح أن

⁵² يتجسدا وإمّا: יתגסד או אמא.

يستدل بذلك على كونه تعالى واحداً، وذلك
أنه يثبت صفات في حكم المتماثلة لموصوف
[16ب]

واحد على وجه لا يمكن تمييز القليل من الكثير
حسب ما ذكرناه في الدلالة الرابعة⁵³ من هذا
الكتاب على إثبات الأعراض، فقلنا: إن
القول بنفي المعاني يؤدي إلى استحالة التمانع
وإلى أن يبطل الفرق بين الخفيف والثقيل. فقال: إني
أثبت للثقيل صفات كثيرة تمنع من نقل
الثقيل. فقلنا: إن كثرة الصفات لا يعقل إلا
بكثرة المعاني لأن الصفات في التحقيق لا
تتزايد إلا تبعاً لتزايد الموجب، فتغايرها
محال أن يعقل ولا موجب متغاير تحقيقاً
ولا تقديراً، فكيف يحصل التمييز؟ فلو كانت
الصفات وحالها ما ذكرنا صفة واحدة ما
زادت الحال، وإذا كان⁵⁴ ذلك⁵⁵ قوله في صفات
المتمانعين وفي نقل الثقيل فما المانع من
إثبات ذوات يستحيل أن تتميز، فلا يعرف
قلتها من كثرتها؟ بل التجويز حاصل وهو المراد.
فقد بان لك أنه لا يصح لهم إثبات شيء من
علوم التوحيد ولا من علوم العدل لأن العلم
بالعدل يترتب على العلم بأنه لا يصح أن يفعل إلا [قبيح] ...

⁵³ الدلالة الرابعة: بين الكلمتين علامة لا تقرأ.

⁵⁴ كان: إضافة في الهامش.

⁵⁵ ذلك: כדלך، ثم محيت د.

EXCERPT FROM PART TWO OF SAHL B. AL-FADL
AL-TUSTARĪ'S *MAQDISIYĀT*

TRANSLATION

You have asked about the reason for dismissing the method they employ in setting forth grounds and drawing analogies, and [you asked] to present examples which clarify this position. You have said: one always hears from them that whoever deviates from the method of setting forth grounds and drawing analogies is unable to prove the existence of the Originator of the world and many other objects of knowledge by way of demonstration. Likewise, [they claim] that whoever does not affirm entitative determinants (*ma'ānī*) is unable to prove things like that.

Reply

Know that our proof of the temporality of the world and the existence of its Originator, mighty and glorious is He, has indicated the falseness of their claim mentioned by you that this is impossible for anyone who deviates from their method of setting forth grounds and drawing analogies and of affirming the reality of accidents (*a'rād*). It has, moreover, shown the falsity of most of their principles (*uṣūl*), not to mention any need to build upon them. Thus, it is futile to discuss this with them. In regard to demonstrating the falseness of the method of setting forth grounds employed by them, we have assumed that, when you asked us to demonstrate this, you were aiming at their method in proving the existence of the Originator of the world in order to relate this question to it. Therefore we shall discuss this and then follow it up with a brief discussion of what is sound and what is false in their method of setting forth grounds, in order to answer your query in the most conclusive manner, and we seek help from God.

Before elaborating the falsity of what they mention in this regard, I say that their claim mentioned by you that we are unable to prove the existence of the Originator and the like of it without adopting the method followed by them, is contrary to fact. That is because by the [way] they follow it is not possible to reach what they want regardless of whether their method is sound in some respect or not. For the [method of] drawing analogies followed by them in the proof for the existence of the Originator of the world—with its remoteness and

the impossibility of deducing a proof by it, except for someone who knows the subtle points of *kalām* theology and is completely trained in it, so that he knows the proof for the attribute of existence in detail while, for knowledge of that, he needs knowledge of nonexistent beings and their essential attributes and of [the attributes] entailed by these; for detailed knowledge of the attribute of existence is acquired when it becomes known that this is the attribute with which no being can dispense for entailing what it entails by itself, since it has no reality but being a condition for that; yet the condition is only known to be a condition when it is known what entails it and what is entailed by it despite the difficulty of knowing that, for this is the utmost skilled minds can reach in this matter—yet despite this extreme difficulty, their method is testimony for the correctness of what we have discussed before.

We have said: he requires detailed knowledge regarding the attribute of existence which they prattle about, because the argument [for the existence of the Originator] is based on that our actions require us and that the reason for their requiring us is their origination. If it is valid that origination is a cause then everything originated requires an originator. Origination is, however, existence from a beginning, it is not innovation (*tajaddud*) of any attribute that occurs. For in their view the attributes providing grounds (*ṣifāt al-ʿilāl*) and others are innovated and their being due to an agent is inadmissible, let alone their being a ground for the need for him. Thus innovation is not the cause, the cause rather is this attribute when it is innovated, regardless of whether the combination of that is the cause or whether one of the two is the cause while the other is the condition; and it is inadmissible to separate one of the two from the other, otherwise the proof is vitiated by what has been said before about the attributes providing grounds and others. Thus, as we have said, a detailed knowledge about the attribute of existence is inevitably needed. Everything we have previously said to be required in its proof must then precede the knowledge of the proof for the existence of the Originator, nay, even the knowledge of the origination of the world. For, according to their doctrine, whoever seeks knowledge of its origination must seek knowledge of the innovation of this attribute [of existence], since the essence of the world is not innovated according to them. It is known, however, that this can only be reached when the validity of what they require for the proof of the origination of the world and the proof for the existence of its Originator has been established. For knowledge of detailed discussion about the essential and entailed attributes, their conditions and related

matters is possible only after knowledge of what precedes it. Then that is dispensible, however, for it is sought only for its sake.

Moreover, most of this is based on the presumption that a being is not a being through an agent and there being no consideration for other attributes in whatever occurs, such as occupying space, despite the need to affirm it as an attribute. The falsity of all this has been previously explained by us. Yet their arguments in this context are specious points (*shubah*) which induce neither conviction nor surmise, let alone knowledge. Furthermore, they ground their premises on their conclusions, while their conclusions raise their premises, and their premises invalidate their conclusions. For they dismiss the knowledge that a being is in a position in space because of the agent by considering the state of someone capable of speech and the like and arguing that he is able to produce anything additional to its existence only by his capacity to existentiate. Thus they make the basis in this that in which the need [for explanation] occurred. For we divert capability to existentiation only after recognizing the impossibility of its being attached to speech itself and similar known matters, so that, when this is impossible in regard to them, it is recognized that capability is attached to something else. Thus they made the path to the proof for existence additional to the motion itself, because the one capable of speech is capable of what is additional to its existence only after the capability to existentiate it. Yet existence has not been established either in it or in anything else. This is, however, what is sought in the proof, for what is wanted by it is that the capability of the capable is not attached to the apparent states of action, such as moving bodies and making them rest and producing sounds and the like, but rather is attached to another attribute that, when it occurs in the essences of these things, such as motion, rest, sound and others, it entails these things by attributes with which they are qualified. Thus they made the affirmation of this attribute the foundation of the discussion, while it is what was sought by the demonstration, and they rendered the capability of the capable for what it is apparently attached to uncertain, while this is what is known, in order to reach through it the unknown, so that it become established in the state of the known. This is so because the one capable of speech can be proved to be so only after proof that he is capable of moving his tongue and the like, for the only way to know his being capable of his speech is the movement of his tongue and his lips and his pressure by them. If this is known at the beginning of the demonstration, its result cannot be that he is incapable of it, otherwise

its beginning would contradict its end. If it is not known, however, its premises are invalid, let alone its result, since it is not established that he is capable of speech, not to mention that through the modality of his capability of it one could arrive at the negation of his being capable of motion. Rather, his being capable of it is recognized when his capability of moving is known, from which it results. Thus the beginning of the demonstration contradicts its end, even though the modality of the capability of the capable is firmly established, while they have turned it into a doubtful matter in order to remove it by the demonstration and to establish the unknown with the like of its description of occurring according to intentions and motives and the like, in spite of the glare of faultiness in this.

Thus it has become clear to you that by their craft it is impossible to reach anything they seek to prove, rather than by our doctrine. Our objective here is not to explain this, for we have already investigated it at length. Our intention is rather to point out that what they have said [about us] attaches only to them and properly applies only to their method. The amount we have mentioned about this is sufficient, and we have already examined this in our discussion about the negation of accidents being entities. Later on we shall explain that from the course of their talk there follows necessarily the eternity of the world, besides the inability of proving the existence of its Originator.

منتزع من الجزء الثاني من المقدسيات

[2أب]

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
مسألة

وسألت عن إبعاد ما يستعملونه في التعليل والمقايضة،
وإيراد أمثلة ينكشف بها القول في ذلك. قلت:
والمسموع منهم دائماً أن من يجيد عن طريق التعليل
والمقايضة لا يتم له إثبات محدث العالم ولا كثير
من المعلومات من طريق الاستدلال، وكذلك من لا
يثبت المعاني يتعذر عليه مثل ذلك.

الجواب

اعلم أن ما دللنا به على حدث العالم وإثبات محدثه
عز وجل قد دل على فساد ما ذكرت من ادعائهم
أن ذلك لا يتم لمن عدل عن طريقهم من التعليل والمقايضة
وإثبات الأعراض مع دلالة مع ذلك على فساد
أكثر أصولهم فضلاً عن أن يحتاج إلى أن يبنى

[3أ]

عليها، فلا فائدة في الكلام معهم في ذلك.
فأما إفساد ما يستعملونه من التعليل فإننا قد ظننا
أنك قصدت فيه ما يتعلق بطريقهم على إثبات محدث
العالم لتعليق هذه المسألة به عند ما سألتنا
الدلالة عليه، فنحن متكلمون على ذلك ومتبعوه
من بعد بما يصح من طريقهم في التعليل ويفسد على
سبيل الإيجاز لنكون قد أخذنا في إجابتك بالوقت، وبالله نستعين.
وأقول قبل الكلام في إفساد ما يذكرونه في ذلك
أن الذي ذكرته عنهم من قولهم أنه لا يصح لنا إثبات المحدث
وما جرى مجراه من دون ما يسلكونه من الطريقة الأمر
فيه بالعكس من ذلك، وذلك أن الذي يسلكونه
هو الذي لا يصح به التوصل إلى ما يريدونه سواءً صح
طريقهم على وجه ما أو لا وذلك أن الذي يسلكونه

[3أب]

من المقايسة في إثبات محدث العالم فإنه
مع بعده وتعذر¹ الاستدلال به إلا لمن علم دقيق الكلام
وارتاض فيه الارتياض التام فعلم إثبات صفة
الوجود تفصيلاً مع حاجته في العلم بذلك إلى العلم
بالذوات المعدومة وصفاتها الذاتيات والمقتضيات²
عن هذه الصفات لأن تفصيل صفة الوجود
إنما يحصل متى علم أنها الصفة التي لا تستغني الذات
عنها في اقتضاءها ما تقتضيه لنفسها إذ لا
حقيقة لها إلا أنها شرط في ذلك، ولا³ يعلم الشرط
شرطاً إلا متى علم ما فيه يكون شرطاً من المقتضي
والمقتضى⁴ مع صعوبة العلم بذلك، لأن هذا
غاية [ما] يصل إليه⁵ الحذاق بهذا الشأن، بل مع
تعذره، [يدل] على ما يشهد بصحة ما سلف من كلامنا.
[4أ]

وإنما قلنا: إنه⁶ يحتاج فيه إلى العلم بتفصيل ما يهذون
به من صفة الوجود لأن مبنى الاستدلال على
أن أفعالنا محتاجة إلينا وأن علة حاجتها إلينا
حدوثها، فإذا صح في الحدوث كونه علة فكل
محدث يحتاج إلى محدث، والحدوث فهو الوجود
عن أول وليس هو تجدد أي صفة اتفقت، وذلك
أن صفات العلل عندهم وغيرها⁷ متجددة ولا
يصح كونها بفاعل، فضلاً عن أن تكون علة في الحاجة
إليه، فكان التجدد ليس هو العلة، وإنما العلة

¹ وتعذر: وبعد، أ؛ + (حاشية) وبعد، ب.

² والمقتضيات: والمقتضات، أ.ب.

³ ولا: فلا، أ.

⁴ والمقتضى: والمقتضا، ب.

⁵ يصل إليه: يذهله (؟)، أ؛ يصل إليه به، ب.

⁶ إنه: بأنه، ب.

⁷ وغيرها: وعمرها (؟)، أ.

تلك الصفة متى تجددت سواء كان مجموع ذلك هو العلة أو أحدهما العلة والآخر شرط، ولا يصح انفراد أحدهما في ذلك عن صاحبه وإلا فسد الدليل بما تقدم من صفات العلل وغيرها، فلم يكن بد من الحاجة كما قلنا إلى تفصيل [41ب]

صفة الوجود. فوجب تقدم جميع ما قدمنا أنه يحتاج في إثباتها إليه للعلم بإثبات المحدث، بل للعلم بمحدث العالم، إذ من التمس العلم بمحدثه فعلى مذهبه إنما التمس العلم بتجدد هذه الصفة، إذ ذات العالم ليست⁸ متجددة عندهم، ومعلوم⁹ أن ذلك لا يتم إلا بعد صحة ما يحتاجون في إثباتها إليه من حدوث العالم وإثبات محدثه، إذ لا يصح العلم بتفصيل الكلام في الصفات الذاتية والمقتضيات¹⁰ وشروطها وما يتعلق بذلك إلا بعد العلم بما تقدم، وفي ذلك الغنى عنه إذ لأجله يراد. ومع ذلك فمبنى جمهوره على أن الكائن لا يكون كائناً بالفاعل، ولا عبدة للحصول¹¹ على غيره من الصفات نحو التحيز مع الحاجة إلى إثباته صفة مع ما قد بيناه [51أ]

من فساد كل ذلك، مع كون ما يحتاجون به في ذلك شُبهاً لا يحصل بها إقناع¹² ولا ظن فضلاً عن علم، مع بنائهم مقدماهم على نتائجهم وكون أواخرها رافعة لأوائلها وأوائلها ناقضة لأواخرها، وذلك أنهم يدفعون¹³ العلم بأن الكائن في الجهة بالفاعل باعتبار

⁸ ليست: ليس، أ.

⁹ ومعلوم: معلوم، أ.

¹⁰ المقتضيات: النفسيات، أ.ب.

¹¹ للحصول: الحاصل، ب.

¹² إقناع: إقناعاً، ب.

¹³ يدفعون: يرفعون + (حاشية) ط يدفعون، أ.

حال القادر على الكلام وما يجري مجراه وأنه لا يقدر على جعله على ما زاد على الوجود إلا مع قدرته على الوجود، فيجعلون الأصل في ذلك ما فيه وقعت الحاجة، وذلك أنا إنما نصرف القدرة إلى الوجود بعد العلم باستحالة تعلّقها بنفس الكلام وما يجري مجراه من الأمور المعلومة حتى إذا استحال ذلك فيها علم أن القدرة إنما تعلّقت بغيرها، فجعلوا¹⁴ الطريق إلى إثبات الوجود زائداً¹⁵ [أ5ب]

على ذات التحرك، [و] هو أن القادر على الكلام إنما قدر على ما زاد على وجوده بعد القدرة على وجوده، والوجود فلم يثبت لا فيه ولا في غيره، وذلك هو الملتبس بالدليل لأن المراد به أن قدرة القادر لا تتعلق¹⁶ بظاهر أحوال التصرف من نحو تحريك¹⁷ الأجسام وتسكينها والتصويت وما جرى مجراه وإنما تتعلق بصفة سوى ذلك إذا حصلت لذوات هذه الأشياء نحو الحركة والسكون والصوت وغيرها اقتضت هذه الأمور لصفات هي عليها. فجعلوا إثبات هذه الصفة هي قاعدة الكلام، وهو المطلوب بالاستدلال، وجعلوا كون القادر قادراً للمتعلق¹⁸ بالظاهر¹⁹ مشكوكاً، وهو المعلوم²⁰، ليتوصل به إلى المجهول حتى يثبت على [أ6]

ما عليه حال المعلوم، وذلك لأن القادر على الكلام لا يمكن إثباته قادراً على الكلام إلا بعد

¹⁴ فجعلوا: فيجعلوا، أ. ب.

¹⁵ زائداً: زائد، أ. ب.

¹⁶ تتعلق: تعلق، ب.

¹⁷ تحريك: تحرك، أ. ب.

¹⁸ للمتعلق: المتعلق، أ. ب.

¹⁹ بالظاهر: الظاهر، ب.

²⁰ المعلوم: كالضرورة (؟)، أ.

إثباته قادراً على حركة لسانه وما جرى هذا المجرى
لأنه لا سبيل إلى العلم بكونه قادراً على كلامه إلا بحركة
لسانه وشفثيه واعتماده بها²¹. وإن كان ذلك معلوماً
في أول الاستدلال فلا يصح أن يكون نتيجته أنه غير قادر
عليه، وإلا نقض مبدأه انتهاءه. وإن كان غير
معلوم فلم يصح أوائله فضلاً عن نتيجته إذ ما
ثبت قادراً على الكلام، فضلاً عن أن يتطرق
بكيفية قدرته عليه إلى نفي كونه قادراً على التحرك،
وإنما يعلم كونه قادراً عليه متى علم كونه قادراً
على التحرك الذي عنه يحصل. فناقض أول
الاستدلال آخره، مع أن كيفية كون القادر قادراً
ثابتة فيما جعلوه²² مشكوكاً ليرفعوه²³ بالاستدلال
[أ6ب]

ويثبتوا²⁴ المجهول على مثل صفته من وقوعه بحسب
القصود والدواعي وما جرى هذا المجرى، مع
ظهور الاختلال في ذلك. فقد بان لك أن صنعهم
هو الذي لا يمكن التوصل به إلى شيء مما يرومونه
دون قولنا. وليس غرضنا هاهنا الشرح لذلك
وكما نتقصاه، وإنما غرضنا التنبيه على أن ما
قالوه لا يلزم إلا لهم ولا يليق إلا بطريقتهم،
والقدر الذي ذكرناه كافٍ فيه، وقد نقصينا
ذلك في كلامنا في نفي كون الأعراض
ذواتاً، وسنبين من بعد أنه يجب على قوده
قدم العالم فضلاً عن [عجز] إثبات محدث له.

²¹ بما: لها (؟)، أ.

²² جعلوه: جعله، أ ب.

²³ ليرفعوه: ليرفعونه، ب.

²⁴ ويثبتوا: ويثبتون، أ ب.

EXCERPT FROM SAHL B. AL-FADL AL-TUSTARĪ'S
BOOK OF INTIMATION
(*KITĀB AL-TALWĪḤ ILĀ L-TAWḤĪD WA L-ʿADL*)

TRANSLATION

In respect to clarification of His effectivity (*ta'thīr*), whether it is in a uniform manner as held by Aristotle and the theologians, namely existence, and whether it is something additional to the realities, or whether it is the realities themselves, we say that His effectiveness is the realities themselves, not existence that is lent as something additional to the realities. This is because existence is nothing additional to the realities, for if it were something additional to realities, it would either be common to all realities, or it would be specific to only some realities. It cannot be specific to only some realities, for if any stable thing (*ba'd al-thawābit*) required this existence in its stability, every stable thing would necessarily require it. And if any stable thing did not need this existence in its stability, by necessity none of them would need existence, since existence is not the effector of the stability but rather the reality of the stability, and realities do not differ from one thing to another.

If then it is not specific to some realities, it must be common to [all of] them. But the thing that is common is not additional to that to which it is common. Rather it means that the encompassed objects share in a single matter and a single reality, and sharing in a thing does not entail its being something additional to what shares in it, but rather it may be identical with it. For if it were something other than it, they would either share in it or not. If they shared in it, its existence would necessarily be additional to that in which they share likewise; this would lead to an infinite regress and that is impossible. If then it is not additional to that in which they share, the characteristic (*ḥukm*) of everything that shares in it must be one and the same. Thus it follows that it cannot be additional. Moreover, if existence were something additional to the realities and were common to all of them, it would necessarily be additional to its essence, since this would be the affirmation of difference and its denial at the same time, and this is impossible. If then existence is the essence of itself and its reality, and not additional to it, it follows that the existence of all other realities is identical with their essence; for there is nothing that entails this in regard to existence, but not in regard to the other realities. Thus it follows that existence is not additional to the realities.

What concerns the theologians in respect to this view is that it denies that the non-existent is a stable essence to which the agent connects and [affirms] that his effect on it is not [giving it] existence; that is to say that the reality that is stable in the [state of] non-existence cannot be the one that is innovated, for innovation (*tajaddud*) requires the removal of stability prior to the innovation. And if it were different from it, then the reality that is stable in the innovated would have to share in the essence of the reality that is stable in the non-existent. Thus the reality that is innovated through existence would be composed of these two, and this composition would be innovated. Prior to its stability, this composition would either have been feasible for it, or it would not have been feasible. If it had not been feasible, the recipient of this composition would have been unable to receive the composition eternally and it would then be impossible for it to transfer from impossibility of reception to its feasibility while its reality in this respect did not change. It would follow that the innovated could never become innovated. But if the recipient had been able to receive it before that and there was no limit to this, the innovated reality could have been eternal. We have already clarified the impossibility of this; thus the recipient cannot be stable prior to the stability of existence.

Moreover, if the recipient were stable prior to the stability of the innovated, it could not be what is in the mind regarding the innovated realities and their consequences, for proof has already shown their temporality and the impossibility of their eternity. But if it were something else, the realities in the mind after the innovation would have to be two matters, one of them what had been stable, the other what has been innovated. Yet it is known that realities and what is in the mind are not composite and that the mind grasps realities only as simple, not composite, and if they were composite, it would be impossible for the agent to intend the stable reality to provide it with existence, but it would be necessary for him to intend the individual thing and that it be known to him so that he could intend it. It would thus be necessary that it be different from other individuals of its kind, so that knowledge and intention could attach themselves to it specifically to the exclusion of those others. Yet there is nothing in it to distinguish it from the remaining individuals of its kind in its essence, its reality is uniform, and accidentals are not present in the state of non-existence, so that they might be distinguished by them. It is known that the agent in the visible world does not know anything in that state so that he could intend it, and it cannot be said that this occurs by chance in

the absence of intention; for the things that occur according to order are not accidental, and it is known that the agent does not aim at a class [of actions] yet subsequently something else occurs. If existence [only] were from him, it could not be that any class [of actions] were impossible for any capable agent, for the object of the capable agent would be existence, and this is uniform, and in a single kind [of acts] some cannot be feasible while others are impossible. It could not be said that it is impossible for us to establish the attribute of existence for one kind [of acts] but not for another, for the agent would bring forth nothing but the attribute of existence and its attachment to the essence, when the attachment is also uniform. It would follow that it be not impossible for us to bring forth substances, yet we know the opposite of it.

If existence were different, it would have to be either similar to the non-existent essences or different. If it were similar to the non-existent essences, some of the kind would have to be eternal, namely the non-existent, and some would be temporal, and that is impossible. If it were different from the non-existent essences, it could be attached to all non-existent essences; this would imply the feasibility of all kinds [of acts] on our part, and this is absurd.

If it were said that not all non-existent essences accept all attributes of existence, it is to be said that when the subject does not accept a predicate, it is either contrary to it or it contains something that is contrary to it. Yet the objects of our capability are not contrary to substances, because we can act upon them, and there is nothing in them contrary to them. If they contained anything contrary to them, the innovated thing would overcome it and thus negate it, and this would imply the feasibility of [producing] substances on our part, but that is absurd.

If it were said: The effect of the agent in the visible world are attributes, not the attribute of existence, the answer would be: This disagrees with the school doctrine that no agent causes any effect but the attribute of existence.

If it were said: This is known by a proof, not by self-evidence, it is to be said: Between the proof and what is proved has to be a link for the proof to prove it and it must precede knowledge of what is proved and must differ from what is proved in some respect. Yet stability, insofar as it is stability of these mental realities, does not prove the stability of other realities, for there is no link between the innovated reality in the mind and the reality that is innovated only after the annihilation

of the reality that is not innovated. Thus it is not possible to establish a proof on the basis of this innovated reality for that reality that is not innovated, and the negation, insofar as it is negation, does not prove stability, for [this would mean] that the thing proves its contrary, and this is absurd. And the composition of stability and the thing does not prove another stability, for there is no link between the combination of the two and that other stability. If the composition of stability and negation proved another stability, this would lead to an infinite regress insofar as each stability would be added to this negation and would be taken as proof for another, and that other would be added to this negation and would be taken as proof for another. That would continue infinitely, and this is absurd.

Moreover, stability and negation are not more likely to prove another stability than another negation. For stability together with what it indicates must have an aspect that it does not have with anything else and with its opposite. If their combination then proves stability, it must also prove negation. Thus it would prove two opposites, and what proves two opposites is not a proof. Thus nothing remains with which a proof could be established, and it follows that there is no proof. And if there is no proof here and it is not known by self-evidence, knowledge of that is impossible, let alone that the like of it is intelligible.

If you consider what is being argued for that on the basis of the connection of the capable agent and the connection of the knower, you will find that this does not go beyond what we have mentioned. For if the connection of the knower and the capable agent were a connection to stable things that cannot be negated such as self-evident matters, this cannot be claimed here, since it would imply abandoning the school doctrine. For the capable agent, insofar as he is capable, cannot have a connection with stable things, since his connection with stable [things] would remove his effectivity and his being capable.

Also, what is proven must not contradict the firmness of its proof, for if it contradicted its firmness, it would contradict the firmness of itself, for it is known through the proof. If the proof then were to be established on the basis of connection, the connection, insofar as he is capable, must be a connection to negation, for the capable has no connection to the stable, because stability removes the connection of the capable.

If the proof, however, were to be established on the basis of the connection of the knower, it would be possible to establish a proof only on the basis of the connection of knowledge implying negation.

For if it connected to the stable things which, if they were affirmed, it would occur in their affirmation, there would be no indication in that for the affirmation of anything else. If there is, however, with the connection a negation, like the connection of my knowledge to my writing prior to its occurrence, then it connects to it only from where it occurs, not from where it does not occur. For the intelligent knows that from himself, since there is nothing more evident to the intelligent than that to which his knowledge connects.

If the connection of the knowledge, however, is from where it occurs, then what occurs is not stable prior to its stability, and it does not indicate affirmation of anything but what occurs, for it does not have any link to it so that the affirmation of a thing would prove that.

Moreover, if the knowledge which first arises with the affirmation is the one by which proof is sought for affirmation of the non-existent, like my knowledge about my non-existent writing which becomes innovated, if the affirmation in this knowledge proved stability, the negation in it would necessarily prove negation. For this knowledge is composed of two knowledges, namely a knowledge of negation and a knowledge of stability. If it were only one knowledge, there would be no difference between knowledge of nothingness and knowledge of the temporally originated. Yet this is absurd because of the difference that is known between these two.

In regard to the capable agent, he also can connect only to what is negated, not to what is stable; otherwise he would not be capable in regard to it. And turning that negation into something stable would require denial of the capable agent being capable in its regard, and denial of what was to be proved by it. Thus there remains no aspect for deducing the proof; rather the proof that has been shattered proves the opposite of what they wanted to prove, namely the affirmation of stable things in the state of non-existence.

When we have clarified that there is no existence additional to the realities, it follows that His effectivity is [upon] the realities themselves; for if His effectiveness were not [on] the realities, He would not have any effect.

Moreover, the intelligible realities that can be pointed to are invariably originated, and origination is what points to the affirmation of the capable agent. It follows that His effectivity consists in the originated things.

منتزع من كتاب التلويح

وأما بيان تأثيره هل هو أمراً متفقاً كما يراه
 أرسطو والمتكلمون¹ وهو الوجود وهو أمر
 زائد على الحقائق أو هو نفس الحقائق فنقول: إن
 تأثيره نفس الحقائق لا الوجود المعروض أمراً زائداً على
 الحقائق. وذلك أن ليس الوجود أمراً زائداً على
 الحقائق لأنه إن كان أمراً زائداً على الحقائق فهو لا
 يخلو إما أن يكون عاماً لجميع الحقائق أو يخص بعض
 الحقائق دون بعض، ولا يجوز كونه خاصاً ببعض
 الحقائق دون بعض لأنه إن افتقر بعض الثوابت في
 ثبوته إلى هذا الوجود وجب أن يفتقر كل ثابت، وإن
 استغنى بعض الثوابت في ثبوته عن هذا الوجود وجب
 أن يستغني [كلها عن] الوجود لأن الوجود ليس بمؤثر الثبوت
 وإنما هو حقيقة الثبوت والحقائق لا تختلف في
 شيء دون شيء. وإذا لم يكن خاصاً ببعض الحقائق فهو
 عام لها والأمم العام ليس هو أمر زائد على المعموم
 وإنما هو اشتراك المعمومات في أمر واحد وحقيقة
 من الحقائق والاشتراك في الشيء لا يقتضي كونه أمراً زائداً²
 [38ب]

على ما اشترك فيه بل يكون هو لأنه لو كان أمراً سواه لكان
 إما أن يكون قد اشتركت فيه أو لم تشترك. فإن اشتركت
 فيه وجب أن يكون [وجوده] زائداً على ما اشتركت فيه مثل
 هذا ويمر إلى غير نهاية وهو محال. وإن كان لا
 زائداً على ما اشتركت فيه فحكم كل ما يشترك فيه حكم

¹ المتكلمون: المتكلمين.

² أمراً زائداً: أمر زائد.

واحد³ فيجب أن لا يكون زائداً. ولو كان الوجود أيضاً أمراً زائداً على الحقائق وهو عام لجميعها وجب أن يكون زائداً عن ذاته لأن ذلك إثبات الغيرية ونفيها معاً وهو محال. وإن كان الوجود هو ذات نفسه وحقيقتها لا زائد عليها وجب أن يكون باقي الحقائق وجودها هو ذاتها لأن ليس أمر يقتضي ذلك في الوجود دون باقي الحقائق فوجب أن الوجود ليس بزائد عن الحقائق. وأما ما يخص المتكلمين من هذا الرأي فهو أن ينبغي كون المعلوم ذاتاً ثابتة يتعلق بها الفاعل ويكون تأثيره لها غير الوجود وذاك أن الحقيقة الثابتة في العدم لا يجوز أن تكون هي المتجددة لأن التجدد يقتضي رفع الثبوت قبل التجدد، وإذا كانت غيرها وجب أن تكون الحقيقة الثابتة في المتجدد تشارك [39]

ذات الحقيقة الثابتة في المعلوم فتكون الحقيقة المتجددة بالوجود مركبة منهما وكان هذا التركيب متجدد، وقد كان قبل ثبوته إما أن كان يصح هذا التركيب منه أو لا يصح. فإن كان لا يصح كان القابل للتركيب قد استحال قبوله للتركيب استحالة أولية فلا يجوز أن ينتقل من استحالة القبول إلى صحته مع أن حقيقته في ذلك لم تتغير فيجب أن لا يتجدد المتجدد أبداً، وإن كان قابلاً قبل ذلك وما يقف على حد كانت الحقيقة المتجددة يصح كونها أولية وقد بينا استحالته فيجب أن لا يكون القابل ثابتاً قبل ثبوت الوجود. وأيضاً إن القابل لو كان ثابتاً قبل ثبوت المتجدد فيجب أن لا يكون هو المعقول من الحقائق المتجددة وما يتبعها لأن تلك قد دل الدليل على حدوثها واستحالة قدمها، وإذا كانت غيرها فيجب أن يكون المعقول بعد التجدد من الحقائق أمرين أحدهما ما كان ثابتاً والآخر ما تجدد ومعلوم أن ليس الحقائق والمعقول مركبة بل لا يأخذ العقل الحقائق إلا بسيطة غير مركبة، ولو كانت مركبة

³ حكم واحد: حكماً واحداً.

لم يمكن أن يقصد الفاعل الحقيقة الثابتة ليحصل لها الوجود ويجب أن يقصد العين وأن تكون معلومة [39ب]

عنده ليقصدها، ويجب أن تكون مخالفة لغيرها من أعيان الجنس ليتعلق بها العلم والقصد بعينها دون تلك وليس بها ما يخالف باقي أعيان⁴ الجنس في ذاتها وحقيقتها متفقة والإضافات ليست حاصلة لها في العدم فتتميز بها، ومعلوم أن الفاعل في الشاهد لا يعلم ما هذا حاله فيقصده. ولا يجوز أن يقال: إن ذلك يقع اتفاقاً مع⁵ فقد قصد لأن الأمور الحادثة على نظام لا تكون بالاتفاق ومعلوم أن الفاعل لا يقصد جنساً⁶ فيقع سواء وإن كان الوجود منه فلا يجوز أن يتعذر على قادر من القادرين جنس من الأجناس لأن مقدور القادر هو الوجود وهو متفق، والجنس لا يصح بعضه ويستحيل بعضه، وليس يمكن أن يقال: إنه يستحيل منا⁷ تثبيت صفة وجود لجنس دون جنس لأن ليس من الفاعل⁸ غير صفة الوجود وغير تعليقها على الذات والتعليق أيضاً متفق فيجب أن لا يستحيل منا إيجاد الجواهر وقد علمنا خلافه. وإن كان الوجود مختلفاً فلا يخلو إما أن يكون مماثلاً للذوات المدومة أو مخالفاً، فإن كان مماثلاً للذوات المدومة كان يكون بعض الجنس أزلياً وهو المعلوم وبعضه محدث وقد استحال [40أ]

ذلك، وإن كان مخالفاً للذوات المدومة صح تعليقه على كل من الذوات المدومة وفي ذلك صحة جميع الأجناس منا وهو محال. وإن قيل: إن ليس كل الذوات

⁴ أعيان: الأعيان.

⁵ مع: من.

⁶ جنساً: جنس.

⁷ منا: أن.

⁸ من الفاعل: للفاعل.

المعدومة تقبل كل صفات الوجود، قيل: إن الموضوع إذا لم يقبل المحمول كان إما ضداً له أو فيه ما هو ضد⁹ له ومقدوراتنا لا تضاد الجواهر لأننا فيها نفعل ولا فيها ما يضادها، ولو كان لها ما يضادها لكان يقوى عليه المتجدد فينفيه وفي ذلك صحة الجواهر منا وذلك محال. فإن قيل: إن تأثير الفاعل في الشاهد صفات ليست صفة الوجود، قيل: هذا مخالف للمذهب بأن لا تأثير لفاعل من الفاعلين غير صفة الوجود. وإن قيل: إن ذلك معلوم بالدليل لا بالبديهة، قيل: إن الدليل يجب أن يكون بينه وبين المدلول علاقة ليدل عليه ويجب أن يكون أسبق من العلم بالمدلول وغيراً للمدلول بوجه من الوجوه، والثبوت من حيث هو ثبوت لهذه الحقائق المعقولة لا يدل على ثبوت حقائق غيرها لأن لا علاقة بين المعقول من الحقيقة المتجددة وبين الحقيقة الغير متجددة [40ب]

إلا بعد انتفاء الحقيقة الغير متجددة فلا يمكن الاستدلال بهذه الحقيقة المتجددة على تلك الحقيقة الغير متجددة، والنفي من حيث هو نفي لا يدل على ثبوت لأن يكون الشيء دالاً على نقيضه وهو محال، وتركيب الثبوت والشيء لا يدل على ثبوت آخر لأن لا علاقة لمجموعهما بذلك الثبوت الآخر، ولو كان تركيب الثبوت والنفي يدل على ثبوت آخر لمر إلى غير نهاية بأن يضاف كل ثبوت إلى هذا النفي، ويستدل به على آخر ويضاف ذلك الآخر إلى هذا النفي ويستدل به على آخر ويتمادى إلى غير نهاية وهو محال. وأيضاً فإن الثبوت والنفي ليس بأن يدل على ثبوت آخر أولى من نفي آخر لأن الثبوت يجب أن يكون له مع ما يدل عليه من الوجه ما ليس له مع غيره ومع نقيضه، فإن دل مجموعهما على ثبوت وجب أن يدل على نفي فيكون قد دل على النقيضين، وما دل على النقيضين ليس بدليل فلم يبق ما يمكن الاستدلال به فوجب أن لا يكون هناك دليل، وإذا

⁹ ضد: ضداً.

لم يكن هناك ولا ذلك معلوم بالبديهة استحالة العلم
بذلك فضلاً عن أن يعقل ما هذا سبيله. وأنت
إذا تأملت ما يحتاج به على ذلك من تعلق القادر وتعلق العالم
وجدته لا يخرج عما ذكرناه لأن تعلق العالم والقادر إن
كان تعلقاً بالثوابت التي لا نفي معها مثل البديهيّات فلا
[41]

يمكن أن يدعى ذلك هاهنا لأن فيه استسلام المذهب
إذ القادر من حيث كونه¹⁰ قادراً لا يتعلق بالثوابت لأن تعلقه
بالثوابت يرفع تأثيره وكونه قادراً، والدليل لا يكون
مدلوله ينقض ثبوته لأنه لو نقض ثبوته لنقض ثبوت
نفسه لأنه عن الدليل علم. فإن استدل بالتعلق فالتعلق
من حيث كونه قادراً يجب أن يكون تعلقاً بالنفي لأن القادر
لا يتعلق بالثابت لأن الثبوت يرفع تعلق القادر. فإن
استدل بتعلق العالم فلا يجوز أن يستدل إلا بتعلق
العالم الذي معه نفي لأن إن كان يتعلق بالثوابت التي¹¹
لو [أثبتت] كان حاصلًا¹² في إثباتها فلا دلالة في ذلك على إثبات غيرها.
فإن كان التعلق معه نفي مثل تعلق علمي بكتابتي قبل حدوثها
فلم يتعلق بها إلا من الجيث الذي منه حدثت لا من حيث ليس
منه حدثت لأن العاقل يعلم ذلك من نفسه لأن لا شيء أوضح
للعاقل مما تعلق به علمه وإذا كان من حيث ما حدثت
تعلق العلم بالحدث ليس ثابت قبل ثبوته ولا يدل
على إثبات شيء آخر غير الحادث لأن لا علاقة له به
فبدل إثبات شيء بذلك. وأيضاً، إذا كان العلم
الذي يتأول مع الإثبات هو الذي يستدل به على إثبات
[41ب]

المعوم مثل علمي بكتابتي المدومة التي¹³ تتجدد. فإن دل
الإثبات في هذا العلم على ثبوت فيجب أن يدل النفي فيه

¹⁰ كونه: هو.

¹¹ التي: الذي.

¹² حاصلًا: حاصل.

¹³ التي: الذي.

على نفي لأن هذا العلم مركب من علمين وهما علم بنفي وعلم
بثبوت ولو كان علماً واحداً لكان لا فرق بين العلم
بالعدم والعلم بالمحدث، وذلك محال لما علم من
الفرق بينهما. وأما القادر فليس هو متعلق أيضاً
إلا بما هو منفي ليس بثابت وإلا لم يكن قادراً عليه وفي
جعل ذلك النفي ثابتاً إبطال لكون القادر قادراً عليه
وإبطال ما يستدل به فلم يبق وجه للاستدلال بل صار
الاستدلال الذي تكسر يدل على نقيض ما يريدوه من إثبات
الثوابت في العدم. وإذا كما قد [بيننا] أن لا وجود زائد
على الحقائق فيجب أن يكون تأثيره الحقائق أنفسها
لأنه إن لم يكن تأثيره الحقائق فلا تأثير له وأيضاً
إن من حيث الحقائق المعقولة المشار إليها لزمها الحدث
والحدث هو الدال على إثبات القادر فيجب أن يكون تأثيره
الأمر المحدث.

EXCERPT FROM THE BOOK OF REVISION OF THE BOOK
OF ARISTOTLE ON METAPHYSICS
BY SAHL B. FAḌL AL-TUSTARĪ

TRANSLATION

From the Third Section of the Book

Revision of the discourse on existence, whether it is a uniform matter in all existent beings and whether it is something additional to the essence being an essence and a stable reality or not? The discussion of the first issue is subordinate to [the discussion of] the second.

Thus we say regarding the first question, whether existence is an additional matter to the intelligible stable realities or whether it is not an additional matter that it cannot be an additional matter to them. For if it were an additional matter to them, substance, which is one of the intelligibles, would have to be conceived as two matters—one its being a substance and the other what is conceived as existence. What is conceived as existence, however, would fall outside what was first stable in the mind, for what is first stable in regard to it is the stability which is not additional to the essence of the stable thing, whereas what is asserted now is existence in a meaning which is additional to the essence being an essence and is not identical with the stability of the essence. But there is no way to establish this.

Moreover, what the mind conceives as intelligible regarding absolute stability prevents this. And also because the existence that is additional to the essence being an essence either has prior to existence a meaning that is additional to its reality, or its existence is identical with its stability. If the first is the case, then the same must be true in respect to its existence, and this leads to an infinite regress, which is absurd. Thus its existence must be its stability. If it is admissible, however, in respect to some intelligible realities that their existence and stability is not additional to their essence, it must be admissible in respect to the rest of them, and it is impossible to say that existence is something additional to the realities and that it is not uniform in them, because it is not conceivable in regard to existence insofar as it is a reality.

If then existence is not an additional matter to the essence being an essence, it necessarily follows that it is not uniform in all existents, for existents are things and realities which differ in themselves.

Moreover, if existence were a single uniform determinant in all stable essences, it would be impossible for some of it to be beginningless and

for some to be temporal; for, of a single uniform reality, two contrary characteristics cannot be asserted, such as the presence of causation of the temporal and elimination of causation of the eternal, for temporality and eternity are not an additional matter to existence. Thus if one explained the cause of one of them, he would have explained the cause of temporal existence, but not the eternal, although both were uniform.

Thus it is necessary that existence is not a uniform determinant, but differing, for explanation of its cause to be possible. This is the answer to the two questions.

If then it were said: if existence is not an additional matter so as to be uniform and it is [identical with] the realities which differ in themselves, because the reality of the substance is other than the reality of the accident and differs from it by itself, how then can the mind grasp stability and existence as if it were one uniform matter that is common to all realities? And if it is not a uniform matter, how can the mind grasp the different matters as if they were uniform? And if it is a uniform matter in all realities it follows necessarily that it is an additional matter to them, because if they, as specific realities, are different, and there is a uniform matter, namely existence, it necessarily is other than that in which they differ. In consequence to what has been said, [existence] must be an additional matter to the realities; it would then be said: The mind, even though it conceives stability and existence as if it were one uniform thing, does not grasp it as something other than the realities. Rather it grasps it as if it were identical with the realities, not additional to them. If that is the case, it must grasp it as if it were one from one aspect and different and contrasting from another. In respect to its grasping it as one thing, it is impossible for it to be a single uniform nature when it was supposed not to be an additional matter to the realities. In respect to grasping their stability as if it were one thing in all the realities, this is stability outside the mind, meaning that the existence that occurs to the existents is outside the mind and different from them. Thus they considered existence and unity as one thing, so that it becomes a uniform matter.

If these two statements, I mean the claim that existence is something single and uniform in all existents, and the claim that existence is not additional to the existents and realities, are contradictory—and we have already shown before in this book that existence is not a genus common to all existents and have clarified it now—it can neither be a general genus nor a uniform matter. And if it is not like that, it follows

necessarily that the mind grasps the intelligibles insofar as their stability is outside the intellect as if they were something uniform in stability outside the intellect because what is conceived of stable essences and genera and what is stable outside the mind agrees in that respect. Thus the mind differs regarding the stability outside the mind insofar as it looks at them with respect to their coincidence with what is conceived of the existent outside it as if it were a common genus. Thus the difference between the two matters has become apparent and what is true of the two positions.

In respect to the examples Aristotle provides in his proof “that ‘existent’ may not be said homonymously, but that it is like ‘health’ which is one single thing and one nature with regard to healthy matters and that everything healthy in them refers to healing and health. Among them is what preserves [it], what produces it or what indicates it, and there is what receives it,”¹—this is not correct. For the things that are attributed to healing are not uniform with regard to healing. Rather they are uniform in being related to it, and the relation to it consists of relations that are different not uniform, as the healing which occurs in the things that preserve it only occurs within the human body. Among the matters that indicate healing are acts, temper, pulse, eating etc.; healing does not occur in any of them, they rather indicate it. The indicator, however, is different from what is indicated by it. What produces health, such as drugs, does not contain health in itself, rather health occurs in the human body as a result of it. Health is not found in any of these things. Yet genera insofar as they are genera and uniform shared natures are found only in what participates in a single uniform existence, and if health is found in that neither as a single existence nor uniformly, that does not constitute a genus of it, nor is their relation to it a single relation. Even though, if a relation occurs among things, that to which something is related does not occur in the thing related because of the difference between what is related and that to which it is related. Thus if their relation to health were on account of health being the end they aim at, then uniformity of acts with respect to the end they aim at does not require their uniformity in genus so that it were a matter common to them. Uniformity in end does not indicate uniformity in form, for form is other than end, and genera insofar as they are genera are not ends but forms. Thus there is no aspect left for

¹ See Aristotle: *Metaphysics* Book Gamma. Chapter 2.

Aristotle's argumentation when he argued on the basis of things that are attributed to a single matter. And it is not possible to interpret the statement of Aristotle according to what some interpreter maintained that "existent" in some respects belongs to the univocal and in another to the equivocal because what he states here disagrees with what he states in the rest of his books. For we have already explained that the existent is not a uniform nature in any respect. And if it is not a [uniform] nature in any respect, it is impossible for it to be a univocal word predicated of different matters for some reason. Nor is possible that it belongs to the derived words, because derived words agree in some meanings or in some of a meaning, and this one [meaning] we are able to establish as indicating a mutual agreement on a meaning from the outset, and thus it goes back to something like the univocal. If, however, existence does not agree in some meaning or in some of a meaning, it is impossible that it belong to derived words. In regard to that "existent" cannot belong to the differentiated nor to the associated words, this is clear because of their sharing in name, whereas in the differentiated and the associated there is no participation in name. Thus the existent can only belong to the words that are equivocal in speech. Likewise is "the one", for that by which we have ascertained the discussion about existence is exactly what clarifies that "one" is equivocal in name with regard to all existents, except that when these two meanings occur, an existent occurs. The existent, however, occurs in so far as the stability that corresponds to what is in the mind is innovated for it. As for the one, it is distinct from anything else by being that reality. If we supposed these matters to be stable meanings they would be concomitants of the realities and follow these, but they would not be genera for them, for genera are followed, they do not follow.

The discourse of Aristotle contains many contradictions but we confine ourselves to only a few because our aim is not to investigate fully the contradictions but to examine the meanings that we need to discuss. Among them is that most of his discourse indicates that the existent is something general and stable in itself. This is his statement that "the study [is concerned] with the ipseity in its essential being and with those things that belong to the ipseity by its essence and with the universality of the ipseity and with the elements of the essence, and that the elements of the ipseity are not by a kind of accident but by essential being;"²

² See Aristotle: *Metaphysics Book Gamma*, Chapter One.

“that [ipseity] may not be said by a kind of homonymy;”³ and likewise numerous other statements [of his] for which there is no proof.

This contradicts his statement that “some things are called an ipseity because they are substances and some because they are pains, for the genus is not predicated of its species because of its specific forms but because of its generic forms, and their being substances and pains is because of their being species not because they are existent, for being existent is a meaning that is common to things according to the established form of their species.”⁴ And likewise his statement: “[some are called ipseity] because they negate one of these accidents. This is so because ‘existent’ cannot be asserted to be existent if it is a meaning conceived in the sense of negation.”⁵ To these also belongs his saying: “If the one and the ipseity are a single and they have a single nature;”⁶ likewise his saying: “It is not that a single definition indicates both of them,”⁷ for this first statement indicates that the single existent is one thing, while the second indicates that the one and the existent are two things insofar as their respective definition is different. For if the two existents were a uniform one additional to the essences and realities, it would be necessary for its definition to be likewise one. But if its definition is other than the definition of the existent it would follow necessarily—just as it is necessary from predicating [the term] existent of all things—that it be a single uniform nature and that the existents likewise have a common uniform nature other than the existent being existent. If then the one according to this statement is nothing but the existent being existent, it necessarily follows that existence is likewise not identical with the existents, rather that they are specific realities of which it is predicated.

And whatever he adduced as proof that the one does not indicate the realities can identically be used as proof for the existent not being an additional matter to the essence. However, if you return to sum up his position, this is nearly impossible, such that if we explained it it would take long. I have alluded to this in regard to the interpretation of his statement: “It is evident that the addition in these [cases] indicates a

³ See Aristotle: *Metaphysics* Book Gamma, Chapter Two.

⁴ See Aristotle: *Metaphysics* Book Gamma, Chapter Two.

⁵ See Aristotle: *Metaphysics* Book Gamma, Chapter Two.

⁶ See Aristotle: *Metaphysics* Book Gamma, Chapter Two.

⁷ See Aristotle: *Metaphysics* Book Gamma, Chapter Two.

single thing, and the one does not indicate anything but the ipseity.”⁸ As for his statement: “It is evident that these substances have one substance that by necessity precedes them all in elevation,”⁹ if the cause of the things is a cause of them in so far as they are existents, and the existent in so far as it is existent is predicated of substances and accidents, then the causes of the substances are not [causes] of their being substances but of their being existents, and their being existent is something additional to their being substances. How then can he explain the causes of matters by anything but their being existent? And if it is higher than their being substances insofar as they are substances, then substances in so far as they are substances have no precedence one over the other. But if it is higher in so far as it is a cause, then cause is not elevated on account of it being a cause, but it requires a mixture because of which it is a cause rather than an effect, so that it has precedence. And the participation of everything, I mean cause and effect, in existence does not give precedence to some over the other. Likewise it is impossible for past existents to be the cause of the [present] existents because this would require that they be like them by their essences, for their essence is also existent, and it is impossible for the thing to be the cause of itself. Moreover, they are uniform in his view in so far as none of them, I mean cause and effect, has precedence. Thus there is no reason for it to become a cause and no reason for its being higher than the other. So what necessarily follows from his statement that the existent beings are not uniform in one matter, namely existence, is that they differ in their realities and essences, and that they must necessarily have an origin. We have already explained that it can only be the agent, and that it is not possible for it to be a cause of them, for they are not uniform in a single matter because of which they could be caused, rather they are different. It follows then that it is either different causes that cannot be explained by causes, but this is absurd for the difference necessitates explanation of causes, or that they are from a single cause. But a single thing cannot be the cause of different matters because of the difference that must be in it and because of its being more than one. Thus it cannot be a cause, and that which is not a cause is an agent. The agent can produce different effects,

⁸ See Aristotle: *Metaphysics Book Gamma*, Chapter Two.

⁹ See Aristotle: *Metaphysics Book Gamma*, Chapter Two.

contrary to the cause, because of differing motives which consist of his knowledge, and his knowledge may differ because of the difference of the things with which it is connected. And the things may vary because of their being different and they are the objects of knowledge. Thus it is correct that the agent of different matters must be one eternal freely choosing Agent, not a [necessitating] cause.

ARABIC TEXT

[47ب]

من المقالة الثالثة من الكتاب

تحرير

الكلام في الوجود¹ هل هو أمر متفق في جميع
الموجودات وهل هو أمر زائد على كون الذات ذاتاً
وحقيقة من الحقائق الثابتة أم لا؟ والكلام
الأول يترتب على الثاني فنقول في المسألة
الأولى هل الوجود أمر زائد على الحقائق المعقولة
الثابتة أو ليس بأمر زائد عليها أنه لا يجوز
كونه أمراً زائداً عليها لأنه لو كان أمراً زائداً عليها
لوجب أن يعقل الجوهر وهو أحد المعقولات أمرين
أحدهما هو كونه جوهرًا والآخر هو المعقول من الوجود
وكان يخرج المعقول من الوجود من أن يكون هو ما
ثبت في النفس أولاً لأن الثابت منه أولاً هو
الثبوت الذي هو غير زائد على ذات الثابت والذي
أثبت الآن هو الوجود بمعنى زائد على كون الذات ذاتاً
وليس هو الثبوت للذات وهذا لا طريق إلى
إثباته. وأيضاً، يمنع ما يأخذ العقل أنه

[48]

المعقول من الثبوت المطلق منه ولأنه لا يخلو²
إما أن يكون للوجود³ الزائد على كون الذات ذاتاً له قبل⁴
الوجود معنى زائد على حقيقته أو وجوده هو

¹ الوجود: الموجود.

² يخلو: يخلو.

³ للوجود: الوجود.

⁴ له قبل: لو مثل.

ثبوته وإذا كان الأول فيلزم في وجوده مثل ذلك ويمر إلى غير نهاية وهو محال فيجب أن يكون وجوده هو ثبوته. فإن جاز في بعض الحقائق المعقولة أن يكون وجودها وثبوتها ليس بزائد على ذاتها جاز في باقي الحقائق ولم يمكن القول بأن الوجود أمر زائد على الحقائق ولا متفق⁵ فيها لأنه غير محصل في الوجود من كونه من الحقائق. وإذا لم يكن الوجود أمراً زائداً على كون الذات ذاتاً فيجب أن لا يتفق في الموجودات لأن الموجودات إنما هي أشياء وحقائق مختلفة في نفوسها. وأيضاً، إن الوجود لو كان معنى واحداً متفقاً في جميع الثوابت لاستحال أن يكون منه أزلي ومنه محدث لأن الحقيقة الواحدة المتفقة لا يثبت لها حكمان متضادان⁶ من وجود تعليل المحدث ورفع تعليل القديم لأن الحدوث والقدم ليس بأمر زائد على [48ب]

الوجود. فإن علل أحدهما كان قد علل الوجود المحدث ولم يعلل وجود القديم مع كونهما متفقين فيجب أن لا يكون معنى متفقاً بل مختلفاً حتى يصح فيه التعليل، فهذا جواب المسألتين. فإن قيل: فإذا كان الوجود ليس بأمر زائد حتى يتفق، وهو الحقائق وهي مختلفة بنفوسها لأن حقيقة الجوهر غير حقيقة العرض ومخالفة لها بنفسها، فكيف يأخذ العقل الثبوت والوجود كأنه أمر واحد متفق عام لجميع الحقائق؟ وإن كان ليس بأمر متفق فكيف يأخذ العقل الأمور المختلفة كأنها متفقة؟ وإن كان أمراً متفقاً في جميع الحقائق فيجب أن يكون أمراً زائداً عليها لأنها إذا كانت من حيث هي حقائق مخصوصة مختلفة وهناك أمر متفق هو الوجود فيجب أن يكون غير ما اختلفت فيه فيجب على سبابة هذا القول أن يكون أمراً زائداً على الحقائق،

⁵ متفق: متفقاً.

⁶ حكمان متضادان: حكيمين متضادين.

قيل: إن العقل وإن كان يعقل الثبوت والوجود كأنه أمر واحد متفق فليس يأخذه على أنه غير⁷ للحقائق بل يعقله كأنه هو الحقائق لا زائد عليها. وإذا كان ذلك كذلك فيجب أن يعقله كأنه واحد من جهة ومختلف [49]

متغاير من جهة. أما أخذه له كأنه شيء واحد فمحال أن يكون مع فرضه أنه ليس بأمر زائد على الحقائق أن يكون طبيعة واحدة متفقة، وأما جهة أخذ ثبوتها كأنه شيء واحد في جميع الحقائق فثبوت خارج الذهن، أي أن الوجود الحاصل للموجودات هو خارج الذهن مخالف لها، فجعلوا⁸ الوجود والوحدة كأنهما⁹ شيء واحد فيكون أمراً متفقاً. وإذا كان هذان القولان أعني أن الوجود واحد متفق في جميع الموجودات والقول بأن الوجود غير زائد على الموجودات والحقائق متناقضين، وقد دللنا فيما تقدم من هذا الكتاب على [أن] الوجود ليس بجنس عام لسائر الموجودات وأوضحناه الآن، فيجب أن لا يكون جنساً عاماً ولا أمراً متفقاً. وإذا لم يكن كذلك فيجب أن يكون العقل يأخذ المعقولات من حيث ثبوتها خارجاً عن الذهن كأنها شيء متفق¹⁰ في الثبوت الخارج عن الذهن لأن الثبوت والأجناس المعقول منها والثابت خارجاً¹¹ عن العقل متفقان¹² في ذلك فتفرد العقل عن الثبوت الخارج عن العقل بأن ينظر فيها من حيث مطابقتها للمعقول من الموجود خارجاً عنه كأنه جنس عام¹³ فقد بان

⁷ غير: غيراً.

⁸ فجعلوا: فيجعلوا.

⁹ كأنهما: كأنها.

¹⁰ شيء متفق: شيئاً متفقاً.

¹¹ خارجاً: خارج.

¹² متفقان: متفقين.

¹³ جنس عام: جنساً عاماً.

[49ب]

الفرق بين الأمرين والحق من كلا¹⁴ المذهبين. وأما
تمثيل أرسطو في دلالاته على أن الموجود لا يقال
بإشتراك الاسم بل [أنه كالبرء الذي] هو شيء واحد وطبيعة واحدة بالأمور
المبرئة وأن كل مبرئ منها ينسب إلى البرء¹⁵ والصحة، فمنها
ما هو حافظ لها ومنها ما هو فاعل لها أو دال عليها ومنها ما
هو قابل لها،¹⁶ فليس بصحيح، وذلك أن الأمور التي تنسب
إلى البرء لم تتفق في البرء¹⁷ وإنما اتفقت في الإضافة إليه
والإضافة إليه هي إضافات مختلفة لا متفقة لأن البرء¹⁸
الذي هو حاصل في الأمور الحافظة له فإنما هو حاصل في
جسد الإنسان، فالأمور الدالة على البرء¹⁹ منها الأفعال
والسجية والنفض والمأكل وغير ذلك ليس البرء²⁰ حاصل في
جميعها بل هي دالة عليه، والدليل غير المدلول عليه،
والفاعل للصحة مثل الأدوية ليس الصحة فيها بل الصحة تحصل
في جسد الإنسان عنها، وهذه الأمور كلها لا توجد
الصحة فيها. والأجناس بما هي أجناس والطباع المتفقة
المشتركة توجد فيما هي مشتركة وجوداً واحداً متفقاً
وإذا كانت الصحة لا توجد في ذلك وجوداً واحداً
ولا متفقاً فليس ذلك جنساً لها ولا إضافتها إليها

[50]

إضافة واحدة مع أن الإضافة إذا حصلت في أشياء
فذلك المضاف إليه ليس بحاصل في المضاف لتغاير
المضاف والمضاف إليه. ولو كانت إضافتها إلى الصحة
من حيث أن الصحة غاية تقصدها فليس اتفاق الأفعال

¹⁴ كلا: كلي.¹⁵ البرء: البرو.¹⁶ T 2.¹⁷ البرء لم... البرء: البرو لم... البرو.¹⁸ البرء: البرو.¹⁹ البرء: البرو.²⁰ البرء: البرو.

في غاية تقصدها يقتضي اتفاقها في الجنس حتى يكون أمراً
يعمها. والاتفاق في الغاية لا يدل على الاتفاق في الصورة
لأن الصورة غير الغاية. والأجناس بما هي أجناس لا تكون
غايات بل صوراً فلم يبق وجه لاستدلال أرسطو
بما استدل به من الأشياء التي تنسب إلى أمر واحد، ولا
يجوز أن يفسر قول أرسطو على ما رآه بعض المفسرين
من أن الموجود بوجه من الوجوه من المتواطئة الاسم
وبوجه آخر من المتفقة فيه لأجل مخالفة قوله هاهنا
لقوله في باقي كتبه. وذلك أن الموجود قد بينا أن
ليس هو طبيعة متفقة لوجه من الوجوه، وإذا لم يكن
طبيعة لوجه من الوجوه فمحال أن يكون اسماً متواطئاً
يحمل على الأمور بوجه من الوجوه، ولا يجوز أن يكون من
المشتقة أسماؤها، وذلك أن المشتقة قد اتفقت في
بعض المعاني أو في بعض المعنى وذلك البعض يمكننا²¹ أن نقيمه
[50ب]

دالاً لتراضي (?) معنى برأسه فترجع إلى مثل معنى المتواطئة.
وإذا لم يتفق الوجود في معنى من المعاني ولا في بعض المعنى
فلا يجوز أن يكون من المشتقة أيضاً. وأما أن الموجود
ليس من الأسماء المتباينة ولا المتألفة²² فبين لاشتراكها
في الاسم والمتباين والمتألف لا اشتراك في الاسم فيه
فلم يبق أن يكون الموجود إلا من الأسماء المتفقة الاسم
في الكلام. وكذلك الواحد لأن ما تبييناً به الكلام في الوجود
فإنما هو بعينه يبين أن الواحد متفق في الاسم في
جميع الموجودات إلا أن هذين المعنيين إن حصلاً فقد حصل
موجود، فإنما يحصل الموجود من حيث ما يتجدد له الثبوت
المطابق لما في الذهن. وأما الواحد فإنه تميز عن غيره
بما هو تلك الحقيقة، وهذه الأمور لو قدرناها معاني
ثابتة لكانت لازمة للحقائق توابع لها لا²³ أن تكون أجناساً²⁴ لها

²¹ يمكننا: يمكننا.

²² المتألفة: المتوافقة.

²³ لا: ألا.

²⁴ أجناساً: أجناس.

لأن الأجناس متبوعات لا تتابع. وفي كلام أرسطو
تناقض كثير إلا أنا تقتصر منه على اليسير لأن ليس
قصدنا استقصاء المناقضة بل استقصاء المعاني التي
نحتاج إلى الكلام فيها. فمنها أن أكثر كلامه يدل
على أن للموجود أمراً عاماً ثابتاً في نفسه، وهو قوله:
[51]

إن النظر في الهوية على كنهها والأشياء التي للهوية بذاتها
وكلية الهوية وأسطقسات الذات وأن لا تكون أسطقسات
الهوية بنوع العرض بل كائنة بالكنه،²⁵ ولا تقال بنوع
اشتراك الاسم،²⁶ وغير ذلك مما يكثر تعديده ولا عليه دليل
وهذا مناقض لقوله: فإن بعض الأشياء تقال هوية
لأنها جواهر وبعضها لأنها آلام لأن الجنس لا يحمل
على أنواعه من حيث صورته النوعية بل من حيث صورته
الجنسية وكونها جواهر وآلاماً²⁷ هو من حيث هي أنواع
لا من حيث هي موجودة على أن الموجود معنى عام للأشياء
لما ثبت من صورة أنواعها.²⁸ وكذلك قوله: أو لأنها سالبة
لشيء من هذه الأعراض، وذلك أن الموجود لا يقال: إنه
موجود، إذا كان معنى معقولاً²⁹ من حيث السلب.³⁰
ومنها قوله: فأما الواحد والهوية إذا كانا شيئاً
واحداً وكان لهما طباع واحد³¹، وقوله: وليس بأن حداً
واحداً يدل على كليهما لأن هذا القول الأول³² يدل على أن

T 1²⁵

T 2²⁶

T 2²⁷ آلاماً: آلام.

T 2²⁸

T 2²⁹ معقولاً: معقول.

T 2³⁰

T 3³¹ طباع واحد: طباعاً واحداً.

T 3³² الأول: للأول.

الموجود الواحد شيء واحد³³ والثاني يدل على أن الواحد والموجود أمران اثنان³⁴ من حيث
تغاير حديهما فإن كان
الموجودان واحداً متفقاً زائداً على الذات والحقائق فيلزم
أن يكون حده واحداً³⁵ كذلك، وإذا كان حده غير حد الموجود فيلزم
[51ب]

كما لزم من حيث حمل الموجود على جميع الأشياء أن يكون طبيعة
واحدة متفقة وللموجودات أن تكون أيضاً طبيعة متفقة
عامة غيراً لكون الموجود موجوداً. فإن كان الواحد على
هذا القول ليس بغير لكون الموجود موجوداً فيجب أن يكون
الوجود أيضاً ليس بعين الموجودات بل هي حقائق³⁶ معينة
يحمل عليها. وما استدل به على أن الواحد ليس
يدل على الحقائق به بعينه يستدل على أن الموجود
ليس بأمر زائد على الذات، وأنت إذا عدت إلى حصر قوله
تعذر ذلك مما إن شرحناه طال وهو ما أومأت إليه
من تفسير قوله: فمعلوم أن الزيادة في هذه تدل على شيء
واحد ولا يدل الواحد على شيء آخر غير الهوية.³⁷ فأما
قوله: فمعلوم أن لهذه الجواهر جوهرأ واحداً متقدماً أرفع
من جميعها اضطراراً،³⁸ إن كانت العلة للأشياء علة لها من حيث
كونها موجودات، والموجود بما هو موجود يحمل على الجواهر
والأعراض فليس العلة للجواهر بما هي جواهر بل بما هي
موجودات وكونها موجودات أمر زائد³⁹ على كونها جواهر
فكيف علة الأمور بغير كونها موجودات؟ وإن كان أرفع
من كونها جواهر بما هي جواهر فالجواهر من حيث هي جواهر
لا رفعة لبعضها عن بعض. وإن كان أرفع من حيث كونه

³³ شيء واحد: شيئاً واحداً.

³⁴ أمران اثنان: أمرين اثنين.

³⁵ واحداً: واحد.

³⁶ حقائق: حقائقاً.

³⁷ T 3

³⁸ T 4

³⁹ أمر زائد: أمراً زائداً.

[52]

علة فالعلة لا ترتفع من حيث كونها علة بل تحتاج إلى مزاج لأجله كانت علة أولى من أن تكون معلولة وقد كانت أرفع واشتراك الكل في الوجود أعني العلة والمعلول لا رفعة لبعضها من البعض الآخر فيه. ولا يجوز أن يكون علة الوجودات ماضي موجودات لأنه كان يجب أن تكون مثلها⁴⁰ لذاتها لأن ذاتها أيضاً موجودة، ومحال كون الشيء علة في نفسه وهي متفقة عنده في ألا رفعة [لها] أعني العلة والمعلول فلا وجه لأجله صارت علة ولا وجه به كانت أرفع من الأخرى⁴¹ فالذي يجب على قوله من أن الموجودات ليس تتفق في أمر واحد وهو الوجود أن تكون مختلفة في الحقائق والذوات وأن يجب أن يكون لها مبدأ، وقد بينا أنه الفاعل لا غير⁴² ولا يجوز كونه علة لها لأنها لا تتفق في أمر واحد لأجله كانت معلولة بل هي مختلفة فيجب إما أن يكون عللاً⁴³ مختلفة غير معللة وهو محال لأن الاختلاف يوجب التعليل أو تكون عن سبب واحد والشيء الواحد لا يكون علة في⁴⁴ الأمور المختلفة لما يجب من الاختلاف فيه وكونه غير واحد، فيجب أن لا يكون علة والذي ليس علة فهو فاعل، والفاعل ممكن اختلاف [52ب]

تأثيراته محالاً للعلة لاختلاف الدواعي وهي علومه وإنما تختلف علومه لاختلاف متعلقاتها، والأشياء قد تنبأين لاختلافها وهي المعلومات. فصح به أن يكون فاعل الأمور المختلفة فاعل واحد أزلي مختار لا علة.

⁴⁰ مثلها: مثله.

⁴¹ الأخرى: الآخر.


⁴² غير: غيراً.

⁴³ عللاً: علل.


⁴⁴ في: هي.

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
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


[illegible]




ואחר עליו ועל לא ימכן תמיוז אגלל מן אכתור
חטב מא רכנאיה פי ארלאה נ ארמבעה מן הורא
אכטנא ב עת א תבאת ארעראן פקלנא יאן א
קן אבנא ארעראני וודי ארמסחא ארמאנע
ווי אן ויבטל ארעק בון אכפוף ואתקול פקלאנ
א תבת לל תקול עבאת כתירה תמנע מן נקל א
תקול פקלנא אן כתירה ארעבאת לא יעקל לא
בכתירה ארעראני לאן ארעבאת תפישתחמיק לא
תתזאיר אר - תבעא לתזאיר אמונב פתנא וחה
מחא אן יעקל ולא מוצב מתעאיר תחמיק אר
ולא תקדיר אכפוף וחזיר ארמיוז פלוכאנת
ארעבאת וחסאה מא רכנא עבה ואחדה מא
זארת אחא ואדא נדלך קולה מי עבאת א
מתמאנעו ופי נקל א תקול כמא ארמאנע מן
א תבאת תרואת יסתחיל אן תתמיוז פלא יעקל
קלתחא מן כתרתחא בל ארמיוז חאנילו וחו ארמא
פקד באן לך אנה לא יענח להם א תבאת שו מן
עלוק א תוחיד ולא מן עלום אעדל לאן ארמסבא
ערליתרוב עליו ארמסבאנה לא יענח ארמפולא





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 مع عدمه ونسب الاستدلال الى الاستدلال وهو الكلام
 والافضل منه الاستدلال فانه على احوال صفة
 الاستدلال مع حاجته في العمل بل الى العمل
 الاستدلال المعقول وهو صفاته انما الاستدلال المعقول
 هو هذه الصفات لان العمل هو الوجود
 الحاصل مني على انما العمل الذي لا ينفك الدلائل
 على انما العمل هو العمل الذي لا ينفك الدلائل
 صفة انما العمل هو العمل الذي لا ينفك الدلائل
 مسرعا الان في العمل فانه العمل هو العمل
 في العمل مع عدمه العمل الذي لا ينفك الدلائل
 في العمل فانه العمل هو العمل الذي لا ينفك الدلائل
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منه الوضوح موجب لعدم فهمها عدونا
 المخرج من انشاءها الله للعالم بأساوا أحدث
 على العمل بعد وف العالم الامم المسمى الصلح
 كونه معادى للصلح المسمى العمل بعد وف
 الصلح اذ ان العالم المسمى محمدا محمد
 معادى ان هذا الاسم الا بعد في عالم خاص في اساطير الله
 من حدود العالم و اساطير محمدا اذ كان العمل
 لصلح الصلح في الصفات الد اساطير والتشكيات
 و سر وطها و اساطير يدلل الا بعد العلم كما
 لدم في هذا الغنى عنه اذ لا طهراد
 و قد تم مني فهو كما في الكائنات الد كما اننا قلنا
 كما في كائنات صلح على عو اساطير كحو
 التي في كائنات الاسباب حصة معادى فلهذا

مرفوعه كذلك من كونها محكيه هي كذلك شيئا
لا كصلها اقناعا ولا ظن مفصلا عنها
بما هي مفصلا عنها على ملكها وكونها اخرها كاف
لا وانها واولها باقتضايها ودلالتها
وهو العيان الكاسر الخجعة كما عدل باعتبار
حاصلها على الصريح ومما يحجها واصلها
لعدم جعلها على ايراد على اليهود الاظهر
على اليهود فعملوا الاصل في ذلك ما فيه
ودعت الخاف وذلك لانها تعرف الدر وال
اليهود بعد العبد باسمه بعلق سوسه الصلة
وما في من الامور المعلومه حتى اذا
اسم ذلك صرح على ان الدر فاما بعلقت
لعلها فعملوا الطريقة الى الساتر الذي هو في زيار

علمي نيات الشكر لله ان العادة على الكلام بال
 قدر على اذاعتي ووضوح بعد القدرة على وجود
 في حدود علمي بسلامة فني وادبي وادبي وادبي
 بالمرئ لا المراء من ان عذرا العادة لا سعلق
 طاهر لهما ان النحرف من كوكبي احكامها وادبي
 والاصحوب وما كرى شجاء واما سعلق نصفه
 سوى ذلك اذ احصلت له وادبي العادة لا سعلق
 الحرف وادبي العادة وادبي العادة لا سعلق
 هذه الامور لهما على علمي فمجلوا
 لهما هذه الصفة هي ما عده الصالح وهو
 المطلوب بالاسدال وعلوا في العادة
 في اذاعتي بالظاهر مستحقا وادبي العادة
 صالحة في لست وصل الى الجهور حتى سعلق

ما علمه على المعلوم وادبي العادة لا سعلق
 العادة لا سعلق اسانته عاده على الصلة بالاعيد
 لسانته عاده على عاده لسانته وادبي العادة
 لسانته لا سعلق الى العادة عاده على الصلة بالاعيد
 لسانته وادبي العادة وادبي العادة لا سعلق
 طاول الاسدال عاده الى العادة عاده على الصلة
 علمي وادبي العادة وادبي العادة لا سعلق
 معلوم طاول الى العادة عاده على الصلة
 عنت عاده على الصلة عاده على الصلة
 بكتفه فادبي علمي الى العادة عاده على الصلة
 وادبي العادة عاده على علمي عاده على الصلة
 علمي الى العادة عاده على علمي عاده على الصلة
 الاسدال الى العادة عاده على علمي عاده على الصلة
 بكتفه عاده على علمي عاده على علمي عاده على الصلة

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 في ما لا يهمله له طرق من هي منه
 واما بان ناسره هل هم كما ينبغي ان يراه
 رتقوا والمسلمين وهو وجود وهو امر
 على الحقائق او هو نفس الحقائق معلول ان
 نفس الحقائق لا الوجود المعروف لمرادنا على
 الحقائق وذلك ان ليس الوجود امرا زائدا على
 الحقائق لانه ان كان امرا زائدا على الحقائق فهو لا
 يحلوا انما ان يكون عاما لجميع الحقائق او يخص بعض
 الحقائق دون بعض ولا يكونا خاصا ببعض
 الحقائق دون بعض لانه ان اخص بعض النواتج
 من حيث الوجود وحيث ان سلطان وان
 معنى بعض النواتج في سوية غير هذا الوجود وحيث
 ان السعي الوجود لان الوجود ليس هو السوء
 واما هو حقيقة السوء والحقائق لا يحل
 سي دون سي لان الوجود ليس هو امر زائد على العموم
 عام لان اسرار الله في امر واحد وحقيقته
 في امر واحد لا ينفصل لونه امر زائد

المعرف من مدعى في المعرفه الذي يحوز فان
 الاسماء هو العلم الى سبوت في سائر المعرفه
 على يعنى ان هذا العلم مركب من علمين هما
 سبوت وهو علم واحد لا يعرف من العلم
 بالعدد ومن العلم بالحدوث وذلك حال لما علم من
 الفرق بينهما . . . واما القادر فليس هو متعلق
 الا بما هو متعلق ليس ثابت والا لم يكن قادرا عليه
 فعلا ذلك المعنى باسم انظار اللون القادر قادرا عليه
 وان كان متعلقا به فليس متعلقا به لان العلم
 الاسماء لا يكون له رتبة على بعض ما يحدوه من اسباب
 المتواردة . . . وان كان قادرا لا وجود له
 على الحدوث . . . يجب ان يكون باسمه الحقائق النفس
 لانه ان لم يكن باسمه الحقائق فلا يملكه . . . وانما
 ان من حد الحقائق المعقوله المسار التي لها الحدوث
 والحدوث هو الذي على اسباب القادر في سائر يكون باسمه
 ما في اسبابه سبحانه عما لا
 حقيقه العالم من باب العلم
 نوسنكا وهذه الحقيقه حاصلة للثبوت

من القامه الثالثه من القامه

حكيه
السلامه الموجوده هلهه
الموجودات
بعضه من الحقائق للماسه اذ لا
والسلامه
والسلامه على الثاني
هل الموجود امر راد على الحقائق
السلامه او ليس به امر راد عليها
كونه امر راد عليها
لو صح ان فعل الحواس
احدها هو توجدها والآخر هو
وكان خرج المعقول من الوجود من ان يكون
نصب في النفس او لا لان الثابت منه
المسبوق الذي هو غير راد على راد الثابت والى
السلامه ان هو الوجود مع
وليس هو السوء للاراد
السلامه وانما كسب منه

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السلامه ان هو الوجود مع
الوجود مع غير راد على
سواء
تكم واما السوء منه وهو كمال
ان يكون وجوده هو سونه فان كان
المعقول ان يكون وجودها وسونها ليس راد
في باقي الحقائق ولذا الصواب ان يكون
راد على الحقائق ولا يسعها فيها
الوجود من ان يكون الحقيقه فادامه الوجود
راد على قسوس الاراد داما محسب ان يكون في الوجود
لان الموجودات الهه اسما وحقائق محسبه في الوجود
وانما ان الوجود لو كان معي واحدا
في جميع النوازل لا سجال ان يكون من ان يكون
محسب لان الحقيقه الواحده المسعده لا تسب
الحقيقه صحه من وجوده فالحقيقه الوجود
لان الحقيقه والعدم ليس به امر راد

بأسرانه عالما للعلمه لا اختلاف الروايع في
 واما اختلاف في اختلاف منغلقاتها والاسماء
 اختلافها وهي المعلومات في
 الامور المحسوسه فاعل واحد ان محار لعله
 من عتبات المساله السادسة

لا يرا الخواهر اما ان يكون حسب اسادها الى
 من اخر من حسب الجوهره او من غير
 ان كان من حسب الجوهره وذلك لان
 الجوهره الجوهره هي ان يكون له ما لا
 جوهر و يودي الى الالهائه له و
 لا يفسر هذا الالهائه من حسب الجوهره
 الجوهره من حسب الجوهره الى هذا الالهائه
 يكون من حسب امر غير الجوهره وهو ليس
 هو ما يعرف من الوجود المسمى العام او من حسب
 الجوهره فاما الوجود فقد قدم لنا في ان يكون
 امر اند على الحقائق ولو سلم انه ليس
 في الجوهر الاول لانه لم يلد ذلك الوجود
 بهانه واما ان يكون من حسب امر غير