

ABŪ YA'QŪB AL-SIJISTĀNĪ AND *KITĀB SULLAM AL-NAJĀT*

A Study in Islamic Neoplatonism

A thesis presented

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis has set out to accomplish two things: one, to prepare, through a detailed textual analysis, an edition of *Kitāb Sullam al-Najāt* of the tenth century Ismaili philosopher, Abū Ya'qūb al-Sijistānī; and two, to explore two topics in al-Sijistānī's thought, namely, his fundamental ontology and his views on the relation between revelation and the human intellect.

The investigation of al-Sijistānī's ontology consists of a study of his basic terms for the created entity. Here the primary aim has been to view his terminology in relation to the pre-Islamic and Islamic Neoplatonic schools as well as some *Kalām* schools.

The investigation shows that the Neoplatonism represented by al-Sijistānī cannot be explained by those versions found in Islamic and (Arabic) pre-Islamic Neoplatonisms. At the heart of al-Sijistānī's ontology is a redefinition of the Aristotelian category of substance into spiritual and corporeal, which enables the author to resolve some important problems in Neoplatonic philosophy, in the *Kalām*, and in Ismaili philosophy, but which in turn creates new problems for him.

This conception of the substance as the category common to the spiritual and the corporeal substance results in a distinctive solution to the problem of reason and revelation, which takes the form of an attempt to integrate the legacy of Plotinus with the demands of Ismaili imamology.

CONTENTS

<i>Abstract</i>	iii
<i>Dedication</i>	vi
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	vii
<i>Abbreviations</i>	x
<i>System of Transliteration</i>	xi

PREFACE	xii
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PART ONE

1	AL-SIJISTĀNĪ AND SOME BASIC PHILOSOPHIC TERMS	1
	The Critique of the term <i>Jawhar</i>	1
	Corporeal Substance from Spiritual Substance	10
	Proving the Existence	
	of the Spiritual Substance	18
	Epistemological Considerations	23
	The Unbounded Character	
	of the Spiritual Substance	27
	<i>Shay'</i>	30
	<i>Ays</i>	39
	<i>Şifah</i>	47
	Spiritual Messenger and Bodily Messenger	61
2	AL-SIJISTĀNĪ, NEOPLATONISM AND KALĀM	65
	Al-Sijistānī and Neoplatonism	65
	Pre-Islamic Neoplatonism	65
	Islamic Neoplatonism	75
	Al-Sijistānī and <i>Kalām</i>	79
	Ontology and Prophetology	83

PART TWO

3	TEXTUAL CRITICISM	90
	Sources of the Manuscripts	90
	<i>Kitāb al-Rushd wa al-Hidāyah</i>	91
	Al-Majdū' and the Classification of	
	<i>Kitāb Sullam al-Najāt</i>	92

The Analysis of the Manuscripts	97
Description of Manuscript B	97
Orthographic and Paleographic Characteristics of B	99
Description of Manuscript K	103
Orthographic and Paleographic Characteristics of K	108
Errors in K	112
Correcting Errors	113
Correcting grammatical mistakes	114
Supplying alternatives	114
Supplying additional text	114
Changing text to change subject	115
Existence of English text	115
 The Relation Between B and K	 116
Derivative Relationship	116
Stemmatic Relation Between B and K	117
The Stemmatic Structure	119
 The Authorship of the Text	 122
The <i>Ṭahārah</i> Section	122
The Anonymous <i>Faṣl</i>	125
Summary of the Doctrine of the <i>Faṣl</i>	129
Evidence for Authorship Contemporary with al-Sijistānī	129
Evidence for Authorship at a Later Period	135
 The Significance of the Work	 139
<i>Da'wah</i> Terminology	141
Human ' <i>aql</i> and Divine Revelation	149
 BIBLIOGRAPHY	 167

PART THREE

4 THE TEXT OF *ḲITĀB SULLAM AL-NAJĀT*

Symbols Used	175
The Arabic Text	176-289

DEDICATION

The People of Tanzania

My Parents and Siblings

My Wife

Karim Aga Khan

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While thesis work eventually compels the graduate student to confine his intellectual development to the bounds determined by his thesis research, some are fortunate enough to have stimulating and challenging fellow students who help to extend one's intellectual horizons. In this regard, I must mention two names: Rafique Keshavjee, for being largely responsible for the interest I developed in the social sciences, particularly in social anthropology; and Laurie McKnight, who has been a constant source of challenging perspectives for me.

I know that academics do not like to hear about such profane things as money. They are, however, harsh realities for some of us, so I cannot, in all conscience, omit to mention the direct and indirect assistance without which, like fuel, my academic interests would have come to a halt long ago.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Fuller bibliographical details for each entry in the list below have been included in the Bibliography.

When a reference is made to any of the works listed below, the page number occurs after the colon in the citation. A typical reference is (*Ārā'*:30), meaning page 30 of al-Fārābī's *Ārā'*. In the case of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā', R1 to R4 stand for the four volumes of their *Rasā'il*. In the special case of al-Sijistānī's *Sullam al-Najāt*, the page numbers are those of the text which has been edited here.

<i>Ārā'</i>	Al-Fārābī, <i>Kitāb Ārā' Ahl al-Madīnah al-Fāḍilah</i> .
<i>Alfāẓ</i>	Al-Fārābī, <i>Kitāb al-Alfāẓ al-Musta'malah Fī al-Manṭiq</i> .
<i>Ḥurūf</i>	Al-Fārābī, <i>Kitāb al-Ḥurūf</i> .
IKM	Arabic Proclus, <i>Kitāb al-Īqāḥ Fī al-Khayr al-Mahḍ (Liber de Causis)</i> .
IN	Al-Sijistānī, <i>Ithbāt al-Nubū'āt</i> .
KM	Al-Sijistānī, <i>Kashf al-Mahjūb</i> .
M	Al-Sijistānī, <i>Kitāb al-Maqālīd</i> .
SKM	Sa'adyā Gaon, <i>Kitāb al-Mabādī'</i> .
SN	Al-Sijistānī, <i>Kitāb Sullam al-Najāt</i> (Thesis edition).
U	Arabic Plotinus, <i>Al-Uthūlūjiyā (Theology of Aristotle)</i>
Y	Al-Sijistānī, <i>Kitāb al-Yanābī'</i> .

SYSTEM OF TRANSLITERATION

	من	d	Long Vowels
ء	ط	t	
ب	ظ	ẓ	
ت	ع	‘	ا ā
ث	غ	gh	آ a’
ج	ف	f	و ū
ح	ق	q	ي ī
خ	ك	k	
د	ل	l	
ذ	م	m	Short Vowels
ر	ن	n	
ز	ه	h	
س	و	w · v (Persian)	أ a
ش	ي	y	و u
ص	ة	ah; at (construct state)	ي i

Diphthongs

او	aw
اي	ay
يى	iy (final form i)
وي	uw

Additional Letters from the Persian Alphabet

پ	p
چ	ch
ژ	zh
گ	g

PREFACE

Some time ago I embarked upon an extensive survey of the basic philosophic terms of the different schools of thought in Islam. The primary focus of this investigation are those terms which center around the ideas of 'substance' (*jawhar*), 'thing' (*shay'*), 'being' (*ays*), 'accident' (*'araḍ*), and 'attribute' (*ṣifah*).

I am selecting, for this thesis, the preliminary results for one specific school of thought, namely, Ismaili Neoplatonism; I expect to continue my work on the Ismailis as well as the other schools. The thesis deals with Abū Ya'qūb al-Sijistānī, perhaps the most outstanding representative of Ismaili Neoplatonism of the period with which the investigation is concerned, that is, up to the end of the tenth century A. D.

Part One of the thesis describes the basic philosophic terms of al-Sijistānī. Part Two consists of the textual analysis of one of al-Sijistānī's works, *Kitāb Sullam al-Najāt*, and Part Three contains the Arabic text of this work. Part Two also discusses the significance of this work for the issue of 'Reason and Revelation'. Al-Sijistānī's distinctive solution to this problem reflects some fundamental differences between himself and the Plotinian tradition as such. Some of these fundamental differences are described in Part One, in which his basic terms are presented.

The investigation shows that the Neoplatonism represented by al-Sijistānī cannot be explained by those versions found in Islamic

and (Arabic) pre-Islamic Neoplatonisms. At the heart of al-Sijistānī's ontology is a redefinition of the Aristotelian category of substance into spiritual and corporeal, which enables the author to resolve some important problems in Neoplatonic philosophy, in the *Kalām*, and in Ismaili philosophy, but which in turn creates new problems for him.

This view of substance as the category common to spiritual and corporeal substance results in a distinctive solution to the problem of reason and revelation, which takes the form of an attempt to integrate the legacy of Plotinus with the demands of Ismaili imamology.

PART ONE

CHAPTER ONE

AL-SIJISTĀNĪ AND SOME BASIC PHILOSOPHIC TERMS

The account presented here is an attempt to gather together the textual contexts within which al-Sijistānī uses his key terms for substance and thing. These terms are *jawhar* (substance), *shay'* (thing) and *ayṣ* (being), each representing in its own peculiar way the created entity. The corresponding terms for attributes and accidents are *ṣifah* and *'araḍ*.

When al-Sijistānī's writings are examined, it soon becomes apparent that one of his major preoccupations is the spiritual substance: proving that it exists, elucidating its distinctive properties, and confronting his critics over the issue of how the bodily substance can develop out of a non-bodily spiritual substance.

The Critique of the Term *Jawhar*

While al-Sijistānī does not formulate an explicit definition of the term *jawhar*, several propositions (*maqālīd*, sing. *iqālīd*, lit. 'key') in his *Kitāb al-Maqālīd* are devoted to different aspects of the term. In particular he presents definitions of *jawhar* which

other groups have used in their doctrines about God, and which he finds objectionable when applied to Him. The critique of these definitions is aimed not at the correctness of the definitions themselves, but at the correctness, or, rather, appropriateness of applying the term *jawhar* to God.

Of the several definitions cited by him, one of the most common formulations, found in circles such as Ikhwān al-Ṣafā' and some Christian groups, as well as in the pseudo-Proclus, *al-Khayr al-Mahḍ*, is the definition utilizing the expression *qā'im bi-dhātihi*. The definition cited by al-Sijistānī (*Iqlīd* 9, pp. 36-41) contains, however, other elements as well:

anna al-jawhar huwa al-qā'im bi-dhātihi al-wāḥid
bi-al-'adad al-ḥāmil li-al-ikhtilāfāt fī dhātihi kamā
yakhtalif al-jawhar marratan bi-al-sawād wa marratan
bi-al-bayāḍ.

The main concern of this *iqlīd*, in which al-Sijistānī conducts an analysis of the concept of *jawhar*, is a theological one: to show that *Allāh* is not a *jawhar* (*laysa bi-jawhar*). Al-Sijistānī is not presenting explicitly his own definition of the term, but refuting those of the others, in particular the definitions offered by the group he labels the *falāsifah*.

Al-Sijistānī's criticism of the above definition of *jawhar*, stemming as it does from a concern with the doctrine of God (here, *al-mubdi'*), focuses not on the expression *qā'im bi-dhātihi*, but on the part which portrays God as a bearer (*ḥāmil*) of differences (*ikhtilāfāt*) within His own essence (*dhāt*):

al-ḥāmil li-al-ikhtilāfāt fī dhātihi.

The inadmissibility of using this term for God is based on the concept of *ikhtilāfāt*, for *jawhar* differs (*yakhtalif*) within itself every time it accepts one of the *ikhtilāfāt*. The consequence of this conception, if applied to God, is that He accepts these differing *ikhtilāfāt* (such as *bayād* and *ḥarārah*) within His own *dhāt*, and becomes an abode (*maḥall*) for them. In his own paraphrase of the definition al-Sijistānī states, after citing the definition,

kamā yakhtalif al-jawhar marratan bi-al-sawād wa
marratan bi-al-bayād wa marratan bi-al-ḥarārah wa
marratan bi-al-burūdah (M:36).

This is the only instance in his works where al-Sijistānī uses the term *yakhtalif* for *jawhar* when wishing to convey the idea of change of state which receiving different things implies. The definition does not state that the *jawhar* itself 'differs' depending on which of the *ikhtilāfāt* it carries. This paraphrasing of the definition is carried one step further when al-Sijistānī uses the term *yaqbal* instead of *al-ḥāmil*. To accept the *ikhtilāfāt* is to be a *maḥall* for them, just as to be a bearer (*ḥāmil*) for them is likewise to be a *maḥall*. His own examples for *ikhtilāfāt* (*marratan al-sawād wa marratan al-bayād*) do not, at least here, distinguish between *ikhtilāfāt* which are *ṣifāt* and those which are 'arad', or between form (*ṣūrah*) and category (*maqūlah*).

There are three features of the above definition which may be of significance for tracing the evolution of definitions of *jawhar* based on the notions of *ḥāmil* or *qābil*. The first is the link between the terms *dhāt* and *ikhtilāfāt*: other definitions use *mutaḍāddāt*, which do not behave the same way as the *ikhtilāfāt* do.

The former are incompatible as simultaneous accidents, but the latter need not cancel each other out. The second feature is that the *ikhtilāfāt* are said to be carried in (*fī*), not upon (*‘alá*), the *dhāt*. The third feature is that the term *dhāt*, as used, clearly refers to the *dhāt* of the *jawhar* (*dhātihi*, referring to *jawhar*). At the same time al-Sijistānī speaks on several occasions of the *jawhar* of a *shay’*. These formulations point to the following inclusive scheme:

dhāt of jawhar of shay’.

Continuing his critique, al-Sijistānī refers to an essential feature of all substances other than the First Intellect (*al-‘aql al-awwal*): they are limited by other substances (M:36-37). This idea of limit (*tanāhī*) applies equally to spiritual substances. The principle being employed by al-Sijistānī is that a limit affecting any aspect of a thing is at once a limit of that thing's essence (*dhāt*). This is so, he says, because to be limited in one direction is to be limited in all directions:

li-anna mā lahu nihāyah ilá ṭaraf min al-aṭrāf huwa
mutanāhī sā’ir al-aṭrāf.

To al-Sijistānī, therefore, such a view implies that the essence of God is limited (*mutanāhī al-dhāt*). The particular consequence of this conception which al-Sijistānī now presents does not consist in the *tanāhī* of the *dhāt*, but in what this *tanāhī al-dhāt* entails for the creative power of God:

wa al-mutanāhī al-dhāt mutanāhī al-qudrah wa al-quwwah
(M:37).

The idea of action is first introduced in *Kitāb al-Maqālīd* via a discussion of God's power (*quwwah*). Al-Sijistānī says that whatever relies on another thing (*musta'īn bi-ba'd*) does so out of weakness (*du'fihi*), whereas the *Bārī* does not seek the assistance of some other substance (*jawhar ākhar*). Substances are thus described by al-Sijistānī as in need of assistance and as weak in respect of their power. This is how the notions of 'doing' and 'ability to do' have been introduced into the semantic scope of the term *jawhar*.

A curious aspect of this formulation is that the sense of weakness (expressed by the term *du'f*) is not opposed by a term expressing strength (*shiddah*). Rather, the argument consists in saying that if the power (*quwwah*) is not complete (*tāmmah*) and perfect (*kāmilah*) then it is weak (*da'ifah*). And since al-Sijistānī wishes to reserve this complete and perfect power to God, who is not *jawhar*, this is equivalent to saying that to be *jawhar* is to be weak in power and, therefore, to be dependent on some other *jawhar* (*ghayrihi*) to do anything. This is the notion of self-sufficiency used in relation to *jawhar* in a negative manner, i.e, by referring to its *lack* of self-sufficiency.

An expression that occurs more than once in al-Sijistānī's works, and which is also to be found in the *Uthūlūjiyā*, equates 'aql with every thing that exists: *al-ashyā' kulluhā*; in this particular instance the equation is not between 'aql and *al-ashyā'*, but between *jawhar al-'aql* and *jawhar al-ashyā'*:

jawhar al-'aql jawhar al-ashyā' kullihā ... wa huwa
al-jawhar al-tāmm al-muḥiṭ bi-jamī' al-jawāhir (M:144).

The second definition which al-Sijistānī presents and analyzes is formulated in terms of the theory of *jins* and *naw'*. The *falāsifah*, he points out, define *jawhar* as *jins al-ajnās* (genus covering all the genera). Commenting on this statement, al-Sijistānī says that *jins* is that which is predicated of the species:

al-jins huwa al-maqūl 'alá anwā'ihī al-mukhtalifah
bi-al-ṣuwar.

The aspect of this definition which al-Sijistānī singles out as rendering the term *jawhar* inapplicable to God is the term *anwā'*. Those who apply the term *jawhar* to Him thereby imply that He has *anwā'* of which He is predicated, which is clearly unacceptable. While the definition has *jawhar* as the subject (*al-jawhar jins al-ajnās*), al-Sijistānī now reformulates this definition:

idh al-jins jawhar li-mā taḥtahu min anwā'ihī wa anwā'
anwā'ihī ilá an yakūn maqūlan 'alá ashkhāṣ al-anwā' wa
'alá ajzā' al-ashkhāṣ (M:38).

Here al-Sijistānī has taken this definition to be symmetrical, that is, *jins* is a *jawhar* to whatever is under it.

Essential to the semantics of the term *jawhar* is the term *fi'l*. Those who posit *jawhariyyah* (substantiality) with respect to God have to explain why they find it necessary to do so. If they reply that

kawn al-af'āl min ghayr al-jawhar ghayr mutawahham
fa-a'ṭaynā al-jawhariyyah li-yathbut lahu al-fi'l
(M:38),

al-Sijistānī does not wish to quibble over this point. What he is objecting to is the claim that action presupposes substance. Actions (*af'āl*) are related (*muḍāfah*) to substances, he points out, and they fall into two main groups: initiated change (*iḥālah*) and change (*istiḥālah*). Some substances have the capacity (*quwwah*) for initiating change, in which case this type of action is a *fi'l* (action). The action of a substance which is subject to change, rather than initiating it, is a passive action (*infi'āl*). However, initiated change and change apply, in al-Sijistānī's view, to everything below *al-'aql*, not just to the world of generation and corruption. He states quite categorically that

af'āl al-jawāhir bayn iḥālah wa istiḥālah (M:39),

so that anything that is not a *jawhar* may not be limited to these two types of actions. Since *'aql* is the very core of what being a *jawhar* is about, this statement appears to include it among those substances (effectively, everything that exists) subject to this limitation. Al-Sijistānī, however, has quite explicitly put the *'aql* above this limitation:

lammā kāna¹ al-'aql ta'yīs lā min ays fa-lā huwa iḥālah wa lā istiḥālah bal jūd maḥḍ wa idh lam yakun ta'yīs al-aysiyyāt lā min ays iḥālatan wa istiḥālatan thabata anna mu'ayyisahā laysa bi-jawhar idh af'āl al-jawāhir bayn iḥālah wa istiḥālah (M:38-39).

Strictly, the elucidation in this passage concerns *ta'yīs*, and only through the syntax does it ultimately refer to *'aql*, which is, in

¹ The text in the manuscript of the *Maqālīd* has *فاما ان يكون*, which has been replaced by me with the expression *lammā kāna*.

al-Sijistānī's conception, the same as *ta'yīs*.

The third definition analyzed by al-Sijistānī is that which divides *jawhar* into two sorts, *jism* and *rūḥ*:

al-jawhar munqasim ilá al-jism wa al-rūḥ (M:40).

The advocates of this conception then go on to assert that God is *jawhar*:

thumma qultum inna al-bārī jawhar (M:40).

Al-Sijistānī's criticism here is not of the definition itself, but its applicability to God. In his comments on the implications of this definition al-Sijistānī uses the term '*uyūb* (sing. '*ayb*), i.e., defects. These defects are properties which he has described when giving an account of the preceding two definitions. Not only is *jawhar* defective (with the exception of '*aql*, of course), but so are the '*rād*, which are carried (*maḥmūlah*) by substance.

Al-Sijistānī's comments indicate clearly that to be *jawhar* or *jism* or '*araḍ* is to have '*uyūb*. Thus all *jawāhír*, being subject to *fi'l* and *quwwah*, to *iḥālah* and *istiḥālah*, and to the classification categories of *jins* and *anwā'* (extending all the way 'down' to *ajzā'* *al-ashkhāṣ*), are said to be defective precisely by virtue of being substances.

These defects, which are integral to the substantiality (*jawhariyyah*) of each created thing, do not constitute any particular hierarchy; at least al-Sijistānī does not spell it out in his works. There is no statement to the effect that one *jawhar* is more defective than another. However, the concept represented by the

expression *afḍal min*, combining the twin ideas of virtue and value, may well include the notion of *'ayb*.

Although al-Sijistānī has characterized substance as inherently defective, the Intellect is the only substance which is an exception to this characterization. It is not, for example, subject to *iḥālah* and *istiḥālah*, and although it is said to be both *bi-al-fi'l* and *bi-al-quwwah*, these are not *'uyūb* in it, for it is *tāmm* with respect to both of these modes of being. It seems, therefore, that if the term *jawhar* has been applied to *'aql*, it is to point to its complete and perfect nature. This may explain why at times al-Sijistānī vacillates between applying a term to it (such as *wujūd*) that is also applied to other created things: in one case, it lacks the *simāt* of creation; in the second case, it has them, but to a perfect degree.

This problem stems from the unique position of *'aql* as the first originated entity (*mubda'*). It must differ from every other originated entity by being the only one to have been originated via God's Command (*amr*). The other entities are included within the *'aql*. This is how al-Sijistānī conceives of the creation of all entities *daf'atan wāḥidatan*: when *'aql* is originated, the others are included within it. The rest 'emerge' from the *'aql* through the latter's intermediacy. In this sense al-Sijistānī, without consciously addressing himself to the major Neoplatonic problem of the one and the many, formulates a solution based on a creationist point of view.

Corporeal substance from spiritual substance

One of the problems which emanationist philosophy must confront is to formulate an adequate solution to the problem of the emergence of sensible from non-sensible things. This problem is not exactly the same as the problem of the one and the many, a problem which Plotinus tried to the end of his life to resolve. But it may be said to be a subset of this problem. As the beings emerge in the scheme of Plotinus, they become progressively darker and farther from the One, until matter appears, for matter is the farthest from the One.

The Islamic philosophers who had formulated their own adaptations had by and large retained this framework of emanation in their cosmologies, and had tended to pass over the critical stage of the emergence of the body out of a non-bodily entity. The physicists (*ṭabī'īyyūn*) and the materialists (*dahriyyūn*), however, were quick to attack this aspect of Neoplatonism, pointing out the impossibility of a spiritual, simple substance transforming into a bodily, coarse substance.

In the *Maqālīd*, al-Sijistānī offers a defense of the Neoplatonic system. He devotes an entire section (*iqlīd* 36, pp. 133-137) to this criticism of emanationism.

The problem is formulated in terms of *laṭīf* (fine) and *kathīf* (coarse). The heading of this section states:

fī ithbāt anna al-‘ālam al-murakkab kāna min al-‘ālam
al-basīṭ.

To deny that such is the case is to deny, says al-Sijistānī, 1) that

the world is an artifact (*maṣnū'*), and 2) that it has a maker (*ṣāni'*). The objectors to this view find the idea of a coarse, heavy thing, emerging from something having no coarseness and heaviness, disgusting:

istafza'ū kawn al-shay' dhī al-kathāfah wa al-thiql min
shay' lā thiql lahu wa lā kathāfah fīhi.

This amounts to denying the *ṣāni'* altogether, says al-Sijistānī, whereas it is not impossible (*lam yamtani'*) for the two worlds, with all the *laṭāfah*, *kathāfah*, *thiql* and *khiffah* to have come into existence *lā min shay'*. Why then should it be impossible, al-Sijistānī asks them, for a composite, heavy entity (*murakkab thaqīl*) to be generated (*kawn*) from a simple (*basīṭ*) entity? At this point al-Sijistānī presents the objection of those who reject this possibility:

li-anna al-wahm law 'amila fī jam' alf alf shay' rūḥānī
li-yakūn minhu shay' murakkab kathīf wajadahū² ba'd
hādhā al-jam' absaṭ wa alṭaf (M:133).

Thus, no matter how many spiritual entities are combined together the result is the same: these entities are still as simple and as fine as before. There is no heaviness or coarseness to be seen. One could paraphrase their objection by stating that no matter how many times the number zero is combined with itself the result will always be zero. Al-Sijistānī, however, counters with his own example, creation *ex nihilo*, which, though conforming to the very objection raised, nevertheless is an accepted fact (as al-Sijistānī sees it).

² Reading *wajadahū* for *wajadahā*, which the text has.

He acknowledges that

al-wahm law 'amila bilā nihāyah fī kawn al-shay' lā min shay' wajada al-imtinā'.

But he attributes the impossibility to the senses, which prevent the imagination (*wahm*) from attaining to the correct knowledge. This knowledge comes via another, more direct, channel in which the hearts of the chosen intimates (*awliyā'*) of God are illumined by symbolic messages from the Soul (*rumūzāt nafsāniyyah*) and emanations from the Intellect (*ifādāt 'aqliyyah*). These *awliyā'*, in turn, direct a simpler (*sahīlah*), easy to understand message toward their followers, couched in terms of the sensible domain (*ṭabī'ah*).

Al-Sijistānī's defense of his position consists in treating the objection as an issue in epistemology, stressing the fundamental limits inherent in sense-based knowledge. The alternative he offers is a formulation of the process of revelation, which adapts Neoplatonism's doctrine of the hypostasis and of the emanative process to develop an Ismaili explanation of how revelation occurs inside the prophets (here referred to as *awliyā'*).

He is, however, aware that the critique of these physicists (*ṭabī'īyyūn*) does not meet them on their own ground. So he formulates his own arguments based on the principles of his critics. In the process, the criterion with which to 'measure' the argument has changed: it is no longer combination (*jam'*), but change and transformation (*istiḥālah*), the form of the verb indicating changes to which the thing is subjected, and not change which is initiated by the transforming thing.

Al-Sijistānī points out that the physicists (*ṭabī'īyyūn*) agree

that the elements (*uṣṭuquṣṣāt*) change from one into the other, and that the two higher elements (*rukṇayn* 'ulwiyyayn) are simpler (*absaṭ*) and finer (*alṭaf*) than the two lower elements (*rukṇayn* *sufliyyayn*) which, conversely, are coarser (*akṭhaf*) and heavier (*athqal*). When, therefore, air changes into water, and coarseness (*kathāfah*) and heaviness (*thiqal*) appear, al-Sijistānī wants the physicists to explain to him how such a state of affairs is possible; for here what is happening is clearly what they, the physicists, have themselves objected to: a coarse, corporeal thing (water) comes out of a light, simple thing (air). The physicists seem to have accounted for this phenomenon by appealing to the view that air and water, grounded as they are in nature (*ṭab'*), blend into each other (*yumāzīj*), as they are similar to each other in wetness (*ruṭūbah*) and opposite to each other in hotness (*ḥarārah*). According to these physicists, if hotness leaves the air, so that air becomes wet (*taraṭṭaba*), then it (air) becomes water:

fa-idhā dhahaba al-hawā' ... ṣāra mā'.

What is crucial to the physicists' contention against al-Sijistānī is the principle that changes in the elements are 'driven' by the movement of the natures (*ṭabā'i'*). More precisely, for an element to change into another element it should lose the *ṭab'* which makes the two elements incompatible (thereby preventing the change from taking place); when this happens, al-Sijistānī represents the physicists as holding that air then becomes moist, and eventually water. The physicists apparently do not describe this 'conversion' of air into water as the result of air developing

wetness (*ruṭūbah*). The fundamental dynamic of their process thus consists of the following sequence of events: 1) the incompatible *ṭab*' leaves the *rukn* concerned; 2) the *ṭab*' which is common to this *rukn* and to the *rukn* it is going to change into, now begins to appear; and 3) this emergence of the common *ṭab*' constitutes 'becoming' the new *rukn*. In the dynamics of the transformation of one element into another, two *ṭabā'i*' are required such that the departure of one is the 'surfacing' of the other. This is just what the physicists say is missing in the alleged transformation of a spiritual substance into a bodily substance:

wa laysa bayn al-‘ālam al-jismānī wa al-‘ālam al-rūḥānī
mushākalah fī shay' mā wa mukhālafah fī shay' ākhar
fa-yumkin an yakūn min al-‘ālam al-rūḥānī ‘ālam jismānī
(M:134).

Al-Sijistānī's rejoinder to this explanation consists of two parts. The first faults the physicists' physics itself, i.e., he does not accept their explanation of the physics of the phenomena involving the *arkān* and the *ṭabā'i*', and how they behave. Instead of explaining the formation of water by saying that *ḥarārah* leaves the air and this air becomes moist, as the physicists understand the problem, al-Sijistānī utilizes a different metaphor and explains the process by saying that when *hawā*' becomes cold (*tabarrada*), it becomes coarser (*takaththafa*), and *mā*' is formed from it (*ṣāra minhu*).

The second part of the rejoinder is the account of the transformation process as understood by al-Sijistānī:

fa-idhā taghallazat laṭāfat dhālika al-‘ālam takaththafa
wa ṣāra minhu al-‘ālam al-jismānī (M:134).

In his own version of the physical process going on between water and air, al-Sijistānī is rejecting the idea of one nature (*ṭab'*) moving out (*dhahaba*) of the air and another nature appearing in its stead. Thus, he does not say that hotness quits air. He says, instead, that air turns cold. And rather than say that air becomes moist (because heat is gone), he says that air becomes coarse. While the physicists invoke heat and wetness, al-Sijistānī invokes cold as the character of change taking place. And finally, instead of viewing the formation of water as the consequence of a developing wetness, al-Sijistānī views it as the consequence of a developing coarseness. The term *tabarrada* thus corresponds to the *ḥarārah-to-ruṭūbah* movement in the account of the physicists, and the term *takaththafa* corresponds to the consequent phenomenon described by them as *taraṭṭaba*.

When, therefore, al-Sijistānī states that the two worlds resemble each other *min jihat al-jawhariyyah*, he is referring to that aspect of both the *rūḥānī* and the *jismānī* substance which remains constant while the change, represented by the *mukhālafah* part of the relationship, is in process. The account of the physicists, on the other hand, represents the two *ṭabā'i'* (similar and dissimilar) as the 'points' along which change occurs. This is not the case with al-Sijistānī. He conceives of the *mukhālafah* aspect as itself consisting of a dyad whose members are mutually opposite to each other: *laṭāfah* and *kathāfah*, for example. The 'locus' of the 'movement' is therefore confined to the *mukhālafah* aspect only. While the *rūḥānī* and the *jismānī* substance are both

jawhar, what distinguishes one from the other is their *laṭāfah/kathāfah* aspect.

It could, of course, be argued that al-Sijistānī's explanation is not really an explanation but a restatement of the problem. The difficulty he must confront is to explain how a *laṭīf* substance transforms into a *kathīf* substance. By separating substantiality (*jawhariyyah*) from the conception of a *laṭīf* substance, al-Sijistānī has left *laṭāfah* with no substantiality, yet proceeds to speak of this *laṭāfah* as undergoing a process in which it 'thickens' (*taghallazāt*). The entire problem has thus been shifted to the problem of explaining how this 'thickening' process comes about, for this is the very outcome which the physicists want explained on the basis of the principles of physics.

A further contention of the physicists is that the transformation of air into water is accomplished by a 'wheel' (or some driving 'motor', *dūlāb*) which perseveres (*dā'iban*) in its motion so as to effect this transformation (M:135). This change among the elements (here the term *ummahāt* is used) is what eventually brings about the occurrence of organic life (*li-yaḥduth minhā al-mawālīd*). The *dūlāb* is therefore the most basic physical mechanism responsible for the genesis of the world of generation and corruption which is implied in the physicists' formulations as presented by al-Sijistānī.

Al-Sijistānī does not seem to object to the term *dūlāb*. He counters, however, by claiming that the *dūlāb* of the simple world (*al-‘ālam al-basīṭ*) is hidden from the reaches of the inferential method (*mastūr ‘an al-iḥāṭah bihā min jihat al-istidlāl*), i.e., from

inferences drawn from sense perception, though not from *istibṣār* (insight). Moreover, this *dūlāb* does not need to move in order that *kathāfah* might develop (*kawn*) from *laṭāfah*. The transformation occurs, instead, due to its *sukūn*, though this, al-Sijistānī points out, is something which only the knowledgeable ones (*‘ālimūn*) are able to understand.

The second serious objection to the view that a spiritual substance transforms into a bodily substance is based on geometrical principles, especially the geometry of bodies. The argument runs as follows. Even if a large number of the *suṭūḥ* (two-dimensional plane surfaces) are brought together and combined, they still fail to undergo combination (*yatarakkab*). As a result, *jism* fails to develop. For the *suṭūḥ* (and the argument is equally valid for lines and points) are *basīṭah*, while the body is composite (*murakkab*). The impossibility of a *murakkab* product developing out of an indefinite number of combinations of *basīṭ* items arises, in the view of the physicists, from the fundamental principle that

al-suṭūḥ laysat bi-jawhar fa-yamtanī‘ kawn al-jawhar
al-jismānī lā min jawhar (M:133).

Al-Sijistānī's objection to this view stems from what he regards as an aspect of the *suṭūḥ* the opponents have failed to consider. The *suṭūḥ*, he points out, are the limits or extremities (*nihāyah*) of bodies (*ajsām*). The spiritual world, in contrast, is not only simple but a *jawhar* as well.

Proving the existence of the spiritual substance

Closely related to the discussion of *suṭūḥ* above is the problem of proving the very existence of the spiritual substance. In order to accomplish this task al-Sijistānī resorts to the concept of dimensionality and its concomitant concept, volume, conducted in *iqḷīd* 38 (M:139-142).

The most fundamental feature of the *rūḥānī* substance, which distinguishes it from its *jismānī* counterpart, and which is the ontological reason why the *simāt* of each are not applicable to the other, is that this *jawhar rūḥānī* is devoid of (*mu'arrá 'an*) length, breadth and width. This is the single most important determinant of the non-*jismānī* character of the spiritual substance. The arguments which are put forward by al-Sijistānī do not, however, rely solely on an analysis of dimensionality: associated with the concept of dimensionality is the concept of density, represented by the two terms *thaqīl* and *khafīf* (heavy and light).

The argument begins by the observation, to which al-Sijistānī draws attention, that when one of two substances of equal dimensions floats to the top (*ṭafā*), and the other sinks to the bottom (*rasaba*), this shows that the first floats up because of its lightness, and the second sinks down because of its heaviness:

matá ra'aynā jawharayn mutasāwiyayn fī al-ṭūl wa al-'ard
wa al-'amq wa rasaba aḥaduhumā suflan wa ṭafā al-ākhar
'ulwan 'alimnā anna al-rāsib innamā rasaba li-thiqlihi
wa al-ṭāfī innamā ṭafā li-khiffatihi (M:139).

As a result, the destination (*makān*) of the one is opposite (*khilāf*) to that of the other. Having shown that the rise and fall

of substances is determined by their heaviness or lightness, al-Sijistānī now moves on to deal with the lightest (*akhaff*) substance, which is the one that rises the highest over the rest of the light substances. This substance is the farthest celestial body (*jirm mustadīr*), which is at once *ṭāfī* and *rāsib* in one and the same state (*ḥālah wāḥidah*). It rises in the east and sets in the west; yet, says al-Sijistānī, it does not have the three dimensions (*fa-lā huwa dhū ṭūl wa 'arḍ wa 'amq*) (M:140) since one would otherwise find another body beyond (or outside, *khārij*) it.

A second 'proof' focuses on the concept of *idāfah* (relation), which implies, according to him, that *jawhar* is being established through something else:

wa law kāna thabāt al-jawhar min al-ṭūl wa al-'arḍ wa al-'amq ḥattā lā yakhlū 'anhā jawhar wa lā yūjad a'nī al-ṭūl wa al-'arḍ wa al-'amq illā muḍāfah ilā jawhar mā aw mawjūd fī jawhar bi-'aynihi kāna idhan ithbāt al-jawhar min ajl mā uḍīfa ilayhi aw wujida fīhi (M:140).

These dimensions, he points out, are nothing but the limits of the sides (*tanāhī al-jihāt*) which adhere (*talḥaq*) to the substance with respect to space. The 'sides' of the spiritual substance, on the other hand, consist not in the bodily dimensions but in the *ifādah* (giving) and *istifādah* (receiving) which form the basis for the *rūḥānī* substance's ability to receive (*qabūl*) the divine emanation (*ifāḍah ilāhiyyah*). As for the question why *ṭabī'ah* has to be in need of the six sides and the three dimensions, al-Sijistānī says that this is something he promises to write about in greater detail in another book. Thus this argument attempts to establish the *rūḥānī* substance by exposing the (mere) relational basis of the

thabāt (stability) of the *jawhar* implied in the dimension-bound conception.

Turning to the soul, he argues for its non-dimensional character on the basis of an analysis of thought (*fikrah*). He finds that thought is able to go beyond the limits implied by the concept of *aqdār* (dimensions), and this establishes his main thesis.

Although the spiritual substance does not have volume (since it is not delimited by bodily sides subject to *tanāhī* in space) al-Sijistānī nevertheless retains the term *jihah* in formulating his conception of spiritual substance. A *jawhar rūḥānī* is said to have two pairs of sides: one consisting of the pair 'giving/receiving' (*ifādah/istifādah*), and the second consisting of the pair 'love/bounty' (*maḥabbah/ghunyah*). Al-Sijistānī is clearly thinking particularly of the soul here, for it is basic to his conception of the soul that it is oriented simultaneously toward two entities with opposing characteristics: 1) toward the 'aql, and 2) toward the *ṭabī'ah*. The pair *ifādah/istifādah* is used in many instances to represent the giving and receiving of assistance (*ta'yīd*) between the 'aql and the *nafs*. The relation between *nafs* and *ṭabī'ah* is usually conceived in a 'leaning toward' and 'turning away from' manner, so that al-Sijistānī is probably applying the second set of *jihatayn* to the *nafs*' relationship to *ṭabī'ah*. This interpretation of the text here is, however, a suggestion only, since the pair *maḥabbah/ghunyah* is not used elsewhere in his works with a clear reference to the *nafs/ṭabī'ah* orientation.

Al-Sijistānī does not appeal solely to a psychological argument in his endeavor to establish the existence of a non-bodily

substance, consisting of an analysis of the soul and its properties. He appeals particularly to bodily things themselves, and to the definition of *jawhar* based on these bodily things. He is also aware that the conception of *jawhar rūḥānī* cannot be a persuasive concept if it cannot be sustained in the face of objections which are premissed exclusively on bodily substances. The formulation of the arguments in support of his thesis in this *iqḷīd* indicates his sensitivity to this basic problem of Neoplatonism, a problem which, because it must involve 'proof' or 'demonstration' of some sort, is ultimately a problem of method. Al-Sijistānī is aware that it is not enough simply to lay forth a doctrinal system which has assertions about things when these assertions are not susceptible of demonstration on the basis of plain bodily things; it is necessary also to show that the entities, which the doctrine speaks about as being *rūḥānī*, actually exist.

Al-Sijistānī's attempt to sustain the very foundations of a metaphysics of non-bodily substances need not be interpreted as a defense of the Plotinian tradition as such, since *rūḥānī* substances can be compatible with a non-Plotinian metaphysics of substances. However, the conception of the two fundamental sorts of substances which al-Sijistānī formulates is integral to Neoplatonic emanationism, and it is in the advocacy of this view also that al-Sijistānī finds himself having to defend Plotinus and his legacy against an attack on a serious issue of emanationism. This is the problem of explaining how, in principle, a bodily substance can emerge from a non-bodily substance.

One of the consequences of the conception of non-bodily

substance is that it is not subject to the characteristics of space (high, low) which pertain to bodily substances. Al-Sijistānī criticizes those who conceive of *rūḥānī* substance along these lines. It is quite false to imagine (*tawahhum*) that the *nafs* is higher than water (IN:157). To him, when the *nafs* is imagined to be 'above' the *falak* (the highest bodily location, that of the fixed stars), it is being ascribed the limitations of bodily substances.

Thus, if it is thought to be 'beyond' the *falak* (which is spherical) in an 'upward' (*'ulwiyyan*) direction, one is led to inquire into its *jawhar* for an explanation of why it is unable to go 'beyond' the *falak*. Is it because its *jawhar* is more narrow (*adyaq*) than that of the more 'spread-out' (*awsa'*) *falak*? It is clear from his use of these terms that the aspect of *jawhar* which is uppermost in his mind is its 'spread' or 'span', represented particularly by the term *awsa'*. Al-Sijistānī could have pointed out that the spatial specification of *nafs* implies greater *thiqal* (density) than that of the celestial bodies. But this would suggest that the *nafs* could not be 'above' the *falak* in the first place, since the lighter substance must rise higher than the heavier substance. The *nafs* is, however, assumed to be higher and above the *falak*. This consideration suggests that in using the term *ḍīq* it is not the density or coarseness of the substance which al-Sijistānī is using as his criterion for determining the untenability of the view he is refuting; it is the idea of 'how far it extends' which the term, as used here, shares with the comparative form *awsa'*. While the *falak* extends all round, the *nafs* is being conceived (by al-Sijistānī's opponents) to have a limited spatial scope: it does

not extend beyond its 'above' location toward the 'below the earth' location.

If, on the other hand, the *nafs* is imagined to be 'above' the *falak* and also to extend all round, this conception is equally false, for it implies that the *nafs*, too, is spherical.

Al-Sijistānī's criticism of this physical conception of the *nafs* touches several prominent Neoplatonic cosmologies in Islam. The Ikhwān al-Ṣafā', for example, frequently depict the universal soul as located at a spot above (*fawq*) the outermost celestial body. Al-Fārābī, in his *Kitāb Ārā' Ahl al-Madīnah al-Fāḍilah*, describes the realm of the spiritual beings to be the region above the sphere of the moon; here, too, a spiritual being (including the intellects) is being conceived to be located within spatially prescribed regions.

Epistemological Considerations

A problem related to spiritual substance is the epistemological one: how is knowledge of it gained? The basic statement with respect to this issue is the following, according to which God has informed human beings that the only way to penetrate to a direct perception of spiritual substances is through assistance (*ta'yīd*):

wa akhbarahum anna lā nufūdh fī darak shay' min
al-jawāhir al-rūḥāniyyah illā bi-al-ta'yīd³ al-jārī
ilayhim min 'ālam al-basīṭ (M:6)

Al-Sijistānī points out that human beings are limited by being

³ Reading *bi-al-ta'yīd* for *bi-ta'yīd*.

subject to the senses (*tābi'ah li-al-ḥasā'is*), which prevents them from grasping spiritual entities (*al-rūḥāniyyah wa al-malā'ikah*), let alone the *mubdi'*. The *jawāhir rūḥāniyyah*, while not explicitly defined as to what they are, are described in this statement as unreachable (or inaccessible) through perception (*darak*) except through an assistance (*ta'yīd*) which flows toward men (*al-jārī ilayhim*) from the simple world. Here the term *ta'yīd* is linked to the term '*ālam al-basīṭ*' by two other terms: directly, to the term *al-jārī*, and indirectly, to the term *darak*. *Ta'yīd* is that which flows toward something from something (in the Ismaili case 'from something' is, ultimately, the '*aql*'), thus the expression *jārī ilā* to convey this 'toward' notion. The context of this *iqḷīd* restricts the recipients of *ta'yīd*, and therefore the semantic range of this term, to the human sector of the cosmos. The text does not provide any further terminological detail with which to form some idea of the situation at the recipient's (that is, the *mu'ayyad*'s) end: Does the recipient receive or accept (*yaqbal* would be the term to expect here) this *ta'yīd*? Does *ta'yīd* produce some kind of effect (*athar*) on the recipient? These implications cannot be drawn from the passage cited above.

A term which occurs in the above passage but which is rarely used by al-Sijistānī elsewhere in his works is the term *nufūdh*. The context shows clearly that it has a Qur'ānic reference: the next few sentences are aimed at providing an amplification of, as well as a scriptural corroboration for, the view denying *insān* direct perception (*darak*) of the *jawāhir rūḥāniyyah*. The specific Qur'ānic verse is:

yā ma'shar al-jinn wa al-ins in istaṭa'tum an tanfudhū
min aqṭār al-samāwāt wa al-ard fa-infadhū lā tanfudhūna
illā bi-sultān (55:33).

Nufūdh, in al-Sijistānī, however, is associated with *ta'līm* and *riyāḍah*. The latter two, which represent knowledge acquired through instruction and training, are incapable of leading to direct knowledge (*nufūdh*) of spiritual substances. The sense of *nufūdh* here is clearly that of penetration into or breaking through to something.

Al-Sijistānī refers to the main modes by which knowledge is acquired. In one mode knowledge is acquired through inference (*istidlāl*); in the other it is acquired through the substance of the knower, which is the 'substantial' mode (*jawharī*) of knowing. The inferential mode (*istidlāl*) is a consequence of the soul's restriction (*inḥiṣār*) in temporal time (*al-zamān*). The condition which is tantamount to *inḥiṣār* is the condition of being subject to the five senses (*mashā'ir*). Al-Sijistānī wants to convey the idea that *istidlāl* is an indirect approach to a knowledge of something.

When he says, therefore, that the second avenue is a *jawharī* one, he has the *jawhar* of the subject in mind. It is as though he were saying that knowing occurs more genuinely or more authentically at the level of the soul's *jawhar*, and less validly, incompletely, at the level of the senses.

There is a further statement which offers a clue to the distinction between the two avenues of knowledge. Upon death, he says, the soul's knowledge no longer deals with things which are confined to time in the physical world (*azminah*); it knows

directly, that is, its own *jawhar* and that of the object known no longer are separated by the *a'rād*:

kānat tilka al-ma'ārif jawhariyyatan mutabā'idatan 'an al-taghayyur⁴ wa al-istiḥālah (M:138).

The expression suggests that when the spiritual substance knows, it knows through its own substance, and is not therefore subject to change and transformation.

To al-Sijistānī, inferential knowledge covers any knowledge which the soul acquires when it is subject to nature (*ṭabī'ah*). There are two fundamental aspects to this type of knowledge. One is that the object which is known, is associated with accidents (*a'rād*) and it is through knowing these accidents that the soul comes to know the object. In the substantial (*jawharī*) mode the soul does not have to know the accidents first before arriving at the knowledge of the object, which consists in knowing its substance. The second aspect concerns time (*zamān*). Al-Sijistānī points out that inferential knowledge is subject to time, and through time, to change and transformation. This is consistent with his conception of the accidents as entities which come and go, constituting alteration and change. In other words, inferential knowledge is unstable knowledge, for the object of knowledge is susceptible to change. None of these limitations apply to the knowledge acquired through the very substance of the knowing subject (*jawhariyyatan*).

⁴ Reading *al-taghayyur* for *al-ghayr*.

The Unbounded Character of the Spiritual Substance

In order to clarify how spiritual substance differs from bodily substance, al-Sijistānī goes to the heart of what being a corporeal substance entails: the idea of limit (*ḥadd*). He endeavors to demonstrate that the spiritual substance is not subject to limit:

al-jawāhir al-rūḥāniyyah tashma'izz 'an al-ḥadd fadlan
'an al-mubdi' (M:173).

The task of showing the inadequacy of applying the idea of limit to spiritual things consists of an examination of certain things that form part of the corporeal world and analyzing them from the standpoint of their being bound entities (*maḥdūd*). The aim of this examination is to show that there is, within the physical world itself, a specific thing which is not bound (*maḥdūd*) at all. The next step consists in following the transition into the spiritual domain, all the while demonstrating the non-*maḥdūd* character of the next thing in the sequence. This specific thing in the physical world is (human) language.

Al-Sijistānī begins his argument by drawing attention to the letters of the alphabet (*ḥurūf al-tahajjī*) (*iqlīd* 47, M:174). These letters, out of which speech is composed through the spoken sounds (*ta'līf al-kalām bi-al-aṣwāt al-manṭiqiyyah*), are without any bound (*ghayr maḥdūdah*). As to what al-Sijistānī means by this term, the next statement offers a clear answer: the letters are *ghayr maḥdūdah*, he says,

bi-ma'nā iḥāṭat al-bashar bi-nihāyāt mā yumkin an
yatawallad minhā al-kalimāt wa al-asāmī wa al-qaḍāyā wa
al-aqāwīl (M:173).

It is not possible to envisage a limit to what can be generated from these letters. This is the case even for one single letter of the alphabet, not just the entire group of letters.

Having begun his account with the letters, he now proceeds to *kalām*, the sentences which are spoken by the human being. *Kalām* is built out of speech elements (*ḥurūf*), and exceeds the latter as far as amount (*kathrah*) is concerned. Precisely because of this greater quantity, al-Sijistānī considers *kalām* to be farther removed from limit than even the speech elements. The *kalām* is the last item of the physical world which al-Sijistānī considers.

From *kalām* he proceeds to *nafs*. If the former 'shrinks away in horror' (*ishma'azzat*) from *ḥadd*, so do the *khawāṭir*, the thoughts within the soul which are the very source of speech (*yanbū' al-kalām*). These thoughts themselves occur within the individual soul, so that the soul too must be such that it is not subject to *ḥadd*. Finally, the universal soul, which has all the spiritual substances within itself, is also *ghayr maḥdudah*. This completes al-Sijistānī's explanation.

The central principle in the formulation of this argument is the term *tawallada* (to be generated). One could argue against him and point out to him that the *ḥadd*, as a concept, can be validly applied to the *ḥurūf* only if their physical characteristics, such as shape, total number, etc., were the things the *ḥadd* refers to; for when bodily things are examined, their *maḥdūd* character is found to lie not in how many things are generated from them, but in their *kayfiyyāt*, such as their length, breadth, width, etc. What

al-Sijistānī has done is to recast the very conditions under which the term *ḥadd* is applied: he wants to look at the products which are generated out of the thing to see if they are finite. The term *nihāyah* clearly is used as a limit when he is considering the *ḥurūf* and the products generated from them. This notion of limit stays with the term *ḥadd* throughout his analysis.

While generation (*tawallud*) is crucial to the above analysis of *ḥadd*, the second explanation presented by him uses the term in association with the term *infaṣala* (to be set apart from another entity). If the *rūḥānī* substances were defined by boundaries, then the emanation which proceeds to them (*al-mufaḍḍ 'alayhā*) would not be extending beyond their boundaries, which immediately limits the perfection and completeness of the *'aql*. In this argument al-Sijistānī considers spiritual substances to be without bounds but set apart from each other by an identity reflecting their individuality.

He goes on to state further that a bounded object of knowledge (*maḥdūd ma'lūm*) is named (*mawsūm*) by an attribute (*ṣifah*). A thing that is named by a *ṣifah* falls within the confines of qualities (*maḥṣūr fī al-kayfiyyāt*). The *maḥṣūr*, on the other hand, depends on (*marhūn*) the senses. Whatever is outside this confining domain of qualities (*ḥiṣār al-kayfiyyāt*) is outside the scope of the attributes, i.e., is not characterized by attributes (*simat al-ṣifāt*). This last phrase is interesting, for it is an unambiguous statement indicating that for al-Sijistānī the single most fundamental term representing the idea of 'characteristic' of any created entity is the term *simah*. The *ṣifah* is a certain type of

simah, and belongs to *jismānī* substances. When al-Sijistānī uses the expression *simat al-ṣifāt*, he is referring to the 'characteristic of having attributes' in the first place.

In the sequence presented by him, language is the 'interface' between the two worlds. *Ḥurūf* make up the building blocks of *kalām*, which is still outside the human person, and can be considered a part of the *jismānī* world. The crucial transition must no doubt be placed between the *kalām* phase and the *khawāṭir* phase. This latter phase is the *nafsānī* phase, eventually coming out from the human being into the external world as speech (*kalām*). The interfacing of the different worlds is embodied in the sequencing given by al-Sijistānī. *Kalām* and the human being are both part of 'ālam al-ṭabī'ah, but *kalām* is without *nafs*, though it is of considerable interest whether in al-Sijistānī human speech is considered *rūḥānī* in any sense at all; for if not then the only alternative is that it must be *jismānī*.

These considerations suggest that language must in some way have been conceived by the Ismailis to be spiritual. Its *jismānī* or *rūḥānī* classification remains, however, a problem. One immediate point, however, can be made. It appears to upset the traditional schema among the Ismailis depicting the vegetable (*nāmiyah*), animal (*ḥayawāniyyah*), and rational (*nāṭiqiyyah*) souls within the biological domain (*al-mawālīd*).

Shay'

One term that al-Sijistānī links only with the term *shay'*, to the exclusion of any other, is the term *zawj* (and its derivative, *zawjiyyah*) (Y:73ff). Every thing (*shay'*), be it *rūḥānī* or *jismānī*,

has *zawjiyyah* in it (al-Sijistānī uses here *mawjūdah* to express the idea of 'being present' or 'being found' rather than the more technical 'existent'). *Zawjiyyah* might mean 'dualism', but this rendering threatens to carry into the translation controversial connotations of present-day discussions of this concept. 'Paired-ness' is an alternative, as is 'being a couple'. The essential idea here is that every thing (*shay'*) is two-sided, consisting of two parts or components. *Zawjiyyah* is a 'constitutive' term, expressing the notion that one single thing is composed of two constituents. *Zawj* is the term he uses to represent this notion. A *zawj* may be either *laṭīf* (fine) or it may be *kathīf* (coarse).

Al-Sijistānī states that each of the two basic types of things, *rūḥānī* and *jismānī*, has *zawjiyyah* in it. While *shay'* is characterized as having *zawjiyyah* in it, al-Sijistānī does not have a similar characterization for *jawhar* and *ays*. In the case of the latter term this may well reinforce the initial suggestion that *ays* is a term referring to things in their non-*ṭabī'ī* aspect, which would further corroborate the suggestion that *ays* expresses the non-*zamānī* side of a thing (*shay'*). If this reading of the term is correct, then *ays* stands for a thing considered without its *laṭīf* or *kathīf* aspect. This would allow al-Sijistānī to continue to use this term for things in the *ṭabī'ī* world, as may well be the case in his formulation *aysiyyat al-insān*.

The term *zawjiyyah* also occurs in the *Maqālīd* (*iqḷīd* 7, M:28-31) dealing with the topic of *al-fardāniyyah*. The first instance of this term occurs within the context of an analogy which

al-Sijistānī draws between the cosmic hypostases (such as 'aql, nafs) and the counting system. The number 'one' of the counting system (*wāḥid al-a'dād*) is termed the 'pure odd' (*al-fard al-maḥḍ*), while the number 'two' (*ithnān*) is termed the 'pure even' (*al-zawj al-maḥḍ*) (M:29). Everything else which is subsequent to these two is one of the *tarākīb*, i.e., it has been generated by a combination of these two numbers. Al-Sijistānī now goes on to introduce the term *zawjiyyah*, which must presuppose two things that are linked together. Pure *zawjiyyah* is the coupling (*muzāwajah*) which occurs between the *sābiq* and the *tālī* from the standpoint of *ifādah* and *istifādah*. Al-Sijistānī refers to the Qur'ānic verse which uses the term *azwāj*: (*subḥān alladhī khalaqa al-azwāj kullahā*).

The text in the *Yanābī'* (p. 73), together with the text in the *Maqālīd*, suggests that the primary meaning of the term *zawjiyyah* is that it refers to the ultimate origin of the thing, in so far as it is a thing, in the two Plotinian primaries, 'aql and nafs. Although al-Sijistānī turns to the counting system to formulate the cosmological meaning for the term, the use of the terms *sābiq* and *tālī*, which are invariably employed in an *ifādah/istifādah* context, casts the sense of the term in the overall framework of guidance and divine assistance. To speak of a *shay'* is thus not only to recognize that there is *zawjiyyah* in it, but to recognize that the thing is constantly receiving assistance from the *sābiq*.

The equivalent of the term *shay'* preserved in Persian translation, *Kashf al-Maḥjūb*, is the term *chīz*. A typical statement, encountered also in an Arabic form, is the following classification of things:

chīzhā yā jawhar bovadh yā 'arad va jawhar yā jism
bovadh yā rūh va jism yā nāmī bovadh yā mavāt va nāmī yā
nabāt bovadh yā hayvān (KM:5),

a formulation found also, for example, in the *Ithbāt*. The statement forms part of an argument against using this term for God, since to do so entails the notion of division (*qismat*) in God. This objection has already been encountered before, in *iqlīd* 11 of the *Maqālīd*. Here the argument goes further, drawing out other consequences which are also unacceptable when the term is applied to God. Every *maqsūm* is *maḥdūd*; every *maḥdūd* is *mutanāhī*; and finally, every *mutanāhī* is created (*āfarīdah*).

In another place al-Sijistānī uses the term *mā'iyah* for *chīzī-ye chīzhā*, which in the Arabic would correspond to *shay' iyyat al-ashyā'* (KM:17). The term *mā'iyah* is distinguished from the term *māhiyyah*, which represents the *hastī* of things (*hastī-ye chīzhā*), and which perhaps would correspond to the expression *aysiyyat al-ashyā'*.

Another term that is used in relation to *shay'* is the term *dhāt*. In the *Nuṣrah* (excerpts available in al-Kirmānī's *al-Riyāḍ*) the term is linked to the concepts of *tamām* and *nuqṣān*, which in turn are associated with the concept of action, *fi'l*. If a thing can perform acts, then al-Sijistānī analyzes this thing for the purposes of determining whether it is perfect or imperfect. The analysis breaks it into its *dhāt* and its *fi'l*. Now this type of analysis is what the *mutakallimūn* conduct in their discussions over God and His *ṣifāt*. However, in the case of al-Sijistānī (as well as in the case of Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī), the subject of disputation is not God's *ṣifāt*

but the perfection or imperfection of *al-nafs al-kulliyah*.

Another meaning of *shay'iyah* is: *huwa ithbāt li-dhāt in mā*, setting up or establishing some 'entity' (*dhāt*) (Y:83). The entities (*dhawāt*) are either sensible (*maḥsūṣah*) or intelligible (*ma'qūlah*). Al-Sijistānī, however, links *dhāt* with *shay'iyah* by way of the knowing process. The *shay'iyah* of sensible entities, he says, is established through the senses (*thabātuhā bi-al-ḥiss*), and that of intelligible entities is established through the intellect (*'aql*) (*thabātuhā bi-al-'aql*).⁵ He says, finally, that anything that has no *thabāt*, whether it is *maḥsūs* or *mawhūm* (the term *mawhūm*, 'imagined', indicates that al-Sijistānī is referring to human intellect here) has no *shay'iyah* (*mā lā thabāt lahu shay'iyatuhu ghayr mawjūdah*).

Al-Sijistānī thus seems to be using *dhāt* and *shay'iyah* as synonyms. He is not equating *dhāt* with *shay'*, but with *shay'iyah*, which is what one would expect. In one of his most 'pantheistic' statements, he says that the First Intellect is the totality of things:

al-'aql huwa al-ashyā' kulluhā wa al-ashyā' kulluhā
al-'aql,

found in several places. In the *Yanābī'*, the first statement of the fourth *Yanbū'* begins with the assertion:

al-'aql huwa shay'iyat al-ashyā' kullihā (Y:82).

Al-Sijistānī thus uses the term *shay'iyah* in two different senses:

⁵ The published text of Ghalib has *bi-al-fi'l*.

one, as that which is identical to the First Intellect, and two, as that which is established by the human being's knowing efforts. One consequence of the latter case, it would seem, is that if an entity remains unknown either by the senses or by the human intellect, then it cannot be said to exist. This is so because if an entity is not known either by the senses or by the intellect, it has no 'thingness' (*shay' iyyah*), which means it does not exist. Al-Sijistānī seems to be making the *shay' iyyah* dependent on human knowledge. On the other hand, when he describes this *shay' iyyah* as being the First Intellect itself, he is making it independent of human knowledge.

His most consistent term for the idea of creation *ex nihilo* is the well-known formula *lā min shay'*. There are, however, a few cases where the alternative formulation, *min lā shay'*, is found. For example, when distinguishing between *ibdā'* and *inbi'āth*, he says:

bal al-inbi'āth min shay' wa al-ibdā' min lā shay'
(IN:46),

and then, one page further, he has the other formulation:

li-anna khalq al-mubdi' bi-al-ḥaqīqah huwa al-'aql
al-awwal al-mubda' lā min shay' (IN:47).

These expressions corroborate the earlier suspicion that *shay'* is al-Sijistānī's term to represent 'something', whatever its character. This would be its *general* use, where it is most universal in scope. In a blanket statement al-Sijistānī speaks of things (*ashyā'*) as falling into two classes (*naw'*), those which are made

by human craftsmanship (*ṣinā'ī*) and those that are produced by nature (*ṭabī'ī*). The criterion which determines which class a thing falls into is the process through which it is produced. The two fundamental processes which together account for the appearance of things are *miḥnah* (effort, endeavor) and *istiḥālah* (transformation). *Miḥnah* is the process by which *ṣinā'ī* things appear, and *istiḥālah* is the process by which *ṭabī'ī* things appear. The former class is clearly the domain of human activities and their output. *Miḥnah* excludes *istiḥālah*, which therefore acquires the meaning of change not involving human intervention or interference. Thus *miḥnah* is the human counterpart of *istiḥālah*. Both are the agent causes of the 'coming-into-being' (*kawn*, generation) of things. The use of *kawn* further strengthens the conclusion that here, in this specific context, al-Sijistānī has confined the scope of the term *shay'* to the natural realm (*'ālam al-ṭabī'ah*) only.

In what may be a reference to the Māturīdiyyah al-Sijistānī attempts to refute the view held by al-Māturīdī and his disciples that God is a *shay'*, yet quite unlike any other *shay'*. This is a view expressed in Qur'ānic statements using the term *shay'*. In the context al-Sijistānī uses *thabata* (of *dhāt*), which is connected to *huwiyyah* (M:47).

Al-Sijistānī devotes a separate section (*iqḷīd* 11, M:46-49) to this controversy. He deals first with the view that God is like other things, from the standpoint of *shay' iyyah*. The advocates of this view felt compelled to formulate their conception in this manner because it is through *shay' iyyah* that God's *dhāt* is established (*li-tathbut dhātuhu*), and his *huwiyyah* is able to

'stand' (*yaqūm huwiyyatuhu*) (M:47). Al-Sijistānī finds the implication of this view objectionable, for it suggests to him that there is no distinction left between creator and created (*fa-ayy al-faḍl yaqa' bayn al-khāliq wa bayn al-makhlūq*). The created *dhāt* also, he argues, is established through *shay' iyyah*.

Further, the expression *shay' lā ka-al-ashyā'* is applicable not just to God but to every other thing. For each thing is a thing (*shay'*) not like other things. The sun is a *shay' lā ka-al-ashyā'*, as is the 'aql, and so on for every thing that is created (*wa ilā sā'ir mā yūjad fī al-makhlūqīn*).

The only true *shay'*, according to him, is *al-'aql (al-shay' 'alā' al-ḥaqīqah)*; for this 'aql is such that all the spiritual and bodily things are manifest (*mabrūzah*) in it, and it is the cause ('illah) of every thing that has appeared under it (*zahara taḥtahu*) (M:48). No other thing deserves to have the expression *shay' lā ka-al-ashyā'* applied to it more than the 'aql.

While the above view of *shay'*, involving the term *shay' iyyah*, focuses primarily on the aspect of *dhāt* and *huwiyyah* of a thing, involving assertion (*ithbāt*), the second view of *shay'* which al-Sijistānī confronts is analyzed by him from the standpoint of divisibility and its impact on the view of God. Describing *shay'*, he says:

wa al-shay' lā yakhlū min an yakūn jawharan aw 'araḍan
wa al-jawhar huwa al-munqasim ilā al-ithnayn min al-jism
wa al-rūḥ wa al-'araḍ huwa al-munqasim ilā al-maḳūlāt
al-tis'.

This is the first instance in the *Maqālīd* where al-Sijistānī comes close to defining *shay'*. He does so in terms of *jawhar* and 'araḍ

(the latter term covers the nine other categories of accident).⁶

This analysis of the term *shay'* suggests that al-Sijistānī is addressing the theological circles of the Māturīdiyyah and the Mu'tazilah who follow Abū al-Qāsim al-Balkhī al-Ka'bī. The latter's views on this topic are presented by al-Māturīdī, who then proceeds to criticize them. While the term *shay'īyyah* is common to both these two, the formulations of al-Balkhī do not contain the terms *dhāt*, *ithbāt* and *huwiyyah*. These terms are, however, found in al-Māturīdī. When, therefore, al-Sijistānī attacks those who use the term *shay'* for God because they want to establish his *dhāt*, he seems to have in mind the schools connected with al-Māturīdī.

Al-Māturīdī himself shows familiarity with Ismaili views, which he ascribes to the Qarmatians.⁷ The few statements which he cites as being Ismaili formulations are very similar to those of al-Sijistānī and other Ismaili writers using the same terminology and formulations. The Ismaili statements are presented in the chapter refuting al-Balkhī (MT:60ff), and in the section dealing with *waṣf li-allāh* (MT:93ff). The statement ascribed to the Qarmatians, which contains the term *mabrūz*, runs as follows:

inna al-mubda' al-awwal fihi jamī' al-'ālam mabrūzan
tastamidd minhu al-nafs al-kulliyyah wa yumidd al-hayūlā
wa minhu tarkīb al-'ālam.

The statement ascribed to the Bāṭiniyyah (MT:94) runs:

⁶ Al-Sijistānī never uses the term *maqūlah* to describe the substance (*jawhar*).

⁷ The appellation *al-qarāmiṭah* occurs in *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd*, p. 63, while the appellation *al-bāṭiniyyah* occurs on page 94.

wa yaj'alūna kulla al-'ālam mabrūzan fī al-'aql
tastamidd minhu al-nafs fa-yumidd al-hayūlā yaqūlūn kāna
al-'aql bi-al-ibdā' wa al-ibdā' 'illatuhu mabrūz fīhi
kull shay'.

Two immediate differences between the two quotes above and the formulations which al-Sijistānī presents in his works are the terms *tastamidd* (seek help) and *yumidd* (give help): he does not use them. They may still be confirmed as his terms in those of his works which have not yet been recovered, or they may originate in Ismaili circles that included al-Sijistānī. The *dā'ir* al-Nakhshabī could conceivably be one candidate, but in the excerpts which are available in al-Kirmānī's *Riyāḍ* and Abū Firās' *Ṭḍāḥ* there is no evidence of the term *mabrūzah*.

Ays

The term *ays* is one of the key terms of al-Sijistānī with which he seeks to represent and describe the created entity. It occurs in several forms throughout his works, as *mu'ayyis*, *ta'yīs*, *ayyasa* and, in its plural form, as *aysiyyāt* and *mu'ayyasāt*. For the negation of the term *ays*, al-Sijistānī uses the terms *lays*, *al-lays*, and *laysiyyah*, the last term as the negation of *aysiyyah* (IN:28, for example).

His conception of *tawḥīd*, expressed by his formulation of the meaning of the term *nafy* when used alone to include both the corporeal and the spiritual domains (*jismānī* and *rūḥānī*), is also reflected in his language. The act of negation (*nafy*) requires that *lā ays* be used to represent the *nafy* of the characteristics of *jismānī* creation. However, al-Sijistānī resorts to *lā lā ays* when

the same negation (*nafy*) must represent simultaneously the characteristics of spiritual (*rūḥānī*) creation also.

A formulation which comes close to that found in Sa'adyā Gaon⁸ occurs in the *Ithbāt al-Nubū'āt*:

wa ghayr mumkin an yaṣīr al-'ālam laysan ba'd an kāna
aysan bi-al-ibdā' idh laysa ibdā' ākhar yaj'al al-ays
laysan kamā yaj'al ibdā' al-mubdi' al-lays aysan
(IN:28).

In his commentary on Sefer Yesīrah, *Tafsīr Kitāb al-Mabādī'* (SKM:83-84), Sa'adyā Gaon (d. 942), a leading figure in the Jewish *Kalām* of the period, has a statement in which he uses the term *ays* within a creation *ex nihilo* context:

khalaqa lā min shay' shay'an wa ja'ala mā laysa aysan.

Further, Sa'adyā uses the expression *lays* in his formulation, i.e., without the definite article *al-*. Al-Sijistānī's most frequent expression is *lā min ays* when the term *ays* is used, but in the few cases where *lays* is used he has *min al-lays*.

With respect to the statement quoted above, two observations are of relevance to the discussion. The first is that Sa'adyā uses *ja'ala* with the phrase *mā laysa*, whereas al-Sijistānī uses *yaj'al* with the term *al-lays*. The second is that *al-lays* is depicted here as that which is made into an *ays*. Further, al-Sijistānī says that another *ibdā'* does not make the *ays* into a *lays*. Thus he is able to state his major position on the eternity of the world, that it is

⁸ *Tafsīr Kitāb al-Mabādī'* (SKM:83-84).

ghayr mumkin an yaṣīr al-‘ālam laysan.

In another interesting formulation, he says

anna khurūj al-‘ālam min lays ilá ays li-ibdā‘ al-mubdi‘
(IN:28).

The form of this statement is very similar to the form of statements found in the *Kalām* environment, with *lays* instead of ‘*adam*’, and *ays* instead of *wujūd* (minus, of course, the expression *li-ibdā‘ al-mubdi‘*). *Kalām* formulations tend, on the whole, to use *muḥdath* or *shay’* instead of *al-‘ālam*, but the latter term would not be inconsistent were it to be made part of these *Kalām* formulations. The *muḥdath* is often described as coming out of (*khurūj* ‘*an*) ‘*adam* into *wujūd*, which immediately prompts the question: is al-Sijistānī’s formulation above made with an eye to this *Kalām* formulation? The similarity in the structure of the two formulations, suggested by the paradigm *khurūj ... min ... ilá*, does not imply a similarity of the conception which each expresses. *Ays* and *lays* in al-Sijistānī presuppose a Neoplatonic framework, which is not what is presupposed by the *Kalām* formulations.

There is one more statement, in the *Yanābī‘*, which reinforces the suggestion of a *Kalām* association in al-Sijistānī’s formulations. This is the statement in which *jawhar* and *ays* are used as synonyms:

..allāh alladhī abda‘a bi-‘ilmihi wa irādatihi al-jawhar
al-sābiq al-tāmm alladhī lam yasbuqhu ays qablahu wa lā
ḥadatha ba‘dahu ays maḥd (Y:56).

The terms *qabl* and *ba‘d*, though non-*zamānī* when regarded from

al-Sijistānī's own view of creation, convey the idea of (temporal) sequence, particularly when they are accompanied by the term *yasbuqhu*. When to this term is coupled the term *ḥadatha*, so prominent in *Kalām* circles, the *Kalāmist* 'prompting' of the formulation becomes much more difficult to ignore.

Al-Sijistānī's view concerning 'being' (*ays*) is developed in some detail in the *Yanābī'*. It is apparent, as soon as these passages are examined, that one of the problems to be resolved with respect to al-Sijistānī's technical terminology is to determine the difference between the term *aysiyyah* and the term *huwiyyah*. In al-Kindī, for example, the two terms are never used together, nor is an expression such as *lā-huwiyyāt al-aysiyyāt* (or even the expression *huwiyyāt al-aysiyyāt*) to be found in his works. In contrast, these two terms are employed together in the second *yanbū'*, entitled *Fī Huwiyyat al-Mubdi' al-Maḥḍah*. Although the term *huwiyyah* is used here for the *mubdi'*, al-Sijistānī's explanations are actually aimed at showing that this use must be qualified. The *mubdi'* is above both *huwa* and *lā huwa*. The *huwiyyah* which is applied (*tuḍāf*) to it is really the *Sābiq's* *aysiyyah*, and the *Sābiq's* *aysiyyah* comes from the *aysiyyah* of the *ibdā'*:

anna al-huwiyyah al-maḥḍah allatī tuḍāf ilá al-mubdi'
subḥānahu 'an huwa wa lā huwa innamā hiya aysiyyat
al-sābiq min aysiyyat⁹ al-ibdā' (Y:71).

To underline the point being made here, he adds:

⁹ The text has the singular form (*aysiyyah*), which makes sense here because the *Sābiq's* *aysiyyah* comes from that which originated it.

ya'nī anna al-mubdi' huwa alladhī 'arafahu al-sābiq
bi-aysiyyatihi.

Several other statements in the *Yanābī'* indicate clearly that it is the *mubdi'*, and not the first *mubda'*, which is meant here. For example, the term *subḥānahu*, which al-Sijistānī uses here, is reserved by him for the *mubdi'* only. Al-Sijistānī also uses the term *al-ḥaqq* with the term *mubdi'* (Y:72). The first *mubda'*, which is the Intellect, clearly has *huwiyyah*:

wajadnā ashraf dhawāt al-huwiyyāt al-'aql (Y:72).

A statement which links *aysiyyah* and *huwiyyah* is the following:

fa-ṣārat ma'rifatuhu li-man abda'ahu bi-aysiyyatihi
huwiyyata al-mubdi' (Y:71).

This statement is of some interest:

1. The *sābiq's* *ma'rifah* of the *mubdi'* becomes, for the *mubdi'*, its (that is, *mubdi''s*) *huwiyyah*. Here *li* would mean 'of'.
2. *Ma'rifah li* can be interpreted in the sense of 'acknowledging' or, perhaps a better rendering, 'recognition': the *sābiq* 'recognizes' the *mubdi'* via its *aysiyyah*, and this 'recognition' constitutes, for the *sābiq*, the *huwiyyah* of the *mubdi'*. According to this interpretation, the *mubdi'* has *huwiyyah* as seen from the standpoint of the Intellect; that is, when the *sābiq* knows and 'recognizes' the *mubdi'* through its (*sābiq's*) *aysiyyah*, one speaks of the *mubdi''s* *huwiyyah*.

Al-Sijistānī creates the impression here that the *sābiq* knows the *mubdi'*. Yet it is his most central doctrine that this is

impossible. The term which is frequently used in that analysis is the term *aḥāṭa bi*. The two are not, however, synonyms, as the analysis of the use of the term *ma'rifah* indicates. *Iḥāṭah bi* is used when al-Sijistānī wants to deny any possibility of knowledge, whereas *ma'rifah* is used in the sense of recognition: that the *mubdi'* is above *huwa* and *lā huwa*. At the core of this recognition is *nafy*, so that it becomes part of the very meaning of the term *aysiyyah* when used for the '*aql*'.

The question here is: why make *aysiyyah* part of the *sābiq's* efforts to 'recognize' (*ma'rifah*) the *mubdi'*? The *sābiq's* ability to know the *mubdi'* is derived from its own *aysiyyah*, which itself is the same as the *aysiyyah* of *al-ibdā'*. Al-Sijistānī has assigned *aysiyyah* to the *ibdā'*, yet nowhere does he speak of *ibdā'* as an *ays*. This is somewhat problematical, for only an *ays* has *aysiyyah*. *Huwiyyah*, on the other hand, is clearly used as an epistemological term: the *sābiq's* *ma'rifah* is *huwiyyah*, indicating that its knowledge of its own *aysiyyah* is the knowledge of its being an originated thing (*mubda'*) (that is, an *ays*), and this is what its *ma'rifah* amounts to: that it has an originator (*mubdi'*) who is beyond its grasp, no more than that. If this is the case, then the strictly negative signification assigned to *iḥāṭah bi* would convey a limit intrinsic to the '*aql*'s ability to know anything more about its originator than what its own *aysiyyah* will allow (and its own *aysiyyah* is itself given to it by *ibdā'*).

One of the more important expressions is the expression *lāhuwiyyāt al-aysiyyāt*, to be compared with the expression *huwiyyāt al-mubda'āt*. Al-Sijistānī also says, elaborating on the

applicability of the term *huwiyyah* to the *mubdi'*, that it does not mean that *huwiyyah* exists while *lāhuwiyyah* does not exist:

lā anna hunāk huwiyyah mawjūdah wa lāhuwiyyah ma'dūmah,

but the *mubdi'*'s *huwiyyah* is

izhār nafy al-huwiyyāt wa al-lāhuwiyyāt.

In this statement al-Sijistānī is probably saying that when the *mubdi'* originates the world, this origination also negates the *huwiyyāt* and the *lāhuwiyyāt* from the *mubdi'*. This interpretation is, however, tentative, for the context does not provide enough textual material with which to determine how one is to read the term *izhār* here. This passage offers, however, one solution to the problem of the distinction between the *mubda'āt* and the *aysiyyāt*: the former have *huwiyyāt*, i.e., they have identity, so they can be identified and recognized. *Aysiyyāt* have no *huwiyyah*, which means that although they have identity, they are, at bottom, the same.

Huwiyyah, moreover, entails (*taqṭaḍī*) an '*illah* (cause). The concept of causality is thus pegged onto the *kalimah*, the first cause (*al-'illah al-ūlā'*). What is interesting here is that *aysiyyah* is not associated with either *ma'rifah* or '*illah*. Al-Sijistānī's formulations suggest that *huwiyyah* refers to the originated entity when one is stressing 1) that it has been originated (it is a *mubda'*); 2) that it can be recognized as a unique entity which has identity (it is a *huwa*); and 3) that it has an originator (its cause). An originated entity thus has *huwiyyah* in this sense.

The term *aysiyyah*, on the other hand, has not been used in

this sense at all. Rather, the text suggests that it is to be used when one wishes to speak of an entity as an entity that just 'is', i.e., that it is an existent, without considering whether it is recognizable (i.e., it has an identity), or whether it is a *ma'lūl*. The term *aysiyyah* would then represent the 'is-ness' of each entity.

The *ays* never becomes *lays* after being created, which implies that the *ays*, considered as an existent which 'is', must also be considered as an existent without reference to time, which affects existents subject to *kawn* and *fasād*. The specific statement, spelling out this conception, is as follows:

lammā kānat al-aysiyyāt innamā šarat aysan min lays¹⁰ wa kāna dhālika min jūd¹¹ tāmm jāda bihi al-mubdi' subhānahu 'alā' al-aysiyyāt kāna tawahhumuhā laysan min ba'd al-aysiyyah mumtani'an li-dukhl al-naqṣ¹² fī jūdihi¹³ alladhī jāda bihi ... fa-laysa al-ays idhan yaṣīr laysan kamā šara al-lays aysan (IN:99).

Another statement says:

kāna fī ta'yīs al-aysiyyāt min lays zuhūr al-'aql.

This is a very unequivocal statement on the appearance of *ays* from *lays*. If al-Sijistānī conceives of *lays* as *lā ays* then *min lays* would be equivalent to *min lā ays*, which would pose a problem: the

¹⁰ Reading *lays* for *lays mā*, which conveys the idea of 'some' (unspecified) *lays*.

¹¹ Reading *jūd* for *wujūd*.

¹² Reading *naqṣ* for *nafs*.

¹³ Reading *jūdihi* for *wujūdihi*.

formula would equate *lā min ays* with *min lays*.

In another passage, however, al-Sijistānī says that

al-lays ... laysa bi-dhī ghāyah qabl zuhūr al-aysiyyāt.

So if it were possible for an *ays* to become *lays* this would imply that *ays* is finite up to the moment when it becomes *lays*. This passage suggests that *al-lays* and *lā ays* are not the same. The former represents both *lā ays* and *lā lā ays*, for *ays* covers both types of created entities. In another statement he says:

fa-ammā al-ibdā' nafsahu fa-huwa al-lays bi-ma'ná nafi
al-aysiyyah wa al-laysiyyah (IN:101).

The transformation (or transition) from *lays* to *ays* is described by the terms *ṣāra/yaṣīru*. An *ays* is somehow distinct from another *ays* (certainly so for the 'aql, which is conscious of these *aysiyyāt* as distinct (*mabrūzah*)). Each *ays* is an *ays* after *al-lays* becomes (*ṣāra*) *ays*. Is al-Sijistānī of the view that a *lays* corresponds to each *ays*? As suggested above, *ays* may simply imply 'is', and *lays* may signify 'it was not', without saying anything more about it. Once it 'is', it always 'is'.

Ṣifah

One of the more notable features of the terminology of al-Sijistānī is the term *ṣifah*, over which the *mutakallimūn* spend considerable effort. With al-Bāqillānī, the conceptual analysis reached a level of considerable sophistication. Al-Sijistānī's use of this term is confined almost exclusively to those topics in the *Kalām* controversies which centered on the doctrine of God, such as

the problem of *ithbāt* and *nafy*, having ramifications for the issue of *tashbīh* (anthropomorphism). His arguments are formulated using the terminology which is common to these *Kalām* discussions. They do not, for example, use the set of technical terms employed in the description and analysis of the Neoplatonic items in his system, such as *'aql* and *nafs*, or terms such as *huwiyyah*, *aysiyyah* and *ghayriyyah*. These terms no doubt constitute an alternative formulation of the *tawḥīd* issue, which was a burning issue at the time. But as soon as al-Sijistānī steps into the *ithbāt/nafy* controversy, and wants not only to formulate an alternative doctrine based on a different (Neoplatonic) cosmology, but also to rebut a *mutakallim*'s doctrine, he operates in the terminological milieu already developed by them. The specific theory of *salibatān* (two negations) is not only his resolution of the *tawḥīd* problem but it is a development within the conceptual and terminological framework of this area of the *Kalām*. His basic approach is to analyze the implications of the term *ṣifah*.

The specific conception of God, formulated in terms of *ṣifah* and *mawṣūf*, and marking his point of entry into the *Kalām*'s universe of discourse, is the statement:

anna allāh ghayr mawṣūf wa lā maḥdūd wa lā man'ūt wa lā mar'ī wa lā fī makān (M:41).

He is aware that this formulation is motivated by a desire to ensure that there is no resemblance of any sort between God and his creation:

li-annahum innamā nafaw al-ṣifāt wa al-ḥudūd wa al-nu'ūt
'an al-bārī taqaddasat 'azamatuhu li-an lā yakūn baynahu

wa bayn khalqihi mushābahah wa lā mumāthalah (M:41).

To uncover the implications of the term *ṣifah* implied in their (the *mutakallimūn*) use of this term, al-Sijistānī poses the question whether a *ṣifah* is the same as the *mawṣūf*. One answer is that it is; that is, *al-ṣifah hiya al-mawṣūf*. Al-Sijistānī points out that in that case

lazimahum an yaqūlū anna al-sawād huwa al-aswad wa al-bayād huwa al-abyad.

Now the *abyad* turns into *aswad* when *bayād* disappears (*zāla*), and the *aswad*, for its part, turns into *abyad* when *sawād* leaves the entity which is *aswad*. Since *abyad* and *aswad* refer to the same entity, and *mawṣūf* has been asserted to be the same as *ṣifah*, it follows that the two *ṣifah* (black and white) must then be the same, which is clearly unacceptable. Basic to al-Sijistānī's argument is the assumption that the entity successively referred to as *aswad* and *abyad* remains the same by the conversion of one *ṣifah* into another.

The alternative answer, that the *ṣifah* is other than the *mawṣūf*, is equally unacceptable; for in negating the *ṣifāt* from God they have implicitly asserted the *mawṣūf*, which is a characteristic properly belonging to the created entity (*makhḷūq*).

A much more grave problem is, however, faced by those who negate the *ṣifāt* from God but assert names (*asāmī*) to him. These names are not free from (*lā tata'arrá 'an*) the *ṣifāt*, since it is due to them that the names are utilized to start with. Al-Sijistānī represents this group as holding that, in lieu of the *ṣifāt* which

they have negated from Him, God can still be said to be an *'ālim*, albeit *'ālim bi-al-dhāt*, as opposed to *'ālim* through the *ṣifah* of *'ilm*. Al-Sijistānī argues that if it is acceptable (*law jāza*) for Him to be *'ālim* without having any *'ilm*, then it is possible for the *jāhil* to be an *'ālim* also, since he has no *'ilm* either. Al-Sijistānī now presents his own position:

ṣaḥḥa anna al-*'ālim* innamā ṣāra *'āliman* li-wujūd al-*'ilm*
wa al-baṣīr baṣīran li-wujūd¹ al-baṣar wa al-samī'
samī'an li-wujūd al-sam' (M:42-43).

It is maintained, in response, that the name *al-baṣīr* is oriented toward the essence (*kāna ism al-baṣīr mutawajjihan ilá dhāt al-khālīq*), whereas the term *baṣar* admits of blindness (*'amā*), as evidenced by observation (*shahādah*),

fa-nafaynā² *'anhu mā yulzim bi-zawālihi dīddahu.*

They wish therefore to avoid the implications of the contraries of the *ṣifāt*. To this al-Sijistānī answers by pointing out what he considers is the major flaw in the formulation. It is not *'ilm* which is the cause necessitating *jahl*, for if such were the case *jahl* would have to be present whenever *'ilm* is present. This is clearly not the case. Rather, the cause of *jahl* is the possibility of receiving *āfah* (blight) (*imkān qabūl al-āfah*) (M:43) which God is not subject to.

The argument now shifts to a problem of method: how to decide between (*tafṣīl bayn*) two equally valid testimonies (*istishhād*) which

¹ Reading *li-wujūd* in place of *bi-wujūd* in the text.

² Reading *fa-nafaynā* in place of *fa-anfaynā* in the text.

respectively support completely opposite conclusions. In one case, that of the position al-Sijistānī is criticizing, it is a valid observation that he who is an 'ālim on account of his 'ilm is just as likely to be subject to *jahl*. In the other case, that which al-Sijistānī holds, it is an equally valid observation that he who is an 'ālim has 'ilm which precedes him (hence 'ālim must presuppose 'ilm). The first observation is used to conclude that there is therefore an 'ālim in the invisible world who knows but has no knowledge, while the second observation is used to support the conclusion that the 'ālim in the invisible realm must also behave like his visible counterpart. The weakness of their position consists in their inability to decide validly (*fī bāb al-ṣiḥḥah*) between these two observations.

It is at this point in his analysis that al-Sijistānī resorts to his Neoplatonic resources. The reason a mere negation of *ṣifah* is not sufficient (for a correct *tawḥīd* conception) is that the spiritual substances also fulfill this condition: they too have no *ṣifāt*. It is therefore necessary to negate both *ṣifah* and *lā ṣifah* when clearing God of any association with the characteristics of both domains.

It could be objected that the condition of contradiction between two propositions (*sharīṭat al-qadāyā al-mutanāqidah*) requires one of them to be true (*ṣādiq*) and the other to be false (*kādhīb*). But his two statements *lā mawṣūf* and *lā lā mawṣūf* are two contradictory statements. Being contradictory, one has to be true and the other false. So how can al-Sijistānī maintain that they are both true? In answer to this objection al-Sijistānī argues that the

principle of contradiction is being misconstrued by his critics. This principle involves two rules omitted in the objection, and which account for the misunderstanding of this principle of logic. One is the pair governing true/false values, *ijāb* and *salb*: the other is the pair governing quantity: *kull* and *juz'*. If, for example, the proposition is universal assertion (*kulliyyah mūjibah*), its contradictory is particular negation (*juz'iyyah sālibah*). Al-Sijistānī gives an illustration (*ka-qawlinā*):

kull insān ḥayy wa hiya qaḍiyah kulliyyah mūjibah
 naqīdatuhā laysa ba'd insān bi-ḥayy wa hiya juz'iyyah
 sālibah (M:45).

What al-Sijistānī has done in this analysis is to replace the principle of true/false with two other pairs: *ijāb/salb* and *kull/juz'*, which together determine the truth value of the propositions. The statements *lā mawṣūf* and *lā lā mawṣūf* are both negations: the first is the negation of *ṣifah lahu*, and the second is the negation of *lā ṣifah lahu*. They are therefore two negations, *salibatān*.

In this explanation of his own application of the rules of logic the term *salibatān* is properly rendered as 'two negations' instead of 'double negation'. The latter is likely to suggest 'negation of the (first) negation', which is not what al-Sijistānī is arguing for. 'Two negations' also has the advantage of referring to two negations of different domains (*jismānī* and *rūḥānī*).

The term *ṣifah* is used in the *Kashf al-Maḥjūb* in a slightly different way. It is applied to both sorts of *jawhar*, bodily and psychic (*ṣifāt-i jism* and *ṣifāt-i nafs*) (for example, KM:5). In an

explicit statement he says

şifāt ki dar yāband yā dar jawhar yāband yā dar ajsām-i
payvastah yā dar nafs (KM:6-7).

The *şifah* is thus found in each of these three types of entities. That which is in *jawhar-i muṭlaq* consists in its being a *mubda'* and in its being a *ma'lūl*, both of which are *şifah* of '*aql-i avval*. The *şifāt* which are in bodies (*ajsam*) are such things as color, taste, etc., consisting of external qualities (*az chigūnagīhā-i bīrūnīst*). As for the *nafs*, its *şifāt* consist of internal qualities (*az chigūnagīhā-i andarūnīst*), such as '*ilm*, '*jahl*, '*dilīrī* (bravery), '*buzdilī* (cowardice), etc.

Further, each thing gets its *şifah* from its immediate constituent. The *mawālīd* receive their *şifāt* from the *ummahāt*, which in turn get their *şifāt* from *ṭabī'at*. *Ṭabī'at* gets them from *nafs*, which gets them from '*aql*. Thus here not only is the application of the term to the *nafsānī* domain repeated, but a causality is ascribed to it as well. Once he extends the application of this term to non-*jismānī* things, al-Sijistānī can then use such expressions as *şifāt-i 'aqlānī* and *şifāt-i nafsānī* (KM:8).

The *Kashf* is not the only work in which al-Sijistānī extends the term *şifah* to *rūḥānī* substances, even though he argues frequently that the term should not be applied to these substances. One context in which it occurs in relation to *rūḥānī* substances is the expression *şifāt wa idāfāt*, which is encountered invariably in *ithbāt/nafy* contexts. These uses pose a problem, for in his analysis of the term *ḥadd* al-Sijistānī is at pains to show that the

rūḥānī substances, in contradistinction to the *jismānī* substances, do not have *ṣifāt* at all. They have no *ṣifāt* because they have no *ḥadd* at all. One resolution of this apparent inconsistency may lie in the different senses in which al-Sijistānī uses this term. Two main senses can be seen in his formulations: one, when it is strictly a *jismānī*-related term, connoting characteristics of bodily substances; and two, when it covers both spiritual and bodily substances; in the latter case the semantic field of the term would bifurcate into mutually exclusive areas.

The term *ṣifah* does not figure prominently in *Kitāb Ithbāt al-Nubū'āt*. This is to be expected, for the term is used almost exclusively in the context of *tawḥīd*.

Instead, the *Ithbāt*, in which al-Sijistānī makes considerable use of the physical properties of the world to prove the existence and necessity of prophecy, has more about the theory of genera (*ajnās*) compared to his other works. This is of some interest since the Ikhwān have also described the genera in their *Rasā'il*. They, however, integrate the term *ṣifah* into the *ajnās* doctrine, which al-Sijistānī does not do.

The genera group many things that differ in their *fuṣūl*, *khawāṣṣ* and *a'rāḍ*. Al-Sijistānī describes the genera as intellectual forms (*ṣuwar 'aqliyyah*) (IN:86). The genera of the natural world are such that there are no

tanāquḍ fihā wa lā fasād bal hiya ashyā' ḥaqīqiyyah
thābitah 'alā ḥālātihā lā taghayyur li-shay' minhā wa lā
zawāl.

The logicians (*ḥukamā' manṭiqiyyūn*), he says, describe four types

of genera: 1) *qabilī*, 2) *makānī*, 3) *ṣinā'ī*, and 4) *manṭiqī*. The first type refers to human kin groups, such as the Quraysh, which is a genus for its members (*awlādihī*). An example of the second type of genus is Nīshābūr (*ka-nīsābūr li-sukkānihā*), a genus for those who live in this city. An example of the third type is trade (*tijārah*), which is a genus for those who practise it (*li-al-muḥtarif bihā*).

The fourth type of genus, the logical (*manṭiqī*) type, is the one treated by al-Sijistānī in detail. Genus in this sense is that which is predicated¹ of many things belonging to different species (*anwā'*), in answer to the question *mā huwa?* It can be such that it has no genus higher than it; or no genus below it; or a genus above it as well as below it. The only example of the first is *al-jawhar al-muṭlaq* (the Intellect), which is higher than any other genus. *Ḥayy* is an example of genus below which there is no other genus. It groups together many *anwā'*, such as *insān*, *ḥimār*, etc. An example of the third type of genus is represented, for example, by *jism*. It has *jawhar* above it and *nāmī* below it. Citing these logicians further, he represents them as saying that the *jins* gives its name to the *anwā'* which are below it. *Jawhar*, for example, gives its name to *jism*, which is a *jawhar qā'im bi-dhātihi* (IN:87). He adds a comment of his own, saying

law lam taḥduth al-jawāhir al-muṭlaqah 'an al-'illah
al-ūlā lam yaḏhar jism wa lā ghayr jism (IN:88).

¹ The text (IN:86) reads *huwa al-qawl 'alā kathīr*. The example given is *al-ḥayy al-maḥlūl 'alā al-insān wa al-faras wa al-fīl wa al-ba'ūd*. This suggests that instead of the term *qawl*, the term *al-maḥlūl* should perhaps be read in the statement *huwa al-qawl 'alā kathīr*.

Although al-Sijistānī cites the logicians here, and seems to accept their *jīns* theory in his own description of the *jawhar* as a *jīns* for both *jism* and *rūḥ*, his subsequent account continues 'downward' (i.e., all the way 'down' to the *shakhṣ* and *juz* 'al-*shakhṣ*) only on the *jismānī* side, leaving *rūḥ* alone. This raises an interesting question about the status of the categories in al-Sijistānī's thought, considered as a development of Neoplatonism within Islam. The applicability or non-applicability of the theory of genera, and of the categories in general, to the intelligible world is an issue to which Plotinus devotes considerable effort, although researchers tend to find his discussion extremely difficult to follow. The problem remains, however, a major problem for Neoplatonic studies.

Al-Sijistānī has, by use of the term *jīns* for *jawhar*, implied that the term *naw'* can be associated to the *rūḥ*: if *jawhar* is predicated of *jism* and *rūḥ*, each must be a *naw'* of *jawhar*. But it is not possible to determine whether *rūḥ* itself has *anwā'*, since he does not carry his application of the *mantīqī* genus over to the *rūḥ*.

The *fuṣūl* are three: 'āmm, *khāṣṣ* and *khāṣṣ al-khawāṣṣ* (IN:92-93). The 'āmm distinguishes between two states, such as *qiyām* and *qu'ūd* (standing and sitting). It is of a short duration (*sarī'* *al-zawāl*). The *khāṣṣ* distinguishes between two states (*hay'atayn*), such as *zurqah* (blue) and 'aṭash¹⁷ (thirst). It disappears gradually (*baṭī'* *al-zawāl*). The *khāṣṣ al-khawāṣṣ*

¹⁷ Reading 'aṭash for 'aṭs in the text, which makes more sense, since sneezing ('aṭs) is short-lived.

distinguishes between two species (*naw'ayn*).

There are four *khāṣṣiyyahs*:

- 1) that which belongs to one *naw'*, but does not apply to it universally: writing (*kitābah*), for example, does not apply to every human being;
- 2) that which belongs to a *naw'* but is also shared by another *naw'*: *qiyām* (standing) can be observed in other species too;
- 3) that which is unique to a *naw'* yet does not appear at all times but only at certain times, such as the greying of hair in old age; and
- 4) that which is unique to the *naw'* and can appear at any time: laughter (*ḍahīk*) is unique to *insān*, and can occur at any time during his lifetime.

The *a'rāḍ*¹⁸ are of two main sorts: *muzāyil* and *ghayr muzāyil*. Examples of the former sort are 'sitting' and 'standing', of the latter sort, the color blue. According to al-Sijistānī,

al-'araḍ huwa alladhī yutawahham raf'uhu min ghayr fasād
ḥāmilihi (IN:97).

I could not find this statement in any of the works I surveyed in preparation for this study. The view of 'araḍ favored by the other Neoplatonic schools, such as the Ikhwān, is that it does not exist except through a *ḥāmīl*, whose existence is thus a precondition for

¹⁸ This section in the *Ithbāt* has numerous errors arising, no doubt, from the editor's misconstruance of the term *a'rāḍ* as *aghrāḍ*. Conceivably the manuscript he has relied upon contains the latter term, which refers to 'objects'. The section, however, is unambiguously concerned with the *a'rāḍ*, being a continuation of the previous section's discussion of *jīns* theory.

the existence of the *'araḍ*. The *zawāl* of one *'araḍ* ushers in another in its place (*badal*). The *a'rāḍ* are subject to *zawāl* and *tabdīl* because it is through this process that things are renewed in time (*zamān*).

Thus here the close link that al-Sijistānī is making between time and *'araḍ* paves the way for al-Sijistānī's concept of alteration (*tabdīl*). He states further:

wa innamā qaddara allāh ta'ālā li-al-a'rāḍ zawālan wa
tabdīlan li-takūn al-ashyā' al-ṭabī'iyah abadan jadīdah
'alā ḥasab al-zamān al-jadīd (IN:98).

The semantics of *'araḍ* involves two sources of creation: God and time. Time cannot create (*yakhluq*) itself, but it can create things. God, however, nullifies what time creates in order that they may become complete (*tamām*): thus God causes the *a'rāḍ* of the bodies, which carry them (*al-ajsād al-ḥāmilah lahā*), to cease being *a'rāḍ* of these bodies.

This *'araḍ* conception is formulated here in the limited context of the physical world, but it gives rise to potential problems for al-Sijistānī in depicting *zamān* as a creator of things. In general, his cosmology assigns to the *ṭabī'ah*, which is an aspect of the universal soul, the task of producing the things in the natural world. By portraying *zamān* as the more active agent of change, and by formulating a conception of *'araḍ* which is integral to the process of change (*tabdīl*), al-Sijistānī has prepared himself with the cosmological basis of the 'coming-and-going' process to which the Law (*sharī'ah*), too, is subject. In his analysis of the renewal and 'lifting' of the Law, al-Sijistānī employs the same

terms *tabdīl*, *jadīd* (and its derivative *tajdīd*). But this question of the lifting (*raf'*) of the Law is a separate question which it is outside the scope of this study to pursue here.

One of the most interesting observations to be made about al-Sijistānī's use of the term '*araḍ*' is his list of the ten categories. In the *Maqālīd*, for example, he describes the categories as consisting of *jawhar* and the nine *a'rāḍ*.

'ālam al-ṭabī'ah alladhī istaqarra amruhu 'alá al-jawhar
wa al-a'rāḍ al-tis'ah (M:107).

In this passage '*ālam al-ṭabī'ah* is opposed to '*ālam anfus al-nafs*. The former is based on *jawhar* and the nine *a'rāḍ*. Here the *a'rāḍ* definitely form the nine categories, and are confined to the physical domain. Al-Sijistānī uses the word *maqūlah* in describing the '*araḍ*', never in describing *jawhar*:

wa al-shay' lā yakhlū min an yakūn jawharan aw 'araḍan
wa al-jawhar huwa yanqasim ilá al-ithnayn min al-jism wa
al-rūḥ wa al-'araḍ huwa al-munqasim ilá al-maqūlāt
al-tis' (M:48).

Two observations may be made here with respect to this conception. The first refers to the categories as substance and accidents. Al-Sijistānī restricts the nine *a'rāḍ* to the sensible world. *Jawhar*, however, covers both domains, spiritual and bodily. The genera receive a different treatment from al-Sijistānī than the categories conceived as *jawhar* and *a'rāḍ*. The *anwā'* are extended to cover spiritual entities such as the virtues and vices (*faḍīlah* and *radhīlah*). But we have no textual evidence to show that al-Sijistānī extended the lower levels of the genera (such as the *fuṣūl* and

ashkhaṣ) to the spiritual domain.

Common to both these schemas for classifying things is the unequivocal and very frequent use of the term *jawhar* for the spiritual world. The first intellect itself (*al-ʿaql al-awwal*) is described not only as a *jawhar*, but as the *jins* which subsumes under itself both the spiritual and the bodily types (*nawʿ*) of substance. The difference with Plotinus is therefore quite marked, for the latter labored strenuously to avoid positing a genus which would gather within itself the entities of the intelligible and the sensible domain, which to him were so incompatible as to almost *require* that they have no common 'meeting ground'.

The role of the terms *kayfiyyah* and its Persian translation *chigūnagī* may be of some relevance here. In the *Kashf* the *ṣifāt* are described as *chigūnagīhā*, external when applied to the bodies, and internal when applied to the spiritual substances. In the *Ithbāt* the term *kayfiyyah* stands for the modes of *tafāwut* (differences) which characterize the body and the soul (IN:17-18). Such things as color, taste, smell, place, quantity, characterize the different ways in which bodily substances exhibit differences among themselves. These things are, however, just the things which the term *ṣifah* would cover when applied to a *jismānī* substance. The term *kayfiyyah*, then, although it is used strictly in association with the term *tafāwut* (*kayfiyyat al-tafāwut*), actually covers most of the categories, though interestingly one of the categories (quality, *kayfiyyah*), is not included in the ten ways in which *tafāwut* expresses itself in the cosmos.

The *tafāwut* which is to be found in the spiritual domain has to

do with the *tafāwut* of *anwā' al-faḍīlah* from the *anwā' al-radhīlah*. For example, *ṣidq* from *kadhib*; *'ilm* from *jahl*; *shajā'ah* from *j'ubn*; and *ḥilm* from *ghaḍab* (IN:18). When this list is compared with the list of *chigūnagīhā-i andarūnī* in the *Kashf*, the *tafāwut* of the soul is seen to consist in these *ṣifāt* considered from the standpoint of their being different from each other. *Jahl* differs from *'ilm*, as does *ḥilm* from *ghaḍab*. It is through these *ṣifāt* that the *nafs* comes to differ from another *nafs*. The *kayfiyyah* of the *tafāwut* lies in the *ṣifāt*. Instead of using the term *ṣifah* here, al-Sijistānī has used the terms *faḍīlah* and *radhīlah* (virtue and vice). The *ṣifāt* which are used to characterize the spiritual substance are, in this formulation, fundamentally moral, and are therefore different from the *ṣifāt* which characterize bodily substances.

Al-Sijistānī uses the expression *anwā' al-faḍīlah* when describing the *ṣifāt* of the soul. This is, it would appear, as far 'down' the genera system as he will go. These observations on the status of the categories suggest that while al-Sijistānī does not apply the nine *a'rāḍ* to the spiritual domain, the notion of attribute and genus is definitely applied to it, but only after being redefined by him to cover characteristics which pertain to the *rūḥānī* substance, and which serve at the same time not only as moral determinants of the state of this *rūḥānī* substance, but also as categories with which to classify them.

Spiritual Messenger and Bodily Messenger

In the foregoing pages an account has been given of the

conception of the substance as the genus including within itself both *rūḥ* and *jawhar*. This idea underlies one of al-Sijistānī's most intriguing conceptions: the conception of two types of prophecy, spiritual and bodily (*rasūl jismānī* and *rasūl rūḥānī*) (IN:49ff).

According to al-Sijistānī, the human 'aql is the very first *rasūl* sent by God to the human creatures. The bodily (*jismānī*) messengers have come to humanity so as to command the praiseworthy (*maḥmūd*) and to forbid the blameworthy (*madhmūm*). Similarly, the 'aql within the human being commands the good and the beautiful, and forbids him from doing the reprehensible and the evil.

It is at this juncture in his account that al-Sijistānī makes the following significant statement:

wa anna al-rasūl innamā yu'addī ilaynā mā ta'rifuhu
'uqūlunā fa-naqbal dhālika minhu min ajl ma'rifat
'uqūlinā (IN:49).

The external, *jismānī* messenger thus merely conveys to the human individual what his 'aql already knows; and the human being accepts what the messenger conveys precisely because the human 'aql already knows it and is, so to speak, corroborating the soundness of the *jismānī* messenger's message.

Al-Sijistānī assigns to the human 'aql a clearly stated priority over the message coming in from the bodily messengers. Appealing to the conceptions of potentiality and actuality, he states that the 'aql which is within the human being is an actual 'aql (*bi-al-fi'l*) whereas what the bodily prophets convey is a potential 'aql (*bi-al-quwwah*).

In using the expression *risālat al-rasūlayn* al-Sijistānī is suggesting that one single message is being conveyed to the human being along two parallel channels. These channels, being in fundamental consonance with each other, cannot contradict each other. The part corresponding to the scriptural messenger is the *sharī'ah jismāniyyah*, the Law which is physical in nature, for it is, at bottom, a series of sounds (*aṣwāt*) which have meaning to them. To be subject to the influence of the 'aql is to accept to use (*isti'māl*) this law, to discriminate (*tumayyiz*), with the strength of the 'aql, between those sounds which belong to speech and those which do not (*al-mantiqī wa ghayr al-mantiqī*). The human intellect, which al-Sijistānī calls the first messenger (*al-rasūl al-awwal*), is also this very discrimination (*al-tamyīz al-'aqlī*) by which the sounds made by the prophets are distinguished from other sounds. In the absence of the 'aql ('adam al-'aql) all sounds would be reduced to one level (*bi-manzilah wāḥidah*).

This conception of substance as genus covering both the spiritual and the bodily domains can be made the ontological basis for a doctrine of dual prophecy because al-Sijistānī regards the Intellect as the substantiality (*jawhariyyah*) of things, be they spiritual or bodily, meaning that both spirit and body are, at bottom, intellectual. There are two further considerations. One is that the intellect ('aql) within the human being is part of the First Intellect, and has a 'direct link', so to speak, with its very source. The second is that the Intellect is united with the Command of God, as al-Sijistānī states in his *Kashf al-Maḥjūb* (KM:23). Were this not so, the Intellect could not provide divine

guidance at all. Thus the Intellect provides guidance to the bodily realm and to the spiritual realm. The conception of substance as the genus including under itself the spiritual and corporeal sorts of substances thus serves as the ontological foundation of the specific conception of guidance which al-Sijistānī formulates. Such a formulation would not be possible within the traditional ontology of Plotinian Neoplatonism, since spirit and body cannot be united under one (higher) genus. Whereas in al-Sijistānī the Intellect is an entity that is connected to both the spiritual and the corporeal worlds, in Plotinus, and in subsequent Neoplatonism, the Intellect belongs only to the intellectual realm (which in al-Sijistānī would be equivalent to saying that it belongs only to the spiritual realm) and needs a different set of categories appropriate to it.

CHAPTER TWO

AL-SIJISTĀNĪ, NEOPLATONISM AND *KALĀM*

Al-Sijistānī and Neoplatonism

1. *Pre-Islamic Neoplatonism*

Two representatives of pre-Islamic Neoplatonism are the Arabic Plotinus, *Uthūlūjīyā*, and the Arabic Proclus, *al-Khayr al-Maḥḍ*. Each of these two works reflects, respectively, one of two interpretations which late Neoplatonism developed concerning the Plotinian One. One position, typified by the *Uthūlūjīyā*, was to make the One totally transcendent, above being and intellect. The other position, typified by *al-Khayr al-Maḥḍ*, was to integrate the One with being and intellect. The following brief conclusions will deal first with the *Uthūlūjīyā*, and then with *al-Khayr al-Maḥḍ*.

The *Uthūlūjīyā* reflects the pre-occupations of Plotinus with the One and the individual soul; in the latter case, the body/soul relationship is a major topic which has no parallel in the works of al-Sijistānī. The outstanding features of the *Uthūlūjīyā* are its dichotomy of intellectual/sensible (*‘aqlī/hissī*), its union mysticism, and its emanationist doctrine in which things originate from the One. The cosmogony of the *Uthūlūjīyā* is therefore not an ex

nihilo cosmogony. Unlike the system of al-Sijistānī, there is no command (*amr*) by which the One creates.

The *Uthūlūjīyā*, however, uses the term *jawhar* for the One, and also the term *'illah* when it depicts the One as the cause (for example, U:27). The One is also described as agent (*fā'il*), so that when it acts, it acts through the intermediary of the Intellect (U:27). It is said to send forth (*tufīd*) life (*ḥayāh*) to the Intellect. The concept represented by the term *fayḍ*, which became a key term for the Neoplatonic passages of al-Kindī and al-Fārābī, is not only not used by al-Sijistānī in this form (i.e., *fayḍ*), but is strongly criticized by him. The basic dichotomy between *'aqlī/ḥissī* cannot be considered to be equivalent to the spiritual/bodily (*rūḥānī/jismānī*) dichotomy in al-Sijistānī. In the *Uthūlūjīyā* (and, by extension, in Plotinus), the concept of 'image' (*ṣanam*) is at the basis of the doctrine of gradations of being and reality. The intelligible realm is the 'truly real' realm, while the things in the sensible realm are but 'images' of the 'authentic' beings in the upper, intellectual world. The term *ṣanam* therefore is directly connected to the notion of 'more real' and 'less real'. Further, corresponding to sensible objects are their equivalents in the intelligible realm. When the beings emerge out of the One, the earlier beings are closer to it, and have more real being than the later beings, who become progressively 'darker' until the entity with the least being, matter, emerges. The term *jawhar* in the *Uthūlūjīyā* is also applied to the One, and translates the Greek *ousia*. In the *Enneads* the term *ousia* is also applied to the One, as

Rist has observed.¹

Other important differences can be cited. While the *Uthūlūjīyā* and Plotinus show a great concern with the problem of the one and the many, specifically, how, starting with the One, multiplicity (*kathrah*) can come about, this is not an issue for al-Sijistānī at all; indeed it is not an issue for other Ismaili writers either, and may well be explained by the fact that the Ismailis have an *ex nihilo* cosmogony, so the problem did not arise as it did for the other *falāsifah*, such as Avicenna.

There is no parallel either in the *Uthūlūjīyā* or in *al-Khayr al-Mahḍ* to the extensive analysis of the problem of divine attributes and the ultimate knowability of God. In al-Sijistānī, this analysis results in the doctrine of the 'two negations', in which the characteristics (*simāt*) of both the spiritual as well as the bodily domain are negated from God. The conception of substance as a single genus, formulated explicitly as genus for the two species (*anwā'*), *rūḥ* and *jism*, is one of the most radical departures from Neoplatonism as it is generally understood. Plotinus had argued vigorously against the possibility of an overriding, unifying genus which would group together, under itself, the intellectual and the sensible domains. This is exactly what al-Sijistānī has done. Even when he lists the categories, he breaks the category of substance (*jawhar*) into *rūḥ* (spirit) and *jism* (body) before proceeding to list the remaining nine categories.

¹ J. M. Rist, *The Road to Reality*, p. 79, where he states that the term *ousia* is used for the One in *Enneads* VI 8.13. However, Rist himself translates this term as 'essence'.

There can be no doubt that al-Sijistānī considered the categories to be equally applicable to the spiritual domain, against Plotinus who rejected such a possibility. The physicists (*ṭabī'īyyūn*) in Islam attacked the emanationist idea, arguing that it is impossible for corporeal substances to develop out of non-corporeal substances. Since Plotinus has rejected a common genus for both the intellectual and sensible realms, it is difficult to determine how he would have responded to this charge, for in his own day the most serious issue he was confronted with was the problem of explaining how multiplicity can arise out of mere unity. Significantly, the *Uthūlūjīyā* does not contain those passages of the *Enneads* in which Plotinus discusses at length the categories and, finally, rejects their applicability to the intellectual realm.

It is characteristic of Neoplatonic thought in general to be other-worldly, to be mystical in its final goal of enabling the soul to return to its source. The soul's return journey involves a process of disengagement and turning away from the domain of matter, which represents darkness and non-being. The soul is portrayed as the initiator of its own journey inward to its essence, where it discovers itself to be part of the intellectual realm; finally, as it continues its efforts, it unites with the One. Another feature of Neoplatonic thought is that beings which are closer (*qurbah*, *al-Khayr al-Maḥḍ*, p. 65) to the One are also more like the One; thus the expression in *al-Khayr al-Maḥḍ*: the Intellect is the most similar to God (*akbar tashabbuhan bi-al-ilāh ta'ālā'*, p. 103). Such ideas are anathema to al-Sijistānī, and one does not run into them in his works. A correlate of the mystical dimension of Neoplatonism

is its apolitical outlook. Its concentration on the inner life of the individual, predicated over a negative view of the sensible domain, precluded the development within it of a social orientation, whereby the betterment of the inner world of the soul could be achieved by changing the external, sensible world.

When the status of Neoplatonic tradition within Islam, and in Ismailism in particular, is examined, its political character stands out as one of Islamic Neoplatonism's most outstanding features. The Ikhwān al-Ṣafā' were a social movement who sought to transform Islamic society toward a more mystical orientation. In the political writings of al-Fārābī, the historical fact that there were law-giving individuals (the prophets) must be explained by the philosopher; and, as the *Ārā'* spells out, there is a Neoplatonic cosmology which provides the earthbound prophet with access to the truths of philosophy, by which he is then enabled to establish the optimum political order. Finally, the political character of Neoplatonism among the Ismailis reaches its most extreme when it is made part of the political doctrine of the Ismaili movement, whose aim was not merely some social reform in the manner of a Ṣūfī order (*ṭarīqah*), but the establishment of state with the Ismaili *imām* as the *khalīfah*. In al-Fārābī, the philosopher has to explain how the prophet-lawgiver gains access to philosophic truths and founds a nation upon these truths. The Ismailis were doing something different with their Neoplatonic legacy: they were making it part of the political state; hence Neoplatonism had a radical role among the Ismailis. The question thus arises: How could a Neoplatonist philosophy, which is oriented toward a personalized spiritual

program of inner intellectual growth, thus become the cosmological foundation of a politically radical movement?

Whatever their origin may have been, two metaphysical adjustments to the Neoplatonic tradition appear to have allowed the Ismailis in general, and al-Sijistānī in particular, to assimilate it to their political teaching. One is the conception of substance, already noted earlier, as the common foundation of both the spiritual and the bodily domain. The other is the abandonment of the mystical dimension of Neoplatonism. Instead of the soul turning inward and upward toward the One, it is the idea of divine assistance (*ta'yīd*), the transmission of divine wisdom and divine guidance from upper to lower levels, which becomes the cornerstone of Ismaili Neoplatonism. The first adjustment allows al-Sijistānī and his fellow Ismaili Neoplatonists to regard the spiritual and the corporeal domains as parallel domains insofar as they are equally recipients of guidance which comes from their common source, the Intellect. This Intellect is the very substantiality (*jawhariyyah*) of the two domains, that is, both spirit and body are, ultimately, intellectual. Divine guidance flows along the bodily domain (*khiṭābah jismāniyyah*) and along the spiritual domain (*khiṭābah rūḥāniyyah*). The spiritual substance is therefore such that it receives this assistance and guidance directly from the Intellect. The prophets, such as Muhammad, belong to the domain of corporeal guidance, as do the Ismaili *imāms*, who also receive the divine assistance from the Intellect. It is therefore the Ismaili *imām* who can give the correct interpretation of Scripture, and therefore the only individual qualified to be the community's supreme leader.

Clearly, these conceptions cannot be traced back to either the *Uthūlūjīyā* or *al-Khayr al-Mahḍ*. In the latter work the One is assimilated to being and intellect, and is described throughout as the First Cause. The terminology of substance, with the associated conception of indivisibility (*lā yatajazza'*) applied to the intellectual substance together with the eternal/temporal aspect of each substance, is foreign to al-Sijistānī's thought. In particular, al-Sijistānī criticizes strongly the concept of the self-subsisting substance (*jawhar qā'im bi-dhātihi*) which is such an important concept for *al-Khayr al-Mahḍ*.

One feature of *al-Khayr al-Mahḍ* is that it contains the triad 'life-intellect-being' (*ḥayāh*, *'aql*, and *anniyyah*) in its doctrine (*al-Khayr al-Mahḍ*, p. 82). The First Cause is said to be present in the lower beings according to the ontological mode of these beings; thus it is present in the Intellect *bi-naw' aqlī*, as an intellect (*al-Khayr al-Mahḍ*, p. 83). This triad has been the subject of recent studies. In particular, Clark points out that it was Marius Victorinus who established "a metaphysics of esse-vivere-intelligere".² Thus the pseudo-Proclus has elements from Victorinus. Clark also points out (p. 156) that Victorinus, in a major development of Neoplatonic doctrine, posits a first principle before the Plotinian One. This first principle "cannot even be called one or alone, but rather, by pre-eminence, before the one, before the alone, beyond simplicity, pre-existence rather than

² Mary T. Clark, 'The Neoplatonism of Marius Victorinus the Christian', in *Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought*, edited by H. J. Blumenthal and R. J. Markus, 1981, pp. 153-159.

existence" (p. 156). Yet this principle, Clark points out, is also the *Logos*. Although the triad 'being-life-intellect' is found in *al-Khayr al-Mahḍ*, there is in it neither a logos doctrine nor the first principle prior to the Plotinian One.

Thus, if neither the *Uthūlūjiyā* nor *al-Khayr al-Mahḍ* explain adequately the unique terminology of substance which the chapter on al-Sijistānī has described, there remain two possibilities. The first is that there is an as yet undiscovered, or unexamined, source for the Ismailis' peculiar formulations; and the second is that the differences between al-Sijistānī and the other Neoplatonists are the contributions of al-Sijistānī himself or some of his Ismaili teachers, or both hypotheses may go together. The determination of al-Sijistānī's own contribution depends, of course, on the prior determination of all the sources which have influenced his thought and terminology, so that in our present state of knowledge this question will have to remain unresolved.

In the first alternative there are several candidates which have not been treated in this study, which has looked at Arabic Neoplatonism. One candidate is the pseudo-Dionysius, mentioned by Walker.³ The feature that seems to be common between pseudo-Dionysius and al-Sijistānī is the subject of negative theology, that is, the consideration of attributes only insofar as they have relevance for a conception of God. This is a subject which al-Sijistānī has in common with the *Kalām* schools, in spite of the fact that al-Sijistānī and the *Kalām* schools have unrelated

³ Walker, *Thesis*, p. 41.

ontologies of substances and attributes when considered from the standpoint of created beings. But it does not seem likely that pseudo-Dionysius can explain the conception of 'aqḷ as the genus covering both the spiritual and the corporeal domains, nor the doctrine of divine assistance (ta'yīd) which is peculiar to the Ismaili conception of the spiritual substance.

A more interesting possibility is that of the so-called 'Ibn Ḥasdāy's Neoplatonist'. Stern and Altmann, in their studies on Jewish philosophy, discovered parallels between Ibn Ḥasdāy (13th c.) and the tenth century Jewish Neoplatonist, Isaac Israeli, who was already part of Fatimid court circles. They published their findings in several articles and also in a jointly authored book.⁴ Their basic conclusion is that the parallels between Isaac Israeli, Ibn Ḥasdāy and the Longer Version of the *Theology*, first reported by the Russian scholar Borisov and examined by Pines,⁵ can be explained by positing a common source for all three works. Stern called this common source *Ibn Ḥasdāy's Neoplatonist*, for want of a better name. How does this posited source relate to al-Sijistānī?

In the description of Israeli's cosmology given in Stern and Altmann's *Isaac Israeli*, the Intellect is not the first entity to be

⁴ S. M. Stern, 'Ibn Hasday's Neoplatonist. A Neoplatonic Treatise and its Influence on Isaac Israeli and the Longer Version of the Theology of Aristotle', *Oriens*, 13-14, 1960-61, pp. 58-120; Stern and Altmann, *Isaac Israeli: A Neoplatonic Philosopher of the Early Tenth Century*, 1958.

⁵ A. Borisov, 'L'Original arabe de la version latine du traité dit *Théologie d'Aristote*', *Zapiski Kollegi Vostokvedov*, V, 1930, Leningrad, 83-98 (in Russian). Pines examines this Longer *Theology* in his article 'La longue recension de la théologie d'Aristote dans ses rapports avec la doctrine ismaélienne', *Revue des Études Islamiques*, 1955, pp. 7-20.

created; there is no universal soul and nature (*ṭabī'ah*); and the first thing that emerges is a pair, matter and form, which are described as substances. The Intellect is described as *mawḍū'* (substrate), a term rarely used by al-Sijistānī, and never for the Intellect. Further, the sequence of entities consists in 1) matter/form; 2) Intellect; 3) the rational, animal and vegetative souls; and 5) the spheres and the natures (*ṭabā'i'*). The difference between the Neoplatonism of Israeli and that of al-Sijistānī is immediately obvious. The terms *rūḥānī* and *jismānī*, with their Sijistānian semantics, are not encountered in Israeli. This fundamental difference, which would require considerable space to document in detail, indicates that there may be some other source which ought to account for the distinctive terms and semantics of al-Sijistānī's system.

There seem to be several terms in the terminological repertoire of the Ismailis of this period (i.e., before al-Kirmānī's extensive development of Ismaili doctrine) which such a source must have had. One of them is the dichotomy *rūḥānī/jismānī*, itself subsumed under the conception of substance (*jawhar*) as a single genus for which the *rūḥānī* and the *jismānī* are species (*anwā'*). A second is the term *mabrūz*, found in al-Sijistānī and in the excerpts which al-Māturīdī cites from what he calls *Qarāmiṭah* works. The textual material supplied by al-Māturīdī is very similar to formulations which al-Sijistānī employs. The term *mabrūz* is used frequently by al-Sijistānī to describe created entities which lie in the '*aqī* as *aysiyyāt*, prior to even the Soul. All entities which are thus manifest (*mabrūz*) in the Intellect have a pre-temporal (*zamān*)

existence. The Neoplatonic source for al-Sijistānī might thus be expected to have this term functioning in a similar manner to that found in al-Sijistānī and in the passages cited by al-Māturīdī.

The pair *rūḥ/jism*, into which the category of substance (*jawhar*) is subdivided, is another item which the Neoplatonic source might be reasonably expected to have; for it is pervasive throughout Ismailism, and is also one of the dichotomies used by the Ikhwān to classify entities. This suggests that the redefinition of the Aristotelian categories into substance, conceived as a genus with spirit and body (*rūḥ* and *jism*), and nine accidents (for the nine remaining categories) was probably done before this scheme entered into Ismaili philosophy. Is there a possibility that the *rūḥ/jism* reformulation of substance originated in some Christian Neoplatonism which wished to buttress its concept of spirit (*rūḥ*) with substantiality (*jawhariyyah*)? And is there a possibility, therefore, that the source for the Neoplatonism of the type found in al-Sijistānī is also some Christian Neoplatonist equally concerned to reconcile creation *ex nihilo* with the emanation conceptions of creation? This question can only be raised but, unfortunately, cannot be answered on the basis of available information.

2. *Islamic Neoplatonism*

There are, apart from the Neoplatonism represented by al-Sijistānī, three types of Neoplatonic thought each represented respectively by al-Kindī, al-Fārābī, and Ikhwān al-Ṣafā'.

Al-Kindī's Neoplatonism figures in a very minor way in his First Philosophy (*al-Falsafah al-Ūlā'*): mostly toward the end of the

work, that is, in his theology. The familiar hypostatic scheme of One, Intellect, Soul is completely absent in al-Kindī. This is all the more remarkable since it is al-Kindī for whom Plotinus was translated, and who himself made corrections to this translation. It is clear, however, that al-Kindī cannot be the source of the sort of Neoplatonism which we find in al-Sijistānī, especially since there is hardly any Neoplatonism in his own works.

Al-Fārābī's works contain a doctrine which is Neoplatonic, but this Neoplatonic doctrine found in such works as the *Ārā'* is a doctrine which he thinks the citizens of the ideal city would be most likely to have; it is not a doctrine to which al-Fārābī himself necessarily subscribed. In any case, this Neoplatonism of the ideal city is not at all the Neoplatonism of al-Sijistānī. But in one respect there is a parallel: in the notion of assistance which is implicit in the prophetology of the ideal city. The Prophet-Lawgiver is supported by the celestial beings and, ultimately, by the First Existent (God) through the mechanism of transmission represented by the term *fayḍ*. In the case of al-Sijistānī, there is a similar notion of assistance originating at the highest levels which is said to 'flow toward' (*al-jārī ilā*) its recipients. Al-Sijistānī's formulations in general show no evidence that he was familiar with the contents of al-Fārābī's works. The criticisms of the conceptions of *jawhar* which al-Sijistānī levels at others are prompted largely by theological issues, in particular the conception of God as substance (*jawhar*). A conspicuous omission in al-Sijistānī's extensive critique of the term *jawhar* is the Mu'tazilah conception of the *jawhar* as indivisible atom. Nowhere does al-Sijistānī refer

to the atom concept. Clearly, he is singling out those schools who, in his view, label God a *jawhar* or a *shay'* (in the latter case his criticism affects the Māturīdiyyah). Since the Mu'tazilah unanimously rejected the term *jawhar* for God, al-Sijistānī does not have to include them in his criticism. This is not the case with the term *jawhar* in al-Fārābī's *Ārā'*, where God is described as *jawhar wāḥid ghayr munqasim*, an expression which al-Sijistānī does not include in the expressions which he criticizes. If al-Sijistānī had been familiar with the theology of the *Ārā'* it is quite conceivable that he would have included it in his critique of the term *jawhar*, for it is precisely of the sort to evoke al-Sijistānī's vigorous responses.

Of all the Neoplatonic schools, however, it is Ikhwān al-Ṣafā' who seem to have the most in common with al-Sijistānī. (The precise relation between the Ikhwān and Ismaili Neoplatonism is an area of investigation which touches the question whether the Ikhwān were Ismailis or not, a subject which is still being debated among scholars of the Ikhwān.) Like al-Sijistānī, the Ikhwān also define substance as *rūḥ* and *jism* (though this is only one of several definitions they survey), and like al-Sijistānī, they have a metaphysical dichotomy of *rūḥānī/jismānī*. Further, their Neoplatonism, like that of al-Sijistānī, is more Plotinian than that found in either al-Kindī or al-Fārābī; i.e., both the *'aql* and the *nafs* are dominant hypostases in the cosmology of the Ikhwān. They share with al-Sijistānī a larger number of terms than is the case with other schools. But many of the strictures which al-Sijistānī directs against those who, in his view, conceive of spiritual

substances in physical terms can be applied to the Ikhwān. The spiritual substances of the Ikhwān are located in physical regions above the sublunar sphere, and God himself is thought to be at the very outermost (in an 'upward' direction from the center of the earth) heaven. The higher one goes the more heavenly is the cosmic region, and this to the Ikhwān is clearly the natural abode of the spiritual. The physical cosmos is divided into regions: the region above the sphere of the moon, and the region below the sphere of the moon. Change and destruction characterize the sublunar sphere, while the upper, celestial regions are unchanging, closer to God, and free from confinement in the body. It is this physical conception of the spiritual substance which al-Sijistānī is at pains to purify, and his efforts are clearly aimed at the sort of ideas found in their encyclopaedic survey, the *Rasā'il*.

The Ikhwān also are liable to the charge levelled against proponents of the Neoplatonist philosophy by the physicists (*ṭabī'īyyūn*) in Islam. Specifically, the problem which the physicists identify, and which they, given their physics, consider insoluble, is that non-corporeal substances cannot produce corporeal substances, no matter how many such non-corporeal substances are used in the effort. In the Ikhwān's cosmogony, the existents which emanate forth from God are all non-corporeal, i.e., they are all forms (*ṣuwar*); even prime matter is a form. The emergence of corporeality occurs when one non-corporeal entity (prime matter) is combined with another (quantity). To the physicists this process would be one example of the problems of how corporeality is generated in an emanationist scheme. Now al-Sijistānī is able to

offer a solution to this problem by invoking the conception of substance (*jawhar*) as the common essence of both the spiritual and the corporeal things. Although the Ikhwān also describe substance in similar language, its potential for resolving the problem identified by the physicists seems to have escaped them. Al-Sijistānī, on the contrary, understood from this conception of substance as a genus that the transformation of the spiritual into the corporeal is conceivable, since both are essentially substance. Thus his effort to formulate a solution to the problem.

Al-Sijistānī and the Kalām

Al-Sijistānī's relation to the *Kalām* schools consists largely in a shared concern: the problem of theology. Here the analysis which he undertakes centers on the term *ṣifah* (attribute). The effort to develop a strict transcendence for God is, for him, the effort to negate all those attributes which created things have. Al-Sijistānī clearly conceives of the attribute in a metaphysical sense, that is, as some entity associated with things. In this regard, he is closer to both al-Māturīdī and al-Bāqillānī, who also conceive of the attribute as some entity associated with that which is described (*mawṣūf*). In al-Sijistānī's case this is seen quite clearly when he undertakes to criticize those who equate the *ṣifah* with the *mawṣūf*, and proceeds to conclude that since the object (*mawṣūf*) remains the same during a change of attribute, this amounts to an equation of the attributes ('white', *bayāḍ*, ends up

being the same as 'black', *sawād*).

But the *ṣifah* conception of the *Kalām* schools are tied strongly to the sensible things which in al-Sijistānī's metaphysics tell only half the story: they would correspond only to the corporeal realm (*jismānī*). The negative theology which the Mu'tazilah attempt is, from al-Sijistānī's standpoint, doomed to failure because the negation (*nafy*) negates only the characteristics of the *jismānī* domain. In this criticism of the *Kalām* al-Sijistānī seems to be assuming that the basic dichotomy which the *mutakallimūn* are making is the *qadīm/muḥdath* dichotomy, in which, implicitly, the *muḥdath*, representing the created order, acquires tacitly the *jismānī* status, in opposition to the similarly tacit status of *rūḥānī* for the *qadīm* order (which is that of God): in other words, the domain of the *qadīm* is spiritual, while that of the *muḥdath* is corporeal. This seems to be how al-Sijistānī interprets, in terms of his own *rūḥānī/jismānī* dichotomy, the implications of the *mutakallimūn*'s fundamental dichotomy of *qadīm/muḥdath*. The negation of the properties (*simāt*) of the *muḥdath* order is then nothing more than another way of asserting (*ithbāt*) the properties of the *qadīm* order.

In al-Sijistānī's ontology, the properties of the *mutakallimūn*'s eternal order are nothing but the properties of the spiritual order which is also part and parcel of creation, and must, therefore, be negated of God. Thus, since things in the *jismānī* domain are said to have attributes, those in the *rūḥānī* domain will be said to have no attributes. Since the things in the *jismānī* order have such things as color, those in the other order, which do

not have them, must be described as not having them. This is the ontological basis of the numerous occasions in which al-Sijistānī uses such formulas as *lā ṣifah lahu*, or its equivalent *ghayr mawṣūf* (it has no attribute; it is not described by some attribute). The thing in the *jismānī* order is described by a formula such as *ṣifah lahu* (it has an attribute). In short, the properties of the spiritual order are described as negations of those of the corporeal order.

A complete negative theology would then have to negate not just the *jismānī* order, but the *rūḥānī* order. In the first negation, one would have to say that God has no attributes, which negates the corporeal order. In the case of the second negation, that of the spiritual order, since these are already described in negative terms, their negation would seem to involve 'double negation' (i.e., negating the negative), but is in reality the negation from God of the spiritual order. In such a formula as *lā lā ṣifah lahu*, the negation can be restated as *lā (lā ṣifah lahu)*, where the expression in parentheses is simply the way the spiritual entity is described: the *lā* in it refers not to God, but to the corporeal domain. It is the first *lā* which refers to God. The entire effort, for which al-Sijistānī continues to use the term *nafy*, thus consists of the negations of two ontological orders, and this is the basis for his term *salibatān* (two negations). Although *salibatān* can be construed as a term representing (two) logical negations, it is, fundamentally, an ontological term, for it reflects the two ontological domains which are unlike each other.

The term *shay'īyyah* provides another theologically inspired

issue with which some *Kalām* schools became involved. Of all the sources examined, only two are found to contain the term *shay'ıyyah*: al-Māturīdī's *Kitāb al-Tawhīd*, and the works of al-Sijistānī. The examination of the term in the case of the latter has disclosed that even the Persian term *chīzī-ye chīzhā* has a high probability of being the translation of the Arabic expression *shay'ıyyat al-ashyā'*. The examination of this term has suggested strongly that one source of al-Sijistānī's terminology and argumentation must be sought in the milieu represented by al-Māturīdī (including his disciples) and the eastern Mu'tazilah (especially the circle of Abū al-Qāsim al-Balkhī).

Al-Sijistānī's concept of *jawhar* has an epistemological dimension as well. There are two basic modes of knowing: the *istidlālī* and the *jawharī*. The former represents the constraints imposed by *ṭabī'ah*, nature, upon the soul's knowing endeavors: it is compelled to acquire knowledge piecemeal, and is therefore marked by temporality (*azminah*). Al-Sijistānī clearly intends by the term *istidlāl* the inference-making activity of the soul: it takes stock of the testimony proffered by the sensible domain, arriving at conclusions which it finds to be valid for the sensible domain. *Istidlāl* consists in regarding the invisible (*al-ghā'ib*) domain to be equally amenable to the conclusions which have been drawn for the sensible domain. The term *istidlāl* betrays *Kalām* origins. However, in the *Kalām* in general the term represents the rational, inferential thinking which the human individual conducts upon 'necessary' (*ḍarūrī*) knowledge, that is, sense-based knowledge and innate notions which his senses have delivered. The scope of human

knowledge is thus covered by these two broad ways of acquiring knowledge. From al-Sijistānī's point of view, both these ways (i.e., *istidlālī* and *darūrī* ways) fall within his *istidlāl* concept, for they both operate within the confines of a linear, sequential temporality (*zamān*), characterized by 'past', 'present', and 'future'. He finds nothing in the *Kalām* conception of knowledge which is the counterpart of his own *jawharī* (substantial) mode of acquiring knowledge.

This mode contrasts sharply with the *istidlālī* mode. In this mode the (spiritual) substance knows at the level of, and through, its very substance: it does not have to work its way through the many particulars which characterize the physical, time-bound world. This is the only mode through which one spiritual substance can gain knowledge of another spiritual substance. Here there are no accidents (*a'rāḍ*) behind which the substance could be said to be 'veiled', condemning the knower to know of this substance only what these *a'rāḍ* will convey.

Ontology and Prophetology

Crucial to this conception of the epistemological aspects of the *jawhar* are some terms which are at the center of al-Sijistānī's doctrine of prophecy and revelation. These are the terms *ta'yīd* and the pair *ifādah/istifādah*. It is here that the Plotinian cosmology becomes indispensable for al-Sijistānī. For while it remains true (in his view) that man's spiritual substance is able to make direct

contact with the (spiritual) realm, such knowledge must come about within the framework of 'giving and receiving', represented by the terms *ifādah* and *istifādah*. The term *ta'yīd* represents the process of giving and receiving, and constitutes the basis for the conception of 'guidance' which is built into these three terms. In al-Sijistānī's conception, the 'aql's very substantiality includes within itself this *ta'yīd* function, for it is through this relationship with both worlds (spiritual and bodily) that it is able to sustain them at all.

The bodily domain is also a recipient of, and a medium for, divine guidance (*hidāyah*). Nature itself receives (*yastafīd*) assistance (*ta'yīd*), whereby it is maintained in existence and is enabled to bring forth its myriad products. For the human being (*bashar*) the *jismānī* realm becomes a second, parallel channel of guidance by the universal soul, which itself operates under the guidance of the First Intellect (*al-'aql al-awwal*). This is the basis of al-Sijistānī's conception of the two types of divine communication: *khiṭābah jismāniyyah* and *khiṭābah rūḥāniyyah*. Because he has placed the *rūḥānī* and the *jismānī* under one single category, and because this single category is the ultimate source of divine guidance for the whole of creation, it is a consistent corollary for al-Sijistānī to consider the guidance coming along the physical 'route' to be in fundamental agreement with the guidance coming along the spiritual 'route'. The spiritual messenger (*rasūl rūḥānī*), who is the source of guidance internal to the human being, and the corporeal messenger (*rasūl jismānī*), who is the source of guidance external to the human being, convey the same message.

Al-Sijistānī's theory of revelation and prophecy is linked fundamentally to his ontological conceptions. The *jīns wāḥid* which covers both the spiritual and the physical constitutes the groundwork upon which the doctrine of 'double-channel' revelation can be based.

But, as has been discussed in Part Two, the Plotinian framework which al-Sijistānī adopts and adapts also creates difficulties of its own. For in this framework the spiritual realm is superior and more authentic than the corporeal realm, which is depicted as being a barrier as well as being that which diverts the soul away from the real and the true. Al-Sijistānī's conception of the spiritual messenger, who guides from within, presupposes this Plotinian outlook. The inner world of the individual in Plotinus' philosophy leads ultimately, through the intellectual realm, to the One. The soul of the individual and the Intellect are ultimately the same in essence, and it is this ontological aspect of the non-sensible being which makes Plotinian mysticism possible in the first place. Al-Sijistānī, however, wants to use this conception for entirely different purposes: to support his prophetology. The prophets (such as Muhammad) are but *jismānī* prophets whose message (*risālah*), which comes from outside the human being, must be vouched for by the human being's own intellect, which itself is part and parcel of the First Intellect. And yet al-Sijistānī's Ismaili commitments call for ascribing to the prophets and the *imāms* an authority over the individual's own mind which al-Sijistānī's own ontology cannot justify. That is why al-Sijistānī is seen in his works, in particular the *Sullam al-Najāt*, laboring repeatedly to sustain the

authority of the *jismānī* communication, represented by the prophets and *imāms*, over that of the *rūḥānī* communication, represented by the human soul's internal sources of communication with the universal soul. The issue remains unresolved because al-Sijistānī does not show any evidence of having abandoned the Plotinian conception of the internal link between the individual soul and the universal soul; for without this link it is impossible, in Plotinian Neoplatonism, to embark upon the journey which is the Return to the One.

The *rūḥānī/jismānī* conceptions which are expressed and presupposed by him indicate that the Neoplatonism which is represented in his doctrine is not some further development of other Islamic Neoplatonisms, such as those of al-Kindī and al-Fārābī. While it is very likely that the specific effort to integrate Plotinian cosmology with Ismaili prophetology is unique to al-Sijistānī and his Neoplatonic colleagues such as al-Rāzī and al-Nakhshabī, the distinctive reformulation of the *jawhar* concept to mean a single, inclusive genus containing the spiritual and the corporeal substance has an unknown source other than the works studied here. In particular, the conception of the spiritual substance receives from al-Sijistānī an elaboration and formulation which is rarely present in the other schools, least of all among the *Kalām* schools.

But the imprint of the *Kalām* on al-Sijistānī, especially in the issue of God and his transcendence, shows also that Ismaili Neoplatonism has a *Kalām* dimension which is much more extensive than those found, if at all, in other Neoplatonisms of the period.

Al-Fārābī does not step into the universe of discourse of *Kalām* controversies, and his terminology therefore remains largely that of the *falsafah* tradition. Al-Sijistānī, on the other hand, not only joins the *Kalām* controversies, but he conducts much of his argumentation by using terms central to these *Kalām* disputations, such as the term *shay'īyyah*. In the process, however, he offers solutions which are grounded in his Neoplatonic ontology, and are obviously unacceptable to the *mutakallimūn* such as al-Māturīdī. The relation of Ismaili thought to the *Kalām* is an area of investigation which needs to be pursued further, especially for the eastern lands of Islam during the period covered by this study. Since al-Māturīdī shows familiarity with Ismaili Neoplatonic formulations, the possibility cannot be ruled out that it is in some eastern Neoplatonic tradition, perhaps some Christian Neoplatonism with an equal concern for the spiritual domain and the creation *ex nihilo* conception, that the sources of this basic aspect of Ismaili Neoplatonism might lie.

The history of Neoplatonic philosophy in Islam can no longer be treated as if the different schools differed only over non-essential aspects of the Neoplatonic legacy, which is generally interpreted as that represented by the Arabic Plotinus and the Arabic Proclus. As the case of the Ismailis, specifically that of al-Sijistānī, shows, Islamic Neoplatonism covers extremely divergent ontological premisses which in cases affect the very foundations of the ontology of Plotinus. These differences are not readily apparent because much of the effort in Neoplatonic studies is directed toward establishing similarities between the Islamic Neoplatonic schools considered as a

monolithic structure, and the early Plotinian Neoplatonists, including Plotinus himself. Just as succeeding individuals after Plotinus offer distinct interpretations of Plotinus, so the Islamic varieties also offer distinct interpretations. Indeed, Islamic Neoplatonism can be said to develop Neoplatonic, specially Plotinian, philosophy in directions which Plotinus himself had ruled out, but which yielded solutions to some intractable problems in his own system, such as the problem of explaining the emergence of corporeal substance from a non-corporeal entity. Detailed studies of the kind attempted here hold out the prospect of uncovering potentially significant aspects of Islamic Neoplatonism which are difficult to perceive when its terminology is automatically invested with the meanings and ontological presuppositions of pre-Islamic Neoplatonic terminology.

PART TWO

3 CHAPTER THREE

TEXTUAL CRITICISM

This part of the dissertation contains the Arabic text of *Kitāb Sullam al-Najāt*. The critical edition is based on the *textkritik* of two manuscripts, one obtained from Bombay and the other from Karachi. The Arabic text proper is, therefore, preceded by a presentation of the results of the textual analysis of these two manuscripts. The final section attempts to assess the importance of the text within the framework of al-Sijistānī's thought and, more broadly, within the framework of Islamic intellectual history.

The remarks of this final section are not intended to be conclusions arrived at after a detailed and exhaustive examination of all relevant source material. They are meant primarily as preliminary summations, and as pointers to further research that could be undertaken fruitfully on the issues covered by these remarks. They could, in this sense, represent potential new areas for investigation within the steadily developing field of Ismaili Studies.

Sources of the Manuscripts

The main reference source for Ismaili works today is Poonawala's *Biobibliography of Ismā'īlī Literature*,¹ which marks a

¹ Published by Undena Publications, Malibu, California, 1977. For al-Sijistānī, cf pp. 82-89.

considerable advance over previous bibliographic resources, in particular those compiled by Brockelmann,² Ivanow,³ Fyzee⁴ and Goriawala.⁵ Poonawala lists five manuscripts of the *Sullam* which are extant. Of these five only two were available for this study: a microfilm of the Bombay manuscript⁶ (designated as B and ب), and a photocopy of the Karachi manuscript⁷ (designated as K and ك). The remaining three belong to private family collections; these were, and continue to be, unavailable.⁸

Kitāb al-Rushd wa al-Hidāyah.

An unusual feature of both manuscripts, which form the basis for the critical edition of the *Sullam*, is that each is followed by the text of another Ismaili work, *Kitāb al-Rushd wa al-Hidāyah* (attributed to the *dā'ī* Ibn Ḥawshab Maṣṣūr al-Yaman, d. 915). Two

² Carl Brockelmann, *Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur*. 2 vols., 2nd edition, Leiden, 1943-9. Supplements, 3 vols., 1937-42.

³ W. Ivanow, *Ismā'īlī Literature*. Tehran, 1963.

⁴ Asaf Fyzee, 'A Collection of Fatimid Manuscripts'. In *Comparative Librarianship: Essays in Honor of Professor D. N. Marshall*. Edited by N. N. Gidwani, Vikas Publishing House, Delhi, 1973.

⁵ Muizz Goriawala, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Fyzee Collection of Ismā'īlī Manuscripts*, University of Bombay, Bombay, 1965.

⁶ This manuscript is numbered 15 in the Fyzee collection cited above, and numbered 11 in the Goriawala catalogue.

⁷ Arabic manuscript no. 165, Ismailia Association for Pakistan, Study Centre. Photocopy used.

⁸ Of these three, two belong to the library of 'Abd al-Qayyūm b. 'Isābhā'ī (Poonawala, p. 440); the third belongs to the collection of 'Abd al-Ḥusayn b. Yūsuf 'Alī Bājī; this third manuscript was confiscated by the head of the Bohra Community in 1973 (Poonawala, p. 389).

versions of this text (located in India) were analyzed by Ivanow, who presented his findings in his *Studies in Early Persian Ismailism*.⁹ Ivanow had noticed the curious fact that the *Sullam* text is followed by the *Hidāyah* text, but he did not venture any conclusions about the relation between them.¹⁰

Al-Majdū' and the classification of *Kitāb Sullam al-Najāt*

One of the most important historical bibliographic sources for Ismaili works is al-Majdū' (d. 1769).¹¹ An interesting feature of his *Fihrist* is his system of classifying Ismaili literature. He classifies Ismaili literature into two main groups: *ẓāhirī* and *bāṭinī*. The former, which are covered in chapters (*fuṣūl*) one through six, include works on such preliminary subjects as language, law, literary topics (poetics), ethics, and history, especially *da'wah* history and biographical literature. These subjects fall within the scope of the *ẓāhir*, dealing with the externals of religion. Chapters seven through twelve deal with the *bāṭin*, covering *ta'wīl* and *ḥaqā'iq*. The author is not completely successful in assigning a proper place to the works. The *majmū'* type of work, being physically a single, bound volume containing several works spanning different subjects, presented him with a problem. An

⁹ Published by the Ismaili Society, 1955. There is an edition of this text by M. Kamil Hussein in a publication of the Ismaili Society: *Collectanea*, Vol 1, 1948, pp. 185-213.

¹⁰ Except to mention that the two works were probably grouped together by mistake. Cf. *Persian Ismailism*, pp. 29-30.

¹¹ Ismā'il b. 'Abd al-Rasūl al-Majdū', *Fihrist al-Kutub wa al-Rasā'il*, edited by Alinaqi Monzavi, Tehran, 1966.

example is the voluminous *Majmū' al-Tarbiyah* of the *dā'ī* Muḥammad b. Ṭāhir. According to al-Majdū' (*Fihrist*, p. 129), it deals not only with *bāṭinī* matters but also with '*ilm al-zāhir*. A work like the *Majmū'* is difficult to classify. Al-Majdū' apparently felt that it belonged to the set of initial readings which formed part of the graduated program (*martabah*) of instruction in the *da'wah*.

The *bāṭinī* works are of two types, *murattabah* and *ghayr murattabah*. The *murattabah* class of *bāṭinī* works consisted of readings which al-Majdū' felt should be covered one by one (*wāḥidan ba'd wāḥid*) (*Fihrist*, p. 120). He lists basic and essential works first, followed by works which he thinks build upon the former, initial readings. The first two works in this *murattabah* category are *Ithbāt al-Imāmah* of the *dā'ī* al-Nisābūrī and *al-Maṣābīḥ fī Ithbāt al-Imāmah* of al-Kirmānī. Next are listed works which provide an introductory level coverage of the Ismaili doctrinal system, such as al-Kirmānī's *Ma'ālim al-Dīn*, and Qāḍī al-Nu'mān's *Kitāb Asās al-Ta'wīl fī al-Bāṭin*. These readings of the *murattabah* class show the considerable influence al-Kirmānī had come to exercise among the later Musta'lī Ismailis. Of the *dā'īs* of the early Fatimid period (i.e., the period before al-Kirmānī), only Ja'far b. Manṣūr al-Yaman and al-Sijistānī are included. The works of Ja'far b. Manṣūr are *Kitāb al-'Ālim wa al-Ghulām* (*Fihrist*, p. 134) and *Risālat Ta'wīl al-Ḥurūf* (*Fihrist*, p. 153). Those of al-Sijistānī are *al-Iftikhār* (*Fihrist*, p. 140) and *al-Yanābī'* (*Fihrist*, p. 142).

Thus neither *Sullam al-Najāt* nor *Tuḥfat al-Mustajibīn* is included in the *murattabah* group. The latter work is placed in the *dūn* subdivision of the *ghayr murattabah* works. It is placed after

al-Sijistānī's other work, *Ithbāt al-Nubū'āt*. However, the *Sullam* work comes after the *Tuḥfah* work, which indicates that al-Majdū' regarded it as more 'advanced' than the *Tuḥfah*. The classification of al-Sijistānī's works thus presents some interesting features. Al-Majdū' apparently considers the *Iftikhār* and the *Yanābī'* required reading, but not something as elementary as the *Tuḥfah*. The inclusion of the *Iftikhār* can at least be understood as reflecting an attempt to equip the student with the tools for polemical occasions, which the work provides. But the *Yanābī'* represents a cosmology which was displaced by al-Kirmānī's more Aristotelian and *falsafah*-oriented system, and which had, in fact, gained sway in the actual doctrinal formulations of the later Musta'līs. It would be interesting to know which was the aspect of al-Sijistānī's thought which continued to be integrated into these formulations.

The *ghayr murattabah* category is further subdivided into two groups: *dūn* and 'ulyā. Works belonging to the *dūn* category were meant to be tackled first before moving up to those listed within the 'ulyā category.

This idea of a program of graduated instruction can be traced as far back as the *Rasā'il* of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā', who had assumed a much greater role in Musta'lī Ismailism¹² than in the Nizari Ismailism of Iran. This graduated system was greatly expanded when the Fatimids established their power in Cairo. Al-Kirmānī is the most important example of this practice. In the *Rāḥat al-'Aql*, considered by later Musta'līs to be his *summa* on Ismaili ḥaqā'iq,

¹² Cf. Husayn Hamdani, 'Rasā'il Ikhwān as-Ṣafā' in the Literature of the Taiyibi Da'wat', *Der Islam*, vol. 20, 1932, pp. 281-300.

this leading exponent of the Ismaili movement's doctrine has a preliminary chapter listing specifically those works which he regarded as necessary prerequisites to a study of the *Rāḥat*. Al-Kirmānī describes each work listed, what it covers and in what way it prepares the reader for the next higher work on the list.

By the time al-Majdū' compiled his *Fihrist* (18th cent. A.D.), therefore, the Musta'lian Ismaili community had had a long tradition of scholarship involving painstaking study of the works of the recognized masters of Ismaili teaching.

Al-Majdū' places the *Sullam* within the category of *dūn* works, having judged it to be a *bāṭinī* work of an elementary type. It does not appear to have been part of the required set of instructional works. It is this inclusion in the *ghayr* section of the *dūn* works which is of some interest here, for it raises the question whether he did this because the work did not meet al-Majdū''s criteria for a *murattabah* work. A satisfactory answer to this question cannot be forthcoming without a separate study of al-Majdū''s scholarly activities and his own doctrines, undertaken against a background of the Musta'lī *da'wah* system of his time.

A second point which may be significant in the present context is the placing of one of al-Kirmānī's works in the *Fihrist*. This is the work entitled *al-Aqwāl al-Dhahabiyyah*. In his lists of the prerequisites for his own *Rāḥat al-'Aql*, al-Kirmānī does not refer to this work.¹³ By placing it under the *dūn* category, al-Majdū' may be faithful to the evaluations of al-Kirmānī himself, and he may be

¹³ *Rāḥat al-'Aql*, edited by Mustapha Ghaleb, Dar al-Andalus, Beirut, 1967, pp. 107-110.

reflecting the classification of Ismaili works in subsequent Musta'li generations. Although much ground needs to be covered in the study of Musta'li works, preliminary efforts have already been made in this direction by a few scholars, notably the late H. Hamdani and Asaf Fyze. In a survey of the literature of the post-Fatimid Musta'li *da'wah*, Fyze describes several instructional programs which had been used in the training and education of Ismaili *dā'īs*,¹⁴ and all the five instructional programs described are different. It is clear, however, that al-Kirmānī and the Musta'li scholar 'Alī b. al-Walīd are considered the two most important sources for the highest levels of the *ḥaqā'iq*. The works of al-Sijistānī do not appear to have been considered important enough, although in one of the five cases described by Fyze, that of Ḥasan b. Nūḥ (d. 939/1533), his spiritual guide Ḥasan b. Idrīs, under whom he (Ḥasan b. Nūḥ) was reading these works, gave him a sizable collection of works which included *al-Maqālīd*, *al-Iftikhār*, and *al-Yanābī'*. However, Ḥasan b. Nūḥ did not have to read these works with the chief *dā'ī*, who later put him through repeated reading sessions so that Nūḥ might master the *Rasā'il* of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā', the works of al-Kirmānī, and those of 'Alī b. al-Walīd.

¹⁴ Asaf Fyze, 'The Study of the Literature of the Fatimid *Da'wa*'. In George Makdisi (ed.), *Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of Hamilton A. R. Gibb*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1965, pp. 232-249.

The Analysis of the Manuscripts

Description of B

The title page of manuscript B (ب in the Arabic section of Part Two) has no *basmala*. The title itself refers to al-Sijistānī as author.

The pages of the manuscript are not numbered, so they have been supplied. The *Sullam* text is 57 folios long. Except for the first and 57th pages, respectively, there are 13 lines to a page, averaging about eight words a line. The script is quite legible, though not as elegant as that of manuscript K.

As mentioned in the introduction to Part Two, both manuscripts are followed by either the entire or a part of *Kitāb al-Rushd wa al-Hidāyah*. In both cases the colophons occur only at the end of the *Hidāyah* text. This *Hidāyah* text, too, lacks a *basmala*.

In B the Anonymous *Faṣl* occurs at the end of all the *bābs* of the *Sullam* text and before the beginning of the *Hidāyah* text, i.e., on page 57, and extends to page 59.

The *Hidāyah* text is labelled as a *faṣl*:

فصل من كتاب الرشد والهداية

and begins on line 11, page 59.

The chapter on *ba'th* follows the chapter on the Last Day (*al-yawm al-ākhir*). It begins on page 49, line 7, and extends to page 53, line 6, where it truncates abruptly. Instead of using *īmān* in the *bāb* title, as has been the case with the other *bābs*, this *bāb* is titled:

باب القول في البحث

The abrupt ending of this *bāb* comes after the expression

... التي من [اجلها امروا بما امروا]

with the expression in the square brackets forming line 6 of page 53; the rest of this line is blank (the brackets and the ellipsis are not in the text). This is followed by another blank line before the *bāb* on purity (*ṭahārah*) begins. A phrase announces this *bāb*:

من مهمنا مقطوع لعله من باب الطهارة والصلوة

The word 'من' is indented on line 8 by approximately the length of two words. Whether this 'announcing' phrase was inserted by the copyist of this manuscript, or whether it was already there when the copyist encountered it, cannot be determined.

As pointed out in the section describing K, the *bāb* on *ba'th* and the *bāb* on *ṭahārah* are missing from the text of K, though a subsequent hand has made an addition toward the end of the text of the *Hidāyah*. The chapter *al-ṭahārah wa al-ṣalāt* ends on page 57, line 9, and with this ends the text of the *Sullam* in B, followed immediately by the text of the Anonymous *Faṣl*.

The colophon of B is reproduced below, since neither it nor that of K is included in the critical edition. The colophon occurs on the last page of B:

وقد وقع الفراغ من نسخة هذا الكتاب بعون الله
تعالى ومادة وليه في أرضه سلام الله عليه في
الجمعة الثامن والعشرين من ربيع الاول سنة ١٣٦٥ في
عصر داعي الله الامين مالك رقاب المؤمنين عمدة العلماء

المجدين سيدنا ومولانا طاهر سيف الدين طول الله
 عمره الشريف الى يوم الدين وادام سوارى بركاته اليه
 في كل حين بحق محمد وآله الطاهرين صلوات الله
 عليه وآله

اجمعين
 سلاما
 منصلا

الى يوم الدين

The scribe is unknown. The date of copying (ca. 1946 A. D.) indicates clearly that it was copied later than K. This fact has been used in determining the relation between the two manuscripts (see below, page 116).

Orthographic and Paleographic Characteristics of B

1. الى is often written as الى, although this is not always the case.
2. ملك is sometimes written as ملك, e.g., الفطرة, on page 1, line 6. Without exception Qur'ānic verses retain ملك.
3. The *tā' marbūṭah* is almost always dotted.
4. Some lines end with a و (36:2; 36:4).¹⁵ Extra spaces are filled over by special symbols, such as line 4, page 1, where the space after انوار is filled by the symbol . . .
5. If the end of the written line is reached before the scribe

¹⁵ Numbers in brackets refer to the page and line in the relevant manuscript. Thus 36:2 refers to page 36 and line 2 of B.

is able to finish copying a word he completes the word by writing out the remaining letters above the line:

فة
... او اضا

However, in B this style is not confined merely to situations at the end of a line. A letter may be written above the line even if the word being copied falls somewhere within the set range of the written line set by the scribe himself. This happens, for example, on page 2, line 7:

ت
. عن سما المخلوقين

7. يي is not always provided with its dots.
8. د and ر , if followed by the third person masculine pronoun ه , are assimilated to this pronoun, making the reading of the text on occasion difficult:

.نحوه : بظهوره ، عبده

9. Certain words are spelled inconsistently:

.تأييد : تأييد

10. The *hamzah* is missing on occasion:

.المؤمن : (المؤمن)

11. The only abbreviations used in the manuscript text occur in relation to invocations over Allāh or the prophets. Thus

عز وجل .
عز for عز عليه السلام ; تعالى for عز
عز وجل .

Here, too, the usage is not consistent; for example, تعالى is sometimes written out in full and sometimes

abbreviated.

12. انكان is often joined to the following verb: انكان.
13. An interesting case is how the scribe deals with an error he makes when copying. There are two possibilities here:
- i) the copyist makes a mistake, realizes it, strikes out this incorrectly written text, and starts again.
- Thus:
- المصدر الديصانية : جمصور هذه المص الامة
- ii) the copyist actually copies out what he finds in the version from which he is making his copy. This is unlikely; leaving out an obviously struck out text is what a copyist is most likely to do.
14. In some instances the slanting stroke of the letter ك is missing: المعان (المكان).
15. The scribe uses مبائة instead of the correct form مباينة.
16. Instances of text written above the line suggest that this was done after realizing that the word had been inadvertently omitted in the copying process:
- انما
بل العيب من قبل
17. Often the text is written in 'layered' format, i.e., letters of the alphabet written up to 2 lines above the regular line of text:
- ت
كا
ادرا
18. سجنه is occasionally written as سجن. On other occasions it is written as سجان or even as سجانة.
19. الحياة may interchange with الحيوه.

20. Certain words end with the *alif* instead of the *ى* :

كنى - كنا
المبتلى - المبتلا

21. Another type of crossing-out of a text is to cross out only those letters of a word being copied which are incorrect. Thus, in the example below, the text from which the copy was being made had the word *al-idāfah*. To correct this error he crossed out only the *dāfah* part of the word and went on to insert, next to the crossed-out letters, the correct text *fāḍah*:

بعض الاصلفة فاضه من العقل ...

Clearly the reader is expected to know what is happening here. Another example is:

من الاحمال عضاء ...

22. Alternative readings of a text are supplied by the scribe above the regular line:

من يومن بكتاب يكتب الله ...

It is impossible to determine whether such alternative readings were already present in the text from which the copyist made his copy, or whether they come from another source which the copyist had in his possession, or whether they are the copyist's own corrections to the reading of the text.

23. An instance of a cross-out text being corrected by replacing the crossed-out text with a text above the line is the following:

ضال : قسمو

24. Examples of inconsistent spelling are: الشرايع : الشرائع.

25. آخر is often spelled simply as اخر, though in general the copyist's practice is to supply a short *alif* at the top right of the regular *alif*: ^االتي.

Description of K

As with B, there is no *basmala*. The title page refers to al-Sijistānī as the author. This manuscript is designated ك in the Arabic section. The title is in bolder ink.

The MS begins with page number 2. On this page there is a rubber stamp on the upper right hand corner displaying the following:

THE ISMAILI SOCIETY
"Sea Croft" Wodehouse Rd
Bombay 5 (COLABA)
INDIA

Another rubber stamp, appearing upside down, states:

Property of the
<Ismaili Society>.

The expression in the angular brackets is a reconstruction of the text as it occurs in the manuscript, for it is barely decipherable except for the letters

ISM TY.

The manuscript's pages are already numbered, so reference to it will be in terms of these page numbers rather than folio numbers. As was the case with B, the photocopy of K is not of much help in describing the dimensions and physical characteristics. As a

result, instead of using inches or centimeters, the statistics have been provided in terms of lines per page and words per line.

The first folio of the manuscript (numbered 2) has 9 lines, including 2 lines of title text; and it averages eight words a line. A typical page of K has 13 lines, averaging 9 words per line.

While the structure of K is different from the structure of B, it does, like B, continue to copy *Kitāb al-Rushd wa al-Hidāyah*. There is only one colophon, at the end of the *Hidāyah* text.

The *Sullam* text begins on page 2, and ends at page 56, line 12, with the following expression:

امره وما يكون من صلاح اهل ذلك الزمان

The space between line 12, page 56 and page 58 is occupied by the text of the anonymous *Faṣl*. The *Hidāyah* occurs between pages 59 and 101.

Between the final words of the *Sullam* text on line 12 of page 56 and the beginning of the text of the anonymous *faṣl* there is a blank space approximately equal to the length of two words, or 10 letters, so that the entire line of text looks like the following:

يومئذ لله الواحد القهار في ان

Into this blank space a later (than 1933 A. D.) hand has tried to squeeze the expression

باب القول في البعث

using a different ink as well (red?). He has succeeded in inserting only the first three words of this expression, and has been compelled, as a result, to write the word البعث on the left margin. Consequently, the entire line reads:

يومئذ لله الواحد القهار باب القول في ان البعث

To the right of this same line someone has added the text فصل, again in a different ink (perhaps red).

Below the last line of the page, and beginning under the first word of that line, is the English word 'see' followed by some illegible text. The Western numbers 107-109, 101-106 occur below the English text. Whoever inserted this is clearly pointing to pages 101 and 109 of the manuscript, for those pages, coming after the end of the *Hidāyah* text and the colophon, contain the chapters on *ba'th* and *ṭahārah* of the *Sullam*, which are missing from the text of K in pages 2 and 56. These two chapters, however, have been added later by some third hand. Comparison of this extra text with the corresponding chapters in B shows that it was not copied from B, so the person who inserted these two missing sections at the end of K had access to a third manuscript of the *Sullam*.

The *Hidāyah* text ends on page 101. The obverse side of the folio was apparently left blank and the original copyist went on to copy portions of the *ṭahārah* chapter on pages 102-106. The colophon of the manuscript occurs on page 106, at the end of the *ṭahārah* chapter. Thus, whereas in B the colophon comes at the end of the *Hidāyah*, in K it comes after this *ṭahārah* text. When this text is compared to the *ṭahārah* text in B there is a discrepancy to be found at the very beginning of the chapter: the section of the chapter beginning with the words

للبشر لم تكن الحكمة ...

found in B, and ending with the words

بالمعرفة والمقائق فاعرفه

is missing in K. Instead, the first line of this chapter on page 102 in K reads:

وجعل التيمم على مسح الوجه واليدين دون

فاعرفه which is the sentence that comes immediately after the word in B. The last line of the text, before the colophon proper begins, on page 106, reads:

التأييد على الاساسين

Pages 107-109 contain the chapter on *ba'th*, inserted by the same hand that inserted the missing *ṭahārah* section on page 102. A heading is provided:

باب القول في البعث

This page (i.e., 107) is also numbered 56. Page 56 was the page where an attempt had been made to insert the heading into the gap between the end of the *Sullam* text and the beginning of the anonymous *faṣl*. In view of this cross-reference it seems that the copyist meant to convey to the reader that the chapter on *ba'th* should follow the last *Sullam* line, before moving on to the anonymous *faṣl*. The insertion of the heading is not really a heading for the following text of the anonymous *faṣl* but a label signalling that the *ba'th* text falls there.

The last line on page 109 reads:

عن علومهم التي من اجلها امرنا بما امرنا

including the five dots constituting the ellipsis, by which the copyist probably meant that the chapter is incomplete. The ellipsis is interesting, for it suggests that the copyist was familiar with some Western editorial practices and conventions. This hypothesis is strengthened by the occurrence of double vertical strokes that separate certain words of the text, indicating with great likelihood the end of the page in the text from which the copyist was preparing

this copy, and the beginning of the next page. These vertical strokes provide yet another check on the relation between B and K, as discussed more fully later (see page 116).

In summary, the sequential composition of the whole of K has the following structure:

pages 2-56	<i>Sullam text</i>
56-58	the anonymous <i>faṣl</i>
59-101	the <i>Hidāyah</i> text
101 (obverse)	portion of the <i>ṭahārah</i> text by the third hand
102-106	rest of <i>ṭahārah</i> , plus the colophon
107-109	the chapter on <i>ba'th</i> , by the third hand (belongs to the <i>Sullam</i> text).

The text of the *Hidāyah* is missing the *basmala*. Both B and K therefore lack the *basmala*. One possible explanation for this situation may be that both B and K are ultimately traceable to some common ancestor which contained other works besides these two which most likely occupied intermediate positions.

The colophon (by the first hand) occurs on page 106, and begins on line 9:

قد وقع الفراغ من تحرير هذه النسخة في العشرين من
شهر رمضان من سنة ١٢٥٨ هـ الموافق للتاريخ الخامس عشر من شهر

جنوبي من سنة ١٩٢٢ في برهاتپور من النسخة القديمة الاقل الاحقر
شيخ آدم ابن الماخذ الشيخ محمد علي السورتي

Orthographic and Paleographic Characteristics of K

1. As in B, ى is sometimes written at the end as ے . The *alif maqṣūrah* and ي are often written as ے ; for example,

الحسنه (26:9)

يعنه (26:10)

without supplying the two dots for the ي .

2. The middle form of ك is sometimes used instead of the conventional ك . However, such occurrences are fewer in K than in B.
3. All *tā^{marbūṭah}* are dotted.
4. The third person masculine singular pronoun is sometimes written closed, sometimes left open: بربريته (closed form); به (open form).
5. Lines of text may end with و (3:12; 16:7,10).
6. In order to ensure that the text line length is equal to the regular line length the scribe uses two short inclined slashes to fill up whatever little space may be left over in the line. For example, page 16, line 9 is a line of regular length, ending with the following words:

عالم الطبيعة

The next line ends with the two short slashes to make its length equal to that of the line above it, and thereby equal to the regular length:

عالم العقل و //

7. In general, the scribe has succeeded well in keeping the right

and left margins straight. He is more committed to this task than the scribe of B. This required him to use devices different from those employed by the scribe of B. For example, he will squeeze the letters of a word closer together, and/or make them smaller in size so as to fit them into the remaining blank space of the line without breaking the line length. Thus (16:3) ends with the expression:

نقول الملائكة

In the manuscript this line actually has the following appearance:

نقول الملائكة

The last few letters of the word الملائكة are smaller and more closely spaced, and take a north-east/south-west direction. This device of re-orienting the slant of a word or an expression is used frequently by the scribe. Another instance is (20:12):

الخالق عن السيفين

Here too the letters have been squeezed together and the letter size made smaller to achieve the desired end, which is to maintain the assigned length.

8. The opposite technique is also used, but less frequently. The letters are spaced out away from each other, rather than spaced in closer to each other, e.g., (14:3)

لم يفتنوا

9. Yet another technique to achieve the same result is to shorten the word length by writing some of the word's letters above the line and packing the remaining letters together:

مساعده في الدنة

10. A word may end with its latter half on an upper line, or even on two upper lines:

د
ج
م (16:11).

Several patterns are used by the scribe. In the case cited above (the term *mawjūd*) the letters ج and د are written a line above the regular text line, followed by the letter م written on the second line above the regular text line. The pattern employed here is to write the first letter of the upper line above the last letter of the lower line, creating a 'stepwise' effect. A second pattern is to write one letter per line for letters written above the regular text line:

ة
الصو (17:5).

Clearly this technique would lead to conspicuous spaces between lines if three or more letters of a word are distributed over three lines, one letter per line. The scribe is well aware of this aesthetic constraint, and has managed to keep himself to those cases involving no more than two letters of a word.

11. تَأْيِد is often written as تَأْيِد (18:7).
12. Unlike B, the third person masculine singular stands isolated from the *shams* letters, conforming to the standard norm of Arabic orthography. For example (3:10,11): ظهوره ؛ عبده .
13. Certain words are spelled inconsistently or incorrectly:
تَأْيِد instead of تَأْيِد ; and sometimes the two forms شَرَائِع and شَرَائِع are used instead of the correct form شَرَائِع .
14. An unusual and unique occurrence is the boldface text (other than the title). On page 27 the text فَاث , written in large boldface, introduces a new paragraph (or section) concerning a

tradition of the Prophet (*ba'd al-akhbār*). No such corresponding boldface exists in B. This offers one more clue as to the relationship of the two manuscripts used in this investigation: if B is copied from K one should expect this boldface to be reproduced, since K antedates B in time.

15. The *hamzah* is not always provided:

تأليف for تأليف ; المؤمن for المؤمن .

16. If the *hamzah* is provided, it may sit in the wrong place:

المؤسسين for المؤسسين (2:8).

17. Like B, the abbreviations are confined exclusively to situations of invocations over the mention of Allāh or the prophets (including the progeny of the Prophet):

عليهم السلام where ع is an abbreviation for النطقاء ع .

18. سبى is used more often than سبى . There is no one-to-one correspondence with the similar inconsistent use of this word in B.

19. A feature that is peculiar to K but is not encountered in B is the orthographic assimilation of the two words اى and شىء , such as on page 14, line 13: ايش

20. الشىء is invariably written السى , with the *hamzah* sitting between شى and ي .

21. On page 4, line 4 اما بعد is missing; instead there is a blank space. This may be simply an 'optical' effect brought about by the photocopying process, in which text written in lighter ink (especially red ink, a favorite of the scribes for headings and titles) is 'blanked out', leaving a space in the photocopy.

22. The *alif maddah* is written with a short vertical stroke instead

of a curved bar: ٲ

However, neither convention is used on several occasions, e.g., when الآخر is written الآخر (4:11).

23. The *shaddah* is never supplied.
24. Alternative forms of spelling may be used by the two manuscripts. Thus while B may write نفا , K may have the variant form نفي .
25. On page 51, line 3, the text باب is missing.
26. حياة and حيوة are used alternatively, although the former form is more frequent.

Errors in K

The scribe of K corrects his copying mistakes in a different manner from that of the scribe of B.

- i) (6:2) عوارقهم for عوارقهم . Here it is not very clear who is trying to correct the error: the copyist himself or some later hand after the copy was made, since nothing more than a slash is required to correct this error. A similar case occurs on page 37, line 1: الاشراف

- ii) (9:12) لا صفت is corrected to لا صفة by applying several short and slanting strokes to the letter ت . These strokes are not applied to the entire letter, but to that half of it which marks the end of the word. The effect is to leave the untouched half looking like the *tā marbūṭah*, which is the effect desired by the scribe. In actual appearance

the effect of the operation is given in the form:

لا صنفه

iii) (10:9) غيرى is corrected to غير by simply striking out the unwanted letter.

iv) (36:7) ~~التي~~ is simply struck off. Another instance is (103:10): ~~اليدى~~.

On the whole, this scribe makes fewer mistakes than the scribe of B, and consequently needs to make fewer corrections.


Correcting Errors

One of the more intriguing features of K is the presence of Western editing symbols, such as $\cap$. What is of special significance here is the likelihood that the corrupting hand and the (western) editing hand are the same. Indeed, it is not far-fetched to suspect in these pages the hand of none other than Ivanow himself, although this is not a subject that can be pursued at this point. The corruptions take several forms: modifications, grammatical corrections, additional material on the margins, superscripts (e.g., 4:10,11), brackets, and other symbols, such as the one indicated above. These corruptions indicate that the 'editor' responsible for them had access to another witness which is not B (since the corruptions are not reproductions of text from B). Many words are even underlined. These observations apply not just to the text of the *Sullam* in K but to that of the *Hidāyah* as well, suggesting that this 'editor' was working out of a witness that had the *Sullam* and the *Hidāyah* lumped together into a single, physical unit.

The actions performed by the 'editor' may be grouped variously

as follows:

a) *correcting grammatical mistakes*

- i. (6:1) has ^{نية}الديانة. He supplies نية above the line, writing it over the letters نة, so that the result looks like this: ^{نية}الديانة.
- ii. The scribe 'corrects' جوامع to جوامعا by attaching an *alif* to the letter ع. The final form of the letter ع in the word جوامع is not cancelled out or struck out. Instead, the *alif*, ا, is simply tagged on, giving the following text in the actual manuscript: جوامعا.
- iii. Enclosing the offending item in square brackets and crossing it out with a slash:
 (3:1).
- iv. supplying the correct version above the incorrect word:
لتبقا for لتبقى (9:7).

b) *supplying alternatives*

- i. alternatives which also correct the grammar: supplying the alternative ممكن above the word in the expression
غير محدود ممكن (7:8).
- ii. alternative reading, possibly from another witness:
فأعرفه for فأعرف (9:11).

c) *supplying additional text*

- i. adding a text to make it grammatically sound: On page 13,

line 10 the text reads:

آل للناس طرق

To this expression is added the text **فيها** above the text line, positioned between the words **لناس** and **طرق** to indicate insertion.

- ii. adding a text to make it complete: At (16:9) the text contains the expression

د عالم العقل والنفس

عالم is added above the line:

. عالم العقل و ^{عالم} النفس

- iii. adding a text to indicate an alternative:

حد
بانه جلى منصوب (21:4)

انصح
ادفع (22:13)

These alternatives are such that they could easily be interchanged without becoming ungrammatical, although the meaning of the text would obviously be altered in most cases.

d) *changing the text to change the subject*

لالة is changed to **دلالة** by inserting the letter **د** to the right of the word.

e) *existence of English text*

- i. (48:9): on the right margin there is the letter M, written in uppercase, presumably to make a reference to al-Mubāarak in the line:

بالمبارك وولده

M (margin).

- ii. page 56, bottom of the page (i.e., below the last text line) has the word 'see'.
- iii. on page 40, line 8 the 'editor' has obviously found something interesting, for he has written 'sic' there.
- iv. the English word 'blank' appears several times in the *Hidāyah* text, though not in the *Sullam* text.

The Relation Between B and K

Derivative Relationship

The main question to be resolved here is whether B or K is derived from the other. The facts that are relevant to this resolution may be listed here as follows:

- 1. B is about 15 years later than K, as is clearly apparent from the dates provided in the respective colophons of the two manuscripts.
- 2. the issue reduces immediately to determining whether B is derived from K.
- 3. K has errors which are not found in B.
- 4. B has text that is not found in K.
- 5. lacunae in K not found in B.
- 6. a chapter that exists in B is missing in K.
- 7. in K, the *Ṭahārah* chapter occurs after the *Hidāyah* text, whereas in B it occurs before the *Hidāyah*.
- 8. the colophon is located after the *Hidāyah* in B (i.e., at the end of the whole manuscript), whereas in K the colophon is encountered not at the end of the *Hidāyah* text but at the end of the *Ṭahārah* section, but before the *ba'th*

chapter.

9. lacunae in B but not in K.
10. extra text in K which does not exist in B, and vice versa.
11. extra text in sentences in K which is not found in B.
12. duplicate text in B but not in K.
13. text in B different from text in K without being grammatically incorrect, e.g., *kutub* in one and *kitāb* in the other.

These considerations are more than sufficient to establish the independence of the two manuscripts, i.e., B is not derived from K.

The Stemmatic Relation Between B and K

Having resolved the question of derivative relationship it remains to attempt a reconstruction of the stemmatic relation along which B and K may have descended. The more outstanding facts to be explained in this regard are:


1. the existence of common errors in B and K;
2. existence of common significant features in B and K, such as the missing *basmala*, the missing heading for the first chapter (dealing with *īmān bi-allāh*), the occurrence of the *Sullam* text together with the *Hidāyah* text;
3. grammatical errors in B but not in K;
4. grammatical errors in K but not in B;
5. chapter on *ba'th* in B but missing from K;
6. the section on *Ṭahārah* forms part of the text in B but occurs after the *Hidāyah* text in K;
7. the intriguing anonymous *Faṣl* occurs in both B and K, and in both cases it forms part of the *Sullam* text, sandwiched,

as it were, between the regular chapters of the *Sullam* and the text of the *Hidāyah*.

8. In K, a third hand has added the chapter on *ba'th*, as well as the beginning few lines of the section on *Ṭahārah*;
9. the material added by this third hand has errors not found in B;
10. the vertical double strokes in this added material suggest page breaks, which do not correspond to the page breaks in B, indicating that this third hand was using a third witness which is not available to us;
11. al-Majdū' does not state explicitly whether his copy of the *Sullam* has the *Hidāyah* tagged on to it at the end. His descriptions of these two works, i.e., of the *Sullam* and the *Hidāyah*, fall at different places in the *Fihrist*, and there is no mention of their occurring together as one single manuscript, with only one colophon. Unfortunately for us al-Majdū' does not give the ending lines of the *Sullam*, which would have been of critical importance, particularly in the determination of the status of the *Ṭahārah* section. The information contained in the *Fihrist*, therefore, provides insufficient grounds for assuming that al-Majdū''s *Sullam* is bound together with the *Hidāyah*, which follows it.
15. both B and K are incomplete (missing the chapter on *al-jannah wa al-nār*).

The Stemmatic Structure

A simple stemmatic structure suggested by the foregoing points is presented below:



O represents the original text. M is what al-Majdū' saw and described in his *Fihrist*. It has no laudatory beginning (*taḥmīd*), but starts off straight away with *ammā ba'd*. Nor does it have the first of the two instances where the work is mentioned in the text itself (as is the case with B and K). A most interesting and, for our purposes here, most significant observation is that al-Majdū' does not report the *Hidāyah* at all in his *Fihrist*. A relevant question here is whether he cites the *basma* when quoting the first few lines of the *Sullam*. He does not. This may not mean much, however, since none of the other works from which he makes excerpts contain *basma*s. His *Sullam* text may or may not have had the *basma* in it; but if it had failed to contain it, and, further, if he in fact encounters the text on its own, i.e., without the *Hidāyah* tagged on to it, one might reasonably expect him to have alerted his reader to such an instance. This point does not, however, constitute sufficient ground for assuming that the *Sullam* text he saw did contain the *basma*; it will not, therefore, be considered as one of the criteria in the effort to determine the

most appropriate stemmatic structure for the *Sullam*.

The absence of the *tahmīd*, plus the single reference to the book by the author himself in the *ammā ba'd* paragraph, is an indication that B and K belong to a different transmission line which contains this laudatory section. (Al-Majdū' does not leave out laudatory lines wherever they exist in a text he is quoting from.) It is possible, alternatively, to suppose that the laudatory section was added to M (the version seen by al-Majdū') at a date later than al-Majdū''s time. This, however, would merely raise more questions, such as the process by which the *Hidāyah* came to be joined to the *Sullam*. A methodologically sounder approach is to examine the style and contents of this laudatory section to determine whether it reflects features which are either typically those of al-Sijistānī or even exclusive to him. A close examination of his technical terminology and concepts, with which he formulates his other laudatory statements, shows that this is indeed the case. Al-Majdū''s version can, therefore, be described as missing this beginning section.

Since B and K are incomplete (missing the *bāb* on *al-jannah wa al-nār*), and since both are found existing together with not just the *Hidāyah* but with the anonymous *Faṣl*, it is reasonable to assume the existence of S which marks the point at which the *Hidāyah* and the anonymous *Faṣl* are added to the *Sullam*. S has to be different from M because it preserves the laudatory passage whereas M does not.

To explain J and P the following points have to be considered. J is postulated by the existence of variants in the text of B and K,

whereas P is postulated by the material added by the third hand which, as has already been pointed out (see p.107), does not correspond to the relevant text in B. As further evidence for J one may cite the disparities in the sequencing of the parts of the *Sullam* that are such a striking feature in these manuscripts. In K the *Ṭahārah* section does not form part of the *Sullam* text, but occurs after the *Hidāyah*. The colophon in this case occurs after the *Ṭahārah* section. The chapter on *ba'th* is missing altogether (these comments apply to the text of the original copyist). On the other hand, P is required to explain the additions supplied by the second copyist (such as the beginning lines of the *Ṭahārah* section; the chapter on *ba'th*, and the extensive corruptions that have been described on page 112 foregoing) which do not tally with the corresponding sections of B. This rules out the possibility that these corruptions and additions were made by someone who had access to B. Hence, there is a P which is the source of these 'editing' operations performed on the main body of the text of K.

Attempts at reconstructing the stemmatic system of manuscripts is a part of textual criticism which careful scholars approach with some considerable degree of wariness, for too much can be made of the scantiest of evidence. Complex and apparently well argued stemmatic structures have been known to have collapsed in the face of some subsequent evidence, or indeed in the face of evidence whose import for the stemmatic analysis had been misjudged by the investigating scholar. The arguments presented above, while suggesting the stemma shown in the foregoing diagram, can suggest other stemmas as well. More elaborate schemes can be constructed,

introducing fine points here and there. These alternative schemes, some of which have been alluded to in the preceding discussion, are not susceptible of verification in the absence of the missing intermediate witnesses which form the actual, historical transmission lines through which an unknown number of copies were made. In view of this, the approach of the present analysis has been to adhere to the principle of parsimony, that is, to adopt the simplest model which explains the facts just as adequately as a more complicated model which may have more redundancies than accuracies. Until the remaining manuscripts have been acquired and examined, it will not be possible to arrive at definite conclusions concerning this question.

The Authorship of the Text

The *Ṭahārah* Section

It is necessary to look more closely at the *bāb* on *Ṭahārah* which is found in B and K. Several peculiarities associated with this *bāb* calling for explanation are listed here:

1. such a *bāb* is not listed by al-Sijistānī in his own 'table of contents' which forms part of the text of *Sullam al-Najāt*;
2. it is also not mentioned in the list of chapters reproduced by al-Majdū' in his *Fihris*;
3. the final chapter according to both lists should be *Bāb fī al-ʾīmān bi-al-Jannah wa al-Nār*; this chapter, however, is missing from both B and K.

In K, the *Ṭahārah* section occurs not just after the other chapters

of the *Sullam* have been copied by the scribe, but all the way toward the end of the entire manuscript, after even the copying of the *Hidāyah*. It stands alone, but ends with the colophon which is, as has been pointed out, the only colophon in the manuscript. It should be recalled that K is made up of text by two different copyists. The text that is added by the second copyist (leaving out corrections, etc.) consists of two parts: i) the first few, beginning words of the *Ṭahārah* section, and ii) the chapter on *ba'th* (see page107 for the sequential breakdown of K).

In B, on the other hand, the *Ṭahārah* section is located *after* the chapter on *ba'th*, *before* the anonymous *Faṣl*, and also *before* the *Hidāyah*. It is therefore not followed immediately by the colophon, as happens in K. Further, it is introduced in B by a brief statement (most likely provided by the copyist) guessing its status in the *Sullam*, and referring to it as a *bab*. The actual words used are:

من هنا منقطع لعله من باب الطهارة والصلاة

One other possibility is that the copyist did not add this introductory expression but merely copied what was present in his exemplar. It is impossible to determine conclusively which possibility is the one that actually occurred. The expression assigns it the status of *bāb* on *Ṭahārah* and *ṣalāt*. However, no such heading is given to this section in K. This is an observation of some significance, for it has been argued earlier (see page120) that the peculiar structure of K and the extensive corruptions in it strongly suggest the existence of P which is the source of the complementing text of the *Ṭahārah* section as well as the source of

the chapter on *ba'th* for K. Thus, if the copyist was drawing upon P to complete the *Ṭahārah* section he would have copied any heading for this section, had there been any in P, for obviously he could see that there was no heading given to the *Ṭahārah* section in the version he had and was seeking to upgrade it by consulting P. This line of reasoning is strengthened by the observation that a heading for the *ba'th* chapter has been provided by him, indicating that such a heading must have been present in P to start with.

The above observations do not, however, prove that this *Ṭahārah* material does not belong to the *Sullam* and should, as a result, be left out of the critical edition. What if it is part of the missing chapter on heaven and hell, rather than a separate chapter on purity which some later copyist misjudged as belonging to the *Sullam*? An examination of the contents of this section shows that it is focused primarily on the *ta'wīl* of the different postures involved in the mechanics of the ritual connected with *Ṭahārah* and *ṣalāt*, setting forth a correspondence between the several body movements of these rituals with the broader characteristics of (Ismaili) cosmology (*al-‘ālam al-‘ulwī*, *al-‘ālam al-sufllī*). Unless one supposes this section and its discussion to form some sort of prelude to a discussion of heaven and hell, it is difficult to imagine the *Ṭahārah* material belonging to the last chapter of the *Sullam*.

Another issue which needs to be examined here is whether the contents reflect ideas and terminology which would be characteristic of al-Sijistānī. This is a very relevant question, because if it is the case that al-Sijistānī did not really write this section the

issue is resolved quite easily. It is precisely this line of inquiry that has proved decisive in determining the status of the anonymous *Faṣl* that is encountered in both B and K as forming part of the *Sullam* text proper.

It turns out that the *Ṭahārah* section's level of *ta'wīl* is such that it could just as likely have been written by such figures as al-Qāḍī al-Nu'mān and Ja'far b. Maṣṣūr al-Yaman. The *ta'wīl* of the *Ṭahārah* section consists in associating with each part of the *Ṭahārah* ritual a corresponding element from the religious as well as the cosmic domain. In the former case, such elements are the *nāṭiq* and the *imām*; in the latter case they are simply the two major divisions of the cosmos, *al-'ālam al-'ulwī* and *al-'ālam al-sufllī*. There is no reference to such more distinctive entities as the *kalimah*, *amr*, *'ālam al-'aql*, *'ālam al-nafs*, etc., which reflect terminology that would support the view that it was written by al-Sijistānī. As it stands, however, any number of Ismaili writers of the period could have been responsible for this section, including, of course, al-Sijistānī himself.

The line of inquiry through the contents of the *Ṭahārah* section fails to deliver evidence that can decisively confirm its place in the *Sullam*. As a result this section has not been included in the text of the *Sullam* prepared for the critical edition, although an edited version is included in the Arabic section, set aside from the *Sullam* text.

The Anonymous *Faṣl*

Reference has already been made (p. 97 above) to the existence

of a *Faṣl* which forms part of the text of the *Sullam al-Najāt*, and which is located before the *Hidāyah* text in both manuscripts. This section examines in greater detail the contents of this *Faṣl*.

The features of this *Faṣl*, which form the basis for any suspicions regarding its relation to the *Sullam* and, indeed, to al-Sijistānī himself are the following:

1. If it is a part of the *Sullam* then it ranks as the only instance of such a *Faṣl* in the entire text. No other chapter has a distinct section marked off as a *Faṣl*.
2. If it is a part of a chapter of the *Sullam* there is the problem of determining which chapter; for in B the *Faṣl* appears immediately after the chapter on *Ṭahārah*, whereas in K it is placed immediately after the chapter on the Last Day. In either case, if the *Faṣl* were an integral part of a chapter, this discrepancy would not exist.

The contents of the *Faṣl* are not readily continuous with the contents of either of the two chapters, respectively, that precede it; there is a sharp discontinuity in the topics, concepts, and terminology, all of which makes it difficult to justify including it with either of them.

3. The *Faṣl* may have been added by al-Sijistānī toward the end of the *Sullam*, as a sort of an appendix. If this is the case it would be necessary to establish that al-Sijistānī wrote it.
4. The fact that this *Faṣl* is found in B as well as in K before the *Hidāyah* text may indicate that it was added to

the *Sullam* before the *Hidāyah* was added (requiring the existence of some Q before S in the stemma).

5. A very relevant point in this context is whether al-Majdū' would mention any *Faṣl* of the *Sullam* had there been any to start with. In general, his practice is to list *Faṣls* of works that have a heading to them, typically of the form *Faṣl fī anna* The *Faṣl* in question here exhibits precisely this characteristic: after the term *Faṣl* there follows the heading *fī anna al-‘ālam kullahu ...min ladunī falak al-muḥīṭ ilā’ muntahā markaz al-‘ālam jism wāḥid wa anna kalimat allāh rūḥahu*. This sentence is the heading of this *Faṣl* because it is immediately followed by *i‘lam yā ayyuhā al-akh...* which is typically the style of addressing the reader familiar in the *Rasā’il* of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā'. Al-Sijistānī never employs this form of address in his writings, an observation that lends considerable weight to any suspicions one might have about the nature of this *Faṣl*.
6. In both B and K this *Faṣl* is the last section which leads abruptly into the *Hidāyah*. The terminating phrase *li-ṣalāḥ ahl dhālika al-‘ālam* does sound reasonable enough as a concluding phrase within the immediate context of the preceding sentences and the ideas they convey. However, in K the remaining spaces of the page are left blank and the *Hidāyah* is begun on the next page. In B, on the other hand, the *Hidāyah* is copied by the scribe beginning with the very next line, but set off by the marker and heading

'*Faṣl*'. The use of the term *Faṣl* to designate the *Hidāyah*, or rather an extract from the *Hidāyah* -- since *Faṣl* is followed by the phrase *min kitāb* -- suggests that here at least this term is being used with the clear understanding that it is not part of the *Sullam* but rather comes from some other work. The anonymous *Faṣl* may well be such an extract too, but from a source which is as yet undetermined.

The above considerations constitute characteristics which are external to the text of this anonymous *Faṣl*. While they are significant enough to raise some doubts about its status within the two manuscripts B and K, they cannot strictly constitute proof that it does not belong to the *Sullam*.

An internal examination of the *Faṣl* reveals two main characteristics which suggest contradictory conclusions for the probable date at which it was composed and, therefore, about its authorship. The characteristics of the first group do not conflict with characteristics which are familiar to such works as the *Rasā'il* of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā' and the works of the Ismaili writers of the period ninth to eleventh century A.D.

The second group of characteristics, on the other hand, constitute certain technical terms which are found only in the later Fatimid, that is Musta'lian, literature, and argues for a much later date of composition for the text in question. These two groups of characteristics will now be considered in some detail; but first a summary of the doctrine contained in this *Faṣl* is given below.

Summary of the Doctrine of the *Faṣl*

The doctrine set forth in the *Faṣl* may be briefly presented here as follows.

The entire cosmos, according to the author, constitutes a single body (*jism wāḥid*) whose spirit (*rūḥ*) is none other than the Word of God (*kalimat allāh*). This single body is not just the physical cosmos but includes all spiritual beings as well (*anwār rūḥāniyyah* and *anfus mutaḥarrikah*). All of them receive the universal emanation (*al-fayḍ al-kullī*).

The basic structure of the cosmos and its process is 1) *al-mubda' al-awwal*, here also called *al-'aql al-fa'āl*, 2) *al-nafs al-kullīyyah*, 3) *al-hayūlā' al-ūlā'*, 4) *al-jism al-muṭlaq*, and 5) *al-ṣūrah*. Each is a *fayḍ* of Allāh. The author focuses on the fifth *fayḍ*, *al-ṣūrah*. This *ṣūrah* is God's *khalīfah* on earth (*fī arḍihi*), assigned the task of overseeing and administering the lower world (*al-qā'im bi-tadbīr 'ālam al-suflī*).

The final point made by the author (before the *Faṣl* terminates rather abruptly) is that to this *ṣūrah*, which has already been described as regulating the lower world, corresponds, in every age (*fī kullī zamān*) a *shakhṣ fāḍil* who caters to the welfare of the humanity of that time (*ṣalāḥ ahl dhālika al-zamān*).

Evidence for Authorship Contemporary with al-Sijistānī

Some of the terms used in the *Faṣl* are similar to those used by al-Sijistānī. The most important of these terms, in the present context, are the terms representing the two-fold division of the universe into the upper and lower worlds, *al-'ālam al-'ulwī* and

al-‘ālam al-suflī. The hypostatic principles that generate the universe are *al-‘aql*, *al-nafs*, *al-hayūlā’*, *al-jism al-muṭlaq*, and *al-ṣūrah*. These terms resemble those which al-Sijistānī uses in his own formulations, as do the terms *anwār rūḥāniyyah* and *ajsām ṭabī‘iyyah*. In the case of al-Sijistānī, and in the case of all doctrines employing the Neoplatonist emanationist framework for their cosmologies, *al-‘aql* precedes the universal soul in coming into being; the latter then precedes *al-hayūlā’* which in turn precedes *al-jism al-muṭlaq*, and so on. It is, however, the specific emanationist structure which differentiates the *Faṣl* from al-Sijistānī; it recalls the *Rasā’il* of the Ikhwān, whose terminology and doctrine clearly is much closer to the *Faṣl*'s than the latter's is to that of al-Sijistānī.

There are, however, important differences between al-Sijistānī and the *Faṣl*. The entire *fayḍ* framework which describes the structure of the cosmos as well as the process through which it came into being is missing in al-Sijistānī's system. Al-Sijistānī never uses the term *fayḍ*. In the *Faṣl* the First Intellect, *al-‘aql al-awwal*, comes into being not through a creative act but through the emanation from Allāh's Word, *al-kalimah*. It is described explicitly as being the first *fayḍ* of the *kalimah*, and also as *al-‘aql al-fa‘‘āl*. The idea of intermediates (*wāsiṭah*) is crucial to the sequential development of these primary and founding entities, and this also bears similarity to some of al-Sijistānī's formulations. But the latter differs from the *Faṣl* in the emphasis he places on time and on the dual character of the world that is created, the spiritual (*rūḥānī*) and the physical (*jismānī*) world.

The sequencing of the coming-into-being of the five cosmic principles is given a very different treatment by al-Sijistānī. They all come into being together, that is, before time has come into being. And yet they also presuppose each other in the sequential order demanded by the *fayḍ* process. This simultaneity and concurrent sequentiality hinges on the role of *al-zamān*, which in turn is intimately linked to the coming into being movement in the universe. (Sorting out the conceptual difficulties involved in this view was one of the major preoccupations of some of the Ismailis, most notably al-Sijistānī and Nāṣir-i Khusrav).

The idea of *fayḍ* from Allāh is very alien to the Ismailis (with the exception of the Ikhwān, whose Ismaili character is a subject of ongoing debate among scholars) in general, and to al-Sijistānī in particular. The *Faṣl* describes the cosmos as receiving the universal emanation (*al-fayḍ al-kullī*) from God (*min bārīhi subḥānahu*), an idea that is anathema to al-Sijistānī. This expression, and the doctrine it conveys, is much more readily acceptable to the Ikhwān's views, who speak of Allāh as the *bārī* from whom the emanation proceeds and originates. The term *al-ʿaql al-faʿāl* is a term which al-Sijistānī never uses but which is quite typical of the Ikhwān.

The most interesting expression in the *Faṣl* is *jism wāḥid wa anna rūḥahu kalimat allāh*. A few lines further the *Faṣl* expands this expression to include the spiritual, non-physical beings in the cosmos:

anna al-ʿālam kullahu wa mā fīhi min al-anwār
al-rūḥāniyyah wa al-anfus al-mutaḥarrikah....

Two features of this expression are of particular significance: The first is the use of the term *jism* as an all-encompassing category that is used to describe even non-physical entities like the *anfus*. The second is the use of the term *kalimah* to speak of this *jism*'s *rūḥ*. Clearly, the author of the *Faṣl* is treating the whole of existence, spiritual and physical, as one body with a spirit (*rūḥ*) in it, identified as the *kalimah*.

One immediate response to this expression is to interpret it as an appeal to microcosm/macrocosm conceptions, of which the Ikhwān were an outstanding example. On several occasions they state that the whole world is one body: *jism al-‘ālam kullīhi* (R4:214). Other examples of the use of the term *jism* to represent the whole world are:

fī jamī‘ *jism* al-‘ālam wa ajzā’ihi (R4:221);

al-‘ālam *jism* wāḥid ... (R2:25); (al-‘ālam) lahu nafs wāḥidah (R2:25; R3:212).

One of the more conspicuous expressions is the following, which exists in the *Faṣl*:

min ladun al-falak al-muḥīṭ ilá muntahá markaz al-ard.

This is one of the favorite expressions of the Ikhwān, occurring several times throughout their *Rasā’il* (R1:146; R1:273; R2:25; R3:187). It is symptomatic of the very distinctive style with which the Ikhwān strive to discuss spiritual topics while aiming at the same time to maintain, for their intended audience, the character of the universe as at once spiritual and physical.

But the Ikhwān do not, in their *Rasā'il*, use the term *kalimah* to represent the *rūḥ* of this *jism*. In all their microcosm/macrocosm analogies and correspondences they never think of *al-kalimah* as the spirit of the entire universe. This position is filled, in their cosmological system, by the universal soul (*al-nafs al-kulliyyah*), required by their emanationist conceptions. The term *al-kalimah* does not play any role in their doctrine of creation and emanation, in conspicuous contrast to the vast majority of the Ismaili writers. In al-Sijistānī, for example, *al-kalimah* has such an important role in the act of creation that it occupies a rank above that of *al-amr* and *al-ibdā'*. One says, in the Sijistānian style and conception, '*ālam al-amr* and '*ālam al-ibdā'*', but one never says '*ālam al-kalimah*'. These constraints on terminological usage are not without a basis in al-Sijistānī's cosmology: they reflect the fine and important distinctions he has painstakingly made among their cosmological references, and he would balk at the thought of a non-analogical formulation involving the term *jism*, obsessed as he is with the extremely controversial issue of substance (*jawhar*) and its correct meaning and usage.

Another term used in the *Faṣl* which constitutes for us an important clue as to its authorship is the term *fayḍ*. This term shares the same roots with another term used by al-Sijistānī: *al-ifāḍah*. In its most fundamental sense within al-Sijistānī's cosmology it is used to describe and represent *al-'aql*'s communication to, and with, *al-nafs*. Its use is not restricted to these two, however. For example, in the *Sullam* it is used in connection with the angels (*al-malā'ikah*), who are described there

as *ifāḍah* which possess special characteristics and functions.

The *Faṣl* uses the term *ifāḍah* only once, to describe the relationship of extension between the *kalimah* and the entire cosmos (which is *jism wāḥid*). This relationship between the *kalimah* and the *jism wāḥid* is also described as one of contact (*muttaṣila bihi*). These modes of their relationship guarantee that the world will remain or persist in existence (*yabqá fī al-wujūd*).

The expression *yabqá fī al-wujūd*, together with other slight modifications such as *baqā' fī al-wujūd*, represents the notion of continuance of the state of being-in-existence. It is a notion which is characteristic of emanation-based cosmologies that attach the emanation process to God himself. The Ikhwān al-Ṣafā', for example, speak frequently of a *fayḍ* which God emanates forth (*yufīḍ*); thus in their scheme the originating point of this emanation (*fayḍ*) is Allāh himself (*al-Bārī*). Existents (*mawjūdāt*) come into *wujūd* after being in 'adam. Among the *falāsifa* al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā use *fayḍ* to describe the coming-into-existence process of existents (*mawjūdāt*) from the First Cause (al-Fārābī) or the Necessary Existent (*al-wājib al-wujūd*) (ibn Sīnā). Thus in *Kitāb Ārā' Ahl al-Madīnah al-Fāḍilah* al-Fārābī describes how the cosmos is brought into being when the First Cause (*al-'illah al-ūlā'*) emanates its existence (*fayḍ wujūdihi*) upon the intellect (*al-'aql*), and so on down the chain of being until the whole cosmos has developed. The basic idea underlying this type of emanationism, in which there is no creation by an act of fiat, is that the coming-into-existence idea is linked to the persisting-in-existence idea. There is therefore a fundamental closeness between the non-creationist

emanationism of the Ikhwān and the non-creationist emanationism out of which the *falāsifa* generate the cosmos.

An intriguing peculiarity of the *Faṣl* is that it is similar to the Ikhwān and the *falāsifa* in having a non-creationist emanationism. On the other hand, a complicating element is that this *Faṣl* gives to *al-kalimah* a cosmological stature and function that it lacks in the systems of the *falāsifa* and the Ikhwān. By describing it as the *rūḥ* of the cosmos it has introduced a distinction between this *rūḥ* and the *anfus* (souls), including the universal soul. And yet the prominent position occupied by *al-kalimah* in the *Faṣl*'s cosmology bears an important resemblance to Ismaili cosmologies, including that of al-Sijistānī. The omission of *al-amr* is not merely a matter of technical terms: the creationist element so crucial to Ismaili thought is missing from the *Faṣl*, offering grounds for skepticism about its authorship by al-Sijistānī.

Evidence For Authorship at a Later Period

The analysis of the authorship of the anonymous *Faṣl* has focused so far on those of its features which suggest that it was composed sometime between the ninth and tenth century A.D. Possible points of similarity with the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā' and the *falāsifa* have been pointed out and discussed, as well as problems presented by other features of the *Faṣl* which argue against its origin from amongst their ranks.

At the same time, the analysis in the previous section has also attempted to establish points of contact between the *Faṣl* and Ismaili writers, particularly al-Sijistānī, in whose work, after

all, the problem text appears. In the process of this the crucial observation has been made that, barring the case of the *Rasā'il* of Ikhwān al-Ṣafā', Ismaili works are creation-based even when there is an emanationist component acting as the mechanism for the development and evolution of the cosmos. In this section, on the other hand, an analysis is conducted of those other features of the *Faṣl* which constitute evidence lending support to the possibility that it was composed during the later phases of the waning Fatimid caliphate, reflecting a genre of Musta'li thought.

There is, toward the end of the *Faṣl*, an expression which is not found in any of the well known Ismaili works of the Fatimid period extending to Nāṣir-i Khusrav but which is still unique to Ismaili works of some Musta'li writers (and also to the Shī'ite 'irfānī and ishrāqī schools of Iran). The expression in question is 'shakhṣ fāḍil'. The specific context in which this expression occurs is that in which the *Faṣl* is describing *al-Ṣūrah*, the final cosmic generating principle, as *khalīfat Allāh*, charged with the task of administering (*tadbīr*) the lower world ('*ālam al-sufli*).¹⁶ Corresponding to this *ṣūrah* there is, on earth, at any given time and with every age, a virtuous or superior individual, *al-Shakhṣ al-Fāḍil*, who is linked to it for the benefit of the people of that time (*ṣalāḥ ahl dhālika al-zamān*).

The expression 'shakhṣ fāḍil' occurs first, among Ismaili writers, in the works of the Musta'lian dā'ī 'Alī b. al-Walīd (d. 1215). It is never used by al-Sijistānī, who is of immediate

¹⁶ One might have expected the expression *al-'ālam al-sufli* instead of this expression, which is found in both B and K.

concern here. Nor is it used by the rest of the Fatimid scholars: al-Rāzī, al-Nu'mān, al-Kirmānī, Ja'far b. Manṣūr, al-Shīrāzī, and Nāṣir-i Khusrav.

The idea that the *Shakhṣ Fāḍil* stands under the direction of the overseer and administrator of the terrestrial world is tantamount to having two *khalīfahs* in the lower world: a *khalīfah* for the whole of the lower world (*al-Ṣūrah*), and a *khalīfah* for the human race (*shakhṣ fāḍil*). The cosmology presented here resembles that formulated by the Ikhwān. Under the system formulated by the *falāsifah* the administrator of the terrestrial world is *al-ʿaql al-faʿāl*, who, it will be remembered, acts as the giver of forms (*wāhib al-ṣuwar*) to the intellects of humans on earth and who is the source of the prophetic phenomenon and revelation in the theories of al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā. The parallelism is structural, however, and covers similarity of *functions* rather than *identity* of entities: the *falāsifah*'s *al-ʿaql al-faʿāl* also has the task of *tadbīr*, of managing and running the sublunar world, and in this function it is similar to the *Faṣl*'s *al-Ṣūrah*, which in its turn is similarly charged with the running and managing of the lower world. But the entities performing these functions are not the same. The so-called Active Intellect of the *falāsifah* is not the same as the Form of the *Faṣl*.

Apart from al-Walīd, another Mustaʿlī scholar who uses the expression *shakhṣ fāḍil* is al-Ḥamidī (d. 1162). He has applied this expression to refer to the author of the *Rasāʾil* (*ṣāhib al-rasāʾil*), a designation used on several occasions in his different works. There is no special cosmological significance to this particular use

of the expression, since it can be regarded equally as an expression meant to pay homage to a figure venerated highly by later generations of Ismailis, especially the Musta'li Ismailis. On the other hand 'Alī b. al-Walīd uses this expression as an important concept in his cosmology, and it is this use of the expression which resembles the use found in our anonymous *Faṣl*. Both al-Walīd and the *Faṣl* present this *shakhṣ fāḍil* as a generalized cosmic entity, linking the overseeing lord of the lower world (*al-Ṣūrah*) to the human component of this lower world. The expression represents a generalized concept because this *shakhṣ fāḍil* is not just the author of the *Rasā'il*: he is the contact with the cosmic *Ṣūrah* all the time.

'Alī b. al-Walīd uses this expression in his *al-Dhakhīrah fī al-Ḥaqīqah* (Chapter 8, 61ff), which describes individuals who are the *zubdat al-ṭabī'ah bi-asrihā*, the highest level reached by the human being (*ghāyat mā fī 'ālam al-insān*). The prophets, imams, and the trustees (*awṣiyā'*) are, according to al-Walīd, these individuals. He also uses the expression in his other work, *Jalāl al-'Uqūl wa Zubdat al-Maḥṣūl* (p. 132).

The Ikhwān do not apply this expression to the case of the human being, as al-Walīd and the *Faṣl* do, but to the stars above (*kawākib thābitah*) (R:1,146).

And yet while the expression '*shakhṣ fāḍil*' appears to be used for individuals during the later Fatimid period, the rest of the terminology employed by the author of the *Faṣl* does not correspond to the set of terminology employed by al-Walīd, who is a very close disciple of al-Kirmānī's system and adheres not just to his master's

terminology but to his conceptual system as well.

These considerations do not offer any decisive evidence with which to resolve unequivocally the problems posed by the *Faṣl*. It does not quite fit into the post-Fatimid Musta'lian literature because this literature is nothing more than a continuation of al-Kirmānī's system as far as doctrine is concerned (and a continuation of al-Nu'mān as far as the *sharī'ah* is concerned). And yet it contains an expression that is clearly of later development, as evidenced by 'Alī b. al-Walīd.

The most important impression conveyed by this text is that it represents an Ikhwān type of cosmology, except for the presence of the term *al-kalimah* and its role as the *rūḥ* of the cosmos. In any event it does not appear to have been the work of al-Sijistānī, and has therefore been left out of the critical edition.

The Significance of the Work

There is more than one sense in which *Kitāb Sullam al-Najāt* can be described as a unique work of al-Sijistānī. Several characteristics contribute to the work's special status. It is more scriptural in its topics than some of his other works, such as *al-Maqālīd al-Malakūtiyyah*, *Kashf al-Maḥjūb*, *al-Yanābī'*, and portions of *Ithbāt al-Nubū'āt*. The issues are drawn from the Qur'ān, and constitute the rungs of the ladder of salvation (*sullam al-najāt*) which are set forth as doctrine for the Ismaili *mu'min*.

In developing the doctrine of this work al-Sijistānī makes less use of the Neoplatonic elements than he does in a work such as the

Yanābī'. When these elements are used, they are not themselves the subjects of explanation and clarification, as is the case in *al-Yanābī'* and *al-Maqālīd*. There are, no doubt, occasions in the *Sullam* where al-Sijistānī gets drawn into a discussion about a topic which might more appropriately have been analyzed in a work such as *al-Maqālīd*. His classification of substances, and his criticism of Galen, are two such topics. But this analysis of substance is subordinated here to the main topic (the nature of the angels) toward which he is trying to develop what he considers to be the correct position which the *mu'min* must take. This leads him to discuss the three major theories about substance, two of which have to be eliminated so as to arrive at the theory that is appropriate for describing these *malā'ikah*.

Insofar as the *Sullam* is a work explaining the major topics of scripture, it resembles his other work, *Kitāb al-Iftikhār*. This latter work is also organized around scriptural topics, and here, too, his method is to interpret the major religious symbols via the general concepts of Neoplatonism which were developed by him in his other, more Plotinian works. Unlike the *Sullam*, however, *al-Iftikhār* is a polemic directed against the opponents of the Ismailis, so that the argument is aimed at showing the truth, validity and superiority of the Ismaili view.

From the standpoint of the work's relation to the themes of his other works, *Sullam al-Najāṭ* has significance for three major areas of al-Sijistānī's thought: the strictly philosophical, such as the analysis of substance; the religious or scriptural, such as the unity of God and the role of the *sharī'ah* after the truth has been

revealed; and the terminological, which, while covering the two preceding areas, covers the entire realm of al-Sijistānī's thought. For example, a careful study of the terms employed by him to describe the *da'wah* system during his day -- or within his locality, suggesting geographical variation within *da'wah* organization and nomenclature -- could shed light on the internal developments within the *da'wah* over time.

The topic of substance has been explored in considerable detail in Part One. In the remainder of this section brief comments are offered with respect to two other issues which arise out of the *Sullam* work. The first is the problem of *da'wah* terminology as an index with which to trace the fate of the Fatimid system in subsequent generations. The second is al-Sijistānī's arguments for observing the Law even when the *ta'wīl* process has disclosed the *ḥaqā'iq* which lay under it. His comments on this third issue, when integrated with his views formulated in his other works, lead to conclusions which constitute a different conception of the relation between the human *'aql* and divine revelation.

Da'wah Terminology

The *da'wah* is the mechanism and the dynamic of the Ismaili movement in history, the vehicle through which Ismailism has exercised its presence and influence within and outside itself. The Ismaili *imāms'* impact on the development of Islamic society would have been practically negligible without some highly organized institution, such as the *da'wah*, through which to communicate their vision of Islamic society and to transform this vision into the

realities and practicalities of their milieu.

Investigators have therefore rightly brought their attention to focus on the nature of the Ismaili *da'wah*. In spite of this interest and effort, Ivanow's article, *The Organization of the Ismaili Propaganda*,¹⁷ still remains the basis of much work aimed at elucidating the functions and positions that constituted the structure of the *da'wah*. The *da'wah* described there is the one developed after the Fatimids established their power in Cairo. Similarly, Canard not only follows Ivanow in describing the Cairo *da'wah* system,¹⁸ but he also does not distinguish between this system and the earlier, simpler one. Although he refers to the Nizar-Musta'lī split, and the subsequent split of the *da'wah* into a *da'wah jadīdah* and a *da'wah qadīmah*, he does not discuss whether the post-Fatimid Syrian Nizari *da'wah* retained the Cairo system of organization or not. Another example of this is Sami Makarem's *al-Shāfiyah*. In the notes to the edition of the text of *al-Shāfiyah* he relies exclusively on al-Kirmānī's descriptions and definitions for presenting not just Ismaili doctrine but the Fatimid *da'wah* terminology and its by then elaborate hierarchy.¹⁹ These efforts have conveyed the impression that the Ismaili *da'wah* was always structured the way it is found to be structured in Cairo, when the Fatimids were at the peak of their political and economic power.

The *da'wah* terminology found in earlier Ismaili works,

¹⁷ For this article, see *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1935, pp. 1-35.

¹⁸ Article "Da'wa", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, New Edition.

¹⁹ *Al-Shāfiyah*, p. 198.

covering al-Nakhshabī, al-Rāzī, and al-Sijistānī, provides material which depicts the earlier and different structure of the *da'wah* before the Fatimids settled down in Cairo to consolidate and expand their power and scope. The *Sullam* continues to reflect this earlier system.

Two characteristics of al-Sijistānī's *da'wah* terminology are especially intriguing. One is that it is different from the set found in al-Kirmānī and in other Cairo-based works. The second is that these terms, used by al-Sijistānī, continue to be used by him even when there is evidence which suggests that he was still alive during the incumbency of al-Hākim as *khalīfah*,²⁰ making him a contemporary of al-Kirmānī.

While this terminology suggests that two distinct and parallel *da'wah* systems existed side by side during the height of Ismaili power in Cairo, it also raises the question of the eventual fate of each of these systems. Madelung²¹ has already pointed out that the Tayyibī Ismaili literature retained the Kirmānian doctrine, but that this doctrine was not adopted by other *da'wah* groups. Two questions need to be raised here.

The first is that Madelung does not refer directly to Cairo: Since al-Kirmānī's doctrine was the official doctrine there while the chief *dā'ī* held the highest position, this implies that outside the territorial limits of the Fatimid political system the *da'wah*

²⁰ This question has been dealt with by Poonawala in his *Biobibliography*, p. 83; by Paul Walker, *Thesis*, p. 26; and by W. Madelung, article "Al-Isma'īliyyah", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, New Edition.

²¹ Article "Al-Isma'īliyyah", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, New Edition.

was organized either along the lines of the system developed for Cairo, or along the pre-Cairo lines, i.e., along the lines of the system reflected in the terminology of al-Sijistānī. A third alternative is that it was organized in an entirely different manner. The areas of immediate interest here would be the eastern lands of Islam, in Khorasan and Fars, which lay outside Fatimid political jurisdiction and therefore could not be integrated into the *da'wah* administrative setup the way some village outside Cairo could. But this analysis does not distinguish between the *da'wah* as an organization and the teaching itself.

This leads to the second question, which arises out of Madelung's observation. He refers explicitly to the *doctrine*, not to the *da'wah* organization, when he says that it (i.e., the doctrine) was adopted only by the Ṭayyibī Ismailis. A cursory examination of the literature of the later Ismailis reveals some interesting details. Those groups which are strongly influenced by al-Kirmānī, and which regard his doctrine as the most authoritative statement of Ismaili *ḥaqā'iq*, reflect in their literature the terminology of the Cairo *da'wah* system. There is no trace of the pre-Cairo system. This is the case with the Yamani school. Here the ten intellects of al-Kirmānī, together with his cosmology and the distinctive formulations of his *Rāḥat al-'Aql*, survive without ever being challenged by subsequent *dā'īs*. Typical Kirmānian formulations which reappear throughout this school's literature are: *al-wujūd al-awwal*, *al-nihāyah al-ūlā yata'allaq bihā wujūd mā siwāhā*, used by

'Alī b. al-Walīd.²² 'Alī b. Hanẓalah (d. 1229), another Musta'li *da'ī*, bases his work, *Kitāb Simṭ al-Ḥaqā'iq*, on al-Kirmānī's conception of *al-kamāl al-awwal* and *al-kamāl al-thānī*.²³

In contrast, the Syrian Ismailis reflect an entirely different picture. They retain not just the doctrine of pre-Cairo Ismailism, but also the terminology of the *da'wah* of that period. This can be seen, for example, in *al-Qasīdah al-Ṣūriyyah* of Muḥammad b. 'Alī b. Ḥasan al-Ṣūrī (d. 1094). The seven-layered cosmology is still prominent, as are such figures as *jadd*, *fath*, and *khayāl*. Another example is the much later *Kitāb al-Ṭiqāḥ* of Abū Firās (d. 1540). Here the older *da'wah* terminology is still alive: *nāṭiq*, *asās*, *mutimm*, *lāḥiq*, and *janāḥ*. The corresponding cosmic figures *jadd*, *fath* and *khayāl* are also present (*Ṭiqāḥ*, p. 100). One of the characteristics of al-Sijistānī's works is that the terms *jadd*, *fath* and *khayāl* are used most frequently with the term *al-aṣḥān* (representing the *sābiq* and the *tālī*). This can be seen in the *Sullam* as well. The *Ṭiqāḥ*, too, displays this characteristic.

A most distinctive style of the Ismaili writers is that of structural correspondence, or homology: to conceptualize the cosmos into divisions each of which reproduces the organizational and functional characteristics of the whole cosmos. The entities in the *da'wah* system are part of the division of religion (*'ālam al-dīn*), and the attributes of each of these entities stand in a relation of correspondence to those of the other divisions. Ideological reasons

²² *Tāj al-'Aqā'id wa Ma'dīn al-Fawā'id*, edited by Aref Tamer, Beirut, 1967, p. 41 and p. 45.

²³ Edited by Abbas al-Azzawi, Damascus, 1953, p. 27.

lay at the back of this conceptual style: to prove to their audience and opponents the truth of their doctrine. Homology offered a powerful tool with which to accomplish this task.

On the one hand, their view of the nature of reality and its structure was supported and confirmed by their interpretation of human history down to and including their own movement and its leaders; for this history was interpreted as headed all along toward them and their specific organization. The human order, as they saw it through their Ismaili doctrine and social organization, was produced by a cosmos which was structured and which functioned according to Ismaili descriptions. The religious history of mankind, culminating in Islam and Ismailism, was proof of the doctrine concerning the cosmos as such.

And on the other hand, the Ismaili religious system was itself vouchsafed and legitimated by the 'striking' parallels and correspondences between its structure and that of the universe and its founding entities. In this unified homologized conception, the doctrine sanctions the claims of the religious group by demonstrating that the divine plans and designs, which create the architecture of the cosmos, are reproduced in this very group. In this way, the existence of the religious group with a structure that reproduces the 'objective' cosmic structure provides a powerful sanction and legitimation for the truth of the doctrine, which is seen by its adherents to possess the singular merit of having truthfully described the cosmos. The doctrine is true because it is a description, not an interpretation, of the cosmos. In so far as it is an interpretation, it is an interpretation of the products of

human history. These products are the symbols of religion, which need to be interpreted correctly.

This homologizing outlook toward reality severely constrained the Ismaili intellectual's ability to adapt to changes in any of the closely integrated areas of his doctrine. Because the meaning of a term in the *da'wah* system was closely connected with, and fundamentally dependent upon, the meaning of a term standing for an entity of the higher world, replacing the former with several terms threatened to disrupt the painstakingly developed semantic world of the doctrine. Al-Sijistānī would have had to face the prospect of reformulating his cosmology to remain congruent with the new *da'wah* system had he adopted it.

A tacit assumption in the foregoing analysis is that besides being a contemporary of al-Ḥākim and al-Kirmānī, al-Sijistānī was a member of the new *da'wah* organization, which would obviously require him to operate along the new lines established with the Fatimid presence in Cairo. If he had been a member of the system based in Cairo, though not himself there, and still adhered to the prior doctrine and *da'wah* terminology, this could well suggest that he was not involved in the activities of the *da'wah*.

Madelung has gone so far as to state that al-Sijistānī "supported the Fatimid doctrine at least from the time of al-Mu'izz", but he does not indicate what evidence supports this view. Al-Sijistānī's relation to the Cairo *da'wah* continues to be an unresolved question. Poonawala has considered several aspects of al-Sijistānī's works in arriving at the conclusion that he was alive as late as the period 996-1002 A.D. Here al-Sijistānī's work, *Kitāb*

al-Iftikhār, is of significance, for Poonawala and Walker point to passages in it which contain dates.²⁴ On the basis of this internal textual data, al-Sijistānī is supposed to have been alive at least as late as the year 971 A.D. Stern is aware of the issue, but remains neutral.²⁵ The works of al-Sijistānī which Poonawala mentions as referring to al-Ḥākim explicitly by name are *al-Mawāzīn* and *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*. Al-Ḥākim is mentioned explicitly in the respective introductions of these two works. If this evidence can be corroborated independently, it raises questions about the relation of al-Sijistānī with the *da'wah* in Cairo. These questions stem from the character of the teaching in even the later works of al-Sijistānī, of which *Kitāb al-Iftikhār* is supposed to be probably his last. Given the doctrine and the *da'wah* terminology in this work, it is difficult to determine in what sense al-Sijistānī can be said to have "supported the Fatimid doctrine", as Madelung has stated. This question cannot be pursued here because it has been merely mooted on the basis of insufficient evidence; it is intended only to suggest lines of inquiry for resolving some apparent paradoxes arising out of al-Sijistānī's works.

One other explanation, which might account for the discrepancy between the *da'wah* terminology of al-Sijistānī and that of the Kirmānian system, may lie in geography rather than in doctrinal disagreements. If al-Sijistānī was located in a geographically distant area not under the control of the *da'wah* organization, it

²⁴ Poonawala, *Biobibliography*, p. 83; Walker, *Thesis*, p. 26.

²⁵ Article "Abū Ya'kūb", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, New Edition.

is reasonable to expect Ismaili *dā'īs* in such areas to continue to operate the *da'wah* system with which they were already so familiar. It may well be, then, that especially in the case of al-Sijistānī (for the others of the older *da'wah* had died by al-Ḥākim's time), two *da'wah* systems existed side by side during al-Ḥākim's time, with one of them (the older one) continuing to act outside the direct control of the newer one, and preserving in those areas the older cosmologies.

One final observation that may be made here is that al-Kirmānī seems to have been rejected by most of the Nizari Ismailis. It is only among the Musta'lī Ismailis that he not only survived but exercised a dominant influence over succeeding generations. Even during the period immediately after al-Kirmānī there is a suggestion of this rejection of his fundamental cosmology by the more Nizari oriented Ismailis within the *da'wah*. An outstanding example here is the Iranian Nāṣir-i Khusrav, whose philosophy is, like that of al-Sijistānī, more Plotinian, and who does not adopt the system of ten intellects which al-Kirmānī introduced into Ismaili doctrine.

Human *'aql* and Divine Revelation

According to al-Sijistānī, *Kitāb Sullam al-Najāt* is intended explicitly to be a *sufficient* text for the *salvation* (*najāt*) of the Ismaili *mu'min*. It is not aimed at silencing the opponents of the Ismaili view with irrefutable arguments and proofs (the aim of *Kitāb al-Iftikhār*). Nor is it aimed at the more curious among the Ismailis who wished to know more about the workings of the cosmos and its two major realms, spiritual and physical (the aim of such works as *Kitāb*

al-Maqālīd al-Malakūtiyya, Kashf al-Mahjūb, Ithbāt al-Nubū'āt and al-Yanābī'.

Instead, al-Sijistānī claims to lay down in this work the doctrine which the *mu'min* should believe in and accept, in order to secure his salvation. This doctrine is centered around the seven topics: Allāh and his unity; the Books; the Angels; the Prophets; the Final Day; the Resurrection; and Heaven and Hell (which is missing in the manuscripts that are available). The *mu'min* should understand these topics in a very definite way; and this definite way is that which he considers essential, even critical, to the *mu'min's* survival in the hereafter.

Kitāb Sullam al-Najāt has a conspicuous emphasis on *doctrine* as the key and guarantor of salvation. Whatever may have been his other views on the subject of salvation, here he leaves no doubt at all that salvation lies in adhering to certain views about some selected topics and accepting them as the only description and interpretation of these topics. The truth of the doctrine will secure salvation. Practice and deeds (*a'māl*) are not dismissed completely as a factor in the theory of salvation, but are at best tacitly assumed to be prerequisites and preconditions; after all, the doctrine is contained (*yataḍamman*) in the codes of religious law. Throughout his career al-Sijistānī had shown considerable interest in ethical behavior, although there was never any doubt that it was knowledge (*'ilm*) to which he paid special attention.

More than any other Ismaili thinker al-Sijistānī was acutely conscious of the ethical implications of the primacy of knowledge over action. The specific form of this problem in Ismailism

involves conceptions that lie at the very core of the Ismaili enterprise and the mandate which it perceives it has in history: the theory of prophecy and the justification of the Ismaili *imāmah*. Nowhere is this problem brought out with greater clarity than in *Kitāb Sullam al-Najāṭ*, in the chapter on the Messengers (*Bāb fī al-Imān bi-al-Rusul wa al-Risālah*).

The problem arises in the following manner. Al-Sijistānī is considering the hypothetical questioner's puzzlement (SN:46ff): Should not the Prophet be considered to have been negligent (*ghaflah*) when he failed to perform the *ta'wīl* of the Book himself, leaving it instead for his *waṣī* (trustee) 'Alī to do? Al-Sijistānī's response to this question is to point out that the Prophet had not been neglectful in any way. On the contrary, just as he (the Prophet) had expanded and explained the commandments (*awāmir*) of God regarding the matters in the *tanzīl* (the Book), and had accorded to each item in this *tanzīl* its due place, such as the *ṣalāt*, which is commanded only in a general way in the Qur'ān but which Muhammad (the *Nāṭiq*) expanded into detail, adding such things as types of *ṣalāt*, times, etc., so the *waṣī* (here 'Alī) was the first to elaborate upon the purpose and intention (*gharaḍ*) of these prescriptions that Muhammad had developed into his *sharī'ah*. 'Alī did for the *sharī'ah* what Muhammad did for God's commandments. Had the Prophet himself revealed the purposes behind the Qur'ānic symbols and practices, he would have weakened (*tawhīn*) the very thing to which God has issued his call to mankind: the search for knowledge and understanding of divine wisdom (*ḥikmah*).

If, for instance (al-Sijistānī is continuing his answer to this

hypothetical questioner) the Prophet had revealed to his followers that the real meaning (the *ta'wīl*) of the *ṣalāt* is that the Muslim should seek knowledge; that the meaning of using water during the *wuḍū'* is to clean one's heart, the people would then have said to him that since they now know the real purpose of these actions that have been prescribed, they are no longer in need (*ḥājjah*) of them; so why should they have to perform them? But the Prophet knew better, and in keeping his followers in the dark about the real meaning and purpose of the Qur'ānic precept he ensured that they would be compelled (*ilzām*) to strive after (divine) wisdom and knowledge. And, al-Sijistānī might have added, by not disclosing the hidden purposes behind (or rather, under (*taḥta*)) the *sharī'ah*, the Prophet was also creating the *raison d'être* of the Ismaili *imāmah*: the only individual who knows what these purposes are.

The *sharī'ah* is thus merely a vessel containing the real thing, and when that real thing has been acquired the vessel becomes an embarrassment. For though it has lost its usefulness by having its contents taken from it, the Ismailis were hard-pressed to justify to their followers its continuing relevance and requirement. By depicting the *sharī'ah* as a knowledge system, al-Sijistānī seems to be implying that in and of itself the *sharī'ah* is meaningless. Its meaning consists solely in serving as a container for divine wisdom, which it is the task of the *mu'min* to discover, and of the *imām* to disclose.

What is of even greater significance here is that the source (*nāṭiq*, *imām*) of this truth (*ḥaqā'iq*) is external to the Ismaili *mu'min*. In practice this source, still external, would most likely

be the local *dā'ī*, qualified and authorized to impart this knowledge. The external character of the source of the true teaching is indeed the impression most Ismaili works tend to convey. But al-Sijistānī has taken different positions on the question in his other works. These views, put forth in such works as *Ithbāt al-Nubū'āt*, *Kashf al-Mahjūb* and *al-Yanābī'*, stress the potential in the human being for activating the *internal* sources of the true knowledge. The crucial thing which the individual needs to do in such a case is to close the gap (*masāfah*) between his *nafs* and its true home (*'ālamuhā*) (*Yanābī'*, p. 77). He needs to discipline his *nafs* and direct it toward this true home and seek, receive and accept the guidance which the '*aql* showers (*ifāḍah*) upon it. This internal process parallels the process going on all the time in the larger, higher world, by which the first intellect showers its guidance upon the universal soul. In the *Ithbāt* (IN:49ff) al-Sijistānī lays out the groundwork for this parallelism.

This parallelism is centered on the conception of the human '*aql* as the internal messenger (*rasūl*) from God. The conception is subsumed under the conception of *risālah* which is of two types: *rasūl jismānī* and *rasūl rūḥānī*. The prophets are *rusul jismāniyyah*, and, corresponding to them within each human being, is the '*aql*, which is the *rasūl rūḥānī* for that individual.

According to al-Sijistānī, the human '*aql* is the very first *rasūl* sent by God to the human creatures. The external, *jismānī* messengers have come to humanity so as to command the praiseworthy (*maḥmūd*) and to forbid the blameworthy (*madhmūm*). Similarly, the '*aql* within the human being commands the good and the beautiful,

and forbids him from doing the reprehensible and the evil.

It is at this juncture in his account that al-Sijistānī makes the following significant statement:

wa anna al-rasūl innamā yu'addī ilaynā mā ta'rifuhu
'uqūlunā fa-naqbal dhālika minhu min ajl ma'rifat
'uqūlinā (IN:49).

The external, *jismānī* messenger thus merely conveys to the human individual what his 'aql already knows; and the human being accepts what the messenger conveys precisely because the human 'aql already knows it and is, so to speak, corroborating the soundness of the *jismānī* messenger's message.

Al-Sijistānī assigns to the human 'aql a clearly stated priority over the message coming in from the external messengers. Appealing to the conceptions of potentiality and actuality, he states that the 'aql which is within the human being is in actuality, whereas that which is conveyed by the prophets is in potentiality:

li-anna al-'aql fīnā bi-al-fi'l wa fī mā addawhu ilaynā
bi-al-quwwah wa alladhī huwa bi-al-fi'l aqdam min
alladhī huwa bi-al-quwwah (IN:49).

The message which the messenger conveys is, in this conception, a potential 'aql. The human 'aql, being an actual 'aql, is the first messenger sent by God to humanity, for it already conveys to the human being what subsequent *jismānī* messengers convey to him.

In developing this conception of the human 'aql as the *rasūl* al-Sijistānī has used one of his most characteristic and basic conceptions, that revelation is a form of knowledge, not a mere

repertoire of ritual and posturing and blind acts of obedience. The human 'aql, being part of the First Intellect (*al-'aql al-awwal*), occupies within the human being the position which the latter occupies within the cosmos as a whole: it is a guide to the soul, constantly sending forth to it divine wisdom (*al-ḥikmah al-ilāhiyyah*), especially guidance with respect to the correct conception to have of God (the subject matter of *tawḥīd*). Since the *jismānī* messengers are also under the ultimate guidance of the First Intellect, al-Sijistānī, not unexpectedly, finds himself developing his conception of prophecy and revelation along the twin tracks of individual, internal revelation, and of cosmic, scriptural revelation. Thus far, at least, the human 'aql is accorded a greater weight, since the external scripture must be corroborated by the internal messenger. The thrust of the conception is therefore toward agreement and harmony (*ittifāq*).

In order to build his case for the essential validity of scriptural revelation, al-Sijistānī argues that the necessity (*luzūm*) of the commandments stems from the 'aql itself, for the lunatics (*majānīn*), who have no intelligence (*lā 'uqūl lahum*), are not subject to this requirement. He presents the commandments as the influences (*athar*) of the *rasūl*, who is the ruler (*sā'is*) and director (*mudabbir*) of the human being. The adult human being, however, is subject to the influence of the 'aql, so it is necessary for him to accept the influence of the *jismānī* messenger. In using the expression *risālat al-rasūlayn* al-Sijistānī is suggesting that one single message is being conveyed to the human being along two parallel channels. These channels, being in fundamental consonance

with each other, cannot contradict each other. The part corresponding to the scriptural messenger is the *sharī'ah jismāniyyah*, the Law which is corporeal in nature. Al-Sijistānī describes the Law as consisting of meaningful sounds which only the 'aql can discriminate.

To show in greater detail the fundamental agreement (*ittifāq*) or similarity (*mushākalah*) between the two types of revelation, al-Sijistānī says (IN:50) that the very first *da'wah* (call) which the Prophet made to humanity is the profession of belief in one God (*shahādah bi-ithbāt al-ṣāni'*). And this, he adds, is just what we see our intellect doing: it, too, testifies to the existence of a *ṣāni'* who created us, for the 'aql knows that it is not itself the *ṣāni'* (*idh ya'lam annahu laysa bi-ṣāni' nafsuhu*), and therefore

al-'aql awwal rasūl ilayhi fī ithbāt al-ṣāni' wa
al-rasūl al-jismānī ākhīr rasūl ilayhi (IN:50).

The foregoing account gives al-Sijistānī's view of the essential harmony between scripture and human intellect. But why should there be messengers in the first place? The answer is provided in the next *faṣl* of the *Ithbāt*. The main argument which al-Sijistānī puts forward here is that in spite of the innate intellect ('aql *gharīzī*), the thoughts of the majority of the human beings can have a sound basis only through a link with sensible things (*min ajl iqtirāniḥ bi-al-maḥsūsāt*) (IN:54). There is need, therefore, of somebody who would establish for people, via the channel of sense, what is already established in the 'aql *gharīzī*:

fa-athbata al-nās bi-mā huwa thābit fī gharā'izihim.

Al-Sijistānī can be seen addressing this problem of human intellect and divine revelation in the *Maqālīd* also. *Iqlīd* 63 is specially devoted to an issue which is also discussed in the *Sullam*: why it is necessary to keep observing the law even though its 'contents' have been disclosed and acquired.

He presents several arguments, each attempting to uphold the view that the *sharī'ah* must be observed ('*amal*'), even if the *ḥaqā'iqah* behind it is known. The first argument merely reiterates the view that omitting to act upon the law eventually leads to the omission and loss of knowledge itself.

In the second argument al-Sijistānī is stating categorically that it is not possible to know the *ḥaqā'iq* without observing the law, since if such were the case the lawgiver (*wāḍi'uhā*) would have laid down something with no value in it. Such a lawgiver would be a stupid (*safīhan*) lawgiver.

The third argument makes use of the conception that the *ḥaqā'iq* which are 'deposited' (*mustawda'ah*) in the actions prescribed by the Law are so innumerable that it is impossible for any human being, besides the lawgiver himself, to cover them all. As long as the *ḥaqā'iq* remain hidden from the individual he is obliged to act according to its prescriptions. On the other hand, even if the *ḥaqā'iq* are disclosed, this does not justify abandoning the law, for beyond this *ḥaqā'iq* there are more *ḥaqā'iq*, which it is even more necessary to acquire:

idh wara'a mā kushifa lahu min al-ḥaqā'iq ḥaqā'iq huwa
aḥwaj ilā al-wuqūf 'alayhā.

He also asserts that attaining to the *ḥaqā'iq* makes it even more necessary to reinforce (*awkad*) one's distance (*mubā'adah*) from the prohibited things and at the same time to reinforce one's perseverance with respect to the commands (*mulāzamatihī li-al-awāmir*).

A different line of argument utilizes the conception that the forces of *ṭabī'ah* and the forces of the spiritual world dominate each other on and off. In the case of the human being, when the *ṭabī'ī* forces overcome the spiritual forces the light of the *nafs* is diminished (*qalla diyā' al-nafs*), *ṭabī'ah* gains strength, and a veil appears between *insān* and *ma'ārif*. It is at this point that *insān* has need for a law which has the *ḥaqā'iq* under it. Conversely, when the spiritual forces predominate, the veil between *insān* and *ma'ārif* is lifted and one is then no longer in need of the law. Al-Sijistānī is quick to point out, however, that this state of affairs will only occur during the incumbency of the *ṣāḥib al-ākhirah*, at which time the *ṭabī'ī* forces will vanish (*idmaḥallat*).

The issue of the sufficiency of the human '*aql*' versus the necessity of revelation, to which al-Sijistānī shows considerable sensitivity, may now be placed and assessed within the perspective of two questions which are an integral part of the problematics of the development of Islamic philosophy. The first is the issue of 'reason and revelation', the efforts of various Islamic thinkers to formulate an acceptable resolution to the incompatibilities they perceived to exist between the doctrine of the Qur'ān and the doctrine represented by classical (Greek) philosophy. The second is an issue which is specific to Ismailism: the assessment and

determination of the impact of Neoplatonism on Ismaili thought; in particular, whether, in adopting and adapting Plotinian thought, the Ismailis created new problems for their theology, especially for the theoretical justification of having revelation at all. This last point is, after all, that which was raised by Zakarīyā' al-Rāzī.

Apart from the Ismailis, two other responses to the challenge to reconcile revelation with human intelligence are those of al-Fārābī and Zakarīyā' al-Rāzī.

Al-Fārābī represents the lawgiver-philosopher conception of prophecy and revelation, in which the lawgiver (*wāḍi' al-sharī'ah*) formulates a system of knowledge (the *sharī'ah*) using sensible images to represent for the multitude the truths which are discovered via philosophy and to which the lawgiver, himself the ultimate philosopher, has access. In this conception the symbolization of philosophic truths is necessary because philosophic truths are not within the reach of the masses. The basis for the harmony between the truths represented by the law and the truths of philosophy is the lawgiver himself, who is philosopher and prophet in one person. The yardstick which measures and validates the content of the *sharī'ah* is philosophy and, ultimately, the intellect of the philosopher. In the case of the lawgiver, it is the intellect of the prophet which vouches for, and guarantees, not just the philosophic truths represented by the symbolic system, but also the soundness of the sensible images (the expressive medium) to effectively accomplish the representation. While the content of the *sharī'ah* conforms to the lawgiver's mind (the locus of philosophic truth), the sensible images have to be in accord with the

susceptibilities of the masses to sense-perception. In a loose manner, therefore, one could speak of the 'exterior' of the law (the system of sensible images) which is oriented toward the masses and their intellects, and the 'interior' of the law, which is oriented toward the prophet's intellect and toward philosophic truths.

As for Zakarīyā' al-Rāzī, the issue of the human 'aql versus divine guidance comes under an entirely different treatment. Unlike both al-Fārābī and al-Sijistānī, al-Rāzī dismisses prophecy and religion altogether as destructive phenomena wreaking havoc among human beings. The human intellect is quite capable, if the individual makes the effort, of acquiring knowledge without any help from revelation (*Rasā'il*, p. 296). Al-Rāzī does not say that the human intellect *already* knows truths, only that it is capable of discovering them by itself. It is self-sufficient and equal to any other human 'aql in principle. This fundamental equality of human intellects makes revelation irrelevant and unnecessary.

Al-Sijistānī's 'aql *gharīzī* is also conceived as being fundamentally equal in all men. Here, however, this 'aql is described as already knowing the truths. But these truths are covered over by the 'distorting' effects of the association (*ta'alluq*) with bodily things. In the *Yanābī'*, al-Sijistānī has described the manner in which the individual has access to guidance from within. The essential precondition is for the soul to turn away (forget) the world of nature and body, whereupon the spiritual distance (*masāfah rūḥāniyyah*) which exists between it and its real abode is removed, and it gains access to the benefits coming from the 'aql. In the *Ithbāt*, al-Sijistānī speaks only of 'aql *gharīzī*,

suggesting that he distinguishes it from the individual *nafs*, whose thoughts (*mawhūmāt*) are affected by the senses. The '*aql gharīzī*' is represented as the particularized First Intellect. The workings of this internal guidance are spelled out explicitly in the *Kashf al-Mahjūb* (KM:23). The '*aql* commands (*farmāyadh*) to the individual soul (*nafs-i nuṭqirā*) good actions and knowledge. It points out for it the things that are beneficial so that it (the *nafs*) might search for them (*tā manfa'atrā ṭalab kunadh*). Al-Sijistānī concludes by pointing out the fundamental cosmological basis of such internal guidance: the '*aql* is one with the *amr*, and it is this fundamental oneness of the '*aql* with the *amr* which makes the *farmān* of the '*aql* equivalent to the *farmān* of God:

va agar nah '*aql* yakī būdhī ba-amr-i īzadh ki 'ibārat az
amr ba-nafs-i amr kunand farmān-i '*aql* mānand-i farmān-i
īzadh nabūdhī.

There is no counterpart of this internal guidance in all men (not just the select leaders) in either al-Fārābī or al-Rāzī. The latter's doctrine differs from that of al-Sijistānī in that it does not conceive of the human *nafs* as being guided internally by an '*aql* in the background, which is al-Sijistānī's conception. Rather, al-Rāzī speaks of *utilizing* the '*aql* as a tool of discovery. Al-Sijistānī's '*aql* does not discover; it already knows. Al-Rāzī's '*aql* does not need any guide, internal or external; it is its own guide. In al-Sijistānī, the individual '*aql* is guided by the cosmic Intellect, of which it is a part; the individual '*aql* is always in touch with the universal Intellect, its ultimate source. In al-Rāzī there, of course, the idea of guidance, but this idea applies to the

cosmic Soul, which God guides away Matter, to which the Soul is attracted. Al-Rāzī does not explicitly describe the human soul as being guided by the cosmic Soul. Ultimately, however, God guides all souls.

The Plotinian basis of al-Sijistānī's thought can be seen here, in his formulation of the conception of prophecy. The human soul, being a part of the universal soul, retains, in al-Sijistānī's scheme, its orientation toward the inward, where its true home lies. For Plotinus salvation lay in turning inward, away from the world of matter and sense, and toward Intellect and Soul. Truth is to be found by turning away from the world of matter. Al-Sijistānī has not just reproduced the Plotinian cosmology; he has attempted to develop a theory of revelation in which the cosmology is the basis not only of revelation but also of the mechanism of internal revelation in the case of each individual human being. Al-Rāzī's 'aql, in contrast, is not a part of a universal intellect but an 'atomistic' 'aql which is but an aspect of the human soul.

Opposed to the idea of internal guidance is the idea of external guidance. In the case of al-Rāzī this external guidance is lacking, because it is irrelevant to the efforts of the human 'aql. Both al-Fārābī and al-Sijistānī adapt Neoplatonism in different ways to formulate their respective conceptions of revelation.

The external guide in al-Fārābī is the *sharī'ah*, whose source is the lawgiver. Although his views on law are generally considered to fall within the discipline of political philosophy, and to have a Platonic character, in one respect al-Fārābī is different from Plato: he considers the product of revelation (the law) to be a

knowledge system, not merely a system of actions and codes, for the sensible images out of which the law is formulated expresses philosophic truths. This conception is integrated with Neoplatonic emanationism to provide a mechanism through which philosophic truths are conveyed from the cosmic sources to the intellect of the Lawgiver-Philosopher-Prophet.

Al-Sijistānī's conception of the law resembles al-Fārābī's conception in two important respects: 1) the *sharī'ah* is a knowledge system, containing truths about ultimate things; and 2) its source is the Prophet-Lawgiver who receives from cosmic principles assistance. The prophet then expresses them in the *sharī'ah*. As al-Sijistānī has pointed out in the *Sullam*, the *sharī'ah* is aimed at the human intellect: the intention is to stimulate the desire for knowledge prompted by the surface contradictions of the *sharī'ah*. The *zāhir* is a veil behind which the *ḥaqā'iq* sit. To recover these *ḥaqā'iq*, it becomes necessary to perform *ta'wīl* (interpretation) which 'decodes' the *sharī'ah*, thereby revealing the truths. In al-Fārābī, the images and similitudes are not 'decoded' to disclose abstract philosophic truths. Such a procedure is unnecessary because images and similitudes are the sensible equivalents of abstract truths, and since the masses cannot deal directly with abstract truths, they must remain content with sensible equivalents.

An important consequence of this distinction is that the Sijistānian conception thereby calls for the existence of a group of authoritative interpreters and the existence of a science of interpretation (*ta'wīl*) which takes away the outer covering and delivers the enclosed thing. This must presuppose that the

individual is capable, after some assistance, of receiving and holding the disclosed truth. In al-Fārābī, after the lawgiver has established his law, the subsequent generation of philosophers can point out to the masses that their imagistic law is actually based on philosophic truths, an essential character of which is that they are pure intelligibles and, therefore, abstract.²⁶ A science of *ta'wīl* is therefore absent, for the masses are conceived to be inherently incapable of receiving the truth in its pure form.

This *ẓāhir/bāṭin* conception of the law, which entails the existence of a distinct class of humans (the prophets and *imāms*), and retains the Plotinian microcosmos as a parallel source of knowledge, poses problems for al-Sijistānī which his other Islamic counterparts do not have to face: how to conceptualize the essential necessity of adhering to the law in the face of its obvious obsolescence after the truth has been disclosed.

When, therefore, the questioners confront al-Sijistānī with the perceived illogic of having to continue the observance of the law when it has, in their view, served its purpose and, as a result, outlived its usefulness, al-Sijistānī is facing a dilemma which goes to the very heart of his conception of revelation and the associated doctrine of *imāmah*: how to maintain the principle of the unavoidability of the revelation, in the form of a *ḥaqā'iq*-conveying system, when the *imāms*, whose own justification rests upon the validity of the *sharī'ah*, successfully disclose these

²⁶ For further discussion of this issue of the relations of philosophy and philosophers to a post-revelation *sharī'ah*, see Muhsin Mahdi, 'Alfarabi on Religion and Philosophy', *Philosophical Forum*, 1972, p. 17.

ḥaqā'iq to their followers and, in the process, render the *sharī'ah* and *themselves* unnecessary.

To get around this difficulty al-Sijistānī formulates the view that it is in principle impossible for one individual to know all the truths in his lifetime. The *imāms* will not reveal everything, and so it shall be until the final day. Al-Sijistānī is compelled to abandon the very rationale for his *imām* (the revealer of truth to those who follow him) in order to justify the conception of a series of *imāms* and guides. Thus the *imām*, portrayed as the only avenue to salvation for the *mu'min*, cannot disclose everything, leaving the incomplete work to his successors. Only the *Qā'im* will reveal everything and become, himself, free of the *sharī'ah* as the legitimation for his own existence. The individuals who will be present during the *Qā'im*'s period appear, on this score, to be the only ones privileged to receive the full disclosure.

The doctrine of the *Qā'im* which al-Sijistānī formulates is thus integrally linked to the *sharī'ah* considered as a knowledge system. The *imāms*, by doing partial *ta'wīl*, sustain their own validity and, in the partial disclosures which they perform for their followers, are contributing to the progressively increasing revelation up to the appearance of the *Qā'im*.

The question of salvation has, given this prospect, two aspects: 1) salvation for the pre-*Qā'im* individual, and 2) salvation for the individual during the *Qā'im*'s time. In the second condition it is the full truth which, besides rendering the law unnecessary, will render doctrine itself unnecessary, since it will no longer be necessary to perform interpretations of symbols

which conceal the truths. It will also no longer be necessary to accept the interpretations of the *dā'īs*, the intermediaries complementing the *imām's* work, as an act of faith. These interpretations, which the *dā'ī* works out and formulates, constitute the teaching in lieu of the full disclosure which is not possible. It becomes an essential part of this teaching to explain this impossibility and -- a consequence of this impossibility -- the necessity of accepting as the guarantor of salvation a body of ideas worked out by the *dā'ī* under the authority of the *imām*.

A work such as *Sullam al-Najāt*, requiring for the *mu'min's* salvation no more than the adoption of such a doctrine, can exist precisely because it is a *de facto* substitute for the full truth from the *imām*.

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PART THREE

CHAPTER FOUR

KITĀB SULLAM AL-NAJĀT:
THE ARABIC TEXT

SYMBOLS USED

ب	Bombay MS.
ك	Karachi MS.
< >	Text not in the manuscripts, but supplied by the editor
<...>	Probable missing text.
^۲ < >	Text in bracket modifies text in either one or both manuscripts. Superscript number refers to footnote.
/ [۲۸]	Slash with square brackets containing a number indicates a new page in the base MS, .
(۲)	Paragraph number in the edited text.
(۱۲/۸۱)	Qur'ānic reference: (ṣūrah/verse).
+	Text added in the MS cited.
-	Text does not occur in the MS cited.
[^] []	A long text found in one MS but not in the other. Bracketed for easy identification; superscript number refers to footnote number.
/	Slash in the footnote section indicates that an alternative entry occurs in the MS.
(A)	Text rejected and replaced by editor.

عن اعادة^١ الركوع لتكون^٢ الوحدة في
 الركوع^٣ سمة علمتهما وانعطاف اليدين
 على الركبتين وهو على اضافة العلم
 والتأييد على الاساسين.

١ عادة ك

٢ - [لتكون الوحدة في الركوع] ك

نصفه < الاعلى > للخصوع وانضم^١ كفا يديه

وهو قابض بهما على ركبتيه^٣ وهما

اول مبتدأ^٤ الرجلين ليتم ركوعه بما ذكرنا.

فاذا اراد ان يسجد انحنأ النصف الاسفل /

مع النصف الاعلى ليتم سجوده. ويكون [١٠٦]

للصلي في السجود العود^٥ الى سجدة اخرى

ولا^٦ يكون له من الركوع عودا الى ركوع

آخر^٧ لان انحناء^٨ النصف الاعلى تلقى^٩ خضوع

الاصلين للمبدع ومعرفتھا بان علمتها هي

امر الله الواحد المتعالي عن^{١٠} الاثنينية^{١١} بحجر^{١٢}

١	انظلم	ك	٧	آخر	ك
٣	ركبته	ب	٨	انحنأ	ك
٤	مبتدأ	ك/ مبتدأ	٩	يلقى	ك
٥	- العود	ك	١٠	على	ب
٦	- لا	ك	١١	الاسفل	ك
			١٢	بحجر	ك

- معلقان به وهما اليدين والنصف الاسفل
- عضوان قوام الاسفل بهما وهما الرجلان.
- وان الانسان مختصر قد اختصره الخالق من
- العالمين النصف الاعلى منه من العالم الاعلى
- اللطيف والنصف الاسفل منه من العالم الادنى
- الكثيف. والعضوان المعلقان بالنصف الاعلى
- هما على الاصلين المعلقين بالكلمة ، والعضوان
- الذان قوام الاسفل بهما على الاساسين اللذين
- بهما وبسياستهما قوام العالم السفلي. وان
- المصلي اذا انتصب قائماً واراد الركوع انحنأ

(٤) فوضع المصطفى صلى الله عليه وآله

في الوضوء والتيمم فرقا^٢ ما بين المؤيدين
وأرباب التعليم. فهذا وجه تأويله وان كان^٣

التأويل الآخر الذي قيل ان المسيح على
الدقرار والغسل على الطاعة تأويلا^٤ صحيحا^٥،
فليس في هذا التأويل مخالفة.

(٥) والعبد اذا توجه في صلواته قام

مندصبا بقامته. والانسان نصفين نصف منه

اعلى / ونصف منه اسفل. فالنصف الاعلى عضوان [١.٥]

١ صلح ك

٢ فرق ك، ب

٣ انكان ب

٤ تناول صحيح ب، ك

لا يبالغوا^١ التاويل ولا يستقصوا^٢
 في المسألة بل تسليما وانقيادا وقبولا ،
 لان^٣ المسيح لا يكون فيه من المبالغة. و ذلك
 من البشرة^٤ ما يكون في الغسل ومنه ما
 لا يكون عند التيمم ، لان المستجب اذا التمس^٥
 من صاحب التعليم^٥ الجواب^٦ عن المسائل
 الغامضة^٧ التي هي من العالم الروحاني واستقصى
 عليه في السؤال ولم يجد عنده جوابا
 شافيا ولا حجة قاطعة اورثه^٨ ذلك استخفافا^٩
 بمذهبه وسؤ ظن بعقيدته.

١ -	التاويل	ب	٥	التاويل	ب
٢	يسعوا	ك	٦	عن الجواب	ك
٣	ان	ك		عن الواجب	ب
٤	البشر	ك/	٧	الغامض	ك
	البشرة	ك	٨	اورثة	ب
			٩	استخفافا	ك

التأييد جواباً لمسائله^١ فيكون طهارة قبله
 من^٢ الشكوك^٣ والحيرة وخطر على
 المستعيجين ان يستقبلوا ارباب^٤ التعليم ولا
 يلتبسوا منهم ما التمسوه من ارباب التأييد.
 وارجب عليهم ان يقتصر^٥ ارباب التعليم
 على شيئين^٦ فقط ، على التماس بيان
 الشريعة والتفصيل^٧ اللذين هما من حيز الناطق
 الموضوع من تلقاء الوجه ، و^٨ على
 استخراج غوامض التأويل الذي هو من حيز
 الاساس الموضوع من تلقاء اليدين ، وان

٥ يقتصروا ب، ك

٦ شيئين ب

٧ الذين لك

٨ - و ك

١ بالمسائل ك

٢ - من ك

٣ بالشكوك ك

٤ + التأييد ب

فجعل الى المؤيدين^١ ان يكشفوا عن كل
 غامض : ويستنبطوا عن كل مستغلق . وخص
 للمستجيبين اذا حضر واحد منهم عند صاحب
 التأييد ان يسأله عما يبدو^٢ له من المسائل
 سوى الشرائع^٣ والحقائق^٤ ، وعن الاصلين وما
 يلحق بهما من معرفة / التوحيد ومعرفة [١٣]
 العلة والمعلول وعن كيفية خلقه العالم
 ولماذا خلق^٥ ، وعما يحصل من تعاقب الاشخاص
 الى سائر ما يشبهها ، لا علم صلى^٦
 ١. الله عليه^٦ ان المستجيب يجد عند صاحب

١	المؤيد	ك	٤	لا اذا	ك
٢	يبدو	ك	٥	عما	ج
٣	الشرائع	ك	٦	ص	ك

تكن معروفة^١ بالمعرفة والحقائق . فاعرفه .

(٧٦) وجعل التيمم على مسح الوجه

واليدين دون الرأس والرجلين وغسل الفم

والأنف ومسح الاذنين ، ولم يقتصر من الماء

هـ الا على <...> اسار الماء على الوجه واليدين والرأس

. والرجلين ومسح الاذنين وغسل الفرجين والفم

بالمضمضة^٢ والأنف بالاستنشاق . وقد قيل ان

الماء على علم المؤيدين^٣ والتراب على علم ارباب

التعليم المحبوبين عن التأييد . فبين المصطفى عليه

١٠ السلام^٤ فضيلة ارباب التأييد على ارباب التعليم

١ معروفة (هـ) ك

معروفة (هـ) ب

٢ المضمضة ك

٣ المؤيدين ب

٤ ٢٤ ك

< الباب السابع >

< في الطهارة و الصلوة >^١

(٤٥) ... للبشر لم تكن الحكمة وسياستها

مقبولة ولا يجب^٢ ان يثاب^٣ العبد. فاذا

٥ ازيل الثواب عن الحيوان زال معه البالغ في الدين

المجتهد في الطلب، كدرجتهم في طاعتهم لمن فوقهم

بالدرجة - وهم البشر - ولم يعد ذلك منهم طاعة^٤

اذ ليس في وسعهم ان يقفوا على حقائقها. كذلك

طاعة البشر لمن فوقهم بالدرجة - وهم الرسل -

١. نوايسم^٥ لا يعد ذلك منهم طاعة اذا لم

١ من ههنا مقطوع لعله من باب الطهارة و الصلوة ب

٢ يجب ك

٣ يثاب ك

٤ طاعته ك

٥ نوايسم ك

[١٩] تلك الصور / الا بمضي وقتها وزمانها. فلو

كلفت القدرة المبعولة في الطبائع^١ لانشاء

المواليد ان تنشئ مولودا^٢ بغتة بلا زمان.

لم يكن لها سلوك الى اظهارها. وهكذا

٥ قدرة الصانع للاختراع المصنوعات لها نمط

وترتيب وآلات^٣ مهيأة لها لم تخالف عمله

ولا عمله خالف امره. ولا يقع^٤ بين

ما علم من كيفية ابداع المبدعات وبين ما

امر بها فصل^٥ وبينونة، كما يقع بين اوامر

١ من دون المبدع وبين علومهم فصول ومدة

تكون اوامرهم متاخرة عن علومهم التي من اجلها

امروا بما امروا...

٣ آلات هـ

٤ وقع ب، ك

٥ - فصل لـ

١ الطبائع ب

٢ تنشأ ب، ك

وترتيبها لتتضي بها الافعال المقدرة منها
ولو زالت عن نمطها وترتيبها باعدته
الافعال^١ وخانتها^١ الاعمال فبطلت ولم تعط
فائدة.

هـ (٦٤) والمثال في ذلك من الطبائع ان
القدرة فيها للاظهار الموالي^٢ ان يستحيل^٢ بعضها
الى بعض ويدوم حركة الدوائر عليها
فينفعل من حركتها ومن استحالة بعضها الى
بعض حدوث كون الموالي^٣ [وتكلمة صورها
مقدرة تحت اوقات وازمنة^٣] لا يمكن تكلمة

١ - الافعال و خانتها لك

٢ - يستحيل لك

٣ - [و تكلمة صورها مقدرة
تحت اوقات و ازمنة] لك

القبور، ونص الكتاب " وان الله يبعث
من في القبور. "

(٦٢) وانما وقع الغلط لاهل التقليد في
هذه المعرفة وفي سائر المعارف لانهم حسبوا
بجملهم ^{هـ} وسؤ تمييزهم ان سمة القدرة التامة
ان لا يكون لها نمط ولا ترتيب، وانما
تسلك المحال المحتنع سلوكها في الواجب الممكن
فوقعوا من اجل هذا الظن الفاسد في اودية
الضلالة. ولو انهم اعتبروا بالقدرة الناقصة
الموهوبة للخلق لامضاء افعالهم كيف لزوم نمطها ^{ا.}

١ - لا ك

موجودة من بين شيخ هرم^١ لا^٢ تحمله
 رجلاه ايام حيوته ومن عجز^٣ همة^٤ منحنية^٥
 الظهر من كبرها مرتعشة الرجلين ومن طفل
 صغير محتاج الى من يحمله على عاتقه فان
 بقيت على الاحوال التي دفنت عليه^٦ ثم كلفت
 الحشر الى الواحد الجبار فما اخفه على الابلطال
 والشياطين الذين عصوا الرحمن^٧ واتبعوا الشيطان
 واثقله على العجائز والاطفال وان
 بعث^٨ الاشخاص على هيئة واحدة وصورة
 متفقة^٩ كان من ذلك بعث من^{١٠} لم يدفن في

٧ الرحمان ب

٨ بعث ب

٩ متفقة ك

١٠ ما ك

١ هـ (عدم) ك

٢ لم ك

٣ عجز ب

٤ همة ك

٥ منحنية ك

٦ عليه (هـ) ب، ك

لا يلحقهم بالنفخ ولم يجعل ارادته وسعة
 قدرته علة لخلقهم، كَأَنَّ السَّعَةَ انما تحدث في
 قدرة الخالق في القوم الذين خلقهم ثم احاطهم
 اذ كانت في هذه البدعة ضرب من الحكمة.
 هـ [٢٨] فان كان / فيها ضرب من الحكمة فليعرفنا به
 اهل التقليد لينزل الشك عن افئسنا. وان لم
 يمكنهم ذلك - ولا سبيل لهم الى الظفر بها -
 فان في بحثه الاشخاص بالنفخ على ما دفنت
 في القبور ضربا من السنة المضاد للحكمة.
 وذلك ان التفاوت في الاشخاص المدفونة

المعرفة عن العلة الموجبة لقبول هذا
 المحال النافر عنه الحقل لم يكن عندهم
 من العلة الا ارادة الخالق وسعة القدرة
 له تعالى الله عن كل قببح يتقولونه علوا
 كبيرا ولو ان اهل التقليد تفكروا في
 الامم السالفة والقرون الماضية الذين ذهب
 آثارهم واضمحلت اخبارهم لم يكن بينهم
 وبين القوم الذين لم يخلقهم الله بعد
 فرق في باب دروس الاثر واضمحلال الخبر،
 فما بال القوم الذين لم يخلقهم الله بعد

والعروق فتلتئم^١ بعضها الى بعض .

ثم ينفتح في القرن نفخة اخرى فاذا هم

قيام ينظرون مع الكفان^٣ التي دفنت

فيها^٤ الاشخاص . ولعمري ان الانفس

مكرهة على قبول هذا اذ لو تركت النفس^٥

واختيارها بما يقضي لها امامها وزمامها

لم تسكن الى هذا ولم تطعن^٦ اليه .

وان جبرت على ذلك واكرهت على

قبوله ساحت مكرهة واقرت مجبرة ،

اذ لو سئل اهل التقليد في هذه

١ + ٦ + ٦ ك

١ فتلتئم ب

٣ الاكفارة ك

٤ فيه ب

٥ الانفس ك

< الباب ' السادس >

< في الإيمان بالبعث >

(٦٢) وان جاز ان يكون الجعل بالشيء
او توهم الحال فيه ايماناً ، وان كان الإيمان
هو العلم والمعرفة بالشيء ، فليس عند أكثر
الخلق من الإيمان بالبعث شيء اذ كلهم مطبقون
على ان طريق البعث ان يأمر الله ملأ يقول
له اسرافيل فينفخ في قرن نفخة فتجتمع بتلك
النفخة الاجزاء المتبددة^٢ من^٣ العظام والاعضاء

١ باب القول في البعث (هـ) ب

٢ المتبددة ك

٣ من (الاعضاء) العظام ك

من العلم الا برز فهو يوم التلاق
 (٤٠/١٦) الذي هم^١ فيه » بارزون^٢ فلا يخفى » عليه » منهم
 (٤٠/١٦) شيء^٣ من شرائعهم لان » الملك يومئذ لله
 الواحد القهار.

١	الذينهم	ك
٢	بارزون	ك
٣	+ و	ك

ووضعا المائتين بازاء الالتواء لان على
 المتم تجري مائة^١ دعوة النجدين . ووضعا
 الالوف على الاسس الذين من قبلهم يجري^٢
 تاليف العلم مع العمل . فبلغ عشرات^٣
 الالوف الى النطقاء^٤ عليهم السلام - اعني
 العشر الالف . فقال <الناطق> عليه السلام^٥
 منها^٦ عن مرتبة صاحب اليوم الآخر بان
 مقداره من قبل فوائد^٧ الاصلين ان يخرج
 الشرائع^٨ والكتب المنزلة على النطقاء الخمسة
 من حد القوة الى حد^٩ الفعل^{١٠} . فلا يبقى فيه

٧ فوائد ك

٨ الشرائع ك

٩ - حد ك

١٠ + به ب

١ مائة ب

٢ تجري ك

٣ العشرات ب

٤ الناطق عليه السلام ك

٥ ع ج ب

٦ منها ك

ووضع كل عقد بازاء ارباب^١ التأييد^٢

وصعد علوا ، بلغ العشرات الالف منها

للنطقاء^٣ . وذلك^٤ ان التأييد لا يتعدي

الإيادي^٥ و^٦ من بعد الإيادي اللواحق^٧ ومن

٥ بعد اللواحق الاتماء^٨ ومن بعد الاتماء

الاسس^٩ ومن بعد الاسس النطقاء^{١٠} . فوضعنا

الآحاد^{١١} للإيادي اذ كل لاحق قد انفرد

بتربية يد واحد لا يجوز له ان يثنيه .

[٥٤] والعشرات اللواحق الذين هم لكل واحد /

١. منهم اثنا^{١٢} عشر^{١٣} فهو من^{١٤} جملة العشرات .

٤ اثنى ك

٧ في ب

١ اصحاب ك

٢ النطقاء ك

٣ كذلك ك

٤ - ٥ ك

٥ الإحاد (٥) ب، ك

و درجته مقدار ما في الشرائع^١ الخمسة

التي ظهرت في العالم^٢ من ادبي العزم

[٥٥] الخمسة من العلم والحكمة، / فانه الحد

المقدر لكشفها ورفع الستر عن حقائقها.

٥ (٦١) فخمسين الف سنة^٣ خمسة عقود من

العشرات الالف^٤ كل عشرة الف بازاء كل

صاحب شريعة. وانما قلنا بالعشرات

الالف الخمسة^٥ انما هي^٦ موازية للنظاء

الخمس، لان العقود اذا نظمت على التوالي

١٠ مثل الآحاد والعشرات والمائين والالف^٧،

٥ + ٥ ك

٦ هو ك

٧ الف ك

١ الشرايع ك

٢ القائم ك

٣ - سنة ك

٤ - الالف ك

خصه^١ الله < سبحانه > بالعفو عنه ، وهو

آدم عليه السلام حيث قال فيه : » ولم (٢٠/١١٥)

نجد له عنهما^٢ . ومعنى تأكيد^٣ كل رسول

على امته بان يؤمنوا باليوم الآخر انما هو^٤

على تحريضه^٥ اياهم على طلب العلم والحقيقة^٦ ،

[اذ ذلك الحد انما هو حد العلم]^٧ والحقيقة .

فاما المعنى في تقدير الله سبحانه^٨ ذلك اليوم

بمخسین الف سنة - وهو قوله : » في يوم كان (٧/٤)

مقداره خمسين الف سنة^٩ - فانه البيان عن

مرتبة صاحب الكشف والحقائق . فان مرتبته

١	محضه ب	٥	الحقائق ب
٢	تاكيدا ك	٦	- [اذ ذلك ... العلم] ك
٣	هي ك	٧	- الله ك
٤	تحريضهم ب	٨	عج ب

(٥٩) وأما نهي كل رسول أمته

عن البيع والشرى في اليوم السابع، فإن

اليوم السابع مثل على القائم - كما تقدم^١ -

والبيع والشرى إنما هي^٢ عقود، عنوا بذلك /

[٥٤] ٥ إن صاحب اليوم الآخر لا يعقد عقدا

ولا ينص ناموسا ولا يقرأ^٣ كتابا

مؤلفا بل يكون منه العلم والحكمة

الذين^٤ فيها الراحة والدعة.

(٦٠) ومن دونه من النطقاء فانهم

١. اصحاب عقود وعزائم^٥ وشرايع^٥ الا من

٤ الذين ب

٥ شرايع ك

١ - كما تقدم ب

٢ هو ك

٣ يقر ب

يقرأ ك

والخميس بازاء^١ عيسى^٢ ويوم^٣ الجمعة
 <بازاء> محمد^٤ والسبت بازاء^٥ القائم^٦ وهو
 صاحب اليوم الآخر. وهو يلزق^٧ الجمعة
 ويلزق^٧ الاحد^٧ متوسط بينهما. على ان
 صاحب اليوم الآخر يتلو ظهوره ظهور محمد
 صلى الله عليه وآله. ومعنى التزاق^٨
 اليوم^٩ الآخر بالاحد - والاحد على آدم
 <والآخر> على <القائم> - انه شبيه بآدم
 في باب انه لا يؤلف شريعة ولا يقرأ^{١٠}
 كتابا.

٦ القائم صلوات الله عليهم ب

للقائم ك

٧ بين الجمعة والاحد ك

٨ لسق ك

٩ يوم ك

١٠ يقرأ ك

١ - بازاء ك

٢ لعيسى ك

٣ - يوم ك

٤ لمحمد ك

٥ - بازاء ك

من لدن آدم^١ الى القائم عليهما السلام
 هم ايام الله سبحانه، وان بظهور كل
 ناطق ظهور كلمة الله سبحانه، فطلوعها
 [٥٢] من جهة ذلك الناطق. فكما ان^٣ بازاء كل /
 يوم ليلة كذلك بازاء كل ناطق صامت
 هو ليله. ووجب ان يكون كل يوم من
 الايام السبعة بازاء كل ناطق من النطقاء
 السبعة. فجعل الاحد منها بازاء آدم^٤،
 والاثنين بازاء نوح والثلاثاء^٥ بازاء
 ابراهيم والاربعاء^٦ بازاء موسى^٨

١	+	عليه السلام	ب
٣		كان	ب
٤		لادم	ك
٥		الثلاثاء (هـ)	ب، ك
٦		الاربعاء (هـ)	ب، ك
٧	-	بازاء	ك
٨		لموسى	ك

(٥٧) فاقول : ان سمة اليوم طلوع

الشمس من المشرق وغروبها من المغرب،

وبازاء كل يوم ليلة الى ان تطلع

من اليوم الثاني . ووجدت^١ الايام متناهية

من جهة الاسامي الى السبعة منها، وهي

من السبت الى الجمعة . ووجدنا كل رسول

قد حظر على امته البيع والشري في اليوم

السابع الذي جعله عيداً لامته . وعظم شأنه

وجعل فيه الراحة والدعة.

(٥٨) فيجب ان يكون النطقاء السبعة

١ وجد ب

١ يوايه ، اذ لكل آخر^٢ اول لا محالة ،
 فصار اول اليوم الآخر . فان قيل انه^٣
 الدنيا التي وضعت لتصرف المعاش فيها
 قيل^٤ له الدول والآخرة^٥ يوجبانه
 ٥ الوسط بينهما ، فما وسط الدنيا واليوم
 الآخر . [٥٢] ولا سبيل الى اتخاذ وسط / الدنيا
 واليوم الآخر . فاحتجنا^٦ الى تأويل يكشف
 عن حقيقة اليوم الآخر ليكون الايمان به
 مشاطا للعلم والمعرفة^٧ اللذين هما مظنتا
 ١٠ الايمان .

٥ الآخرة ب
 ٦ الدين ك

١ يوايه ب
 ٢ آخر (هـ) ب، ك
 ٣ ا ب
 ٤ قبل ك

< الباب الخامس >

< في الإيمان باليوم الآخر >

(٥٤) وأما الإيمان باليوم الآخر فإنه

البغية المطلوبة . ومن أجله أرسل الله

٥ سبحانه الرسل ليدعوا الخلق^٢ الى ذلك اليوم .

وسماه الله^٣ سبحانه عظيماً^٤ لشرفه ومرتبته . (١٩/٢٧)

وان من حق^٥ الإيمان بذلك اليوم ان يعرف

المؤمن ان الآخر انما هو اسم واقع على

شيء قد تقدمه ما يماثله وسبقه ما

١ + سلام الله عليه (هـ) جـ ك هـ احق ك

٢ لخلق ك

٣ - الله ك

٤ عظيم ك

سرقوا الى اربابه ، وعليهم عقوبة ما
 ارتكبوا من السرقة . ومن قبل دينه
 [٥١] على غير بصيرة يوشك / ان يلحقه
 ذم السرقة ، نعوذ بالله من الغفلة
 . والهيل مع الصوى . ف هذه جملة في
 معرفة الرسل^١ والرسالة^١ .

١ الرسالة والرسالة ك

وافتتن الناس به ايام خلفائه^٢ الاربعة.

فلما بلغ الامر الى الرابع وتيسر له من
افتتاح المدن ما تيسر أيَّس الضد من
رواج سوقه وايقن ان لا قوام له مع
صاحب الدين المستخلف في ارض الله
سبحانه باذنه. فبطلت رياسته واضمحلت
دعوته ، ورجع الامر الى خلفاء القائم
عليه السلام. فصار امر الامة بمنزلة
قوم سرقوا متاعا فظهرت سرقتهم عليهم
ولزمهم العار والفضيحة وردوا ما

١ بهم
٢ خلفاءه
ك، ب
ك

الضد ورده الى سليمان. والمعنى

في ذلك ان القائم عليه السلام لما

خرج من العالم . ولم يكن له قوة

[٥٠] ظاهرة طمع الضد من 'اهل بيته ان /

٥ بضيف الإمامة الى نفسه ويدعو الناس

الى رياسته جالسا على مرتبته.

(٥٥) ففعل ذلك واسس مذهب

الإمامية التي اليها دعوة شيعة الظاهر.

فساعدته الليام حتى فشلت دعوته

ا و ك، ب

١ العالم ايام غيبته ان يدمروا على
 القوم وان يكشفوا عن عورات الفلاسفة وفضائحهم
 لتستقر امور اصحاب الديانة وتنمحق
 آثار^٢ الفلسفة . فوقفهم^٣ الله سبحانه بحيله حتى
 ٥ اوهنوا مذهب الفلاسفة^٤ وردوا الخلق الى
 دين الله سبحانه الذي ارتضاه .

(٥٤) ومن قصة سليمان ان الضد
 قد اختلس خاتمه^٥ وجلس على كرسيه
 اربعين يوما يدعو الناس الى نفسه ، فرد الله
 ١٠ < سبحانه > عليه خاتمه وانتزع الملك من

٤ الفلاسفة ب
 ٥ خاتمه ب

١ العلم لك
 ٢ تنمحقا اثر به
 ٣ - الله لك

الاضداد لما يُسوا من الظفر بالمبارك
 وولده، وابتغوا ان دعوتهم قد انتشرت
 في البلاد ومدت الاعناق نحوهم، احتالوا
 لكشف الفلسفة ودعوة الخلق الى العقليات.
 ٥ وارخوا ازمة^١ الشرائع^٢ طمعا في ان
 تدرس آثار الشريعة، فلا يكون لها طالب
 حقيقة^[٢٩] فيكون من ذلك دروس / آثار
 بيت النبوة ودروس علومهم وحكمتهم.
 فجرى خياله الى لواحقه والى من و كلم
 ١٠ الله سبحانه بنشر^٣ العلوم والحقائق بين اهل

١ زمة لك
 ٢ الشرائع لك
 ٣ نشر لك

خلفائه والمتصلين بهم^١. ومن لم^٢
 يطع لهم : ولخلفائه^٣ من هؤلاء الشياطين^٤
 فانهم مقرنون " في الاصفاذ " يعني موكلون^٥ (٢٨/٢٨)
 الى ما اختاروا لانفسهم من التقليد والحي
 والحيرة.

(٥٣) ثم ختم الله سبحانه قصة سليمان
 بالملائكة^٦ التي تدعو الناس الى عبادة الشمس.
 وما يسر الله لسليمان من تصيدها بمن عنده
 علم من الكتاب حتى " رآه " مستقرا عنده. (٢٧/٤٠)

والمعنى في ذلك في هذا الموضع ان

ه راءها ب

١ لا ك
 ٢ لخلفاءه ك
 ٣ موكلين ك
 ٤ بالمملكة ك

من خلفائه ان يجري خياله الى لواحقه

متى شاء ويؤيدهم^١ ويخرجهم بخياله

من ضيق المستغلقات الى سعة المستفتحات.

ثم قال : " ومن الشياطين كل بناء وغواص " (٢٨/٢٦)

يعني ٥ واعطى القائم عليه السلام وخلفائه

من القوة والغلبة^٢ والنصرة ان ينقاد له

ولخلفائه روساء اهل الملّة من الفقهاء

الذين اليهم [بناء الظاهر ومن المتكلمين الذين

اليهم^٣] الخوص في بحر الكلام. فلا يبقى^٤ لهم

[٤٨] ١. قوة ولا لكلامهم بهاء مع كلامه وطلام/

٥ يبقى لك

١ يؤيدهم ب

٢ الغلبة و القوة ب

٣ - [بناء الظاهر ... اليهم] لك

انه وولده اللذين خما بنشر العلم

والحكمة^١ فقال : " ولقد آتينا داود وسليمان (٢٧/١٥)

علما ، ينبغي^٢ ما يسر الله <تعالى> للمبارك وولده

عليهما السلام من نشر العلم والحكمة في العالم. / [٤٧]

٥ فاما تخصيص سليمان بالملك الذي لا ينبغي لاحد

من بعده اصابته^٣ ، فانه الحظ المخصوص به

القائم <عليه السلام> من ذلك العالم العلوي^٤

المدخر له من محض الكلمة ، لا ينبغي لاحد ان يناله :

<...> "فسخرنا له الريح تجري بامره رخاء حيث (٢٨/٢٢)

١ اصاب " ما سخر الله له من الخيال وقت الغيبة

٥ ملك لك

١ الحقيقة ب

٢ - يعني ب

٣ تع ب

٤ اصابته ب

في الجزائر للدعوة الى دين الله ،
 وفي تيسير ذلك له ^١ والظفر له بالبغيعة من
 قتل الاضداد وهدم بيوتهم التي اسسوها
 على شفا جرف هار. فلما التام له تفرقة اللواحق
 في الجزائر بشرهم بالقائم سلام الله على ^٢ ذكره ،
 واخبرهم بانه هو الذي يستاصل شاة الظلمة
 وينتقم من مافتهم. فلان لهم ^٣ من العلوم الصعاب
 المتغلقة حتى استعمل بها ما دمر ^٤ على مذاهب
 الاضداد وما يختص به شيعته لناظرتهم ^٥
 ومنازعتهم. وقد نص الله تعالى ذكره عليهم على

٤ - ما دمر ك
 ٥ لناظرهم ك

١ - و ب
 ٢ عليه ك
 ٣ له ب

عليه السلام - وهم العلويون^١ - وفيهم

يتوسم الامامة والرياسة.

(٥٢) وكان المبارك على وجل شديد منهم

وفي تقيّة وستر على نفسه

٥ وعلى ولده^٢ والمحن تنوجه اليه ونحوه^٣

وتتراكم عليه . فايده الله سبحانه بانشاء

دعوات يبتهل فيها الى الله سبحانه في ان

يكشف عنه وعن ولده ما هو فيه من البلوى،

فاستجاب الله له دعائه^٤ ويسر له^٥ مع

[٤٤] ١. قلة عدده / وشيعته كحكمة اللواحق وتفريقها

٤ دعاءه ك

دعائه ب

٥ يستر ك

١ العلويين ك

٢ - على ب

٣ - ونحوه ك

عليه وآله^١ قد وقع في أيامه^٢ الفترة ،

حيث احتال الاضداد من الجالسين على

كراسي عترة / الرسول لما صفت لهم الدولة [٢٥]

وقد فرغوا من استيصال الامويين قصدوا

للفر^٣ بالعلويين^٤ ، ليستاصلوهم ويدرسوا

آثارهم ليتهميا لهم امامة دعوة محمد صلى الله

عليه وآله كي يروج اسواق ضلالتهم وازافة

الامامة الى من نفى^٥ الله عنهم من الظلمة .

وكان لهم ، اعني الاضداد ، خيرة وبصيرة

١. بمن انتهت اليهم صفوة نسب رسول الله

١ - [صلى الله عليه وآله] ب

ه نفاك
نفاء ب

٢ ايام ك

٣ بالظفر ب

٤ للعلويين ب

والآن له الحديد لعل السابغات وتقديرها

في السرد. وايداه لتأليف الزبور وهو

كتاب من كتب الله سبحانه يشتمل على الإبتحال

والتضرع لكشف ما هو نازل به من ظلم

الظالمين وعدوان الجبارين ، وعلى البشارة

بمن يستاصل شافة الظالمين ويدمرهم^١

وينتقم من كافتهم وينشر العدل

ويرفع الجور.

(هـ) فوجدنا التأويل لما ذكرناه ان المبارك

١. عليه السلام ^٢ سادس ائمة دور محمد [صلى الله

١ يريدهم ك

٢ + دور ب

موسى ليرجع اسراقتهم^١ وضلالتهم^٢ و نجفى^٣

اغتنصاب امانهم^٤ فلا يظهر فضائهم^٥ و اضافتهم^٦

الامامة والخلافة الى من نفى الله عز وجل^٧

عنهم ذلك من الظلمة . فاقاموا جالوتهم

و شددوا ملكه . وكان داود عليه السلام^٨

في نفر يسير من اتباعه وشيعته غير/انه [٤٤]

علم ان الغلبة لمن اسند ظهره الى خالقه

والتجأ^٩ الى فاطمه . فبرز لكاشفة الضد

ومنازعته في قلة عدده . فهزمهم الله

» و قتل داود جالوت واتاه الله بالملك^{١٠} (٢/٢٥١)

٦ التجا ب
٧ + د الحكمة ب

١ اسراقتهم ب
٢ يخفاه (هـ) جـ ك
٣ امانتهم ب
٤ + و ب
٥ نفاك
٦ نفي ب

بذكرهما^١ فان ذكرهما بعد ذكر اولي العزم
 <...> وأُضيف اليه كتاب سماه زبورا ونسب الى
 واضيف اليه كتاب سماه زبورا ونسب الى
 ابنه ملكا مخصوصا به في قوله "لا ينبغي
 لاحد من بعده مثله". ٥

(٥٠) فأقول فيه بعون الله <تعالى>^٢ ومنة
 اوليائه : ان داؤد وسليمان عليهما السلام
 كانا امامين^٣ من ائمة دور موسى عليه السلام.
 وكان ظهور داؤد وقت الغفرة وعند
 اختيال اضداد ذلك الدور لان سميتوا دعوة ١٠

١ بذكرهما ث

٢ نع ب

٣ امامان (هـ) ب، ك

١
 من الحلاوة والمرارة والمحوضة والعفوصة
 والملوحة وما اشبهها. على ان القائم
 عليه السلام هو الحد المخصوص بالكشف عن
 حقائق الاشياء. وما هو مضمن في شريعة
 نوح وابراهيم وموسى وعيسى ومحمد
 صلوات الله عليهم اجمعين. راعى من
 القدرة على شرح متشابهات الكتب المنزلة
 عليهم.

(٤٩) وبقي في ^٢ هذا الباب ان ننظر في

[٤٣] ١٠ امر داود وسليمان والى ماذا يؤك / المراد

١ العفوصة ك

٢ - في ب

والبرودة واليبس والرطوبة وله

القدرة على ترجمة ما يرد على السمع

[٤٢] انواع الاصوات ودقتها وجهادتها ، وهو /

الحاكي عن جميع الاصوات والالحاد الواردة

٥ على السمع. وله القدرة على ترجمة ما

يرد على البصر من اللوان والاشكال

وهو الحاكي عن جميع الصور المدركة بحاسة

البصر. وله القدرة على ترجمة ما يرد

على الانف من الروائح الطيبة والمنتنة

١٠ وله القدرة على ترجمة ما يرد على الفم

١ - هو ك

٢ الفم ك

الله عليه وآله^١ هي الشريعة التي

ختمت الشرائع^٢ بها، وهو قوله: "يا

(٥/٦٧)

أيها الرسول بلغ ما أنزل إليك من ربك،

خاصة لعلي عليه السلام^٣. وانطبق التأييد^٤

بحدوث ما ينسخها. وفيه اللسان وهو

على القائم عليه السلام على أن في صلبه

من يقوم بالكشف عن الحقائق. وإن

اللسان هو المترجم عما يريد على الحواس^٥

من المحسوسات. فله القدرة على ترجمة ما

يرد على اللسان من اللين والحشونة والحرارة

١ - صلى الله عليه وآله ب ه عن ما ك

٢ الشرائع ك

٣ ع م ب

٤ + عليه ك

- السلام^١، لان الانف يشم^٢ ويتنسم^٣ الهواء^٤
 لاسترواح^٥ الروح. فوجدنا الله تعالى ذكره^٦ قد
 وصفه بالروح قوله: "وايدناه بروح القدس" (٢/٢٥٢)
 الذي يحتاج الى الاسترواح^٧. وهو الذي يشم^٨
 رائحة القائم عليه السلام حيث جعله الله علم الساعة.
 ووضعنا الغم باراء شريعة محمد صلى الله عليه
 وآله^٩، لان به تصل^{١٠} الاغذية الى البدن^{١١} /
 [٤] <د> بها حياة^{١٢} البدن. كذلك بكلمة شريعته
 وبالمتم وقعت الحياة الابدية للارواح. ووالغم^{١٣}
 ١٠ منطبق بالشفعتين على ان شريعة محمد صلى

١ - عليه السلام	ب	٥ - صلى الله عليه وآله	ب
٢ - الهوى	ك	٦ - يتنصل	ب
٣ - ذكره	ب	٧ + و	ل
٤ - الذي	ب	٨ - حيوة	ب
		٩ - الحيوة	ب

نظرة في النجوم فقال اني ستقيم. وكذلك

[٥] حكى عنه / قوله: "يا بني اني ارى في

(٣٧/١٠٢)

المنام اني اذبحك. ووضعنا السمع

بازاء شريعة موسى عليه السلام، لان الله

تعالى ذكره قد وصف احوال كلمته موسى

»

بما يكون سامعا، وهو قوله: "واذ نادى

(٢٦/١٠)

ربك موسى؛ وقوله: "وناديناه من

(١٩/٥٢)

جانب الطور اليمين؛ وقوله: "وما تلك

(٢٠/١٧)

ييمينه يا موسى، الى سائر اشغاله.

١٠ ووضعنا الشم بازاء شريعة المسيح عليه

١ انى لك

٢ ان (هـ) ج

ان (هـ) لك

٣ - عليه السلام ج

٤ كلمة لك

نوح عليه السلام^١ ، لان الشمس باليد .

ووجدنا الله سبحانه^٢ قد امره بصناعة الفلك .

بقوله^٣ : ” واصنع الفلك باعيننا ووحينا ” (٢٢/٢٧)

والصناعة انما تكون باليد . ووضعنا البصر

بازاء شريعة ابراهيم عليه السلام ، لان البصر

بالعين والعين للروية^٥ . ووجدنا الله تعالى^٦

قد وصف احوال خليله^٧ بالروية حيث يقول :

” وكذلك نرى ابراهيم ملكوت السماوات والارض ” (٢١/٧٥)

وكذلك حكى عنه روية الكواكب والقمر والشمس ،

وحكى عنه نظرة^٩ في النجوم قوله : ” فنظرا ” (٣٧/٨٨)

١ - عليه السلام	ب	٤	سبحانه	ب
٢ - سبحانه	ب	٧	خليلية	لك
٣ - في قوله	ب	٨ - و		لك
٥ بالروية	ب	٩	نظرا	لك

الإنسان الذي انتهت إليه صفوة العالم قد^١
استقرت مصلحة جسده بالحواس الخمسة فلم تمسه
الحاجة إلى زيادة فيها. ^٢ و ^٣ بنقصان أحدهما
بطلان المصلحة و ^٤ ظهور العجز والمضرة. ^٥

[٣٩] ٥ (٤٧) وكذلك بتكلمة ^٩ الشرائع ^٧ الخمسة /

تمام مصلحة روح البشر، ولا يمس روحه
حاجة إلى زيادة فيها. ^٨ وبنقصان ^٩ إحدى الشرائع
ظهور النقص فيما الغرض في تكلمتها.

(٤٨) فوضعنا اللبس منها بازاء شريعة

١ - قد	ب	٦	تكلمة	ك
٢ او	ب	٧	الشرائع	ك
٣ احدهما	ك	٨	نقصان	ب
٤ ظهور	ب	٩	الشرائع	ك
٥ النصرة	ب			

واليدان للقبض والبسط والضرب ؛

والفم للأكل والشرب^١ وما اشبههما من

الاعمال ؛ والذكر للجماع والبول وما اشبههما.

(٤٥) وبقي عضو واحد للعلم والمعرفة وهو

القلب بازاء صاحب اليوم الآخر الذي لا نظير

له. وهو في الحجب مستور غير^٢ ان حد

القائم عليه السلام كان في شرائع^٣ الرسل

مستورا^٤.

(٤٦) ودلالة^٥ اخرى من الحواس الخمسة

على كمية الشرائع^٦ وهو ان الحيوان وخاصة

١	+	و المتع	ك	٤	مستورة	ك
٢		على	ب	٥	للة	ك
٣		شرائع	ك	٦	الشرائع	ك

الإسلام، فجعل سمتها الكلمة التي هي
 الشهادة : والشرائع الأربع بازاء الاصول
 الاربعة. وكما انه لا يوجد للكلام عضو
 غير اللسان كذلك لا يوجد شريعة سمتها
 الكلام غير ملة الاسلام. ولما كانت للاعمال
 اعضاء كثيرة وقع بازاء كل عضو شريعة،
 وانتهت الاعمال الى اربعة من الاعضاء اذا
 كانت الاعمال بالمباشرة، / الى الرجلين واليدين
 والفم والذكر. [٣١]

١٠ (٤٤) فالرجلان للسعي والحشي والذوق :

١ وكذلك ك

وتسديده : ان العلة فيها هي ان كلمة
 الله تعالى ذكره علة لجميع الخلق. فان اول
 شيء ظهر منها الاصلان / اللذان هما ركنان العالم [٣٧]
 الاعلى الاشرف. وانتهى امر الخلقة الى الصبولى
 والصورة اللذين^٢ هما ركنان العالم الادنى الاكثف .
 وحصل منهما اعني من الصبولى والصورة ،
 الاساسان. فقامت بازاء العلة التي هي الكلمة
 وبازاء المعلولين اللذين هما الاصلان والاساسان
 خمسة من الشرائع . ولما كان اول الفكرة آخر
 العمل وقع بازاء الكلمة التي هي العلة ، شريعة^١

 ١ تع ب

٢ اللذان ك

والرسول الذي بعده زمان محدد طويل، ووجدوا
 في الكتاب المنزل على صاحب دورهم بذكر اسامي
 عدة من الانبياء، جعلوهم ارباب الازمنة التي
 وقعت بين كل زمان وزمان. وجعلوهم
 داخلين في طاعة ارباب الازمنة السبعة. وما تحت
 ايدي هؤلاء المتمين من الادلاء داخلون في طاعتهم،
 الى ان ينتهي الامر الى المؤمنين.

(٤٣) فاما الاشراف على ان لا^١ اقتصرت
 الشرائع على الخمسة فلم تجاوزها ولم^٢ يجنس^٣
 عنها، فانا نقول في علتها بتأييد الله تعالى^٤

٤ نع ب

١ لا ك
 ٢ الشرائع ك
 ٣ يتجنس ك

وهو قوله (تعالى):^١ شرع لكم من الدين ما
 (٤٢/١٣) وصى به نوحا والذي اوحينا اليك وما وصينا
 به ابراهيم وموسى وعيسى ان اقيموا الدين
 ولا تتفرقوا فيه .

٥ (٤٢) فوضهوا ارباب الازمنة التي تلاقي^٢ زمن
 آدم فبلغ القسمة الى محمد صلى الله عليه وآله
 صاحب الزمان السادس . وهو يامر الناس بالايان
 باليوم الآخر . فعلم من هذه الجصة ان صاحب اليوم
 [٣٦] الآخر هو صاحب / الزمان السابع . ولا علمت
 هذه الطائفة الموفقة^٣ للصواب ان بين كل رسول^٤
 ١٠

١	تغ	ب
٢	تلاقى	ك
٣	+ ان	ك
٤	كل	ك

في هذا الباب^١ على ما يشئ سمعه اى ذكره.

البيست هذه المعرفة معرفة بهيمة^٢ ؟ واهل

بيت الرسالة والمتسكون^٣ بهم ومجايلهم لم

يرضوا لانفسهم بهذه المعرفة / حتى قسموا [٣٥]

الزمان باقسامه ، ووضعوا بازاء كل قسم منه

ربا له :صاحبها . ووجدوا القسم الاعم فيه

السبعة . فقسموه بها وجعلوا الابتداء من آدم

عليه السلام^٤ ، فجعلوه رب القسم الاول . ثم نظروا

في الكتاب المننرل على صاحب دورهم فوجدوا

فيه^٥ آية مشروحة في عدد اولي العزم^٦ ،

١	الكتاب	ب	٤	-	عليه السلام	ج
٢	بهيمة	ب	٥	-	فيه	ك
٣	المتسكون (هـ)	ك	٦	الاولي		ك
	المتكئين (هـ)	ج				

والتقسيم معرفة، ولا بها عناية إلا
 عند أهل بيت النبي عليهم السلام^١، وعند
 المصطلين بنارهم.

(٤١) وإن أكثر أهل الإسلام لو سئلوا
 عن داود وعيسى أيهما أفضل وجدت
 أكثرهم يقولون بفضل داود على عيسى. ولو
 سئلوا عن موسى وسليمان [أيهما أفضل لفضلوا
 سليمان على موسى]^٢. ولو سئلوا عن يوسف
 ونوح لقالوا بفضل يوسف. والمفضلون
 عندهم^٣ أعلى من الفاضل. وأكثر اعتماد الأمة

١ ع م ك
 ب
 ٢ - [أيهما ... على موسى] ك
 ٣ عندهم ك

القرآن ، وصاحب كل قرآن^١ قد شمل
طاعته عدة من اصحاب السنين ، على هذا
المنهاج .

(٤) فصاحب الكور القائم عليه السلام .^٢

واصحاب الادوار هم النطاء عليهم السلام ؛^٣

واصحاب القرآن هم / الاسن^٤ والائماء ؛ [٣٤]

واصحاب السنين هم اللواحق ؛ واصحاب

الشهور هم الايادي ؛ واصحاب الياوم هم

الاجنحة ؛ واصحاب الساعات هم^٥ المأذونون .^٦

وليس عند جميع اهل الملل^٧ لهذا الترتيب

ب، ك ٥ الساعة (هـ)

ك ٦ الماذونين

ك ٧ اصحاب

١ قرآن ب

٢ - عليه السلام ك

٣ ع م (هـ) ب، ك

٤ - الاسن و ك

صاحب الجمعة^١، [وصاحب الجمعة في طاعة

صاحب الشهر، وصاحب الشهر في طاعة

صاحب السنة، وصاحب السنة في طاعة

صاحب الغزان، وصاحب الغزان في طاعة صاحب

الدور، وصاحب الدور في طاعة صاحب^٥

الكور^٢]. وكذلك يجب على المؤمن ان يعرف

الرسلى والانبياء والادلاء بهذا^٣ الترتيب

وهذه^٤ المنزلة. فيعلم ان الكور صاحبه قد

شمل عدة من اصحاب الادوار، وصاحب

كل دور قد شمل طاعته عدة من اصحاب^{١٠}

١ الشمر على ذلك المثال (هـ) ك ه صاحب ج

٢ - [وصاحب الجمعة ... في طاعة الكور] ك

٣ بهذه ك

٤ - هذه ك

الزمان بهذه المنزلة وبهذه الترتيب^١ ليكون

صاحب الكور عنده اعظم من صاحب الدور،

وصاحب الدور اعظم من صاحب / القران ، [٣٢]

وصاحب القران اعظم من صاحب السنة،

وصاحب السنة اعظم من صاحب الشهر، ٥

وصاحب الشهر اعظم من صاحب الجمعة ، وصاحب

الجمعة اعظم من صاحب اليوم ، وصاحب

اليوم اعظم من صاحب الساعة .

(٣٩) ويكون صاحب الساعة داخلا^٣ في طاعة

١٠ صاحب اليوم ، وصاحب اليوم في طاعة

١	الترتيب	ك
٢	- يكون	ك
٣	داخل	ك

(٣٨) ومن عرف الزمان حق معرفته وجده ذات^١

افسام كثيرة يقع فيها^٢ القلة والكثرة . والقليل

منها^٣ داخل في الكثير كالموجود فيه : إن يقال

الكور والدور القران . والسنة والشهر والجمعة

واليوم . والساعة ، فالساعة^٤ داخله في

اليوم ، واليوم^٥ داخل في الجمعة ، والجمعة

داخله في الشهر ، والشهر داخله^٦ في السنة ،

والسنة^٧ داخله في القران ، والقران < داخل >

في الدور ، والدور < داخل > في الكور .

١. كذلك يجب على المؤمن ان يعرف ارباب

٦ - داخله ب
٧ - داخله ب

١ ذوات ب
٢ فيه ك
٣ منه (هـ) ب، ك
٤ والساعة ب
٥ اليوم ك

بالبغيّة من الايمان بالرسول .

(٢٧) فان أكثر الامم انما ضلت في دينها
وانكرت بالرسول <والاسلام> الذي يتلو رسول دوره
بجهله بزماذ فحُسِبَ ان زمانه آخر الازمنة
لتحلمة عدة الرسل فحُسِبَ من اجله ان
رسول دوره خاتم الرسل الذي لا يكون بعده
رسول. ومن وقف على امام زمانه آمن
بصاحبه / ولم يرفعه^١ فوق منزلته ولم
ينزله دون منزلته وانتظر بانتظار الزمن
اللاتي^٢ صاحبه وصدق بآرباب الازمنة الماضية

[٣٢]

١ يعرفه لك

٢ اللاتي لك

اللاتي ب

< الباب الرابع >

< في الإيمان بالرسل >

(٣٦) ومن^١ حق الإيمان بالرسل ان

يعرف المؤمن زمانه الذي هو فيه اي زمان

هو. فاذا عرف المؤمن اي زمان هو علم

الماضي منه والمنتظر. فاذا وقف المؤمن

على الازمنة الثلاث^٢ من الماضي والمقيم

والمنتظر لم يخف عليه ارباب الازمنة.

وفي الوقوف على ارباب الازمنة الظفر

١ - من ك

٢ - الثلاث (هـ) ك

الثلاثة (هـ) ب

المؤمن قلبه^١ بالعلم من الشك والحيرة،
 كان من^٢ ذلك لقومه^٣ ان يقولوا له : فما حاجتنا
 اذاً الى التوضي بالاء بعد ان وقفنا على^٤ الحقيقة؟
 فكان من^٥ كونه عن الحقائق^٧ الزام الخلق ان
 يستعملوا شريعته ، و^٨ في وضع المتشابهات
 الزام طلب العلم والحقيقة ، فيكون من/ ذلك
 عموم صلاح الدارين واستقامة^٩ طريق النجدين.
 فاعرفه.^{١٠}

[٣١]

- ٤ - من ج
 ٧ - عن الحقائق ك
 ٨ - و ج
 ٩ استقامة ك
 ١٠ + ان شاء الله تعالى

- ١ قبله ك
 ٢ - من ج
 ٣ - لقومه ك
 ٤ عن ك
 ٥ وكان ك

الى تنزيله المنزل عليه وشريعته
 فاول عنهما وقابلها بغرائز الحقول ،
 واستشهد عليهما بالافاق والانفس . ولم
 يكن ذلك خلافا لمراد الرسول .

• (٣٥) فان قال قائل : لم لم يول الرسول

ذلك بنفسه ؟ قيل له : ان تولى^٢ ذلك بنفسه

كان فيه توهين لما دعى الخلق اليه من

الشرائع والقرآن ، لانه لو قال لهم^٣ ان

مرادي في طهارة^٤ الوضوء بالماء ان يطهر

١ لا يتولى ب ٤ طهارات ك

٢ يتولى توليته ب

٣ - لهم ب

. وصلاة الحضر ، وعن صلاة الجمعة
 والعبدین ، الى سائر ما تقتضيه^١ احكام
 الشريعة في الصلاة . ولا يخلو شرح
 الرسول عن الصلاة على ما بيناه^٢ عن
 وقوعها بمراد الخالق سبحانه^٣ او خلاف مراده .
 فان كان وقوعها خلاف مراده ، ففي شرح
 الرسول اذا نقص الامر . وان كان وقوعها
 بمراده^٤ ولم يكن امره منه الا جملة بغير
 تفسير ، لان من ذلك لقائل / ان يقول : كذلك
 الوصي احتذا^٥ بالرسول عليهما السلام . فبعد

[٣٠]

١٠

١	تقتضيها	ك	٢	+	منه	ب
٢	بيناهما (هـ)	ب، ك	٥	يقولوا	ب	
٣	سبحنه	ب	٦	احتذاء	ك	
			٧	٣٤	ك	

الجملة شيء مشرح عنه مثل امر الله

تعالى^١ بالصلوة مجملًا. فقال: " اقيموا الصلوة " (٢/١١٠)

[٢٩] وقال: " ان / الصلوة كانت على المؤمنين

كتابا موقوتا^٢. فوقف الرسول < صلى الله عليه > (٤/١٠٣)

ه حتى شرح عنها وعن عددها وعدد ركعاتها،

كل صلوة بما فيها من القراءة^٣ والركوع

والسجود والجلوس، وما يقرأ^٤ في الركوع

والسجود والجلوس وعن التكبير والتسليم

وعن سننها ونوافلها، وعن الفرق بين صلوة السفر

١ عز اسمه ب

٢ صلح ك
ص ب

٣ القراءة (ه) / القراءة (ه) ك

٤ يقرأ ب / يقرأ ك

يكن ذلك غفلة من الخالق جل جلاله،
 كذلك الوصي هو الذي اول من بين عن
 شريعة^١ الرسول^٢ عليه السلام^٣ وعن كتابه.
 فوضع كل شيء منه موضعه وشرح عن
 غرضه والمراد منه. ولم يكن ذلك غفلة
 من الرسول صلى الله عليه وآله^٤ وليس
 حال التأويل^٥ عن التنزيل^٦ والشريعة مما يعد^٧
 من حال شرح الرسول عن اوامر الخالق جل
 جلاله^٨ اذ ليس في اوامر الخالق بعد

٥ - التأييد
 ٦ - من
 ٧ - با بعد
 ٨ - جل جلاله

١ الشريعة
 ٢ - الرسول
 ٣ ع
 ٤ ب

اللهم (تعالى) ^١

(٣٤) فان قال قائل : فلم تنفل الناطق

عليه السلام ^٢ عن تأويل كتابه وشريعته

حتى / أول كتابه ^٣ وشريعته وصيه ابن عمه [٢٨]

٥ قيل له : كما ان الرسول صلى الله عليه وسلم

هو الذي اول من بين عن امر الخالق جل

جلاله ^٤ ووضع كل شيء موضعه وقسم

كل امر منه باقسامه وحده بمحدوده، ولم

٤ اسمه ب

١ تع ب

٢ مع ك

٣ تناول (هـ) ب، ك

الصحيحة عن رسول الله صلى الله عليه
 وآله انه قال : « ما آمن بالقرآن من
 استحل محارمه ويستنبط^١ من الكتب الماضية،
 مثل التوراة^٢ والانجيل^٣ والزبور وغيره
 من كتب الله سبحانه^٤ ما فيها من المتشابه
 ليظفر بتأويلها^٥ فينال بحكمتها حياة^٥ ابدية .
 فليست له الى الاشراف^٦ على محكمها حاجة
 اذ هي قد نسخت^٧ . فهذه هي المعرفة^٧
 التي يسمى العارف بها مؤمنا . فاعرفه رحمك

-
- | | | |
|---|---------------------|---|
| ١ | لستنبط | ب |
| ٢ | - الكتب | ك |
| ٣ | + و القرآن و الزبور | ب |
| ٤ | تغ | ب |
| ٥ | حيوة | ب |
| ٦ | - الى الاشراف | ك |
| ٧ | معرفة | ك |

قتر ولا ذلة^١ يعني ولا يلحقهم ذل

الجهل / والحيرة والخضوع والانقياد لكل [٢٧]

ضال غاو^١ فهم في الجنة خالدون.

(٢٢) ومن بعد الوقوف على متشابهات

القران يؤمن بحكمه. فلا يستحل

محارمها ولا يرتكب مناهيها ولا يعمل

فرائضها.

(٢٣) فان في بعض الاخبار المروية

١ غاوي ك

بإضافتها^١، مستبشرون بالاحاطة بها، طالبون

للمزيد فيها من عند أربابهم المنصوين لكشفها.

فهم الذين قال الله جل ثناؤه^٢ فيهم :

”للذين أحسنوا الحسنى وزيادة“، يعني (١٠/٢٤)

”للذين“ التمسوا حقائق التشابهات ”الحسنى“

وهو إصابة الحقائق، و”زيادة“ يعني ما

يزيد لهم من البصيرة والتبصرة واستنباط

ما لم يفتح لهم بما فتح عليهم من

غوامض التشابهات. و”لا يرهن“ وجوههم^٣ (١٠/٢٤)

١ أصابتها ب

٢ أسسه ك

٣ وجوههم ك، ب

في مسامحة او مساعدة^١، بل معرفة
ووقوفنا واحاطة وتمكنا في القلوب
والخواطر.

- (ب) فان اكثر الغافلين عن حقائق
- [٢٦] ٥ التشابهات منكرون / بقلوبهم وان لم يفحصوا^٢
بالسنتهم. وكثيرا منهم يستعقرها
ويستحلها، ويضعها على انها واقعة
بالبحث جارية على ألسن الرسل بالمجاز^٣
١. ويتوهمونها^٤ من اساطير الاولين
- (٢١) والواقفون على حقائقها فرحون

١ - [والله لا يرضى من المؤمن
ان يكون ايمانه في مسامحة او مساعدة] ب

٢ يعسجوا ك
٣ بالجواف ب
٤ يتهمونها ب

اضيف الى العقل ما وجد في الشئ من
 السمات والاضافات . فكانت الحكمة به
 اشبه والعلم به^١ اليق . فوجب على من
 يؤمن بكتب^٢ الله تعالى ذكره ان يعرف المحكم
 والمتشابه [فيطلب للمتشابه تأويلا من عند من
 جعلهم الله قراء كتابه ؛ وهم عترة النبي
 والوصي . ولا يعتقد في المتشابه^٣ انه مثل
 ما اراه ظاهر اللفظ لما في ظاهره من التناقض
 والمحال ، فيكون ايمانه ايمان^٤ مساعدة او مساعدة
 [والله لا يرضى من المؤمن ان يكون ايمانه

١ له ب

٢ لكتاب (هـ) ب ؛ لكتب (فوق)

٣ - [فيطلب للمتشابه تأويلا من عند
 من جعلهم الله قراء كتابه وهم عترة
 النبي و الوصي ولا يعتقد في المتشابه] ب

عن حالته ولا يدخل الافة عليه^١ من جرم آخر
 مشاغل له. وليس^٢ لهويته عن هوية
 الكلمة زوال بل هو هي وهي هو من غير
 زيادة في احدهما او نقصا عنهما.

٥ (٢٩) ولو افصح الخالق سبحانه^٣ عن العقل
 باسمه ولم يكن عنه هذه الكناية الشريفة
 لم يكن للاشراف عليه^٤ وعلى فضائله^٥ سبيل
 لـ [٢٥] لـ / جوهره^٦. فلما كنى عنه بالشمس
 والشمس ظاهرة العين مرسومة الحالات

١	عليهم ك	٤	عليها (هـ)	ب، ك
٢	لست ك	٥	فضائلها (هـ)	ب، ك
٣	سبحته ب	٦	جوها (هـ)	ب، ك

الذي به يمكن^١ السعي لنيل الاخرة
 والظفر بها. وبذلك استقام مصلحة الحدود
 الذين هم دونه. / وما لا [شروق لتأييده
 [٢٤] عليه لا قوام له ، كما ان ما لا^٢ شروق
 للشمس عليه لا نماء فيه. وليس لاحد^٣
 من الحدود معه مقاومة في^٤ ان يبلغ الى
 مرتبته او ان يصير الى تماميته. فليس له ،
 اعني للسابق ، رجوع عن وجده مبروزا في
 انيته^٥ ليكون رجوعه عنه تمامية^٦ حال بعد^٧
 ظهور نقص فيه ، بل ما برز فيه لا يستحيل

٥ انسيته ك
 ٦ تمامية بعد حال ك

١ تمكن ب
 ٢ - [شروق لتأييده عليه
 لا قوام له كما ان ما لا] ب
 ٣ لاحد (هـ) ب
 احد (هـ) ك
 ٤ الى ب

حدوث النهار^١ الذي فيه يمكن^٢ السعي للعاش
 وبه^٣ استنقام مصلحة العالم الجسداني من
 المواليد . ولا يقوم مع ضوءه^٤ ضوء^٥ ،
 وليس له نظير من الكواكب ، وليس له
 رجعة مثل رجعة سائر الكواكب ، ولا احتراق
 له^٦ ، وسيرها^٧ في اليوم والليلة على حالة
 واحدة لا زيادة فيه^٨ . ولا نقصان عنه ، وسير
 سائر الكواكب مرة زائدة . ومرة ناقصة .

(٢٨) كذلك العقل منه لمع التأييد النير

١ + و	ك	٥	وضوء	ك
٢ تمكن	ك	٦	لها	ب، ك
٣ يه	ك	٧	مسيرها	ب
٤ وضوءه	ك	٨ -	فيه	ك

من يعادي^١ الرسل بالمناظرة ، وتنضج
 شرائعهم^٢ والكتب المنزلة عليهم اذا جاورت اسمهم ،
 وتنير قلوب المأنوسين اذا توجهوا نحو ائمة
 دورهم . ولو ان الخالق سبحانه^٣ افصح^٤ عن ذلك
 [٢٣] بالتأييد / لم يكن فيه فائدة عظيمة . فلما كنى^٥
 [عنه بالنار كان من ذلك اشراف على ما^٦] فيه من
 المنفعة للولياء الله سبحانه^٧ والمضرة لاعدائه .

(٢٧) وكالمضروب مثل السابق بالشمس
 في آيات كثيرة من كتاب الله <عز وجل> لان من الشمس

١	يعادي	ك	٥	كنا	ك
٢	شرايعهم	ب	٦	- [عنه بالنار كان من ذلك	
٣	سبحنه (هـ)	ب، ك	٧	اشراف على ما	ك
٤	اوضح	ك	٨	سبحته (هـ)	ب، ك
				عج	ب

أيام قوة التقليد المضروب مثله بالشتاء^١

وجميع ما يتقون به مساعدوه في الديانة .

فان وقت المحنة والتقية وقت الفراغ ،

والفراغ مهيأ للاستنباط والاستخراج .

هـ (٢٦) وكالمضروب مثل التأييد المتصل

بالنطقاء عليم السلام^٢ بالنار . فان من شأن النار

احراق ما يضادها بالمباشرة ، وانضاج ما

بلادقهما بالمجاورة ، وانارة ما^٣ يقابلها بالمواجهة .

فكذا^٤ التأييد المتصل بالنطقاء فانه يهلك

ح و هكذا ك

١ الشتا ك

٢ ٢٤ (هـ) ب ك

٣ + فيها ك

(٢٥) وكالمضروب مثل الجناح في

حد التنقية بالنمل. فانه لو افصح عنه

وقيل الجناح المبتلي^١ بالتنقية، لم يكن

فيه فائدة عظيمة. فلما ضرب^٢ مثله بالنمل،

ومن شأن النمل^٣ خفاء حسه وحركته

وشدة تستره في حفرة^٤ ايام الشتاء

وكثرة اجتهاده في^٥ نقل الحب المطروحات^٦

الى كنهه، كان من ذلك ارشاد^٧ الله^٨ سبحانه

بالجناح المبتلي^٩ بالتنقية الى اهبة الحذر. وقلة

مباشرة الناس والتستر بما يكنه ويخفيه

[٢٢]

١	المتلا (هـ)	ج، ك	ب
٢	ولما	ك	ك
٣	- النمل	ك	ك
٤	حفرة	ك	ك
٥	و	ك	ك، ب
٦	المطروحات	٦	ب
٧	الارشاد	٧	ك
٨	لله	٨	ك
٩	المتلا (هـ)	٩	ك، ب

والسفينة مضمر^١ تحتها الرجل المنصوب
 لنجاة الخلق من امواج الاختلاف . فلو افصح
 الخالق عن السفينة بالرجل المنصوب كان فيه
 تلبيس امره . فلما ضرب / مثله بالسفينة ، [٢١]
 والمعروف من السفينة انها آلة متخذة ه
 لسلوك التبار في البحر وانها مأمن^٢ لهم من
 الغرق ، كان من ذلك دلالة الخلق الى طاعة
 هذا الولي المضروب مثله بالسفينة ، بانه هد^٣
 منصوب لنجاة الخلق من امواج الاختلافات ،
 وبه يمكن نجاة^٤ الآخرة والسعى لها . ١.

١	المضمر	ك
٢	مأمن (هـ)	ك
	ماء	ب
٣	جل	ك
٤	تجارة	ب

مطية ظاهرها . والواجب مركب باطنها .
 ولو افصح عن متشابهات الكتب بالكشف
 عن معانيها استرخت قراها وضعف بناؤها .
 فعلم الخالق جل ثناؤه ذلك فجعل المتشابهات
 من كتابه سمة اوليائه وما جرى في زمانهم
 من توهمين الحدود وتقويتها ، لتكون الماثلة
 في الآيات المتشابهات ادلة على فضائلهم
 ومناقبهم .

(٢٤) ومثال ذلك الامثال المضروبة بالسفينة .

١ بناها ك

واخبارها^١ بالعالم الروحاني البسيط غير

مشار ولا بذى تأليف ولا بذى ضرب

ولا حروف قبل ان انحصرت^٢ في العالم

الجسماني في الاوراق بالنظم والتأليف

ووقعت في السمع بالاصوات والالخان. ٥

(٢٣) وليس^٣ في كتب الله تعالى بالتحقيق

محال ولا في العقل / عما تنافر وتضاد^٤. [٢.]

وانها جميعها^٥ [من بين آيات محكمات تحتها معان^٧

محكمة و] من بين آيات متشابهات تحتها معان^٩

مستترات لا يحتمل غيرها^{١٠} فيكون الامتناع ١٠

١	احتيازها	ك
٢	حصرت	ك
٣	فليس	ك
٤	تضاد (هـ)	ك ب
٥	انها	ك
٦	جميعها	ك
٧	معاني (هـ)	ك ب
٨	- [من بين آيات محكمات تحتها معاني محكمه و]	ب
٩	تعالى	ك
١٠	تحتمل	ك

< الباب الثالث >

< في الإيمان بكتب الله >

(٢١) واما الإيمان بكتب الله تعالى ذكره ،

فانه عنزيمة المؤمن بقلبه ان كتب الخالق
خلاف كتب المخلوقين في باباتها^١ قد جمعت
فيها اسرار الخلق وآيات الآفاق والانس.

(٢٢) وان كتب الله قد جاورت الانفس

اللطيفة والاذهان الرضية قبل ان تنتشر

في الاسن الكثيفة واللغات^٢ الليفة .

١ جاباتها ب
٢ اللفة ك

عرف الملائكة على هذه السمات كان ايمانه

بهم ايمان يصلح للايمان بالله المخلص عن

الصفات والاضافات^١ . ولولا اننا شرطنا

الاختصار / لاخذنا في وصفهم من هذه [١٩]

المقدمات واشبعنا القول فيه ليقف كل

ناظر عليه ، غير اننا قد ارشدنا الطريق للمقتدين

بنا وبطريقنا^٢ بناء^٣ عليه ان شاء الله تعالى^٤.

١	لاضافات	ك
٢	بطريقتنا	ب
٣	بنا	ك
٤	- تعالى	ك
	نق	ب

بغثة بلا زمان : وطفرة^١ بلا مكان.

(٢٠) وهكذا^٢ جرى من افاضة امر الله تعالى

ذكره على القلم ان صفوة البشر تنتهي^٣ الى

من يقبل التأييد بغير واسطة او بواسطة

روحانية. ٥ وجرت الافاضة منه الى تاليه ،

فصارت تلك الافاضة من امر الله تعالى ذكره^٤

ملكاً موكلاً بتبليغ^٥ الرسالة الى الرسل. فاذا

في عالم العقل والنفس من الملائكة الموكلين^٦

باتمام الحكمة ما لا يحصيها عدد ، لا

يسبقونه بالقول ١٠ وهم بامرهم يحملون . فمن

ب	٤ - ذكره	١ طفرة	ب
ب	٥ بتبلغ	٢ هذا	ب
ب	٦ الموكلون	٣ ينتهي	ب

الى الحيوان الناطق المائت الذي هو الانسان

<٩> كان مما افيض على المبدع الذي هو امره ان

لا يصلح قوام البشر في العالم الطبيعي الا بان

يتعاقب الموت عليه بعد الحياة^١. وكان بعض

ه الافاضة من العقل مفضية^٢ على تاليه، وكانت

هذه الافاضة من العقل مفاضة - اعني تعاقب الموت

على البشر بعد الحياة^٣. فصارت هذه الافاضة من

[١٤] امر الله على القلم / ومن القلم على اللوح ملکا

وقد وكل بموت البشر، لا يمكن^٤ دركه حسا،

ه راعطى القدرة بتلك الافاضة على قبض الارواح

١	الحياة	ب	٤	يحل	ب
٢	مفضية	ك	٥	درله	ب
٣	الحياة	ب			

اعم شئ^١ يكن واطوره للعالم ليكون ذلك
 لنا سبيل^١ على حرفة^٢ سائرهم. فلم اجد شيئاً
 اعم من ملك الموت. ومن شريطة الروحاني انه
 غير/مدرك بشئ من المحاسن. وما لا يدرك بشئ
 من المحاسن ادرك بالعقل والنظر.^٣

[١٧]

(١٩) فاقول: ان الله سبحانه لما ابدع بامره
 الاصلين اللذين هما القلم والورق، رجعهما اصلي
 الخلائق اجمعين، فبرز فيهما ما كان وما يكون.
 واستغنى امرهما^٤ على الهيولى والصورة لتكون <منهما>
 العالم الطبيعي^٥. وبلغ الحاصل من العالم الطبيعي

٤ امرها ب
 ٥ + الى الحيوانات ك

١ سبيلا ب
 ٢ - معرفة ك
 ٣ + الفطن ب

على هذا الطريق^١ الذي نقوله^٢: الملائكة
حيوان لا يطعم ولا يشرب ولا يلبس ولا
ينام^٣. وما لا يطعم من الحيوان ولا يشرب
ولا يلبس ولا ينكح ولا ينام ليس بجسد^٤.
فاذا^٥ الملائكة^٦ ليسوا بأجساد. فاذا^٧ صبح انهم ليسوا
بأجساد ثبت اذا^٨ انهم ارواح. وعالم الروحانيين
عالم العقل والنفس^٩ ، وعالمها غير عالم الطبيعة.
فليست الملائكة اذا^{١٠} في عالم الطبيعة.

(١٨) والان ناخذ في كيفية معرفتهم عن

عالم العقل والنفس. ونجعل الابتداء من

١	هذه	ك	٥	- فاذا	ك
٢	نقول	ك	٦	لملائكة اذا (هـ)	ك
٣	تنام	ب	٧	واذا	ب
٤	بجسدا	ك	٨	+ عالم	ب
			٩	عالمها	ب
			١٠	+ الملائكة اذا	ب

اهمالها^١ فسالت مؤيد^٢ أوليائه الذين يجاهدون

في سبيله ان يرشدني الى تصور^٣ معرفته.

فجعلت المقدمات التي تصلح^٤ لنتيجتها

ودركها ما للجميع بما اتفاق وتواطؤ^٥. وهو

ان الجميع يقولون بان الملائكة لا حاجة لهم

الى الطعام والشراب واللباس والنكاح والنوم^٦.

وقد اختلفوا في موتهم^٧ قوم^٨ يقولون يموتون

و قوم^٩ يقولون لا يموتون. وقد اتفق جميعهم [١٦]

بانهم احياء. فنظرنا فيما نعني^٩ به من

القضايا المعاونة^{١٠} له فوجدنا الحال الجامعة فيه

١ اهمالها ك

٢ مؤيدا ك

٣ نص ب

٤ - تصلح ك

٥ تواطئ (هـ) ك/ تواطئ (هـ) ب

٦ النوم ب

٧ - في موتهم ب

٨ - قوم يقولون يموتون و ب

٩ نعبر نعني ب/ نعنا ك

١٠ المتعاونة ك

جوهره ، كالسياسة والتمييز هما في الإنسان موجود،

ولا يدري جوهره أي شيء^١ هو ومن أين منشؤه^٢،

[أمن القلب]^٣ أم من الدماغ ؛ (٣) والضرب الثالث ما [١٥]

جوهره ليس بموجود ولا فعلم ، كالملائكة . فان جوهرها

غير موجود ولا يوجد شيء من أفعالها . فلم

ينتهيء لهذا الرجل مع حصاصته ونباعته^٤ ان

يشرف معرفته على انية الملائكة ، ولا من أين

يجب ان تؤخذ مقدماته .

(١٧) ولا كان الايمان بالملائكة تالي للايمان

بالله . وسميت كتابي هذا بسلم النجاة ، لم يسعني

ك ٤ نباعته

١ ايش (هـ) ك ب

٢ منشأهما (هـ) ك ب

٣ [أم من القلب] ك

طرق المعرفة^١ عليهم^٢ كلهم حتى لم يفتنوا^٣ لدركها
والوقوف عليها.

(١٦) هذا جالينوس الطبيب ، مع براعته في العلم
ورياسته في معرفة الطبيعة^٣ وقواها وفعالها ،
وامامته في قوانين البراهين ودعائهم^٤ ، قد وصف
الملائكة بوصف ما ابعده من العلم والمعرفة حيث
يقول في كتاب البراهين ان الاشياء على ثلاثة اضرب:
(١) ضرب منها ما جوهره موجود وفعله غير موجود ،
كالجنين موجود في بطن امه ولا يدري^٦ احي^٧ او
ميت ؛ (٢) وضرب آخر فعله موجود ولا يدري^٨

١ المعارف	ب	٤ + ٣	ك
٢ يفتنوا	ب	٥ + ٣	ب
٣ الطبيعية	ك	٦ يدرا	ك
		٧ + ٣	ك
		٨ يدرا	ك

< الباب الثاني >

< في الإيمان بالملائكة >

(١٤) وليس شيء من المعارف إلا للناس

فيه طرق يسلكونها للإشراف عليه،^٢ وخواطر

يتوجهون نحوه للاحاطة به،^٤ غير الملائكة.

(١٥) فان جل الناس قد اقتصروا على الاقرار

بها باللسنة دون العلم والمعرفة. ليس/العوام

واهل التقليد بل المعروفون^٥ بالعلم والحكمة،

والمبارزون للاستنباط قد اُعييت^٦ مذاهبهم وأُفسدت^٧

١ + نور	ب	٤	بها	ج، ك
٢ - فيه	ك	٥	المعروفوه	ب
٣ - عليهما (هـ)	ج، ك	٦	أُعييت	ب
		٧	أُفسدت	ك

لقبول تمامية الحال قرة . وفعلًا من نون

”كن“ حتى استعكم الاتحاد بين العلة الاولى (٢/١١٧)

والعلوك الاول، وجرى امره في الحلقة

الى آخر ترتيب^٩ وضع^٨ لتتخلى^١ بحلية الدوام،

وتتزين^٢ بزينة السرد من نور ذلك الامر.

فسبحان^٣ الله رب العرش عما يصفون.

٣ سبعين ب

١ لتتخلا ب

لتتخلا (هـ) لى

٢ يتزين ب

متعاضل ان يكون مفعوله منه

بغير واسطة، اذ في رفع واسطة الامر بينه

وبين مفعوله^١ لزوم ازالة المفعول، وفي

لزوم الازلية تعطيل الخالق المبدع. ^٢ وفي وضع

الفعل منه لا امرا لزوم العجز ونقصان القدرة. ^٣

[١٣] فاذا في وجوب الامر/ دفع العجز وتامة

القدرة وتوهم حدوث الفعل في مفعول الفاعل

الحق. بل الله الذي ابدع جميع الاليسيات بامره.

فلم يستعص لامره مأمور، بل^٤ ان^٥ نون "كن" اذا (٢/١١٧)

اتحد بفاء "فيكون" كان^٦ الفاء اسرع ما يكون (٢/١١٧)

١	+	منه	بغير واسطة اذ	٣	النقصان	ب
		في	رفع واسطة الامر بينه	٤	بلا	ب
		و	بين مفعوله	٥	- ان	ب
٢	-	و		٦	- كان الفاء	ب

[١٢] والجلال / مما لا يتجاسر نحوه الخواطر

والاذهان الى سلوك سبيل اعالى واشرف
من كل ثابت ، وابهى من كل بهي ، واجمل
من كل جميل . وتعالى الله عن ما اضاف اليه
المفترون علوا كبيرا . فهذه هي المعرفة التي يسمى
بها العارف مؤمنا برياً من التشبيه والتعطيل .

(١٣) وبقي من معرفته بمخالقه وما يليق بهذه

المعرفة مما هو من جنس التوحيد ومقصوده ان

يعرف المؤمن ان المبدع الحميد بهذا التمجيد والمعظم

بهذا التعظيم متعال^١ عن^٢ ان يكون فعله الا امر^٣ ،

١ متعالى (هـ) ب ، ك

٢ عن ب

٣ - الا امرا ك

<إ> مكانه ؛ ولم يروه غير ممكن ليتصدا^١ عن
 سمة جواهر روحانية قد تصدت عن الانحصار
 ف المكان. وكذلك المرئي وغير المرئي ،
 والمشار وغير المشار ، والموقت و^٢ غير الموقت .
 بل توحدت هذه الطائفة^٣ نحو الخالق تعالى ذكره
 بأنه قد تعالى بسمو^٤ سبحانه عن الجولان في
 طريق [الإدراكات حساً أو عقلاً]^٥ ، وانفرد بما
 له من العظمة والكبرياء^٦ عن مساهمة ما
 برأ ومشاركه ما ذرأ . والذي للمبدع
 الحق من أُرْدِيَةِ الكبرياء وإزار العظمة
 وقيعان البهاء

٦ الكبر ب

١ ليتصدا ب

٢ - و ك

٣ الطائفة ك

٤ يسمو ب

ليسمو ك

٥ [الإدراك كان

حسا او عقلا] ك

والله سبحانه^١ غير محوى من جنس حاوٍ^٢
عليه وعلى ما يشاركه في جنسه.

(١٢) فقد بقي الظفر للطائفة الذين نفوا عنه
سمات الخلقة ، و جردوه عن الاضافات^٣ فلم يروه
[محدودا لان لا يكون معه شيء هو حده؟ ولم
يروه]^٤ غير محدود ل يتميز من^٥ جنس حاوٍ^٦ عليه/
[١١]
وعلى من يشاركه في جنسه.] ولم يروه موصوفا
ليزول عنه كون شيء معه هو صفته^٧؛ ولم يروه
غير موصوف ليتقدس^٨ عن نوعية فوقه جنس.

١٠ ولم يروه مكلنا ليضمحل^٩ كون شيء معه وهو

- | | | | | | |
|---|--|------|---|--|------|
| ١ | سبحته | ب | ٥ | عن | ك |
| ٢ | حاوى (هـ) | ك، ب | ٦ | حاوى (هـ) | ب، ك |
| ٣ | الاضافة | ك | ٧ | - [و لم يروه موصوفا ليزول عنه كون شيء معه هو صفته] | ب |
| ٤ | - [محدودا لان لا يكون معه شيء هو حده ولم يروه] | ب | ٨ | ليتقدس | ب |

ولا انتقال له^١ ولا مكان له ، ففي الخلقة

[٩] ما هذه السمات لازمة له / وذلك ان العقل

لا حد له ولا نعت ولا حركة ولا انتقال

ولا مكان له - هذه سمة الروحانيات .

٥ و بوجود الروحانية بهذه السمة وجود ما يقابلها

من الجسمانيات مما انحصر في الطبيعيات . وبوجودهما^٢

وجود الجنس الحاري عليهما ، وهو الجوهر المنقسم

الى الروح والجسم . وقد سبق من قولنا في

ففي الجوهرية عن المبدع الباري الحق في كتاب

١٠ المغاليد الملوكية ما فيه غناء^٤ وكفاية عن غيره .

ك عا ك

١ - له ك

٢ بوجودها ب

٣ مبدع ب

والمقدمة انه كان ولا شيء معه ،
 لتبقى^١ له الوجدانية ، فسواء وجود هذه
 الاشياء ذاتية في الخالق او مباينة^٢ عنه .
 بل لو قيل وجودها مباينة^٣ عنه كان من العيب
 ابعده ، لان وجودها مباينة^٤ عنه مزائلة^٥ الاحدية^٦
 عنه [و ثبات الواحدية فيه ، ووجودها ذاتية
 فيه مزائلة^٧ الواحدية^٨ والاحدية عنه . فاعرفه
 رحمك الله .

(١١) وان توجهت المعرفة نحوه بانه لا

حد له . ولا نعت . ولا صفة . ولا حركة .

٧ الواحدية و الاحدية ب
 ٨ - [و ثبات الواحدية فيه
 و وجودها ذاتية فيه
 مزائلة] ك

١ لتبقى ل
 ٢ مباينة (هـ) ك، ب
 ٣ مباينة (هـ) ك، ب
 ٤ لا ك
 ٥ مباينة (هـ) ك، ب
 ٦ مزائلة (هـ) ك، ب

اذ هي التي ذكرناها انما هي اشياء
 فكيف يكون هو ولا شيء معه وقد
 وجدت هذه الاشياء [معه] وان لم تكن
 هذه الاشياء^١ التي / ذكرناها اشياء فكيف تضاف

[٩]

هذه الاشياء اليه وهي ليست بشيء،
 والاضافة انما تكون بين الشيئين . فان قال
 القائل ان هذه الاشياء التي ذكرتها انما هي
 اشياء ذاتية فيه غير مفارقة عنه . قيل له : ليس
 العيب انما حل من قبل انما ذاتية فيه او
 مباينة عنه ، بل العيب انما من قبل وجودها .

١ - [معه] وان لم تكن
 هذه الاشياء^ب

هو الواحد الباري بالحقيقة. فنتيجة
 هاتين القضيتين^٢ [ان الله هو
 الواحد بالحقيقة]^٢ فيجب ان ننظر في
 عمرة هذين الضربين ونكشف^٣ عن
 عوارهما ليتبين فضيلة الضرب الثالث
 ويتحقق بطلانها.

(١٠) فاقول: ان كان الله^٤ ولا شيء^٥

معه، ثم توجهت المعرفة نحوه بان له
 صفة او حد^٦ او كيفية او عضو^٧ او جارية
 او انتقال^٨ او مكان^٩، لم تكن هذه المقدمة مطردة.

هـ الله كان ب، ك

١ هاذين ب

ك ٦ حد

٢ - [ان الله هو الواحد

ك ٧ عضو

ك بالحقيقة]

ك ٨ انتقال

ب ٣ تكشف

ك ٩ مكان

ب ٤ فنقول

ك ١٠ لهذه

ب

(٩) وليس شيء يصلح^١ ان نجعله

مقدمة لنا على تصحيح معرفة الخالق

جل اسمه إلا المقدمة التي يتفق فيها

آراء^٢ الجميع، وهو انهم جميعا يقولون :

• [٨] كان الله ولا شيء معه. فهذه/ قضية

مفردة لا تنتج شيئا. فنحتاج^٣

ان نضيف^٤ اليها مقدمة اخرى مقارنة

لها لتنتج عنها نتيجة^٥. فيجب ان

يكون المقدمة الاخرى ما يتفق فيها

آراء^٦ الجميع. فوجدنا^٧ ان ما لا شيء معه

١ + ان يصلح ك

٤ تضيف ك

٢ آراء ب

٥ ما نتيجته ب

٣ فيحتاج ك

٦ آراء ب

٧ فوجدناه ك

و المكان اليه. والضرب الثاني

القائلون بنفي الجسم وما يليق الجسم

من الحد والصفة والنعته ونفي

المجوارح والحركة والانتقال والمكان عنه.

والضرب الثالث القائلون بنفي ما يوجد

في الخلقة عنه، موصوفا كان او غير

موصوف، محدودا او غير محدود، ممكنا

او غير ممكن، مرئيا او غير مرئي، الى

سائر ما يليق بالضررين من الايجاب

والسلب.

ا ممكن ما ب

اضرب من الاختلافات في الله تعالى
 ذكره ، وان كل ضرب منها يمتوي على
 جمل من الاختلاف غير ان الكشف عن
 عورة كل ضرب من هذه الاضرب كشف بما
 تحته من أنواعه ، وهو أن جمهور
 هذه الامة مرجعهم في معرفه خالقهم وخالق
 دنياهم الى ثلاثة / اضرب.

[v]

(١) فالضرب الاول منها^٢ القائلون^٣ بإضافة
 الجسم وما يليق بالجسم من الحد والصفة

والنعت والجوارح والحركة والانتقال

١ الاختلاف تعالى الله ذكره ب

٢ + كان كـ

٣ القائلون منها ب

والديسانية^١ واليهود والنصارى والصابئة

في الله تعالى ذكره ، اذ كنا نحتاج الى
الكشف عن عوراتهم في وصف خالقهم الى
اضعاف ما يتضمن كتابنا هذا . واقتصرنا^٢
على ما توجهت نحوه معرفة ملّة الاسلام
مع تباين^٣ اختلافهم اذ هذه الملّة قد
التفت^٤ على سائر الملل واحتوت معرفتهم
على سائر المعارف .

(٧) فاقول : ان معارف هذه الملّة مع

تباينها^٥ وكثرة اختلافاتها ترجع الى ثلاثة^٦

١ -	و اليهود و النصارى ك	٤	اختلفت	ب
٢	اقتصدنا ك	٥	سائر	ك
٣	تباين ك	٦	تباينها	ك
		٧	ثلاثة	ب

عن غيره بما فيه من الصفة والحد
والنعت وجميع الكيفيات ان كان
الشيء مما يسلك^١ هذه الطرق^٢ وانحصر
فيها ؛ او نفي^٣ الصفة والحد والنعت
وجميع الكيفيات عنه ان كان مما يحصر
عن الصفة^٤ والحد والنعت وجميع الكيفيات ؛
او تنزيه^٥ الشيء عن المنحصر ليكون المعرفة
بحقها وصدقها .

(٤) وقد تركنا ما توجهت نحوه معرفة

اصحاب سائر المثل من المجوس / والثنية [٤]

٤ الصفات ب
٥ تنزيهه ك

١ سلك ب
٢ الطريق ب
٣ انفاء ك

< الباب الاول >

< في الايمان بالله >

(٥) الناس في التوحيد لهم متفقون
 بألسنتهم على أنهم يعرفون الله تعالى ذكره،
 وإن لهم وللدار التي سكنوها خالقاً. ثم
 تختلف المعرفة في قلوبهم لإزدحام الاختلاف
 فيها. فمن هذه الجهة لا يعد اتفاقهم
 بألسنتهم <على> أنهم يعرفون الله تع معرفة،
 بل المعرفة ما يعتقده القلوب في الشيء بإفراده

١ - في التوحيد ك
 في التوحيد ب

[٥] من جهة الوضع والتأليف. / وبالله
المحول والقوة.

عليها مما هي نجاته في معاده وأخرته.

ووجب ان يكون ذلك على سبيل جامع

اختصار ورفع الشك ولزوم اليقين.

وجعلنا سبيل المعارف على التوالي التي

جاءت الايمان به ، وهو الايمان (١) بالله

و (٢) ملائكته و (٣) كتبه و (٤) رسله

و (٥) اليوم الآخر و (٦) البعث بعد الموت

و (٧) الجنة والنار. ونضمن فيه نكتا

ما هي^١ في الابنية السبعة التي بني عليها

الاسلام من الاسرار واتقان السياسة

و ازال بظوره جميع العلل المبعوث
 مع الساعة كالسبابة والوسطى والمجول^٢
 في ذريته من يبسط العدل ويرفع الجور/
 [٤] - وينشر الحق ويطوي الباطل ويكشف
 عن كل مستور - ويفسر كل مرموز . صلى
 الله عليه وعلى الدوحة الكريمة والسبع
 المثاني الصلوات المتوالية والبركات المتتابعة
 <عليهم اجمعين>
 (٤) اما بعد . فانا بتوفيق الله وتأييده
 قد ضمنا كتابنا هذا الموسوم^٥ بسلم النجاة جملا
 وجوامع^٦ مما يحتاج اليه^٧ المؤمن الى الاشراف

١	- و ب	٤	الصلوة	ب
٢	المجول ك	٥	المرسوم	ك
٣	عليهما (هـ) بـ ك	٦	جوامع	ب
		٧	- اليه	ك

ولم تتزيد عليه بل وقفت على
 ما اناها امره. ثم تكثرت وترقت،
 واظهرت ما فيها من عجائب الابداع
 ولطائف التدبير. واهم المتعالي عن
 سمات المخلوقين لم يتكثر ولم يتصف^٢
 ليعلموا ان الله هو الواحد القهار
 العزيز الغفار

(٣) واشهد ان لا اله الا الله

بهذا التمجيد، واشهد ان محمدا عبده

و رسوله الذي ختم بملته سائر الملل،

١ لطائف ب

٢ ينصرف ك

و استتر محجب التأيس عن ان يكون
 لشيء^١ من المؤيسين^٢ به تعلق ، او له
 الى شيء استراحة ، يكاد المؤيسات عند
 اضافتها - او اضافة / شيء^٣ مما لها او
 فيها او منها او بها - الى مبدعها ان
 تليس .

(٢) فسبحان^٤ الله ذي العزة والجبروت
 بالتقديس والتعظيم ، وذي القدرة
 والملكوت بالتنزيه والتقديم ، الذي انعطفت
 الخلقه على امره الواحد ، فلم تختص^٥ منه

٥ ينتقص ب

١ الشيء ك
 ٢ المؤيسين ك
 ٣ + منها ك
 ٤ فسبحن ب

كتاب^١ سلم النجاة

لسيدنا ابي يعقوب السجستاني
رحمة^٢ الله و بركاته و نجاته عليه^٣

< بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم >

< المقدمة >

٥

(١) الحمد لله المحتجب بربوبيته^٣ عن

مشاهدة^٤ المخلوقين المستتر بفردانيته عن مشاركة

المربوبين الساطع انوار وحدانيته في اول شيء

ابدعه بانه تعالى عن ان يلحقه القاصد او يدركه

المشاهد ملك الفطرة فاتقنها^٥ واحسن الخلقة فاحكما

١٠

ه فانقنها ب

١ - كتاب ب

٢ - قس ك

٣ - بربوبيته ب

٤ - مساهمة ك

كتاب

نظم النجاة